共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Linda Sax 《Sex roles》2013,68(5-6):397-399
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Frank Jackson 《Ratio》1999,12(4):420-435
I argue that the (widely accepted) normative constraints on belief raise a serious problem for non-cognitivism about normativity. 相似文献
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Lara Buchak 《Philosophical Studies》2014,169(2):285-311
There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a puzzle which lends support to two theses. First, that there is no formal reduction of a rational agent’s beliefs to her credences, because belief and credence are each responsive to different features of a body of evidence. Second, that if our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible is correct, then belief has a distinctive role to play, even for ideally rational agents, that cannot be played by credence. The question of which avenues remain for the credence-only theorist is considered. 相似文献
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Peter Railton 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2014,57(1):122-150
AbstractAn adequate theory of the nature of belief should help us explain the most obvious features of belief as we find it. Among these features are: guiding action and reasoning non-inferentially; varying in strength in ways that are spontaneously experience-sensitive; ‘aiming at truth’ in some sense and being evaluable in terms of correctness and warrant; possessing inertia across time and constancy across contexts; sustaining expectations in a manner mediated by propositional content; shaping the formation and execution of plans; generalizing spontaneously projectively; and being independent of the will and resisting instrumentalization. Using the method of ‘creature construction’, I attempt to show how we can build an attitude with these features step-by-step from simpler components, thereby avoiding the problems of regress or circularity affecting a number of influential accounts of belief. 相似文献
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Robert Audi 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,63(1-3):87-102
Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception
of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better
express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these
three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar
complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief
and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance
of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense
of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important
both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and
some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in
some detail. 相似文献
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Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non‐doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This article sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non‐doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic faith. We argue that belief is required to maintain a distinction between genuine faith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith. 相似文献
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LUIS CLAUDIO FIGUEIREDO 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2004,85(6):1439-1453
A case of hysteria is presented in order to create a frame of reference for the author's approach to the concepts of hope, belief and faith. A difference between hope as a 'sad passion' (which is here called regressive hope) and hope as a principle of mental functioning is established. The concept of hope will at fi rst always be based on beliefs-either beliefs organised in the paranoid-schizoid position (called here fragmented and delusional beliefs)-or those organised from the depressive position (complex systems of beliefs, which end up being dogmatic); the latter typically occur in neurotics. It is suggested here that there is another possibility for hope, which is based on faith. The meaning of faith is considered here externally to the religious sense. The solid establishment of hope as a principle-based on faith-can be viewed as responsible for the opening up of creative potentials and as one of the main aims of analysis. Such an aim, however, requires the establishment of a deep relationship, both in theory and in clinical practice, between the Kleinian question of the depressive position and the Freudian question of the Oedipus complex. 相似文献
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Davide Fassio 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(4):1084-1106
Some philosophers have argued that a standard of correctness is constitutive of the concept or the essence of belief. By this claim they mean, roughly, that a mental state is a belief partially in virtue of being correct if and only if its content is true. In this paper I provide a new argument in support of the constitutivity of the correctness standard for belief. I first argue that the standard expresses a conceptual necessity. Then I argue that, since conceptual necessities are such in virtue of some concept, the standard must also be necessary in virtue of some concept. Finally, I provide an argument by exclusion to the effect that the standard is necessary in virtue of the concept of belief. 相似文献
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Thomas W. Simpson 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(3):447-459
Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust. 相似文献
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《Journal of cognition and development》2013,14(3):295-300
Evidence from dual-process and cognitive behavioral theorists points to the conclusion that the products of associative learning are sometimes available in working memory. Adolescents, adults, and children (to a lesser extent) can engage in metacognitive intercession, reflecting on the products of associative processing and deciding whether to assimilate these products to existing knowledge or create new levels of understanding. To highlight my arguments, I discuss research on belief-biased reasoning and an intervention that reduced reasoning biases. 相似文献
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Peter Murphy 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2017,98(4):602-617
Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ. 相似文献