The Real World: What Good Is It?

Any experimental science runs the risk of implosion. The tasks that were created as surrogates for complicated real-world situations can take on lives of their own. When that happens, scientists become fascinated with the nuances of variations within that little world. Their theoretical accounts end up with little place for phenomena that could not be observed there. Extrapolations to other settings may require large doses of conjecture (or leaps of faith). This essay examines some possibilities for understanding the world of the lab by grappling with applied problems in the world outside and perhaps doing a little good along the way.     

What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors’ Introduction

We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current debates within both epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism, realism, rationality of scientific change), we conclude by highlighting three topics as especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second concerns the ways in versions of HE can be connected to versions of naturalized and social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim.     

The View from the Driver's Seat: What Good Is Salience?

A set of experiments gauged the value of salient and non‐salient visual information to drivers' decision making. Stimuli were images of traffic scenes viewed from a drivers' approximate perspective, and the subjects' task was to make stop‐or‐go driving judgments. Under some experimental conditions (Experiment 1), subjects viewed only the salient information from within each scene. Under other conditions (Experiments 2–3), they viewed only the non‐salient information. A signal detection measure of sensitivity served as the primary dependent measure. Data indicated that an above‐chance amount of the information needed for accurate judgments was contained within salient image regions and that some information was available only from the salient regions. Other critical information, however, was contained exclusively within non‐salient regions. Results suggest that an attentional bias toward visual salience would serve as an economical information‐seeking strategy for drivers but by itself would overlook many task‐critical cues. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is Good Reasoning?

What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections.     

What Good are Counterexamples?

Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefsthat are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude thatknowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason totrust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide rangeof cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have agreater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliableintuitions. What’s distinctive about the faulty intuitions, Iargue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple,systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated,disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting theGettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead havebeen explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds ofcases.     

Is Nature Enough? Introduction

Abstract. The forty‐ninth annual IRAS conference on Star Island pursued the science‐religion dialogue primarily in terms of two concepts: nature and transcendence. Robust Yes responses and likewise robust No responses were presented by both scientists and theologians to the theme question, “Is Nature Enough? The Thirst for Transcendence.” After this introductory survey of the definitional landscape, representative papers from the conference are presented.     

What Makes Good Ministry Good? Women in Ministry

Abstract

What are the special ethical issues faced by women in ministry? In this article conventional assumptions about ethics in ministry, taken from the work of Gaylord Noyce, are compared with the experiences, attitudes and expectations of ordered and lay members of the Anglican Church of Canada and the United Church of Canada in two Canadian regions. The similarities and differences are then explored in conjunction with more contemporary theories. Conventional approaches to pastoral ethics and women in ministry limit concern to issues of discrimination in wages, employment and advancement. This article concludes that while such discrimination exists, it is not nearly as great a concern for women as the fear of sexual harassment. This fear is not only great but well founded. The research supports the claim that for a woman to be engaged in good ministry, she is required to do it differently from men.     

What Is Dissent?

Res Publica - Dissent is a word we come across frequently these days. We read it in the newspapers, use it in discussions with friends and colleagues—perhaps even engage in the...     

What Is Ineffable?

In this essay, I argue, via a revision of Freud's notions of primary and secondary process, that experiences of resonant form lie at the root of many serious ineffability claims. I suggest further that Western European culture's resistance to the perception of resonant form underlies some of its present crises.     

What Is Ignorance?

This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by paying attention to four philosophical problems in which ignorance plays a crucial role.     

What Is Love?

SUMMARY

A theory to explain the phenomena of love is suggested. The construct of love is dissected into physiological and psychodynamic components. Love is explained first via its adaptive function, then by its physiological arousal which is interpreted as either anxiety or excitement, which is activated via goodness-of-fit of each individual's internal love model. The leap to love is contingent on the complex constellation of the above-mentioned idiosyncratic components finding synthesis within individuals and between mates. Intimacy can be nurtured, but love, similar to humans and life itself, appears to be greater than the sum of its parts.     

What Is Terrorism?

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.