Loss: the ultimate philosophical problem

This paper draws on Jan Zwicky’s claim in Lyric Philosophy that loss is the ultimate philosophical problem and Wittgenstein’s attitude to philosophy in his Culture and Value that: ‘philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition’. This paper will enter the difficult territory of loss using poetry and reflections to engage loss as a spiritual challenge and perhaps one of the major forces shaping cultural ways. Death inescapably brings loss into life for those who remain after a death but loss has many other forms and is a persistent experience in living that touches every stage of the life journey. It is a philosophical problem rooted in common human experience from childhood on that has been addressed in a multitude of forms, conceptualizations, rituals, belief systems and religions. As a method, poetry is a way of inquiry that allows one to enter experience and meet the intensity of events, particularly loss. In her essay ‘Entering the Bird Cage: Poetry and Perceptibility’, Jane Hirschfield says that poetry allows us ‘to understand the world beyond the narrow self’ and to do so ‘it is necessary to be available to the unknown’ and loss moves experience into the unknown.     

On psychic elements in a case of autistoid perversion

The paper explores the formation of psychic elements from an epistemological point of view, drawing on the work of Bion to examine a clinical case of autistoid perversion. Distinguishing the qualification of psychic elements from the realization of pre‐conceptions, the paper argues that psychical elements are constituted through a mutually shared experience of presence, and so they should be understood in a paradoxical way – through being‐O and transformations into K. These ideas are explored via a clinical case concerning a patient with an autistoid–perverse organization. The patient had been denied any bodily contact with her parents during her first year of life due to an infection; in later life she exhibited an autistoid coprophilic perversion. During the course of her treatment, as it became possible to break down the autistoid organization, the nameless contents surfaced in a mutually shared experience of presence. The analyst was able to hold on to their meaning, which was unavailable to the patient. The absent analyst, however, turned into the mother who ‘put the child down’ and was experienced by the patient as a suicidal threat. In being‐O, the analyst was able to endure the paradox of being the one who ‘put her down’ in order not to put her down; the paradox of being‐O functioned as a container for the destructive objectal dimension of the state of ‘being put down’.     

‘I am not crying. I am rubbing my eyes’: Annie and the hollow object

This article explores the relationship between the development of severe eczema and asthma in an eight-year-old girl and her difficulties with experiencing psychic pain and conflict. The author focuses on the transference dynamics that preceded and surrounded the psychosomatic reaction in the session. The observations in this case may explain why patients, despite feeling taken over by intense physical sensations, can display flatness and superficiality of affect giving the appearance that they are emotionally ‘hollow’. The author proposes that these patients experience an emotional sense of emptiness in themselves and in their objects that is the result of a very early defence of dissociation caused by overwhelming anxieties of annihilation that are lived out in and through the body. The appearance of a psychosomatic symptom during the session can follow the emergence of sudden and intense raw hostile feelings towards the primary object, accompanied by a sense of danger and profound anxiety, as the hated object is also desperately needed for the subject’s own physical/emotional survival. The analyst can contribute to triggering these episodes by failing to contain the patient’s projections, which may lead to the patient feeling forced to re-introject unprocessed and unbearable ‘psycho-physical’ emotions. This article discusses the different degrees – and forms – of symbolic functioning in connection to this girl’s experience of her eczema and asthma and their manifestation in the transference relationship to the therapist.     

Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

This paper explores, from a phenomenological perspective, the conditions necessary for the possession of intentional content, i.e., for being intentionally directed toward the world. It argues that Levinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy makes an important contribution to this task. Intentional directedness, as understood here, is normatively structured. Levinas's ‘ethics’ can be understood as a phenomenological account of how our experience of the other subject as another subject takes place in the recognition of the normative force of a command. This supplies a condition that—as the paper shows by examining Husserl and Sartre on how our experience of the Other constitutes an ‘objective’ world—earlier phenomenologists have misunderstood, because they have treated ethical experience as ‘founded’ on a prior theory of representation (‘ontology’ in Levinas's language). Ethics is first philosophy because it is only by acknowledging the command in the ‘face’ of the Other that we can account for the sensitivity to the normative distinctions that structure intentional content. Throughout, the paper shows how Levinas's analyses, in Totality and Infinity, draw upon and develop the analyses of Husserl and Sartre.     

Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience

Abstract

Phenomenology is considered a philosophy of experience. But in the wake of French post‐structuralism beginning in the 1970s, the concept of experience within phenomenology has fallen under heavy critique. Even today, in the context of feminist philosophy the phenomenological concept of experience has yet to recover from the poststructuralist critique.

In this article, I will closely examine the poststructuralist critique of the concept of experience within the context of feminist theory. I will thereby refer first and foremost to the poststructuralist theorist Joan Scott, and her influential text “‘Experience’”. In my examination of the poststructuralist critique of experience, the leading question will be whether or not this critique, down to its details, can in fact be applied to phenomenology. My thesis is that phenomenology is able to withstand the poststructuralist critique of experience. Further, I will argue that post‐structuralism and phenomenology have more in common as regards the concept of experience than is usually admitted. For several reasons, it seems – as I will maintain – that both poststructuralist feminism and phenomenology are equally interested in a strong concept of experience and thus do not promote doing away with the concept.     

Science and Morality: Mind the Gap, Use Happiness as a Safe Bridge!

In 2002 Sissela Bok re-published her book “Common Values”, first published in 1995, about her search for a minimal set of values to be respected all over the world. In her view such a set of values is needed to facilitate international communication and cooperation. Values already recognized in every society can be included as a starting point. In her book “Exploring happiness”, published in 2010, she explains why she finds happiness unfit to be included. She observes that there are discordant claims about what happiness is. Any particular vision can lead to practical choices that either adhere or violate the values she prefers. In my view subjective happiness should be included, because there are no discordant claims about the meaning of subjective happiness, and subjective happiness is simultaneously attractive as a moral value and as an object of scientific research. Subjective happiness can function as a bridge between science and morality. The only discordant claims are about ‘objective’ happiness, as a wider interpretation of well-being in the context of some specific morality or ideology.     

Inheritance,Originality and the Will: Bergson and Heidegger on Creation

Abstract

In the work of Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger we find different responses to traditional ideas of ‘creation’. Bergson advances a philosophy of creation, wherein ‘creation’ is presented as the production of a ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ novelty, not only in art, but in all forms of human experience and biological life. Heidegger, in contrast, comes to criticise ideas of ‘creation’ in art as the expression of an alienated ‘humanism’ and ‘subjectivism’ essential to the modern age. This paper illuminates this divergence by showing how Bergson and Heidegger, despite appearances, grapple with the question of art-production – and with the attendant issues of inheritance and originality – in similar ways. It is only in recognising this proximity, I argue, that it is possible to perceive adequately what essentially distinguishes their approaches: Bergson’s conception of creation as a function of the will.     

Hilda Oakeley on Idealism,History and the Real Past

In the early twentieth century, Hilda Diana Oakeley (1867–1950) set out a new kind of British idealism. Oakeley is an idealist in the sense that she holds mind to actively contribute to the features of experience, but she also accepts that there is a world independent of mind. One of her central contributions to the idealist tradition is her thesis that minds construct our experiences using memory. This paper explores the theses underlying her idealism, and shows how they are intricately connected to the wider debates of her period. I go on to explain how the parts of Oakeley's idealism are connected to further areas of her thought – specifically, her views on history and her growing block theory of time – to provide a sense of Oakeley's philosophy as a system. As there is no existing literature on Oakeley, this paper aims to open a path for further scholarship.     

On the use of the uncanny in ritual

In ‘The Future of an Illusion’, Freud suggested that religion allows a person to ‘feel at home in the uncanny’ – that unsettling interplay of suppression and memory that arises from living subject to fears and anxieties in an unpredictable world. Here, the author examines a ritual called the ‘Wild Hunt’ that occurred during her ethnographic research among contemporary Pagans to explore how uncanny encounters within religious rituals can help participants come to terms with fears and anxieties, transforming inchoate emotions stemming from trauma or dislocation. Following Otto, the author suggests that such a sense of the uncanny can be central to the power of religious ritual. These uncanny elements within religious ritual provide an illustration of how religious experiences can help participants to feel ‘at home in the uncanny’, thereby bringing together the seemingly disparate accounts of Otto and Freud on the relationship between religion and uncanny experience.     

Identification with the aggressor and the ‘normal traumas’: clinical implications

Ferenczi's (1933) surprisingly unknown concept of identification with the aggressor – an abuse victim's ‘eliminating’ her own subjectivity and ‘becoming’ precisely what an attacker needs her to be – has radical implications for our understanding of analytic technique. Its very frequent occurrence also forces us to broaden our understanding of what constitutes trauma. Ferenczi saw the experience of ‘traumatic aloneness’ or ‘emotional abandonment’ as the key element of trauma, since this is what enforces the traumatic responses of dissociation and identification with the aggressor. Identification with the aggressor operates in the analytic relationship in both patient and analyst. This has various consequences, including the structuring of the relationship through unconscious collusions – mutually coordinated, defensive identifications designed to help both participants feel secure. This view of the analytic relationship has clinical implications in at least four areas: the understanding of the patient's free associations, which may reflect the patient's compliance with the analyst's wishes rather than the contents of the patient's own unconscious; the need for some kind of mutuality of analysis; the traumatizing potential of the analyst's authority; and the tendency of some patients to take blame and responsibility reflexively, as a way of protecting the analyst.     

No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question

ABSTRACT

Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the term ‘empathy’ which conditions the appropriation of the Other as we think that we know how the Other feels. To claim that we do know an Other’s feelings – or any kind of their intentional experience – means to appropriate their experience through our own. I will first reveal the equivocal use of the term ‘empathy’ and, then, I will explore Husserl’s use of the term. In Husserl, the understanding of an Other as empathy is only partial. I shall conclude by reiterating a thesis from philosophy of existence and feminist theory according to which to know another person comes from creating a community with them and not because we have a biological structure that can mirror each other’s feelings.     

Who founded Buddhism? Notes on the psychological effectiveness of religious objects

Starting with an outline of Buddhist history from a psychoanalytic perspective, this paper uses ideas from philosophy and psychoanalysis to consider the nature of the psychological effectiveness of religious objects. It suggests that the development of the devotional cult of Buddhas ‘without form’ such as Amitābha, at‐first‐glance surprising when juxtaposed with the founding vision of Gautama Siddhartha, tells us a great deal about the psychological needs that impel the evolution of religious thinking. Distinguishing religious objects from mythological ones, it argues that ‘religious objects’ are, more specifically, allegorical objects that can be encountered in the second person; that these may not always be well described as ‘illusion’; and that they may in some cases be better understood as providing opportunities for experience that, like the transference in psychoanalysis, may have far‐reaching psychological impacts.     

Richard Popkin – A Personal Memoir

This article is an introduction to an ancient Egyptian text called The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant and an argument that it ought to be seen as a classic of political philosophy. After contextualizing the tale as part of a tradition of moral and political philosophy in ancient Egypt, I explore the methods by which the text defines the proper roles of political authority and contrast its approach to justifying political authority with the argument from the state of nature so common in modern Western political philosophy. I claim that the tale's argument from dysfunction anticipates the move in contemporary Western political philosophy towards privileging non-ideal over ideal theory. I discuss challenges in translating the key term in the tale – ma'at – in light of the fact that it can be taken to mean ‘justice’ and/or ‘truth’. Finally, I discuss how the irony at the heart of its narrative can lead us to interpret the tale as having either conservative or revolutionary implications for the political system it depicts.     

Home to men’s business and bosoms: philosophy and rhetoric in Francis Bacon’s Essayes

This article claims that today’s reading of Francis Bacon’s Essayes as a solely literary text turns upon philosophers’ having largely lost access to the renaissance culture which Bacon inherited, and the renaissance debates about the role of rhetoric in philosophy in which Bacon participated. The article has two parts. Building upon Ronald Cranes’ seminal contribution on the place of the Essayes in Bacon’s ‘great instauration’, Part 1 examines how the subjects of Bacon’s Essayes need to be understood as Baconian contributions to ‘morrall philosophye’ and ‘civile knowledge’, rather than rhetorical or poetic exercises. In Part 2, contesting the interpretations of Crane, Fish, Ferrari and others, I will argue that the Essayes’ striking rhetorical form needs to be conceptualized in light of Bacon’s renaissance account of the ‘duty and office’ of rhetoric in any moral and civil philosophy that would look to actively cure mental afflictions and cultivate the virtuous or canny conduct it extols. Bacon’s Essayes, in this light, are best understood as a legatee and transformation of the popular early modern genre of books of apothegms and maxims designed to guide conduct.     

The explosion of the present and the encapsulation of time: Transference phenomena in the analysis of a psychotic patient

The paper deals with some basic problems concerning the experience of time and space in the psychoanalytic treatment of psychotic patients. Whereas borderline patients tend to distort the experience of time and space under emotional pressure, the concepts of time and space seem to dissolve in acute psychotic states of mind. Sometimes this manifests itself in an explosion of the present, where the past is ubiquitous and the future is perceived as the end of all times. The case of a 48 year‐old patient with the external diagnosis of ‘paranoid–hallucinatory schizophrenia’ is presented to illustrate that the main task is to recreate a structure to contain the experience of space and time. Such a development may occur if primitive psychotic anxieties can be taken up and metabolized. A near‐psychotic decompensation before the first break and the development of a transference psychosis in the second year of the analysis are depicted in detail. Subsequently some developments became visible which helped the patient to better tolerate catastrophic fears of loss. This included the formation of a structure which the patient called ‘hibernation’ enabling her to psychically survive without falling apart. By retreating into her ‘time capsule’ she managed to overcome breaks and to delay her fears of fragmentation until they could be taken up and worked through in the transference. The creation of a structure like the patient's ‘time capsule’ is considered to be an attempt to construct the experience of time and space. It prevented a collapse of her internal space thereby enabling further steps towards thinking and symbolization. In conclusion, some theoretical and clinical aspects are discussed including the role of the countertransference.     

Sense data and logical relations: Karin Costelloe-Stephen and Russell’s critique of Bergson

ABSTRACT

Though scholarship has explored Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s contributions to the history of psychoanalysis, as well as her relations to the Bloomsbury Group, her philosophical work has been almost completely ignored. This paper will examine her debate with Bertrand Russell over his criticism of Bergson. Costelloe-Stephen had employed the terminology of early analytic philosophy in presenting a number of arguments in defence of Bergson’s views. Costelloe-Stephen would object, among other things, to Russell’s use of an experiment which, as she points out, was first conducted by Carl Stumpf. Russell appeals to Stumpf's experiment in his attempt to prove that sense data are terms in logical relations, a thesis presupposed by the project of logical analysis outlined in Our Knowledge of the External World. A reformulated version of Costelloe-Stephen's argument put forth by this paper shows that Russell's argument fails to provide adequate proof for his thesis. Further modifications of the argument can also address a reconstruction (based on contemporary reports) of Russell's reply to Costelloe-Stephen. In his reply, Russell would use, already in 1914, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in contrasting his and Moore’s approach to a continental one, exemplified by Bergson and Costelloe-Stephen.     

‘Critical psychotherapy,’ ‘postpsychotherapy,’ and the cult of technicism

This paper about the terms ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ argues that the terms ‘critical psychology,’ ‘critical psychiatry,’ and ‘postpsychiatry’ are already in use, and we can see the new terms – ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ – as additions to this already existing family of terms. However, this paper also argues that what is of most importance is not the case for using these new terms, but the tendencies and features these terms might be taken to refer to. The paper begins with an experience the author had while working as a counsellor some years ago. The terms listed above are explored, as are the roots of ‘critical psychotherapy’ in psychoanalysis, before providing an example of how a philosopher’s work might be relevant to psychotherapists.