Cognition as the Cooperative Appropriation of Affordances

Michaels (2000) expressed concerns about the implications of the notion of 2 visual systems (Milner &; Goodale, 1995) for ecological psychology. This leads her to suggest a decoupling of perception and action, by which action is separate from perception. It is suggested that although Michaels noted, on the one hand, that Milner and Goodale's approach to perception is a constructivist one, she mistakenly adopts their view that separates vision for perception from vision for action. An alternative position is presented, based on a recent article (Norman, in press), in which the parallels between the 2 visual systems, dorsal and ventral, and the 2 theoretical approaches, ecological and constructivist, are elucidated. According to this dual-process approach to perception, both systems are perceptual systems. The ecological-dorsal system is the system that picks up information about the ambient environment allowing the organism to negotiate it. It is suggested that this type of perception always processes the relevant information for action and that there is no need to sever the perception-action coupling. Ecological psychology and the 2 visual systems are quite compatible, and there is no need for concern.     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

进化心理学与生态心理学的整合：理解适宜可用性

进化心理学源自达尔文进化论,以分析心理机能及起源为主要研究目的。同样,生态心理学在Brunswik(1956)和Gibson(1979)开创引领下,探讨了有机体的知觉、判断、行为等因素在环境适应中的作用。尽管进化心理学和生态心理学都具有生物机能主义倾向,但过去研究较少探讨二者联系。该文引入适宜可用性观点来整合进化心理学和生态心理学的理论与实证研究。适宜可用性的观点认为,生存与繁衍问题中的代价与利益分析有助于特定种群的动物采取趋近或回避行为来保证潜在适宜性。适宜可用性的观点源自进化生物学中的知觉理论,它解决了认识论中许多传统问题,也整合了进化心理学和生态心理学的实验研究成果。适宜可用性的观点为新世纪的感觉、知觉、认知、情绪和决策的研究提供了新的理论基础     

Compatible Dynamical Models of Environmental,Sensory, and Perceptual Systems

ABSTRACT

One of the cornerstones of the ecological stance in psychology is the compatibility, or symmetry, between animal and environment. In this article, it is argued that a first principles reevaluation of the dynamical systems that structure the information signals animals live through is an important step in understanding how compatibility is possible. What is especially important is how environmental properties are encoded by dynamical laws into the information signals of the environment and how these signals can reveal environmental properties. It is argued that that compatibility is not just 2-way compatibility between animal and environment but also 3-way compatibility of environmental, sensory, and perceptual systems. The argument is illustrated using a conceptual exegesis of 2 dynamical systems, Newtonian mechanics and Webster's acoustic horn equation. The discussion of the latter equation is accompanied by the extraction of articulatory information from speech signals of 50 speakers. It is believed that the work presented here further develops the theory of ecological psychology as well as its specific application to speech perception pioneered by Carol Fowler.     

Evading conceptual self-annihilation: Some implications of Albert Bandura's theory of the self-system for the status of psychology

There are two cognitive revolutions occuring in psychology. The first in the fields of perception, memory, language and thought uses information processing and computer models of cognition. The second in learning theory and behavioral therapy uses folk psychological concepts of cognition. To test the philosophical compatibility of these cognitive revolutions I examine the implications of Albert Bandura's theory of the self-system for the disputed question of the status of folk psychology. I argue that if the theory of the self-system is correct, then strong eliminative materialist claims about the falsity of folk psychology are disconfirmed, functionalist homunculi hypotheses need modification, and certain constraints are imposed on neurophysiological accounts of the self. Thus I conclude that the cognitive revolution in learning theory and behavior therapy is making its own distinctive contribution to the new philosophical psychology emerging from the cognitive revolution in psychology as a whole.     

The Essential Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Perception

ABSTRACT

Traditional theories of perception developed for centuries before Darwin conceived his theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Although many areas of psychological theory and research now have mainstream approaches strongly influenced by evolutionary thinking, mainstream perceptual theory remains close to its pre-Darwinian roots. This paper draws on insights from ecological psychology, especially as represented in J. J. Gibson's The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), to identify 4 elements that any future evolutionary approach to perception should be expected to include: (a) an ecological analysis of ambient energy, (b) a comparative understanding of the perceptual abilities of different species, (c) a dynamic understanding of organism–environment interaction as essential for perception, and (d) an understanding of perceptual attunement based on the concept of affordances. Each of these elements serves an essential theoretical role while also pointing toward lines of research where much work remains to be done. The presence of these elements explains, in part, the affinity between ecological psychology and other evolutionarily grounded approaches to psychology, including the emerging fields of enactivism and embodied cognition.     

Visual illusions and ethnocentrism: exemplars for teaching cross-cultural concepts

This article discusses the origins of cross-cultural interest in two concepts fundamental to psychology students' views of the world: simple visual illusions and ethnocentrism. Although students encounter these ideas in introductory psychology, textbooks rarely describe the nature or origin of cross-cultural knowledge about them. The article presents a brief account of the history of these concepts and relates them to contemporary notions of psychology and culture. Using visual perception and ethnocentrism as examples, the article suggests the importance of teaching that different people see the world in different ways and the role of that lesson in a future demanding increased cross-cultural understanding.     

Why do animals differ in their susceptibility to geometrical illusions?

In humans, geometrical illusions are thought to reflect mechanisms that are usually helpful for seeing the world in a predictable manner. These mechanisms deceive us given the right set of circumstances, correcting visual input where a correction is not necessary. Investigations of non-human animals’ susceptibility to geometrical illusions have yielded contradictory results, suggesting that the underlying mechanisms with which animals see the world may differ across species. In this review, we first collate studies showing that different species are susceptible to specific illusions in the same or reverse direction as humans. Based on a careful assessment of these findings, we then propose several ecological and anatomical factors that may affect how a species perceives illusory stimuli. We also consider the usefulness of this information for determining whether sight in different species might be more similar to human sight, being influenced by contextual information, or to how machines process and transmit information as programmed. Future testing in animals could provide new theoretical insights by focusing on establishing dissociations between stimuli that may or may not alter perception in a particular species. This information could improve our understanding of the mechanisms behind illusions, but also provide insight into how sight is subjectively experienced by different animals, and the degree to which vision is innate versus acquired, which is difficult to examine in humans.     

Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based on ecological psychology: compatibility with the explanation of perception and action at the ecological scale and the rejection of computation as a paradigm for the explanation of the activity of the brain. In section three, we show how neural reuse meets the two requirements and, furthermore, we evaluate its theoretical parallelism with ecological psychology. Finally, after developing these ideas, in the conclusion we put forward further aspects and research possibilities that follow from the coalition of neural reuse and ecological psychology for a Gibsonian neuroscience.     

The Ecology of Human-Machine Systems I: Introduction

A symposium entitled, The Ecology of Human-Machine Systems, was held at the Fifth International Conference on Event Perception and Action. This sympo- sium examined the challenges that human-machine systems hold for an ecological approach to perception, cognition, and action and the promises that an ecological approach holds for problems that traditionally have been the domain of human factors psychology. The presenters from this symposium have been invited to submit articles about an applied ecological psychology to Ecological Psychology. Articles that are accepted for publication will be appearing in future issues of this journal. It is hoped that these articles will stimulate productive interaction between ecological and human factors psychology. This correspondence reflects the natural affinity between ecological and human factors psychology. It examines some of the issues that distinguish basic and applied research. It also considers the contribution that ecological physics can make for improving tradi- tional approaches to task analysis. Finally, this article speculates about emerging areas of research in which the ecological approach may contribute to the design of human-machine systems.     

The Ecological Level of Analysis: Can Neogibsonian Principles be Applied Beyond Perception and Action?

Is it useful to apply ecological principles, developed to understand perception and action, in research areas such as social psychology? Charles (Integrative Psychological &; Behavioral Sciences 43(1) 53–66 2009) warns ecological psychologists interested in this question that much time and effort can be saved through a backwards extension to or rediscovery of the New Realism tradition. In response, we analyze what ecological psychology risks to lose with such a backwards extension and describe existing extensions of the approach not considered by Charles. According to Charles, New Realism holds that: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Our arguments originate from a comparison of these principles with six recently described ecological ones: (1) organism-environment systems are the proper units of analysis, (2) environmental realities should be defined at the ecological scale, (3) behavior is emergent and self-organized, (4) perception and action are continuous and cyclic, (5) information is specificational, and (6) perception is of affordances (Richardson et al. 2008).     

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ‘APPROPRIATE PSYCHOLOGY’ FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD?

The impact of psychology on the developing world has begun to receive some attention, but there is a need for theoretical concepts in order to provide a framework for critical discussion. Using the concepts ‘dual perception’ and ‘parallel growth’ (Moghaddam and Taylor 1985) as a framework, the concept of ‘appropriate psychology’ is introduced to assess the transfer of psychology from the developed to the developing world. Six criteria for evaluating appropriateness are discussed: self-reliance, needs responsiveness, cultural compatability, institutional feasibility, economic suitability and political practicality.     

From “The Depleted Self” to “The Will to Believe”: Excavating the Hermeneutics of Donald Capps

The concept of “reframing” lies at the heart of the pastoral psychology of Donald Capps. In previous articles I have argued that the process of reframing follows a circular hermeneutics. An excavation of Capps’ hermeneutics reveals foundations in the fields of philosophy and psychology. This article focuses on the legacy of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Friedrich Schleiermacher, William James and Paul Ricoeur. It explores the differences and commonalities between William James and Friedrich Schleiermacher’s understanding of religious experience as well as Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of narrativity and traces these strains to Capps’ pastoral psychology. As illustration of his pastoral approach to healing and wholeness the problem of “the depleted self,” so prevalent in “our narcissistic age,” encounters the healing narrative of Jesus that appeals to “the will to believe.”     

Directed forgetting and posthypnotic amnesia: information processing and social contexts

In three experiments we compared posthypnotic amnesia (PHA) with directed forgetting (DF), evaluating subjects' hypnotic susceptibility, hypnotized or not. Experiment 1 suggested that the memory processes in PHA and DF were not the same. Low and high susceptibility subjects responded differently in the two contexts. Experiment 2 demonstrated a context effect for highly susceptible subjects: They showed the usual DF response outside hypnosis but not during hypnosis. Experiment 3 showed that high and low susceptibility subjects responded similarly to DF instructions outside hypnosis, eliminating the susceptibility as an important variable in the DF response. We concluded: (a) The interaction of context and susceptibility was the important determinant of unusual DF responses for high susceptibles, and (b) information processing concepts are too limited to explain PHA and perhaps DF. Theories that include interactions appear necessary for an accurate understanding of hypnotic phenomena and perhaps some phenomena usually focused on by cognitive psychology.     

Stratification in perception and action

Summary This paper discusses the concept of stratification, in the sense of levels of analysis and levels of control, in relation to human perception and performance. It is contended that functional analysis is the proper level of analysis for the domain of perception and action. This is illustrated by means of models of cognitive energetics and motor control. The functional level of analysis can be situated in between the level of symbolic representations and the level of neurophysiological mechanisms. It is also argued that the concept of levels of control provides a way of integrating or relating ecological and information-processing approaches to psychology, in the sense that ecological psychology is concerned with lower and more peripheral levels of control (coordinative structures). Finally, some remarks are made on the relation between cognition and perception and action, drawing on Piaget, and it is proposed that the concept of schema is more appropriate for the domain of perception and action than is the notion of symbolic representations.     

An ecological analysis of knowing by wielding.

The ecological approach to perception, as developed by James Gibson, is described and applied to how one knows, by means of the haptic perceptual system, various properties of hand-held objects. Four sets of experiments are reviewed in which subjects reported on the extent, orientation, shape, and fractional components of unseen objects wielded freely. For each task, an invariant specific to the object property in question is identified in the structured arrays of rotational moments and strains produced by the act of wielding. Results are discussed in relation to the concepts of attention and stimulation, as reformulated by the ecological approach, and the general theory of perception as information pickup.     

Apperception in primed problem solving

Mental representation is a central theoretical concept in modern cognitive psychology. However, its investigation has been predominantly based on inapt perceptualist concepts, which presume that information contents in them, i.e., mental contents, solely arise from stimulus. This is in spite of the evidence that much in human thought does not have any sensory equivalence. Consequently, we make a difference between perception and apperception, as e.g., Kant and Wundt did, and argue in favor of a detailed analysis of this mental process that is responsible for the construction of representations. We present here five primed problem solving experiments. The basic idea was to demonstrate that depending on priming information people represent perceptually identical stimuli very differently, i.e., they ascribe different uses and meanings to objects and they integrate them differently to compose distinct solutions. In this vein, we demonstrate that people regularly rely on information, which is not or cannot be perceived in principle. On the ground of our empirical findings, we resurrect the issue on why the difference between perception and apperception is theoretically adequate and introduce some central concepts for the theoretical analysis of apperception such as "seeing as" and functional binding.     

Countertransference as active imagination: imaginative experiences of the analyst

Active imagination is at the heart of Jung's elucidation of depth psychology. Yet, in the discourse of present day analytical psychology theory it is not always given the serious attention accorded to some other Jungian concepts. Active imagination emerges spontaneously within the 'third' area--the imaginal or dynamic field--in-between patient and analyst. It is commonly regarded as the patient's experience but I am proposing that, looked upon as the analyst's experience as well, active imagination offers a distinctly Jungian way of understanding some forms of countertransference. I am describing what I think many present-day analytical psychologists already do in their clinical practice but, as far as I know, it has not been theorized in quite this way before. The intention is to exploit the unique contribution of our Jungian heritage by reframing certain profoundly symbolic countertransference-generated imagery as active imagination. In this article these are differentiated from other less complex forms of imaginative countertransference through examples from clinical practice. The point is that such countertransference experiences may activate the symbolic function in the analyst and thus contribute to the mediation of emergent consciousness in the analysand.