Evidentiality in language and cognition

What is the relation between language and thought? Specifically, how do linguistic and conceptual representations make contact during language learning? This paper addresses these questions by investigating the acquisition of evidentiality (the linguistic encoding of information source) and its relation to children's evidential reasoning. Previous studies have hypothesized that the acquisition of evidentiality is complicated by the subtleness and abstractness of the underlying concepts; other studies have suggested that learning a language which systematically (e.g. grammatically) marks evidential categories might serve as a pacesetter for early reasoning about sources of information. We conducted experimental studies with children learning Korean (a language with evidential morphology) and English (a language without grammaticalized evidentiality) in order to test these hypotheses. Our experiments compared 3- and 4-year-old Korean children's knowledge of the semantics and discourse functions of evidential morphemes to their (non-linguistic) ability to recognize and report different types of evidential sources. They also compared Korean children's source monitoring abilities to the source monitoring abilities of English-speaking children of the same age. We found that Korean-speaking children have considerable success in producing evidential morphology but their comprehension of such morphology is very fragile. Nevertheless, young Korean speakers are able to reason successfully about sources of information in non-linguistic tasks; furthermore, their performance in these tasks is similar to that of English-speaking peers. These results support the conclusion that the acquisition of evidential expressions poses considerable problems for learners; however, these problems are not (necessarily) conceptual in nature. Our data also suggest that, contrary to relativistic expectations, children's ability to reason about sources of information proceeds along similar lines in diverse language-learning populations and is not tied to the acquisition of the linguistic markers of evidentiality in the exposure language. We discuss implications of our findings for the relationship between linguistic and conceptual representations during development.     

Conditional Probabilities, Potential Surprise, and the Conjunction Fallacy

Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that a relationship of positive conditional dependence between the components of a conjunction of two events increases the prevalence of the conjunction fallacy. Consistent with this finding, the results of two experiments reveal that dependence leads to higher estimates for the conjunctive probability and a higher incidence of the fallacy. However, contrary to the theoretical account proposed by Tversky and Kahneman, the actual magnitude of the conditional relationship does not directly affect the extent of the fallacy; all that is necessary is for a positive conditional relationship to exist. The pattern of results obtained can be accounted for in terms of Shackle's (1969) 'potential surprise' theory of subjective probability. Surprise theory predicts that the impact of the conditional event will be at its maximum where the relationship is a negative one. Tversky and Kahneman's model, on the other hand, predicts the maximum effect when the relationship is positive. In all 12 scenarios tested, multiple regression analysis revealed that the standardized beta weight associated with the conditional event was greater when the relationship was a negative one. Thus the outcome was supportive of the surprise model rather than Tversky and Kahneman's account.     

Surprise: unfolding of facial expressions

Responses to surprising events are dynamic. We argue that initial responses are primarily driven by the unexpectedness of the surprising event and reflect an interrupted and surprised state in which the outcome does not make sense yet. Later responses, after sense-making, are more likely to incorporate the valence of the outcome itself. To identify initial and later responses to surprising stimuli, we conducted two repetition-change studies and coded the general valence of facial expressions using computerised facial coding and specific facial action using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Results partly supported our unfolding logic. The computerised coding showed that initial expressions to positive surprises were less positive than later expressions. Moreover, expressions to positive and negative surprises were initially similar, but after some time differentiated depending on the valence of the event. Importantly, these patterns were particularly pronounced in a subset of facially expressive participants, who also showed facial action in the FACS coding. The FACS data showed that the initial phase was characterised by limited facial action, whereas the later increase in positivity seems to be explained by smiling. Conceptual as well as methodological implications are discussed.     

情景知觉中的信息界定:从主观预期到“惊奇”算法

情景信息加工是情景知觉研究领域内的核心问题。然而,不同的研究者对"情景信息"的界定并不相同。在过去80多年的时间里对情景信息的界定先后经历了研究者主观确定、观察者评估、基于情景物理特征的计算模拟等方法。Itti和Baldi等人通过比较先验概率和后验概率之间的差异,提出了"惊奇"理论。文章介绍了真实情景知觉研究中"惊奇"理论的应用及进展,并指出"惊奇"算法的拓展及界定、情景知觉过程中的注意转换与"惊奇"的关系,以及社会情景知觉中的"惊奇"应用可能是未来相关领域需要进一步探索的问题。     

Rational Selective Exploitation Among Americans and Chinese: General Similarity, With One Surprise

A cross-cultural experiment tested predictions regarding reward allocation decisions among subjects in the United States and Taiwan. The experiment included five independent variables—two between-subject factors (American vs. Chinese; instrumental vs. unspecified vs. social-emotional allocator orientation) and three within-subject factors (high vs. low employee competence, social skill, and mobility). In general, Americans and Chinese distributed rewards quite similarly: In both cultures, allocators distributed greater rewards to employees who were more competent and possessed greater social skill. In both cultures, instrumental allocator orientation induced stronger tendencies to base allocations on competence; social-emotional allocator orientation induced stronger tendencies to base allocations on social skill. In both cultures, subjects engaged in competence-based "rational selective exploitation"—among highly competent employees, those with greater professional mobility received larger portions of the reward pool than did counterparts with constrained mobility. In both cultures, subjects also evidenced an unexpected social-skill-based rational selective exploitation—among employees with good social skill those with greater professional mobility received larger portions of the reward pool than did counterparts with constrained mobility. However, there were a number of interactions with culture that ran contrary to our a priori predictions: We hypothesized that Americans would exhibit greater individualism by focusing on competence in allocating outcomes, and that Chinese would exhibit greater collectivism by focusing on social skill. Although Americans did attend to employee competence more than Chinese, Americans also attended to employee social skill more than Chinese. These findings are discussed in terms of an expanded conceptualization of the nature of individualism and collectivism.     

Taken with Surprise: Critical Incidents in Teaching

Abstract. This collection of essays tackles thorny questions related to critical incidents in teaching. By using different pedagogical methods and techniques, each author provokes creative thinking about how to address specific concerns common to teaching. The authors demonstrate that the teaching and learning process must make room for – if not celebrate – the surprises that happen not only to the students, but to the teachers as well. The discussion of critical incidents helps to promote reflection on teaching practice and prompt insights into the intricate dynamics shaping the increasingly diverse learning community. Each individual essay is accompanied by reflection questions that can be used to spark conversation among colleagues and/or prompt further personal reflection on teaching and learning.     

To Give a Surprise Exam,Use Game Theory

This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a diagnosis of where the backwards induction argument, which “proves” that no surprise exam is possible, is mistaken. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Surprise is predicted by event probability,outcome valence,outcome meaningfulness,and gender

The present research was designed to better understand how the magnitude of experienced surprise is affected by both individual difference variables as well as variations in surprise-eliciting stimuli. Eighty-five participants played 5 versions of a slot machine-like game. The five games only differed with respect to the probability of winning each trial—10 % (i.e., wins were highly unusual), 30, 50, 70, and 90 % (i.e., losses were highly unusual). Players were given a fictitious “bankroll” at the beginning of each game and played up to 25 trials of each game. On each trial, players selected their wager amount, “pulled” the handle, learned the outcome (win or loss), and reported their surprise level using a 1 (none) to 9 (extremely) Likert scale. Replicating past research, results revealed that self-reported surprise was inversely related to outcome probability and that wins were rated as more surprising than losses, even when wins and losses occurred at the same level of probability. Novel results include finding that larger wagers predicted greater felt surprise (regardless of outcome), and that women reported greater surprise to both wins and losses than men.     

飞行中惊吓和惊奇的管理——拓展的Landman模型

在飞行活动中,飞行员的惊吓和惊奇反应是导致飞行失控的重要因素。惊吓和惊奇反应可能使飞行员熟练训练过的操作程序和技能被遗忘,取而代之的是不适当的直觉性的行为或草率的决策。现有的使用飞行模拟器的研究表明,Landman模型对减轻飞行员惊吓和惊奇的训练有重要价值。在Landman模型的基础上,我们加入了飞行员心理能力的个体间差别（即拓展的Landman模型）,因此拓展的Landman模型对于飞行员的选拔和训练将具有重要意义。     

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin’s, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of “making sense of surprising events”. The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people’s perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people’s perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.     

You'll Never Believe This: Irony and Hyperbole in Expressing Surprise

Three experiments compared how people comprehend irony and hyperbole as expressing surprise. Experiment 1 demonstrated that, when irony and hyperbole are used together, they express more surprise than if either is used alone. There was no difference between the degree of surprise expressed by hyperbole and irony, although both expressed more surprise than literal commentary. Experiment 2 revealed that, when a speaker has exaggerated about some unexpected event, as much surprise is expressed by very slight, realistically possible hyperbole as by outlandish, impossible hyperbole. In a third experiment the range of possible levels of hyperbole tested in Experiment 2 was shown to cause differences in how easy it was to determine that a speaker was surprised at some turn of events. The results are discussed in terms of theories of irony and hyperbole comprehension.     

Accommodating Surprise in Taxonomic Tasks: The Role of Expertise

This paper reports a psychological study of human categorization that looked at the procedures used by expert scientists when dealing with puzzling items. Five professional botanists were asked to specify a category from a set of positive and negative instances. The target category in the study was defined by a feature that was unusual, hence situations of uncertainty and puzzlement were generated. Subjects were asked to think aloud while solving the tasks, and their verbal reports were analyzed. A number of problem solving strategies were identified, and subsequently integrated in a model of knowledge‐guided inductive categorization. Our model proposes that expert knowledge influences the subjects' reasoning in more complex ways than suggested by earlier investigations of scientific reasoning. As in previous studies, domain knowledge influenced our subjects' hypothesis generation and testing; but, additionally, it played a central role when subjects revised their hypotheses.