Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

Identifying mediators of training effects on performance-related psychobiosocial states: A single-case observational study in an elite female triathlete

ObjectivesRelationships between training load, psychobiosocial (PBS) states and performance are dynamic and individual-specific. The nature of these relationships can be investigated using a combination of dynamic linear models (DLMs) and mediating variable analysis, potentially assisting applied sports psychologists in planning and monitoring of individual elite athletes’ intervention programmes.DesignWe illustrate this approach by examining the relationships of training loads with a performance-related state (‘self-efficacy’) and the role of potential mediating PBS variables (‘fatigue/lack of energy’ and ‘being in shape’) in explaining these relationships in an elite triathlete across time.MethodSelf-reports of PBS states (twice weekly) and training data were collected over 137 days. Using DLMs and mediating variable analysis, direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated) short-term associations of training load with ‘self-efficacy’ were examined.ResultsIn this triathlete, we found evidence for positive effects of training on ‘self-efficacy’, which were partly explained by feelings of ‘being in shape’ and suppressed by feelings of ‘fatigue/lack of energy’. Changes in the relationship between lagged training load and ‘fatigue/lack of energy’ were observed across time and were particularly pronounced in temporal proximity of an injury.ConclusionStrengths of the presented approach are its dynamic nature enabling the observation of changes occurring over time, use of statistical inference rather than visual data interpretation, and quantification of mediating effects to identify potential pathways of intervention. Additionally, the DLM method can identify complex nonlinear associations by examining correspondence between changes in levels of predictors and changes in magnitude and direction of predictor-outcome associations.     

The Dialogical Nature of our Inner Lives

Abstract

Classically, we have treated talk of such things as meaning, understanding, and thinking, etc., as raising problems about mental states assumed to exist inside people's heads. And in our philosophical inquiries, we have sought determinate in-principle solutions to these problems. In the dialogical, relational-responsive view of language use presented here — influenced by Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, and Voloshinov — a very different view of such talk is presented. Our ‘inner lives’ are not hidden ‘inside’ us, but are ‘displayed’ out ‘in’ the unfolding, living encounters spontaneously occurring between us and the others around us as we live out our lives     

How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

Abstract

Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (G&W) suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms.     

Introduction: Belief as Cultural Performance

Abstract

Although the concept of belief has become a focus of critical discussion in other disciplines, sociologists of religion have tended to assume that belief is a universal phenomenon, structured around cognitive propositions which can be made explicit in the context of research surveys and interviews The articles in this special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Religion explore belief in the lives of young people in different religious, cultural, and national contexts to suggest more complex ways in which belief might be conceptualised and researched. While the ‘authenticity’ of belief is a significant value for young people across these cases, the authors show how belief can, in different contexts, be a marker of identity, an expression of socially significant relationships or an organising centre for the lives of individuals and groups. Belief can also be understood as the performance of embodied practices shaped by one’s spatial and cultural environment. In this wider context, training young people in propositional forms of belief is shown to be a particular kind of religious project, which can be unstable and have unintended consequences.     

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.     

Wittgenstein,Quasi-fideism,and Scepticism

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief.

     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.     

Practising the Space Between: Embodying Belief as an Evangelical Anglican Student

Abstract

This article explores the formation of British evangelical university students as believers. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with a conservative evangelical Anglican congregation in London, I describe how students in this church come to embody a highly cognitive, word-based mode of belief through particular material practices. As they learn to identify themselves as believers, practices of reflexivity and accountability enable them to develop a sense of narrative coherence in their lives that allows them to negotiate tensions that arise from their participation in church and from broader social structures. I demonstrate that propositional belief—in contexts where it becomes an identity marker—is bound up with relational practices of belief, so that distinctions between ‘belief in’ and ‘belief that’ are necessarily blurred in the lives of young evangelicals.     

Religion,Truth and Religious Education

The main questions discussed are (1) what we are to count as ‘religion’, and what kind of propositions are central to religious belief, and (2) in particular, how can religious belief be sustained without a superstitious belief in the supernatural? R.M. Hare's views are first examined, and in part rejected: religious belief involves more than ‘commitment’, and is primarily concerned to assert that certain features of the world are worthy of worship. We need to consider how such assertions may be verified or falsified.     

Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Abstract

While it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as ‘characteristics’ and ‘determinations’, which are just two different words for ‘properties’, in the broadest senses of these terms. The second argument is based on the fact that kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they account for similarities between things, they are what predicates express, and they are what abstract nouns refer to.     

Trust and Betrayal from a Husserlian Standpoint

Abstract

This paper provides an interpretation of trust and betrayal within political communities from the perspective of Husserl’s concept of social communities. I situate the paper amidst Margaret Gilbert’s theory of political obligations, arguing that at least one outside conception of trust fills a gap left in her theory. More specifically, I argue for the supplementary fit that Karen Jones’s conception of trust understood as ‘basal security’ provides for Gilbert. From there, I tie this conception of trust and betrayal to Husserl’s notions of ‘original belief’ and socio-cultural crisis. There is thereby a phenomenological elucidation of features within the social world that allow such crises to occur in the first place.     

Sport-Based Life Skills Programming in the Schools

SUMMARY

The philosophy of sport and physical activity being readily available for all youth has a long history. Research suggests that sport is a significant factor in the development of adolescents' self-esteem, identity and feelings of competence. Using sport to promote competence in youth has tremendous benefits and risks. The greatest risk is the belief held by many that we can make a difference by just ‘throwing the ball and letting them play.’ This paper will focus on the role that sport can play in facilitating positive youth development. We delineate the environments in which sport best contributes to positive youth development and the role schools, and the psychologists who work in these schools, can play in this process. In addition, we will provide examples of several sport-based programs designed to enhance positive development, the components that make these programs successful and issues related to the design, implementation and evaluation of these programs.     

An Inquiry into Views,Beliefs and Faith: Lessons from Buddhism,Behavioural Psychology and Constructivist Epistemology*

Abstract

 The causes of disagreements between individuals, social groups, cultural groups, political parties, and nations can be traced down to the basic human tendency to give form to – and to reify views, beliefs, and opinions. With this being the case, I would like to ask the question: what, exactly are ‘views’ (including here such overlapping categories as ‘opinions’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’,)? How, exactly, do we give form to them? Why is it so difficult to change, or get rid of them? The Buddhist tradition since the time of its inception, has been greatly concerned with the matter of identifying ‘false views’ and replacing them with ‘correct views’. But serious and insightful research into the formation and maintenance of views and beliefs is by no means limited to Buddhism. It has been a topic of great concern in the past century to a wide range of secular researchers: social and behavioural psychologists; literary theorists and epistemologists; scientists and marketing strategists. What the specialists in these various fields have to say about beliefs is diverse – and yet there is much overlap. The ways in which they overlap are thought-provoking, and their differences are revelatory. In this paper, I investigate a few prominent approaches to the study of views and beliefs, and show how these various approaches can do much to fill in each other’s discourse. Finally, I reframe the Mahayana Buddhist notion of ‘correct faith’ within the context of this exploration of views.     

Nietzsche on Rock and Stone: The Dead World,Dance and Flight

Abstract

Although images of rock and stone play a significant role in Nietzsche’s thinking, from his earliest writings to his ideas in Thus Spoke Zarathustra about will to power and eternal return, this stratum of his imagery has not been much discussed. Initially rocks come across as ‘witnesses of prehistory that are eager to acquire language’, as well as border markers of, and means of entry to, the ‘dead world’, or inanimate realm. Later, stone becomes an image of the raw material that we have to work if we want to make something of our lives by fashioning them, which we can do with all strata of the soul except the deepest. At that level granite signifies what is unalterable, being the sedimentation of a very long past, and so rock comes to be associated with the past that is recalcitrant in the face of will. But when will can will as will to power, stone takes part in the play that is the consummate affirmation of life. It also has to be a dance, a dance on the force-field of will to power, overcoming for the moment the Spirit of Heaviness by lifting lightly from the earth. And finally flight: when ‘the boundary stones themselves fly into the air’, with a few of us shifting along with them.     

The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis

Abstract

Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence greater than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning.     

Semantic relationism, belief reports and contradiction

In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that Tully is bald” is correct according to Fine’s provided truth-conditions of belief reports, but its semantic content is (very likely) a contradiction. As I will argue in the paper, even the resort to the notion of token proposition, introduced in Fine’s recent article “Comments on Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’”, does not suffice to convincingly eliminate the contradiction; moreover, it raises new difficulties.     

The Anglican Communion: Idea,Name and Identity

Abstract

In the early nineteenth century, the idea that the United Church of England and Ireland (with the ‘Colonial Church’), the Scottish Episcopal Church and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the USA belonged to each other was (in England at least) a belief advocated by high-churchmen, not an established fact. Their ministries were not interchangeable. The article first traces the growth of the view that they were or should be branches of one communion. The second part surveys the variety of names used for this communion in the earlier nineteenth century. It records use of the name ‘Anglican Communion’ in the modern sense in 1847—more than three years earlier than previously known. Finally, reasons are suggested why the terms ‘Anglican’ and ‘Anglican Communion’ are not found in the Church of England's formal expressions of identity. One is the Church of England's reluctance to view itself as a denomination with a particular (‘Anglican’) identity. Mid-twentieth-century statements to this effect are recorded and defended against more recent criticism; indeed, the author agrees with Michael Ramsey in placing a question mark against the very concept of ‘Anglicanism’. References to the provisionality of the Anglican Communion—most recently by Archbishop Runcie—are cited with approval.     

‘If I only had a little humility,I would be perfect’: Children’s and adults’ perceptions of intellectually arrogant,humble, and diffident people

Abstract

Intellectual humility is usually regarded as a virtue. In this paper, we conceptualized intellectual humility along two dimensions: (1) placing an adequate level of confidence in one’s own beliefs; (2) being willing to consider other people’s beliefs. We tested whether children (ages 4 to 11 years) and adults perceived intellectual humility as positive and how these perceptions changed across development. To do so, we asked participants to evaluate an intellectually humble person as compared to an intellectually arrogant person, who readily dismissed other people’s beliefs, or to an intellectually diffident person, who was unsure of a well-supported belief. Young children did not favor the intellectually humble person over the others, but older children and adults liked this person better and tended to consider her nicer than the arrogant one and smarter than the diffident one. These findings suggest that the virtuousness of intellectual humility in others is recognized from mid-childhood on.