Perceived warmth and competence of others shape voluntary deceptive behaviour in a morally relevant setting

The temptation to deceive others compares to a moral dilemma: it involves a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences. Thus, people might feel different levels of emotional and moral conflict depending on the target of the deception. Here we explored, in a morally relevant setting, how social judgements based on two fundamental dimensions of human social cognition – ‘warmth’ and ‘competence’ – impact on the decision to deceive others. Results revealed independent effects for warmth and competence. Specifically, while people are less inclined to deceive for self-gain those individuals they perceive as warm, they also tend to lie more to highly competent others. Furthermore, the perceived warmth and competence modulated the general tendency to reduce deceptive behaviour when there was a risk of disclosure compared to when the lying was anonymous, highlighting the importance of these judgements in social evaluation processes. Together, our results demonstrate that the emotional costs and personal moral standards that inhibit engagement in deceptive behaviour are not stable but rather malleable according to the target and the consequences of the deception.     

Knowing too much: using private knowledge to predict how one is viewed by others

People have more information about themselves than others do, and this fundamental asymmetry can help to explain why individuals have difficulty accurately intuiting how they appear to other people. Determining how one appears to observers requires one to utilize public information that is available to observers, but to disregard private information that they do not possess. We report a series of experiments, however, showing that people utilize privately known information about their own past performance (Experiments 1 and 2), the performance of other people (Experiment 3), and imaginary performance (Experiment 4) when intuiting how they are viewed by others. This tendency can help explain why people's beliefs about how they are judged by others often diverge from how they are actually judged.     

A truth that’s told with bad intent: An ERP study of deception

Human social cognition critically relies on the ability to deceive others. However, the cognitive and neural underpinnings of deception are still poorly understood. Why does lying place increased demands on cognitive control? The present study investigated whether cognitive control processes during deception are recruited due to the need to inhibit a tendency to state the truth, or reflect deceptive intent more generally. We engaged participants in a face-to-face interaction game and examined event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants lied and told the truth with or without deceptive intention. The same medial frontal negative deflection (N450) occurred when participants lied and when they told the truth with deceptive intent. This suggests that the main challenge of lying is not to inhibit a tendency to state the truth. Rather, the challenge is to handle the cognitive conflict resulting from the need to keep others’ mental states in mind while deceiving them.     

Online deception: prevalence, motivation, and emotion.

This research has three goals: first, to find out how prevalent online deception is within a sample of Israeli users, second, to explore the underlying motivations to deceive online, and third, to discover the emotions that accompany online deception. A web-based survey was distributed in 14 discussion groups, and the answers of 257 respondents were analyzed. It was found that, while most of the respondents believe that online deception is very widespread, only about one-third of them reported engaging in online deception. Frequent users deceive online more than infrequent users, young users more than old, and competent users more than non-competent. The most common motivations to deceive online were "play" on the one hand and privacy concerns on the other. Most people felt a sense of enjoyment while engaging in online deception. The results are discussed in light of a possible mechanism for changing personal moral standards.     

Detecting deception in a bluffing body: The role of expertise

Studies of deception detection traditionally have focused on verbal communication. Nevertheless, people commonly deceive others through nonverbal cues. Previous research has shown that intentions can be inferred from the ways in which people move their bodies. Furthermore, motor expertise within a given domain has been shown to increase visual sensitivity to other people’s movements within that domain. Does expertise also enhance deception detection from bodily movement? In two psychophysical studies, experienced basketball players and novices attempted to distinguish deceptive intentions (fake passes) and veridical intentions (true passes) from an observed individual’s actions. Whereas experts and novices performed similarly with postural cues, only experts could detect deception from kinematics alone. These results demonstrate a link between action expertise and the detection of nonverbal deception.     

Burger or yogurt? Indulgent consumption in impression management contexts

We conducted three studies to investigate indulgent choice in settings with and without impression management by public–private manipulation with evaluation. Study 1 showed that the participants were less indulgent under public scrutiny due to the employment of impression management. Study 2 focused on the impression management context to test the moderate effect of self‐consciousness in two impression managed contexts. Study 3 focused on context without impression management to test the moderate effects of self‐awareness on choices. We found that depending on differences in primed personality, individuals tended to make choices other than those they favoured privately when anticipating that others might form impressions of them based on the decisions made. The findings of all three studies support our basic prediction that people are less indulgent under impression management and suggest that people tend to manage their impression by eating healthier (less indulgently) in public.     

得失情境下他人参照点及心理距离对自我-他人利益权衡的影响

以福利权衡率(WTR)为利他程度的指标, 通过3个实验逐步深入地考察了得失情境下他人参照点及心理距离对自我-他人利益权衡的影响。实验1的结果表明, 得失情境并未改变被试的WTR。实验2引入他人底线、现状和目标三个参照点变量, 发现被试获益情境下的WTR高于损失情境, 且WTR从高到低依次为他人临近底线、目标和现状; 他人临近底线时, 被试在获益情境下的WTR高于损失情境, 而他人临近现状和目标时, 个体在得失情境下的WTR无显著差异。实验3进一步引入心理距离变量, 发现心理距离较近他人的WTR高于较远他人, 且与得失情境和参照点发生了复杂的交互效应, 得失情境的主效应消失了, 但总体上并未改变实验2发现的参照点效应。这些结果对于更深入地理解得失不对称效应、三参照点理论及社会折扣和自我-他人决策差异研究的相关发现具有一定的启示意义。     

Doing unto future selves as you would do unto others: psychological distance and decision making

Four experiments showed that the decisions people make for future selves and other people are similar to each other and different from their decisions for present selves. Experiments involved decisions to drink a disgusting liquid for scientific purposes (Experiment 1), tutor peers during exam week (Experiment 2), receive e-mails for charity (Experiment 3), and defer a lottery prize for a larger one (Experiment 4). These findings seemed to be at least partially rooted in the tendency for decisions regarding the ongoing, present self to be uniquely influenced by internal subjective experience. Specifically, these effects emerged for real, but not hypothetical, decisions. Also, they were mitigated by manipulations that altered participants' attention to present or future subjective experience. In addition, when participants' subjective experience primarily involved empathy for others (Experiment 3), their decisions on behalf of present selves were more generous than their decisions for future selves and others. Applications are discussed.     

Mind games: the mental representation of conflict

Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, when prompted to represent a conflict in matrix form, more than 70% of the people created 1 of 4 archetypal mixed-motive games (out of 576 possibilities): Maximizing Difference, Assurance, Chicken, and Prisoner's Dilemma. Study 3 demonstrated that these mental representations relate in predictable ways to negotiators' fixed-pie perceptions. Studies 4-6 showed that these mental representations shape individuals' behavior and interactions with others, including cooperation, perspective taking, and use of deception in negotiation, and through them, conflict's outcomes. Study 7 found that the games that people think they are playing influence how their counterparts see them, as well as their counterparts' negotiation expectations. Overall, the findings document noteworthy regularities in people's mental representations of outcome interdependence in conflict and illustrate that 4 archetypal games can encapsulate fundamental psychological processes that emerge repeatedly in conflict and negotiation.     

Incidental anger and the desire to evaluate

Our results indicate that people experiencing incidental anger are more likely than people in neutral and other emotional states to prefer to perform evaluative tasks, even though their anger may bias the evaluations they make. Induced anger increased participants’ desire to evaluate others’ ideas (Experiment 1) and made the evaluations of those ideas more negative in valence (Experiment 2). Anger increased the appeal of evaluating ideas when evaluations were expected to be largely negative but not when evaluations were expected to be positive (Experiments 3 and 4). Mediation analyses revealed that this willingness to evaluate when angry stems from a belief that evaluating others can leave angry people in a positive mood. Because people are often free to decide when to perform the tasks required of them, this tendency may have implications for how and when ideas are evaluated.     

Implicit and explicit attitude dissociation in spontaneous deceptive behavior

Society considers deception to be an improper act but at the same time, people deceive each other surprisingly often during interpersonal interactions. In our study, this hypocrisy was assumed to be derived from ambivalent attitudes stemming from different sources, which we divided into implicit and explicit. Using a simulated racing task in a virtual environment, we identified participants who chose to be deceptive. Twenty two of the 60 subjects spontaneously decided to cheat in order to gain monetary compensation, while the other 38 subjects chose to be honest. We compared these two groups’ implicit beliefs about deception using the Implicit Association Test (Deception-IAT), as well as their explicit attitudes about deception and their personalities using self-report questionnaires. There was no difference between the two groups in explicit attitude or personality; however, the group who cheated on the racing task showed their implicit preference for deception more than that of the group who acted honestly as measured by the Deception-IAT.     

The effectiveness of penalty takers' deception: A scoping review

Attackers are supposed to take advantage of producing deceptive actions in competitive ball sports, particularly in penalty situations. We conducted a scoping review of the experimental literature to scrutinize whether penalty takers do indeed benefit from using deceptive actions in penalty situations, especially by increasing the likelihood to score a goal. Studies using video-based and in-situ tasks in which soccer and handball goalkeepers try to save a penalty were evaluated. Results showed that penalty takers' manipulation of spatial information available to the goalkeeper during deception (i.e., by using misleading and/or disguising actions) is less effective in in-situ than video-based studies. We argue that this difference occurs because goalkeepers adapt differently to the spatiotemporal constraints in the video-based and in-situ tasks. Goalkeepers appear to prioritize picking up spatial information in video-based tasks while prioritizing temporal information in-situ tasks. Therefore, the manipulation of spatial information appears to be less effective in the more representative in-situ studies than in video-based studies. In order to deceive, penalty takers are advised to manipulate temporal information during on-field penalty situations.     

Self-deception requires vagueness

The paper sets out to reveal conditions enabling diagnostic self-deception, people’s tendency to deceive themselves about the diagnostic value of their own actions. We characterize different types of self-deception in terms of the distinction between intervention and observation in causal reasoning. One type arises when people intervene but choose to view their actions as observations in order to find support for a self-serving diagnosis. We hypothesized that such self-deception depends on imprecision in the environment that allows leeway to represent one’s own actions as either observations or interventions. Four experiments tested this idea using a dot-tracking task. Participants were told to go as quickly as they could and that going fast indicated either above-average or below-average intelligence. Precision was manipulated by varying the vagueness in feedback about performance. As predicted, self-deception was observed only when feedback on the task used vague terms rather than precise values. The diagnosticity of the feedback did not matter.     

Thanks for asking: Self-affirming questions reduce backlash when stigmatized targets confront prejudice

Two experiments tested the prediction that stigmatized individuals can avoid backlash when they confront others about bias if they first ask questions designed to activate self-affirmation processes. Experiment 1 showed that compared to a no-strategy control condition, highly prejudiced perceivers tended to express less desire to meet an Arab-American when he asked them to take his perspective on prejudice, but they expressed more desire to meet him when he asked self-affirming questions prior to making the perspective-taking request. Experiment 2 replicated this effect with a different affirmation and revealed that asking self-affirming questions reduced perceptions that the target was being confrontational when asking others to take his perspective. Together, these studies show that stigmatized targets can effectively challenge prejudiced individuals to reduce their biases if they first use a subtle strategy that reduces defensiveness.     

Social exclusion and donation behaviour: What conditions motivate the socially excluded to donate?

Previous research has indicated that social exclusion can result in people becoming more focused on themselves than on others, and this may reduce their likelihood of engaging in prosocial behaviour. However, the question of how to promote prosocial behaviour in people who have experienced social exclusion remains. This study comprised two experiments that address this question in the context of donation advertising. Experiment 1 examined participants’ donation intentions after experiencing social exclusion in a ball‐passing game. Experiment 2 followed the same design as Experiment 1, except that real‐life donation behaviour was measured. Consistent with prior findings, our results indicated that those who experienced social exclusion displayed lower donation intentions (Experiment 1) and donated less (Experiment 2) than did those who did not experience social exclusion. However, when those who experienced social exclusion watched advertisements that only portrayed alienated people, they showed as much donation intent as those who did not experience social exclusion (Experiment 1) and ultimately donated more (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that social exclusion may increase an individual's tendency to help others who also are alienated.     

Advice conditionals about tips and warnings: interpretations and inferences

Two experiments examine how people interpret and reason about advice conditionals, such as tips, for example, “if you study more your grades will improve”, and warnings, for example, “if you stop exercising you will gain weight”. Experiment 1 showed that when participants reason about whether a tip or warning could be true in different situations, their judgments correspond to a biconditional or conditional interpretation on about half of all trials, but to an enabling or tautology interpretation on many others. Experiment 2 showed that participants make few modus ponens and tollens inferences from tips and warnings, and more modus ponens inferences from tips than warnings. The implications for alternative theories are discussed.     

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children’s elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children’s second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children’s ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.     

儿童面对不同对象的欺骗表现及其相关的社会性特点

为进一步探讨儿童欺骗行为的表现及其影响因素,在研究一中,分别引入陌生的成年女性、成年男性、同龄女孩、同龄男孩等四种游戏对手,探讨159名幼儿园大班的儿童在面对不同对象的情况下外显欺骗行为是否发生变化？结果表明,被试性别、对手年龄和对手性别三因素之间交互作用显著,儿童更倾向于欺骗成年女性以及和自己性别不同的同伴。研究二采用儿童社会化量表进一步考察儿童欺骗行为和其它社会性特点的关联。结果表明隐蔽的动作欺骗和意志维度显著相关,外显的动作欺骗和好胜心维度显著相关,说谎和自我概念维度显著相关     

Young children discover how to deceive in 10 days: a microgenetic study

We investigated how the ability to deceive emerges in early childhood among a sample of young preschoolers (Mean age = 34.7 months). We did this via a 10‐session microgenetic method that took place over a 10‐day period. In each session, children played a zero‐sum game against an adult to win treats. In the game, children hid the treats and had opportunities (10 trials) to win them by providing deceptive information about their whereabouts to the adult. Although children initially showed little or no ability to deceive, most spontaneously discovered deception and systematically used it to win the game by the tenth day. Both theory of mind and executive function skills were predictive of relatively faster patterns of discovery. These results are the first to provide evidence for the importance of cognitive skills and social experience in the discovery of deception over time in early childhood.     

Understanding maladaptive responses to rejection: Aggression with an audience

Logically, responding aggressively to rejection is maladaptive because one is unlikely to seek a relationship with an aggressor. We predict that when concealed, the illogical aggressive response to rejection is more likely, whereas when the rejected individuals’ aggressive responses are perceived as public, the aggressive acts may be reduced. Participants were rejected by others (Experiment 1) or were either accepted or rejected during an online ball-tossing game (Experiment 2) and were then given an opportunity to aggress publicly or privately. Across experiments, when the opportunity to aggress was made public, rejected participants exhibited less aggressive behavior. When concerned about the perception of their public aggressive responses by others, rejected individuals’ aggressive responses diminished compared with those whose actions were private. Crucially, this extended to aggression visible only to neutral others, suggesting that effects cannot solely be due to fear of retribution.