萨特:人学辩证法对历史唯物主义的“重建”

萨特用批判性的新人本学重建历史唯物主义。在《辩证理性批判》中,萨特首先批评苏联马克思主义实证方法论导致其理论存在"人学空场",质疑辩证唯物主义作为历史唯物主义基础的合理性。然后萨特创立了个人辩证法,并将个人的实践经验作为辩证法的来源,将个人活动纳入到社会历史考察中,严格将辩证法限定在历史领域,否定自然辩证法存在的必要性。最后萨特用人学辩证法阐释先验性和必然性的统一,自由与历史必然的辩证统一,思维与实践的统一,个人与历史整体化的统一。萨特的人学辩证法对反对教条主义和实证主义思维方式有重要作用,丰富了马克思主义的基本命题的内容,提供了重建历史唯物主义的新理论范式与视角,具有重要的理论意义。但是其理论的建构缺乏科学的学理基础,不失为一种遗憾。     

第一人称视角假设与他人问题——萨特的思路

通常认为第一人称视角假设会导致我无法认识或知觉到他人的心灵,如何解释两主体之间的关联就成了问题。萨特认为不能将他人问题等同于对他人心灵的知觉问题,而是应在与世界和与我的关系中来定义他人。通过分析遭遇他人的日常经验,萨特阐明了我与他人在意识层面上的根本关联,即"我的为他存在"。     

绘画艺术中笛卡尔式的透视主义

笛卡尔式的透视主义对绘画产生了很大影响,但这一影响常常被忽视和贬低。他对透视在绘画中的存在样式的哲学反思,触及了从柏拉图直至梅洛-庞蒂等哲学家所意谓的绘画的本质。与梅洛-庞蒂及其含混倾向不同,笛卡尔的理性主义借助于"自然之光"使得绘画得到了清楚分明的表达。他和梅洛-庞蒂各自表达着绘画传统中的两个可以并行不悖的走向:"心看"与"眼看"。     

神人论:俄罗斯白银时代宗教哲学的人学主题

俄罗斯宗教哲学家站在现代哲学的立场上重新诠释“神人论”这一传统基督教人学理论,在重建神、人与世界三者的内在关联的基础上,揭示了神人论的理论基础和现实意义。神人论的核心是“肯定神性”与“否定神性”的统一,人的精神实在性之确证就在于人性中内在蕴含着神性,即神人的两位一体是人存在的本质规定。只有在“绝对存在”的宗教形而上学基础上,人才可以自由的意识、反思神的原则,同时又保持与神的内在同一关联。内在精神世界中人与神的绝对同一为人的生活提供了绝对意义和永恒价值,是人所追求的本真生存方式。神人论是俄罗斯白银时代宗教哲学的人学主题和理论基础,也是宗教哲学家为完善传统形而上学所作的努力。     

从生存到生成:马克思人学思想的发展路径

本文立足于文本学研究方法 ,聚焦马克思关于人的思想发展历程 ,认为马克思经历了一个从先验人的人性公设的价值信仰到现实人的历史性生成的科学探索的思想转变 ,终结了西方先验人性思辨的形而上学传统 ,开辟了人的历史性生成这一全新哲学理论视域。     

存在、荒诞与自由——《少年派的奇幻漂流》之存在主义分析

存在主义作为一种西方现代的哲学思潮,在多个领域都产生了深刻的影响。而当电影与存在主义结合之后,电影从此拥有了表达思考与痛苦的哲学功能。《少年派的奇幻漂流》讲述了一个少年派的奇幻的海上历险经历,通过对男主角的心路历程的描述,探讨了人的存在的问题和意义。     

论作为现象学“意向性”概念之起源的笛卡尔式“夸张的怀疑”

"夸张的怀疑"是笛卡尔得出其形而上学第一命题的方法,亦被胡塞尔认为在现代哲学中首次揭示了"意向性"概念的内涵。依据它的机制,"我思"的确定性意味着"自由意志的确定存在"与"持续现前于精神的清楚分明的知觉的不可怀疑"。以此为基础,笛卡尔不仅可以完成观念论式的二元论证,而且也认识到人是"灵魂与肉体的紧密结合体",由此指明了建立在二元论基础上的"笛卡尔科学"独特的伦理内涵。     

克服情感,征服命运:对于笛卡尔伦理学的反思

本文对笛卡尔的情感理论进行了重构,尤其着眼于慷慨美德。笛卡尔将慷慨视为主要美德,认为它可以帮助人类掌控其欲望,从而超越命运的不可预测性和任意性,实现最高层次的幸福。文章首先分析了笛卡尔的神意、徒劳欲望及遗憾等概念,然后对作为情感和美德的慷慨进行了探究,最后对作为掌握情感工具的慷慨进行了审视。     

论虚拟社会中人的存在的新时代特征

通过从马克思主义的人的存在论出发,论证了虚拟社会中人的存在、人们交往方式的演变,以及虚拟社会中人存在的新时代特征,分析了虚拟社会给人们带来的各方面的改变,展望了越来越虚拟的现实社会的发展方向和特点。     

在经历的一切中，成就上帝的话语——特邀代表与他们的见证

现实生活中，一个人的价值，不在乎你拥有多大的才华或能力，乃在于你为社会群体“付出”了什么；一个人的存在如果无法成为别人的祝福，那么纵使他拥有再好的条件，也是枉然。     

A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions

This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean‐Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focussed on ‘malformed’, ‘irrational’ or ‘distorted’ emotions. I argue that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biassed perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In my defence of Sartre I show that the directional fit of emotions is not towards an evaluatively loaded world which is independently given and, at best, represented by emotions, but towards a world shaped through the impact of emotions themselves. Sartre's idea of emotions ‘magically transforming’ reality for the subject so that the latter is better able to cope with problematic aspects of practically relevant situations encapsulates the world‐shaping capacities of emotions, which are thus not reserved for a restricted class of emotions. Recognition of the transformative powers of emotions will also direct attention away from their seemingly representative elements to their normative and practical aspects and offer a new basis for delineating the criteria for judging them. The plausibility of this position is discussed with reference to some of Sartre's examples, such as fear, sadness and horror, but also with reference to Joan Didion's account of grief in The Year of Magical Thinking.     

医学人道主义视阈下生命伦理学的思考

以生命伦理学的产生与发展为标志,医学人道主义思想完成了由传统到现代的转变。当代生命伦理学是现代医学科技发展的产物,其体系由伦理基础、原则、问题和技术四个维度构成,主旨是从一定的伦理基础出发构建伦理原则,通过对问题的探讨做出对技术的回应。医学伦理委员会的构建是生命伦理学主要的实践形式。作为医学人道主义的现代形式,生命伦理学由于从技术出发重点关注非常态的医学、关注少数人群和对美德的相对忽略,使其不能完成代替传统医学人道主义的任务。     

The Soul: An Existentialist Point of View

The debate in relation to the soul suffers nowadays from a great lack of clarity. At least part of this cloudiness stems from a confusion among three different viewpoints that are not always reconcilable or mutually intelligible: the scientific point of view (natural sciences and empirical psychology), the therapeutic point of view (especially psychoanalysis) and the philosophical point of view. The goal of this paper is to blow away a little this cloudiness, and to introduce into the discussion a view that has not yet received its proper place in it: existentialism. The scientific approach investigates the soul as if it were an object in the world, a fact. This approach gives priority to objective observations over subjective ones, and steps in the direction of materialization of the soul (the soul becomes the mind and the mind becomes the brain). Transcendental philosophy and psychological therapies explain the relation between the subject and its objects, and by this reveal the subjective dimension of our reality as the ground not only for our objective knowledge but for our ethical life as well. Existentialism, I suggest, makes a further and important step in this direction by focusing on individualistic aspects of human existence, which science could not know and general theories of the subject do not see.     

A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non‐theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons.     

Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of Cartesian dualism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -