Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ‘Q and I don't believe that Q’ sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).     

Asserting your mind: Interruptions extremize consumer choices

Interruptions prevail in the retail environment, especially during consumer decision-making. However, scant research has examined whether and how interruptions that suspend decisions affect consumer choices. We posit that interruptions heighten the consumers' preference certainty, which leads to a choice extremity effect—consumers choose their preferred products even more and their unpreferred products even less. Six experiments provide convergent evidence for the choice extremity effect and the underlying process. Study 1a shows that interruptions lead to choice extremity with a vice product (i.e., chips). Study 1b confirms the effect in the context of incentive-compatible choices. Study 2 replicates the choice extremity effect with a virtue product (i.e., yogurts). Study 3 further tests the robustness of the effect with a decision-related interruption. Study 4 shows that preference certainty mediates the effect of interruptions on choice extremity and rules out the level of arousal and task involvement as alternative accounts. Using a moderation approach, Study 5 shows that the choice extremity effect disappears when consumers have high self-concept clarity. The present study contributes to research on interruptions, preference certainty, and consumer choices and provides implications for marketers.     

Asserting scientific authority. Cognitive development and adolescent legal rights

The APA uses amicus briefs to communicate scientific knowledge to the legal system. There can be tension, however, between promoting the social good through law and the disinterested reporting of scientific data. This article examines this conflict by discussing two APA amicus briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court in cases involving adolescents' abortion rights. The Court has restricted adolescents' rights to make important life decisions in part because adolescents have been presumed to lack competence and maturity. The briefs argued that developmental theory and data confirm that adolescents and adults have equivalent decision-making capacities. The scientific arguments in the briefs, however, do not justify this assertion. Analysis of the briefs illuminates some dimensions describing the role of a scientific statement in a legal brief. These dimensions identify ways to limit scientific claims about the evidence at hand to avoid overstatement. The primary danger of overstatement is that it undermines psychology's claim to expert authority in assisting in the formation of law and the shaping of social institutions.     

Promising,Expecting, and Utility

While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.     

The Ambivalence of Promising Technology

Issues of responsibility in the world of nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible development’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of nanotechnology and of promising technology in general. Actors must find means of dealing with these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses to ambivalence are shaped by their position and context, along with strategic games they are involved in, together with other actors. A number of interviews were conducted with industrial actors with the aim of uncovering their ethical stances towards responsible development of nanotechnology. The data shows that standard repertoires of justification of nanotechnological development were used. Thus, the industrial actors fell back on their position and associated responsibilities. Such responses reinforce a division of moral labour in which industrial actors and scientists can focus on the progress of science and technology, while other actors, such as NGOs, are expected to take care of broader considerations, such as ethical and social issues.     

A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising

Conventionalists about promising believe that it is wrong to break a promise because the promisor takes advantage of a useful social convention only to fail to do his part in maintaining it. Anti-conventionalists claim that the wrong of breaking a promise has nothing essentially to do with a social convention. Anti-conventionalists are right that the social convention is not necessary to explain the wrong of breaking most promises. But conventionalists are right that the convention plays an essential role in any satisfactory account of promising. A new conventionalism can explain this by appealing to special features of social conventions. Two of these special features have important implications for any moral requirements they mediate, such as the requirement to keep one's promises and the moral requirements attached to social or occupational roles. First, these requirements will not depend on features of a situation that are inaccessible to typical participants in the convention. Second, these requirements often cannot be tailored to fit the overly unusual circumstances of participants.     

Applying Organizational Justice: Questionable Claims and Promising Suggestions

With an eye toward promoting applications of organizational justice, I respond to commentaries on my focal article ( Greenberg, 2009a ). Specifically, I challenge questionable claims regarding (a) characterization of applied research, (b) why we don't conduct more applied justice research, (c) moral versus instrumental rationales for promoting justice, (d) the validity of intervention studies, and (e) interpretations of Lewin's classic observation about the practical value of theory. I also identify and comment upon two suggestions for promoting applied justice research: (a) promoting cooperation between researchers and practitioners and (b) conducting comprehensive, integrative interventions.     

Subcortical Aphasia(s): A Controversial and Promising Topic

Many aspects of subcortical aphasias are not accounted for by a unique pathophysiological mechanism; rather the diversity of the observed symptoms suggests that many functional ensembles, more or less related, to language functions may be disturbed by subcortical lesions. However, such disorders are only moderate in intensity and subcortical aphasias certainly constitute an interesting model for studying the dynamics of recovery of language functions and related neural systems, combining neurolinguistic concepts with advanced functional imaging techniques.     

On Promising to Supererogate: A Response to Heyd

In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.

Cognitive-Based Compassion Training: A Promising Prevention Strategy for At-Risk Adolescents

Compared to the general population, youth in foster care experience multiple psychosocial difficulties due to exceptionally high rates of maltreatment. Many youth in care receive psychological and/or psychotropic treatment but not all require or are willing to accept that level of intervention. For many, a “mental health” approach feels pathologizing. Nevertheless, these youth have suffered maltreatment and interventions to improve their ability to cope with past trauma and their often uncertain present are clearly needed. Cognitively-Based Compassion Training (CBCT) provides an alternative perspective on suffering and can be framed as a wellness intervention that is appropriate for all humans. The present study examined whether a 6-week CBCT intervention would improve psychosocial functioning among adolescents in foster care. Seventy adolescents were randomized to CBCT (twice weekly) or a wait-list condition. Youth were assessed at baseline and after 6 weeks. Groups did not differ on measures of psychosocial functioning following training; however practice frequency was associated with increased hopefulness and a trend for a decrease in generalized anxiety. Qualitative results indicated that participants found CBCT useful for dealing with daily life stressors. Adolescents in care were willing to engage in CBCT. The majority reported CBCT was very helpful and almost all reported they would recommend CBCT to a friend. Participants reported specific instances of using CBCT strategies to regulate emotion, manage stress, or to respond more compassionately towards others. Standardized self-report measures were not sensitive to qualitative reports of improved functioning, suggesting the need for measures more sensitive to the positive changes noted or longer training periods to demonstrate effects. Practical issues surrounding implementation of such programs in high-risk youth populations are identified. Recommendations are provided for further development.