古典对当方阵和广义量词

古典对当方阵可同溯到亚里士多德逻辑,并且自此后就一直被广泛地讨论,特别是在中世纪和现代。它刻画了所有、没有、并非所有和某些这四个量词之间的特定逻辑关系,即对当关系。亚里十多德和传统逻辑学家,以及人多数当代语言学家,都把“所有”看作具有存在预设,也即“所有A是B”可以推山“存在A”,而现代逻辑则放弃了这一假定。用现代逻辑对“所有”的解释来代替亚里十多德的解释（对“并非所有”也可以作类似处理）,就产生了现代版本的对当方阵。近年来有许多争论,探讨这两个方阵中哪一个是正确的。本文中我的主要观点是,这个问题不是,或者不应该主要是关于存在预设的,毋宁说它是关于否定的模式的。我认为现代方阵表述了自然语言中否定的一般模式,而传统方阵则没有做到这一点。明乎此,不仅需要把对当方阵应用于四个亚里士多德量词,还需要把它应用到这一类型的广义量词上。现代方阵上的任一量词所展示的否定的模式,常常不是在传统方阵中发现的对当关系。本文提供了一些技术性结果和工具,阐述了解释各种英语限定词的量词方阵的若干例子。本文最后一个例子引入了否定的第二模式。它伴随特定复杂量词出现,也能够在方阵中被表达。     

Varieties of Reflection in Kant's Logic

For Kant, ‘reflection’ (Überlegung, Reflexion) is a technical term with a range of senses. I focus here on the senses of reflection that come to light in Kant's account of logic, and then bring the results to bear on the distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘transcendental’ reflection that surfaces in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although recent commentary has followed similar cues, I suggest that it labours under a blind spot, as it neglects Kant's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic. The foundational text of existing interpretations is a passage in Logik Jäsche that appears to attribute to Kant the view that reflection is a mental operation involved in the generation of concepts from non-conceptual materials. I argue against the received view by attending to Kant's division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic, identifying senses of reflection proper to each, and showing that none accords well with the received view. Finally, to take account of Kant's notion of transcendental reflection I show that we need to be attentive to the concerns of applied logic and how they inform the domain-relative transcendental logic that Kant presents in the first Critique.     

The Logic of the Ontological Square

The Ontological Square is a categorial scheme that combines two metaphysical distinctions: that between types (or universals) and tokens (or particulars) on the one hand, and that between characters (or features) and their substrates (or bearers) on the other hand. The resulting four-fold classification of things comprises particular substrates, called substances, universal substrates, called kinds, particular characters, called modes or moments, and universal characters, called attributes. Things are joined together in facts by primitive ontological ties or nexus. This article describes a logic that is meant to capture the basic intuitions behind the Ontological Square. Given a minimal correspondence between atomic logical form and ontological structure, the commitment to nexus as a distinct ontological category entails a rehabilitation of copulae as ties of predication. Thus, the Logic of the Ontological Square is a copula calculus rather than a predicate calculus; its soundness and completeness can be established with respect to a model akin to a so-called first-order semantics for standard second-order logic. Presented by Hannes Leitgeb     

创造力的领域性研究进展:从对立到融合的转向

创造力究竟是领域一般性的还是领域特殊性的?这一争论是创造力研究面临的首要问题。由于它涉及创造力的内涵、研究方法等基本问题,所以长期以来一直颇具争议。在系统梳理创造力领域特殊性与领域一般性观点及其研究证据的基础上,指出了创造力领域性研究面临的诸多质疑和困境,并从理论探索和实证研究进展两个层面论证了创造力领域性研究逐步呈现出从对立转向融合的趋势。未来研究应以创造力领域融合性理论为基础,进一步细化创造力领域性的二级子维度,加强基于创造力培养的实践探索,并按照行为学—测量学—认知神经科学—基因学的研究主线,综合使用多种方法和技术手段来揭示创造力领域性研究的全貌。     

Logical Foundations and Kant's Principles of Formal Logic

The abstract status of Kant's account of his ‘general logic’ is explained in comparison with Gödel's general definition of a formal logical system and reflections on ‘abstract’ (‘absolute’) concepts. Thereafter, an informal reconstruction of Kant's general logic is given from the aspect of the principles of contradiction, of sufficient reason, and of excluded middle. It is shown that Kant's composition of logic consists in a gradual strengthening of logical principles, starting from a weak principle of contradiction that tolerates a sort of contradictions in predication, and then proceeding to the (constructive) principle of sufficient reason, and to a classical-like logic, which includes the principle of excluded middle. A first-order formalisation is applied to this reconstruction, which reveals implicit modalities in Kant's account of logic, and confirms the implementability of Kant's logic into a sound and complete formal system.     

罗素《哲学问题》序言

罗素的《哲学问题》是几代哲学学生的必读之物。在该书中,他并没有探讨所有的哲学问题,而仅限于他认为自己可以肯定而且能有所建树的那些问题,他主要涉及的是知识论,即考察我们能说知道或有理由相信的那部分哲学分支。在此基础上,他得出了某些令人瞩目的有关所有事物的终极类别的结论。他并没有探讨伦理学以及有关心灵和行为的各种经典问题,如自我的本性或意志自由等问题。     

从劳动逻辑到实践逻辑

马克思实践哲学面临了从劳动逻辑向实践逻辑提升和转换的需要,以拯救易被化约于"劳动"之中的伦理—政治型"实践"范畴的独立地位。但这项工作必须自觉区别于西方实践哲学传统的"实践"与"劳动"二分立场。马克思劳动概念中蕴含了属于它自身的伦理规范内涵,需要将这一伦理规范内涵释放出来,以完成向伦理—政治型实践范畴的过渡。     

From the clarity of ideas to the validity of judgments: Kant's farewell to epistemic perfectionism

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity.     

From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia

This paper focuses on (an interpretation of) the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics.

     

Nothing More or Less than Logic: General Logic, Transcendental Philosophy, and Kant's Repudiation of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre

In this paper I lay the foundations for an understanding of one of Fichte's most neglected and least understood texts: the late lecture course on Transcendental Logic. I situate this work in the context of Fichte's lifelong struggle with the problem of understanding the relation between logic and philosophy – a problem that I show to figure centrally both in Fichte's own revolutionary thinking and in his response to Kant's notorious denunciation of the Wissenschaftslehre. By attending to this context we can understand Fichte's philosophical ambitions in the late lectures: a critique of particular doctrines of general logic; a critique of the conception of thought presupposed both by the traditional logic and by Kant himself; and a new conception of the relation between logic and the philosophical theory of experience. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.