Intersections of behavior analysis with cognitive models of contingency detection

Bower and Watson have offered, respectively, a logical hypothesis-testing model and a conditional probability model of contingency detection by young infants. Although each could represent cognitive processes concomitant with operant learning, empirical support for these models is sparse. The limitations of each model are discussed, and suggestions are made for a more parsimonious approach by focusing on the areas of overlap between the two.     

Maternal responsiveness and search for hidden objects and contingency learning by infants

The relationship between maternal responsiveness and infant cognition was examined during two activities: the search for hidden objects and the learning of a contingency rule. Thirty-four mother–infant dyads were observed in a laboratory setting when the infants were 11 months old. The experimental session included three phases: a search for hidden objects (Piagetian tasks), the learning of a contingency rule on a touch screen, and a mother–infant play session using a standardised toy. The results indicated a link between performances in the search and contingency tasks. Moreover, infants who succeeded in both tasks had mothers who displayed higher responsiveness score. The findings are discussed in terms of the infant's detection of relevant stimulus information. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Abstraction of contingency in concept learning

It is generally agreed that concept learning involves the abstraction of some general representation or schema. Just what is abstracted, however, and how it is used in the classification of sets of stimuli in the natural world or in the laboratory, remain outstanding questions. In this paper a hypothesis involving contingency abstraction is described as a possible solution to these questions. An experiment which manipulated measured contingency in a concept-learning task, and which offered empirical support for the hypothesis, is reported. The advantages of a contingency-abstraction theory of concept learning are briefly discussed.     

Cognitive processes in stereotype formation: the role of correct contingency learning for biased group judgments

Three studies investigated contingency learning and stereotype formation in a scenario about group membership and behavior with a confounding context factor. The studies tested predictions from theoretical accounts of biased group judgments in terms of simplistic reasoning, parallel distributed memory, and pseudocontingencies. Study 1 revealed a positive correlation between erroneous stereotype formation and learning of the true contingencies with the confounding factor. Study 2 showed that a focus manipulation during encoding moderated the correlation between stereotype formation and contingency learning but not the strength of the erroneous stereotype. Study 3 used a quasiexperimental comparison between participants with biased versus unbiased group judgments and extended the findings of a positive relation between stereotype formation and contingency learning. The results support an explanation of biased group judgments by pseudocontingencies; that is, unwarranted inferences from accurately perceived bivariate correlations in complex environments.     

Contingency proportion systematically influences contingency learning

In the color-word contingency learning paradigm, each word appears more often in one color (high contingency) than in the other colors (low contingency). Shortly after beginning the task, color identification responses become faster on the high-contingency trials than on the low-contingency trials—the contingency learning effect. Across five groups, we varied the high-contingency proportion in 10% steps, from 80% to 40%. The size of the contingency learning effect was positively related to high-contingency proportion, with the effect disappearing when high contingency was reduced to 40%. At the two highest contingency proportions, the magnitude of the effect increased over trials, the pattern suggesting that there was an increasing cost for the low-contingency trials rather than an increasing benefit for the high-contingency trials. Overall, the results fit a modified version of Schmidt’s (2013, Acta Psychologica, 142, 119–126) parallel episodic processing account in which prior trial instances are routinely retrieved from memory and influence current trial performance.     

Category learning in the color-word contingency learning paradigm

In the typical color-word contingency learning paradigm, participants respond to the print color of words where each word is presented most often in one color. Learning is indicated by faster and more accurate responses when a word is presented in its usual color, relative to another color. To eliminate the possibility that this effect is driven exclusively by the familiarity of item-specific word-color pairings, we examine whether contingency learning effects can be observed also when colors are related to categories of words rather than to individual words. To this end, the reported experiments used three categories of words (animals, verbs, and professions) that were each predictive of one color. Importantly, each individual word was presented only once, thus eliminating individual color-word contingencies. Nevertheless, for the first time, a category-based contingency effect was observed, with faster and more accurate responses when a category item was presented in the color in which most of the other items of that category were presented. This finding helps to constrain episodic learning models and sets the stage for new research on category-based contingency learning.     

Aging and the detection of contingency in causal learning

Young and older participants' ability to detect negative, random, and positive response-outcome contingencies was evaluated using both contingency estimation and response rate adaptation tasks. Age differences in contingency estimation were consistently greater for negative than positive contingencies, and these differences, though still present, were smaller when response rate adaptation was used as the measure of contingency learning. Detecting causal contingency apparently becomes more difficult with age, especially when an oven numerical estimate of contingency must be provided and when the relationship between a causal event and an outcome is negative. A model that incorporates features of both associative and rule-based approaches to contingency learning (e.g., P. C. Price & J. F. Yates, 1995; D. R. Shanks, 1995) provides the best explanation for this pattern of findings.     

Congruency sequence effect without feature integration and contingency learning

The magnitude of congruency effects, such as the flanker-compatibility effects, has been found to vary as a function of the congruency of the previous trial. Some studies have suggested that this congruency sequence effect is attributable to stimulus and/or response priming, and/or contingency learning, whereas other studies have suggested that the control process triggered by conflict modulates the congruency effect. The present study examined whether sequential modulation can occur without stimulus and response repetitions and contingency learning. Participants were asked to perform two color flanker-compatibility tasks alternately in a trial-by-trial manner, with four fingers of one hand in Experiment 1 and with the index and middle fingers of two hands in Experiment 2, to avoid stimulus and response repetitions and contingency learning. A significant congruency sequence effect was obtained between the congruencies of the two tasks in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. These results provide evidence for the idea that the sequential modulation is, at least in part, an outcome of the top-down control process triggered by conflict, which is specific to response mode.     

Opposite effects of feedback contingency on the process of risky decisions-making

The main aim of this study was to look into the effect of feedback contingency on decision making in complex risky situations, using a driving context. Participants had to decide braking or not in a set of risky traffic situations. After the response, a negative non-contingent or contingent feedback was used. The results highlight the importance of feedback contingency upon safer decision making in risky contexts, as they showed how a contingent feedback led to faster and safer responses than a control group without any feedback; whereas a non-contingent one gives rise to slower responses and, more importantly, an enhanced risk-taking behavior that could be the cause of undesirable effects on road safety. The feedback effect was even more evident in the appearance of an opposite response bias as a function of contingency and enhanced by learning. These results accord with the theoretical accounts based upon the feedback influence on the threshold level of decision making. Moreover, the effects of feedback may be explained by new proposals focusing on the importance of attentional factors as well as of the mental models people build to react in complex risky scenarios, as a product of feedback and learning. Finally, this research may increase our understanding of the role of feedback in the process of learning safer behavior in complex risky situations.     

Comparing associative, statistical, and inferential reasoning accounts of human contingency learning

For more than two decades, researchers have contrasted the relative merits of associative and statistical theories as accounts of human contingency learning. This debate, still far from resolution, has led to further refinement of models within each family of theories. More recently, a third theoretical view has joined the debate: the inferential reasoning account. The explanations of these three accounts differ critically in many aspects, such as level of analysis and their emphasis on different steps within the information-processing sequence. Also, each account has important advantages (as well as critical flaws) and emphasizes experimental evidence that poses problems to the others. Some hybrid models of human contingency learning have attempted to reconcile certain features of these accounts, thereby benefiting from some of the unique advantages of different families of accounts. A comparison of these families of accounts will help us appreciate the challenges that research on human contingency learning will face over the coming years.     

Learning to like or dislike by association: No need for contingency awareness

One way to learn to like or dislike a neutral target stimulus is through associations with positive or negative context stimuli. The present research investigates whether people need to be aware of the association between a target and a context stimulus (i.e., contingency aware) in order for associative learning of likes and dislikes to occur. We predicted that awareness of the association between context and target is necessary when target novelty is low, but not when target novelty is high. We conducted two experiments in which we varied target novelty and measured contingency awareness using a picture-bound recognition task. This allowed us to separately investigate evaluative conditioning for “contingency awareness” and “contingency unawareness” context–target pairs. The results show, as predicted, that awareness of the association between context and target is needed for low-novelty targets but not needed for high-novelty targets.     

Augmentation in contingency learning under time pressure

Recent research suggests that cue competition effects in human contingency learning, such as blocking, are due to higher‐order cognitive processes. Moreover, some experimental reports suggest that the effect opposite to blocking, augmentation, could occur in experimental preparations that preclude the intervention of reasoning mechanisms. In the present research, we tested this hypothesis by investigating cue interaction effects in an experimental task in which participants had to enter their responses under time pressure. The results show that under these conditions, augmentation, instead of blocking, is observed.     

Arousal, working memory, and conscious awareness in contingency learning

There are wide individual differences in the ability to detect a stimulus contingency embedded in a complex paradigm. The present study used a cognitive masking paradigm to better understand individual differences related to contingency learning. Participants were assessed on measures of electrodermal arousal and on working memory capacity before engaging in the contingency learning task. Contingency awareness was assessed both by trial-by-trial verbal reports obtained during the task and by a short post-task recognition questionnaire. Participants who became aware had fewer non-specific skin conductance responses and tended to score higher on a digit span assessment. Skin conductance level was not significantly lower in the aware group than in the unaware group. These findings are consistent with studies showing that lower arousal and greater cognitive processing capacity facilitate conscious perception of a greater breadth of information within a scene or a task.     

Contingency learning with evaluative stimuli: testing the generality of contingency learning in a performance paradigm

In two experiments, we tested the generality of the learning effects in the recently-introduced color-word contingency learning paradigm. Participants made speeded evaluative judgments to valenced target words. Each of a set of distracting nonwords was presented most often with either positive or negative target words. We observed that participants responded faster on trials that respected these contingencies than on trials that contradicted the contingencies. The contingencies also produced changes in liking: in a subsequent explicit evaluative rating task, participants rated positively-conditioned nonwords more positively than negatively-conditioned nonwords. Interestingly, contingency effects in the performance task correlated with this explicit rating effect in both experiments. In Experiment 2, all effects reported were independent of subjective and objective contingency awareness (which was completely lacking), even when awareness was measured at the item level. Our results reveal that learning in this type of performance task extends to nonword-valence contingencies and to responses different from those emitted during the performance task. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories about the processes that underlie contingency learning in performance tasks and for research on evaluative conditioning.     

Learning,awareness, and instruction: Subjective contingency awareness does matter in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm

In three experiments, each of a set colour-unrelated distracting words was presented most often in a particular target print colour (e.g., “month” most often in red). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were told the word-colour contingencies in advance (instructed) and half were not (control). The instructed group showed a larger learning effect. This instruction effect was fully explained by increases in subjective awareness with instruction. In Experiment 2, contingency instructions were again given, but no contingencies were actually present. Although many participants claimed to be aware of these (non-existent) contingencies, they did not produce an instructed contingency effect. In Experiment 3, half of the participants were given contingency instructions that did not correspond to the correct contingencies. Participants with these false instructions learned the actual contingencies worse than controls. Collectively, our results suggest that conscious contingency knowledge might play a moderating role in the strength of implicit learning.     

Two mechanisms of human contingency learning

How do humans learn contingencies between events? Both pathway-strengthening and inference-based process models have been proposed to explain contingency learning. We propose that each of these processes is used in different conditions. Participants viewed displays that contained single or paired objects and learned which displays were usually followed by the appearance of a dot. Some participants predicted whether the dot would appear before seeing the outcome, whereas other participants were required to respond quickly if the dot appeared shortly after the display. In the prediction task, instructions guiding participants to infer which objects caused the dot to appear were necessary in order for contingencies associated with one object to influence participants' predictions about the object with which it had been paired. In the response task, contingencies associated with one object affected responses to its pair mate irrespective of whether or not participants were given causal instructions. Our results challenge single-mechanism accounts of contingency learning and suggest that the mechanisms underlying performance in the two tasks are distinct.     

Contiguity and contingency in action-effect learning

According to the two-stage model of voluntary action, the ability to perform voluntary action is acquired in two sequential steps. Firstly, associations are acquired between representations of movements and of the effects that frequently follow them. Secondly, the anticipation or perception of an acquired action effect primes the movement that has been learnt to produce this effect; the acquired action-effect associations thus mediate the selection of actions that are most appropriate to achieve an intended action goal. If action-effect learning has an associative basis, it should be influenced by factors that are known to affect instrumental learning, such as the temporal contiguity and the probabilistic contingency of movement and effect. In two experiments, the contiguity or the contingency between key presses and subsequent tones was manipulated in various ways. As expected, both factors affected the acquisition of action-effect relations as assessed by the potency of action effects to prime the corresponding action in a later behavioral test. In particular, evidence of action-effect associations was obtained only if the effect of the action was delayed for no more than 1 s, if the effect appeared more often in the presence than in the absence of the action, or if action and effect were entirely uncorrelated but the effect appeared very often. These findings support the assumption that the control of voluntary actions is based on action-effect representations that are acquired by associative learning mechanisms.     

Associationism and cognition: human contingency learning at 25

A major topic within human learning, the field of contingency judgement, began to emerge about 25 years ago following publication of an article on depressive realism by Alloy and Abramson (1979). Subsequently, associationism has been the dominant theoretical framework for understanding contingency learning but this has been challenged in recent years by an alternative cognitive or inferential approach. This article outlines the key conceptual differences between these approaches and summarizes some of the main methods that have been employed to distinguish between them.