The influence of attentional focus on the development of skill representation in a complex action

ObjectivesRecent research has indicated that performers' mental representation of a motor skill changes over the course of learning. In the present study, we sought to ascertain whether the type of instructions (instructions that emphasize either an internal or external focus of attention) influences the development of skill representation during motor learning.DesignParticipants without golf experience were recruited to practice a golf putting task over the course of three training days. Participants were randomly assigned to either an internal focus (focus on the swing of the arms; n = 10) or external focus (focus on the speed of the ball roll; n = 10) learning group. Changes in putting performance and mental representation structure were assessed over the course of learning, as well as during a follow-up retention test two days after practice.MethodsMental representation structure was measured employing the structural dimensional analysis of mental representations (SDA-M), which provided psychometric data on the structure of the mental representation in long-term memory. Additionally, the change in putting accuracy and consistency was recorded over the course of learning.ResultsFindings indicated that the external focus group performed with greater accuracy and consistency during training, and revealed a larger degree of development in their mental representation of the putting task.ConclusionsOverall, our findings suggest that facilitating the link between an action and its effect by means of an external focus is crucial for motor performance as well as the development of skill representation.     

Recent Scholarship on Hume's Theory of Mental Representation

In a recent paper, Karl Schafer argues that Hume's theory of mental representation has two distinct components, unified by their shared feature of having accuracy conditions. As Schafer sees it, simple and complex ideas represent the intrinsic imagistic features of their objects whereas abstract ideas represent the relations or structures in which multiple objects stand. This distinction, however, is untenable for at least two related reasons. Firstly, complex ideas represent the relations or structures in which the impressions that are the objects of their simple components stand. Secondly, abstract ideas are themselves instances of complex ideas. I draw two important conclusions from these facts. Firstly, contra Schafer and Garrett (to whom Schafer responds), the Copy Principle, properly emended, constitutes the entirety of Hume's theory of mental representation. Secondly, whereas paradigm examples of complex ideas, e.g. ideas of spatial and temporal complexes, are structured by relations of contiguity, abstract ideas are those complex ideas instead structured by relations of resemblance. As such, they represent their objects not as spatially or temporally contiguous but rather as resembling.     

Visual enhancement of touch and the bodily self

We experience our own body through both touch and vision. We further see that others’ bodies are similar to our own body, but we have no direct experience of touch on others’ bodies. Therefore, relations between vision and touch are important for the sense of self and for mental representation of one’s own body. For example, seeing the hand improves tactile acuity on the hand, compared to seeing a non-hand object. While several studies have demonstrated this visual enhancement of touch (VET) effect, its relation to the ‘bodily self’, or mental representation of one’s own body remains unclear. We examined whether VET is an effect of seeing a hand, or of seeing my hand, using the rubber hand illusion. In this illusion, a prosthetic hand which is brushed synchronously—but not asynchronously—with one’s own hand is felt to actually be one’s hand. Thus, we manipulated whether or not participants felt like they were looking directly at their hand, while holding the actual stimulus they viewed constant. Tactile acuity was measured by having participants judge the orientation of square-wave gratings. Two characteristic effects of VET were observed: (1) cross-modal enhancement from seeing the hand was inversely related to overall tactile acuity, and (2) participants near sensory threshold showed significant improvement following synchronous stroking, compared to asynchronous stroking or no stroking at all. These results demonstrate a clear functional relation between the bodily self and basic tactile perception.     

Content: Covariation,control and contingency

The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically simple mental representation, proposing that the content of such a representation is determined by the intersection of the representation's correlational and control properties. The theory is distinguished from standard information-based accounts of mental content in allowing that the relevant correlations be contingent while insisting on an efferent aspect to mental content. The theory on offer allows for a natural explanation of misrepresentation, finds a niche for the notion ofnarrow content, welcomes radical first person fallibility with respect to questions of content, admits of mental ambiguity and recognizes that the future of a psychological agent is a factor in determining the content of the agent's present psychological states.     

Representation and aspectual shape

One of the most significant characteristics of intentional states is the fact that they represent their intentional objects under selective aspects (or modes of presentation); that is, that they manifest an aspectual shape (Searle, 1992). Surprisingly however, although this remarkable feature is widely recognized little has been done to explain what makes representation aspect-relative in the first-place. In this article I attempt to outline an answer to this question. I begin with a critique of Searle's explanation of aspectual shape as anchored in conscious experience. I argue next that, since to represent an object under an aspect is to represent it relative to a selective set of properties, the task - from the perspective of a theory of mental representation - is to explain what makes intentional states property-relative. It is then argued that while this task cannot be handled properly by standard (in particular computational-representational) theories of mental representation, a shift towards an action-based framework for theories of perception and representation promises to provide the key with which to unlock the puzzle.     

Thalamic fear

This paper suggests that some neuroscience concepts particularly concerned with brain pathways in trauma and fear, as well as the neurobiology of emotion, provide an additional vertex to the psychoanalytic understanding of patients' material. The role of the body has been neglected in psychoanalytic thought and formulations in favour of purely ‘mental’ experience. The paper attempts to show how neuro-psychoanalytic understanding, which is conveyed to patients through interpretation, can increase their depth of understanding. Different types of memory are delineated and the paper describes a simplified schema of emotional processing, drawing on Damasio's distinction between emotion as an instinctual body based experience and its mental representation as feeling. Clinical examples are used to illustrate the usefulness of the distinction. The concept of emotional regulation is discussed as well as showing how its failure is associated with the appearance of persecutory superego structures.     

Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.     

Psychological distance reduces the effect of internalized stigma on mental health treatment decisions

Although stigma is a major barrier to treatment for those with mental health concerns, it is poorly understood when stigma is more or less influential in mental health treatment decisions. In the current work, we examined whether psychological distance—the removal of an event from direct experience—reduced the influence of internalized stigma on willingness to seek treatment. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that psychological distance versus proximity (e.g., seeking treatment in three months vs. in two days, respectively) decreases the negative influence of stigma on willingness to seek treatment. We focused on a population for whom mental health treatment decisions are personally-relevant: individuals who had previously sought mental health treatment. Experiment 1 showed that the extent to which these individuals internalized (i.e., personally endorsed) stigma about mental illness predicted lower intentions to make an appointment with a mental health care provider for themselves (but not another person). Experiment 2 replicated this result using a different measure of psychological distance (temporal distance) and extended this finding to behavior (time spent reading mental health resources). Overall, this research demonstrated that internalized stigma disrupts mental health treatment-seeking intentions and behaviors when they are psychologically proximal, but not when they are distant. Potential applications of these results are discussed.     

The Occasion-Sensitivity of Thought

On the most common interpretation of occasion-sensitivity what varies cross-contextually is the truth-conditional content of representations. Jerry Fodor argues that when extended to mental representation this view has some problematic consequences. In this paper I outline an approach to occasion-sensitivity which circumvents Fodor’s objections but still maintains that the aspect of thought that guides deliberation and action is occasion-sensitive. On the proposed view, what varies cross-contextually are not truth conditions but rather the conditions for accepting a (true) representation as true relative to a practical goal that is pursued on an occasion. I show that although the proposal entails an error theory this theory is not problematic since it is meant to compensate for the over-generating nature of semantic competence, namely, the fact that not all of the representation’s truth-makers are conducive to a given contextually salient goal.

     

Mental states inside out: Switching costs for emotional and nonemotional sentences that differ in internal and external focus

Mental states—such as thinking, remembering, or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy—have a clear internal component. We feel a certain way when we are in these states. These internal experiences may be simulated when people understand conceptual references to mental states. However, mental states can also be described from an “external” perspective, for example when referring to “smiling.” In those cases, simulation of visible outside features may be more relevant for understanding. In a switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional mental states while manipulating their internal or external focus. The results show that switching costs occur when participants shift between sentences with an internal and an external focus. This suggests that different forms of simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemotional mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a similar way—through the process of simulation.     

The Epistemological Status of Vision and its Implications for Design

Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual representation, namely, the nature of the perceptual encoding. One of the drawbacks of inverse-optics approaches has been the difficulty in defining the constraints needed to make the inference computationally tractable (e.g. regularity assumptions, Bayesian priors, etc.). These constraints, thought to be learned assumptions about the nature of the physical and optical structures of the external world, have to be incorporated into any workable computational model in the inverse-optics paradigm. But inference models that employ an inverse optics plus structural assumptions approach inevitably result in a naïve realist theory of perceptual representation. Another drawback of inference models for theories of perceptual representation is their inability to explain central features of the visual experience. The one most evident in the process and visual understanding of design is the fact that some visual configurations appear, often spontaneously, as perceptually more coherent than others. The epistemological consequences of inferential approaches to vision indicate that they fail to capture enduring aspects of our visual experience. Therefore they may not be suited to a theory of perceptual representation, or useful for an understanding of the role of perception in the design process and product.     

Wittgenstein,Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons

In The Sources of Normativity (Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Christine Korsgaard tried to argue against what she called the ‘privacy’ of reasons, appealing to Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language. In recent work she continues to endorse Wittgenstein's perspective on the normativity of meaning, although she now emphasizes that her own argument was only meant to be analogous to the private language argument. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the Wittgensteinian perspective is not only not useful in support of Korsgaard's general project, but that it is positively inimical to it, in two ways. First, Wittgenstein opposes views on which principled or rule-following behavior requires that one be guided by anything like a mental representation of a rule or principle. But for Korsgaard, human action essentially requires this. Second, Wittgenstein systematically attempts to de-emphasize the importance of the first-personal perspective, and to emphasize the social functions even of concepts that might seem deployed primarily from that perspective: for example, concepts of sensations and intentions. This is the reverse of Korsgaard's emphasis. The paper also argues, however, that the private language argument does have some implications for a theory of rationality and reasons.     

Transgenerational transmission of indigestible facts: from trauma,deadly ghosts and mental voids to meaning‐making interpretations

Abstract: In this paper¹ I will discuss clinical material and make some hypotheses on how to work with patients for whom trans‐generational transmission of trauma is an issue. Basing my hypothesis on two clinical cases, I will propose a way of dealing with undigested facts, the fabric of trauma, which generate deadly ghosts and mental voids that are transmitted from one generation to the next. I will propose a way of formulating interpretations for the unthinkable to become thinkable and find a representation in the mind of patients who suffer from transgenerationally transmitted trauma. Some thoughts will be given to the maternal and the paternal transmitters of trauma in relation to child development issues.     

The Analytic Truth and Falsity of Disjunctions

Disjunctive inferences are difficult. According to the theory of mental models, it is because of the alternative possibilities to which disjunctions refer. Three experiments corroborated further predictions of the mental model theory. Participants judged that disjunctions, such as Either this year is a leap year or it is a common year are true. Given a disjunction such as Either A or B, they tended to evaluate the four cases in its ‘partition’: A and B, A and not‐B, not‐A and B, not‐A and not‐B, as ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ in ways that bore out the difference between inclusive disjunctions (‘or both’) and exclusive disjunctions (‘but not both’). Knowledge usually concerns what is true, and so when participants judge that a disjunction is false, or contingent, and evaluate the cases in its partition, they depend on inferences that yield predictable errors. They tended to judge that disjunctions, such as follows: Either the food is cold or else it is tepid, but not both, are true, though in fact they could be false. They tended to infer ‘mirror‐image’ evaluations that yield the same possibilities for false disjunctions as those for true disjunctions. The article considers the implications of these results for alternative theories based on classical logic or on the probability calculus.     

Unarticulated meaning

It is a common experience of mental life that we come to articulate meanings which we had initially grasped in only a sketchy way. In this paper, I consider how this idea of an initially unarticulated meaning may fit in a general theory of mental representation. I propose to identify unarticulated meanings with what I callspecific concepts, which are quite similar to Rosch's categories of basic objects and are distinct both from images and generic concepts (which come to articulate meanings). I argue that unarticulated meaning is non-representational in an important respect, a claim which relies on a distinction amonglevels of representation.     

Cognitive development as an executive process – in part: a homeopathic dose of Piaget

Piaget’s theory of cognitive development retains its importance through showing us how the exercise of agency is necessary to the development of self–world dualism and to the developing ability to frame explicit judgements about the physical and mental world. I begin by describing the Piagetian position in my own terms (Agency: Its role in mental development, 1996, for a fuller account) and then set it in the context of research on the executive functions. I also argue, however, that the theory lacks the resources to explain second-order mental representation. The theory was insufficiently nativist in general and insufficiently nativist about symbolic capacities in particular. But adopting a nativist view does not preclude one from taking a Piagetian line on the essential contribution of the first-person experience of agency to cognitive development.     

Lukasiewicz's Many-valued Logic and Neoplatonic Scalar Modality

This paper examines the role of ‘situations’ in John Dewey's philosophy of logic. To do this properly it is necessary to contrast Dewey's conception of experience and mentality with views characteristic of modern epistemology. The primary difference is that, rather than treat experience as peripheral and or external to mental functions (reason, etc.), we should treat experience as a field in and as a part of which thinking takes place. Experience in this broad sense subsumes theory and fact, hypothesis and evidence, reason and observation, thought and perception. Logic in this view is a formal study of the generic features of all possible kinds of experience in this broad (thick, deep, wide, multifaceted) sense. The goal of this paper is to explain what Dewey thinks a situation is in the context of this view of experience, and to argue for the fundamental importance of that idea for logic and philosophy in general.     

Mental Spaces from a Functional Perspective

In his book Mental Spaces, Fauconnier develops a powerful theory of human knowledge representation and linguistic processing that handles a variety of problems in linguistics and the philosophy of language in a simple, uniform, and intuitively plausible way. However, he has little to say about the structure or general role of mental spaces in cognition. The present paper proposes that mental spaces are a means of organizing knowledge in support of a general inference method, simulative reasoning, found in various guises both in logic and in Artificial Intelligence. The structuring required to fulfill this role allows us to make a wide variety of predictions which seem to be borne out by evidence from natural language. In attributing a specific function to mental spaces, this paper suggests that the theory of mental spaces defines a potentially significant paradigm for knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence.     

RESILIENCE,AGENCY, AND EVERYDAY LOJONG IN THE TIBETAN DIASPORA

ABSTRACT

Despite exposure to political violence, many Tibetans in the diaspora avoid framing past experience in terms of trauma. Instead, they deploy shared cultural understandings often infused with Buddhist doctrine, to reframe loss, violence and displacement. Drawing on 14 months of ethnographic research in Dharamsala, India conducted in the Tibetan language, this article investigates how Tibetans utilise everyday cultural wisdom framed by lojong (mind-training) teachings to cope with adversity. Here, compassion practices serve to orient members of the diaspora towards recovery even, and perhaps, especially, when they are struggling. In this article, I argue that this cultural form of resilience is better conceived of as a practice of agency than a mental health practice, despite a global interest in adapting meditation and mindfulness for use in clinical settings. This study also challenges theory on structural violence and social suffering, which tends to overemphasise victimhood, bypassing the ordinary (and extraordinary) ways that people find agency.     

Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

This paper explores, from a phenomenological perspective, the conditions necessary for the possession of intentional content, i.e., for being intentionally directed toward the world. It argues that Levinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy makes an important contribution to this task. Intentional directedness, as understood here, is normatively structured. Levinas's ‘ethics’ can be understood as a phenomenological account of how our experience of the other subject as another subject takes place in the recognition of the normative force of a command. This supplies a condition that—as the paper shows by examining Husserl and Sartre on how our experience of the Other constitutes an ‘objective’ world—earlier phenomenologists have misunderstood, because they have treated ethical experience as ‘founded’ on a prior theory of representation (‘ontology’ in Levinas's language). Ethics is first philosophy because it is only by acknowledging the command in the ‘face’ of the Other that we can account for the sensitivity to the normative distinctions that structure intentional content. Throughout, the paper shows how Levinas's analyses, in Totality and Infinity, draw upon and develop the analyses of Husserl and Sartre.