‘How can we help when she won't tell us what's wrong?’ Professionals working with South Asian women who have experienced sexual abuse

In this paper, we explore some of the issues facing professionals in the UK currently involved in providing services for South Asian women who have experienced sexual abuse. The study describes part of a wider Economic and Social Research Council funded project, based upon interviews and focus groups with both professionals and women survivors of sexual abuse. Drawing on semi‐structured interviews and two focus groups with 37 professionals including psychological therapists, refuge and project workers, from a range of organisations, our aim in this paper is to provide a discursive analysis of some of the key dilemmas faced by professionals working with sexual abuse in South Asian communities by exploring two central interpretive repertoires: ‘culture not self’ and ‘symptom talk as solution’. The analysis indicates that professionals face a series of dilemmas when working with South Asian women survivors. They highlight the tension between individualised models of personhood in many psychological therapies and the challenge to these by South Asian communities who hold a more relational view of the person. One of the strategies used by professionals to work with the tensions between ‘culture’ and the ‘reality’ of the survivor's pain was the translation of women's distress into symptoms of mental disorder. However, the consequences of this intervention raised some serious issues, including further pathologisation and stigma. The implications of these findings will be discussed in terms of how to understand the experiences of South Asian women from a more socially grounded perspective and to explore the issues they face in accessing and receiving appropriate services to deal with the aftermath of sexually abusive experiences. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science

Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the ‘causal exclusion’ of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being ‘higher‐order’ properties functionally defined over ‘lower‐order’ properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience that shows that this is the case for the psychological property of fear. Though this may suggest that some psychological properties should be revised in order to conform to those of neurophysiology, the history of science demonstrates that this is not always the outcome, particularly with properties that play an important role in our folk theories and are central to human concerns.     

‘BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND!’ WITTGENSTEINIAN REFLECTIONS ON RATIONALITY AND REASON

Wittgenstein does not talk much explicitly about reason as a general concept, but this paper aims to sketch some thoughts which might fit his later outlook and which are suggested by his approach to language. The need for some notions in the area of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are rooted in our ability to engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges. But because such exchanges can (as Wittgenstein emphasises) be so various, we should expect the notions to come in many versions, shaped by history and culture. Awareness of this variety, and of the distinctive elements of our own Western European history, may provide some defence against the temptation of conceptions, such as that of ‘perfect rationality’, which operate in unhelpfully simplified and idealised terms.     

Processing of audiovisually congruent and incongruent speech in school‐age children with a history of specific language impairment: a behavioral and event‐related potentials study

Previous studies indicate that at least some aspects of audiovisual speech perception are impaired in children with specific language impairment (SLI). However, whether audiovisual processing difficulties are also present in older children with a history of this disorder is unknown. By combining electrophysiological and behavioral measures, we examined perception of both audiovisually congruent and audiovisually incongruent speech in school‐age children with a history of SLI (H‐SLI), their typically developing (TD) peers, and adults. In the first experiment, all participants watched videos of a talker articulating syllables ‘ba’, ‘da’, and ‘ga’ under three conditions – audiovisual (AV), auditory only (A), and visual only (V). The amplitude of the N1 (but not of the P2) event‐related component elicited in the AV condition was significantly reduced compared to the N1 amplitude measured from the sum of the A and V conditions in all groups of participants. Because N1 attenuation to AV speech is thought to index the degree to which facial movements predict the onset of the auditory signal, our findings suggest that this aspect of audiovisual speech perception is mature by mid‐childhood and is normal in the H‐SLI children. In the second experiment, participants watched videos of audivisually incongruent syllables created to elicit the so‐called McGurk illusion (with an auditory ‘pa’ dubbed onto a visual articulation of ‘ka’, and the expectant perception being that of ‘ta’ if audiovisual integration took place). As a group, H‐SLI children were significantly more likely than either TD children or adults to hear the McGurk syllable as ‘pa’ (in agreement with its auditory component) than as ‘ka’ (in agreement with its visual component), suggesting that susceptibility to the McGurk illusion is reduced in at least some children with a history of SLI. Taken together, the results of the two experiments argue against global audiovisual integration impairment in children with a history of SLI and suggest that, when present, audiovisual integration difficulties in this population likely stem from a later (non‐sensory) stage of processing.     

Materialism and ‘the soft substance of the brain’: Diderot and plasticity

ABSTRACT

Materialism is the view that everything that is real is material or is the product of material processes. It tends to take either a ‘cosmological’ form, as a claim about the ultimate nature of the world, or a more specific ‘psychological’ form, detailing how mental processes are brain processes. I focus on the second, psychological or cerebral form of materialism. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the French materialist philosopher Denis Diderot was one of the first to notice that any self-respecting materialist had to address the question of the status and functional role of the brain, and its relation to our mental life. After this the topic grew stale, with knee-jerk reiterations of ‘psychophysical identity’ in the nineteenth-century, and equally rigid assertions of anti-materialism. In 1960s philosophy of mind, brain–mind materialism reemerged as ‘identity theory’, focusing on the identity between mental processes and cerebral processes. In contrast, Diderot’s cerebral materialism allows for a more culturally sedimented sense of the brain, which he described in his late Elements of Physiology as a ‘book – except it is a book which reads itself’. Diderot thus provides a lesson for materialism as it reflects on the status of the brain, science and culture.     

Transcultural histories of psychotherapy

Abstract

Both proponents of and critics tend to assume psychotherapy’s origin and status as a ‘Western’ practice. The history of the emergence of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are far more complex than this picture allows for. Today as we enter a more multipolar era of world history, the easy identification of psychotherapy with ‘the West’ will become increasingly difficult to sustain, as Bangalore and Shanghai are likely to rival Hampstead and Manhattan as centres of influence for the development of therapeutic practice and theory in the coming decades. Adapting to this new world will necessitate a different conception of the role of ‘culture’ than we have been used to in recent discussions in psychotherapy. Rather than simply seeing ‘culture’ as a factor that needs to be added to discussions to counteract the alleged ethnocentrism of ‘Western’ psychotherapy, we will need to begin to pay more careful attention to the work that is done by appeals to the ‘culture concept’ in different contexts. In particular ‘culture’ can be constructed as an object of evaluation that makes it part of the ‘check-list’ of skills that characterise the reconception of psychotherapy in an era of neoliberal instrumental manualised therapy training and practice.     

The subjective effort of everyday mental tasks: Attending,assessing, and choosing

Why are some mental tasks experienced as more effortful than others? Answers to this question about subjective effort have begun to be addressed by researchers investigating why some mental tasks are associated with more ‘elbow grease’ or ‘depletion’ than other tasks. It has been proposed that tasks such as sustained attention should be accompanied by more subjective effort than other tasks, such as assessing (e.g., counting a handful of items) or choosing randomly between two alternatives. In general, these proposals coincide with people’s intuitions regarding how effort should vary by mental task. However, little laboratory data have corroborated these conclusions. In two studies, we cataloged the relative amount of subjective effort associated with some basic and ubiquitous mental activities: attending (most subjective effort), assessing, and choosing (least subjective effort). Results support hypotheses about subjective effort. Because subjective effort is perceived to be experienced by a subject, we explored also the relationship between effort and the involvement of the ‘psychological self.’     

Psychiatric diagnoses, ‘thought styles’, and ex post facto fact fallacies

Living in two-way, dialogical relations with our surroundings, rather than in monological, one-way causal relations with them, means that we can no longer treat ourselves as inquiring simply into a world of objective ‘things’ already existing in the world around us. We need to see ourselves instead as always acting ‘from within’ a still-in-process world of flowing streams of intermingling activities affecting us as much, if not more, than we can affect them. In such a world as this, instead of discovering pre-existing things in our inquiries, we continually bring such ‘things’ into existence. So, although we may talk of having discovering certain nameable ‘things’ in our inquiries, the fact is, we can only see such ‘things’ as having been at work in people’s activities after they have performed them. This, I want to argue, is also the case with all our diagnostic categories of mental distress – thus to see the ‘things’ they name as the causes of a person’s distress is to commit an ex post facto fact fallacy. Something else altogether ‘moves’ people in the performance of their actions than the nameable ‘things’ we currently claim to have discovered in our inquiries.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm,and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections (Paper 2 of 2)

This second of two papers focuses on the shame which emerged in the first 14 years of analysis of a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed, and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. To explore this intense and pervasive shame I draw on Jung's and Laplanche's emphasis on experiences of unresolvable, non‐pathological ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at the heart of the psyche. Images, metaphors, elements of clinical experience, and working hypotheses from a number of analytic traditions are used to flesh out this exploration. These include Kilborne's use of Pirandello's image of shame as like a ‘hole in the paper sky’ which, I suggest, points to a crack in subjectivity, and reveals our belief in the efficacy of the self to be illusory. Hultberg's observations on shame as having an existential mode (function) are also explored, as is the nature of analytic truth. Using these ideas I describe my patient's process of finding some small but freeing space in relation to her shame and self‐hatred. Through enduring and learning from her shame in analysis she realized that it was part of a desperate unconscious attempt to draw close to her troubled father and so to ‘love him better’.     

Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of “Perspicuous Presentation”1

Gordon Baker in his last decade published a series of papers (now collected in Baker 2004 ), which are revolutionary in their proposals for understanding of later Wittgenstein. Taking our lead from the first of those papers, on “perspicuous presentations,” we offer new criticisms of ‘elucidatory’ readers of later Wittgenstein, such as Peter Hacker: we argue that their readings fail to connect with the radically therapeutic intent of the ‘perspicuous presentation’ concept, as an achievement‐term, rather than a kind of ‘objective’ mapping of a ‘conceptual landscape.’ Baker's Wittgenstein, far from being a ‘language policeman’ of the kind that often fails to influence mainstream philosophy, offers an alternative to the latent scientism of Wittgenstein's influential ‘elucidatory’ readers.     

文化差异影响彝、白、纳西和汉族大学生对黑白的认知

以彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的大学生为被试,采用颜色相似性判断和颜色再认任务,考察了彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的大学生对于黑色和白色的认知,意在探究不同民族的黑、白文化是否影响人们对黑、白颜色的认知。结果发现：⑴彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的黑、白文化影响四个民族的大学生对于黑色和白色的认知;⑵语言和文化对于颜色认知的影响包括间接效应和直接效应。整个研究表明,语言和文化对颜色认知有重要影响     

Transparency and reflection

ABSTRACT

Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge.     

End notes: two unpublished presentations by Michael Fordham

Following the publication in this journal of two of Fordham's unpublished papers selected by James Astor (2010, 55, 5), the editors have asked me to select a further two. I have chosen two clinical pieces, one clinical notes and the other notes that refine his previous thinking, which Fordham wrote at the end of his life. Both are examples of the way Fordham continued throughout his analytic work to turn to patients as his primary source of learning. Fordham presented the first piece, ‘A case study’, to Parkside Clinic in 1988. Its subject is his last child patient, a nine‐year‐old boy with behaviour problems that destroyed the analytic frame. The second is clearly for an SAP (Society of Analytical Psychology) audience and written probably around 1992–93. It is titled ‘Some comments on transference and countertransference’ and contains material from the patient who has become known through papers in this journal as ‘K’. The two pieces are presented together within a commentary rather than separately with footnotes, in order to provide some context for Fordham's thinking in his late years.     

Number-space associations without language: Evidence from preverbal human infants and non-human animal species

It is well known that humans describe and think of numbers as being represented in a spatial configuration, known as the ‘mental number line’. The orientation of this representation appears to depend on the direction of writing and reading habits present in a given culture (e.g., left-to-right oriented in Western cultures), which makes this factor an ideal candidate to account for the origins of the spatial representation of numbers. However, a growing number of studies have demonstrated that non-verbal subjects (preverbal infants and non-human animals) spontaneously associate numbers and space. In this review, we discuss evidence showing that pre-verbal infants and non-human animals associate small numerical magnitudes with short spatial extents and left-sided space, and large numerical magnitudes with long spatial extents and right-sided space. Together this evidence supports the idea that a more biologically oriented view can account for the origins of the ‘mental number line’. In this paper, we discuss this alternative view and elaborate on how culture can shape a core, fundamental, number–space association.     

Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

The client,the therapist and the paranormal: a response to the special edition on psychotherapy and the paranormal

Abstract

In this paper, I provide a published paper response to the papers in this special edition on the paranormal and psychotherapy articulated largely from my career as a parapsychologist. In the introduction I note the definitional differences between advocates and counter-advocates in terms of what might be ‘paranormal’, although I argue ultimately that definitional differences aside, the therapist’s relationship with the client’s unusual experiences is critical, taking a phenomenological stance which is echoed by at least two of the papers in the special edition. In broad review, the papers make a variety of welcome contributions; historical individually and small sample phenomenological and also more metaphorically in terms of articulations of the haunting nature of collective and intergenerational trauma in the social and cultural sphere. I review the papers from a parapsychological perspective, considering the evidence drawn from parapsychological studies where it supports or adds to the topics of each paper. In concluding this response, it seems clear that therapists often work from first principles when relating to clients’ anomalous experiences, and that the papers of the special edition each offer practising therapists some important evidential and practical insights into working with client presentations of ostensibly paranormal and anomalous experiences.     

No Outside,No Inside: Duality,Reality and Vasubandhu's Illusory Elephant

Some of the basic terminology of Yogācāra philosophy needs reevaluation. Whereas commentaries almost universally gloss the term dvaya (‘duality’) with some version of the phrase grāhya grāhaka ca (lit. ‘grasped and grasper’, but usually translated as ‘subject and object’), in fact this gloss is absent from the earliest strata. The term and its gloss are derived from separate streams of Yogācāra reasoning—one from discussions of linguistic conceptualization and the other from discussions of perception. Once we see that these two are distinct, it becomes clear that the commentarial literature asserts their identity in order to philosophically unify Yogācāra thought. One upshot of this is that even in this later assertion ‘duality’ refers not to the distinction between internal and external reality (as in ‘textbook’ Yogācāra), but to the falsely projected distinction between mental subjects and mental objects.     

THE SORROW THAT DARE NOT SAY ITS NAME: THE INADEQUATE FATHER,THE MOTOR OF HISTORY

Although the following essay is literary‐philosophical, it arose from a practical interest. I have been struck by how widespread today is the complaint about the ‘inadequate father’. Of course a father may be inadequate in diverse ways, either absconding, absent and weak, or overbearing, bullying, and tyrannical, or some combination of these. Further, I am not restricting the term ‘father’ to its narrow biological sense, but using it rather as a metaphor for any institution or structure which an individual or a group feels should have been in place to guide, direct, and protect them in important situations, but did not do its job properly. Consequently they are willing to concede they are not all they could have been, but they insist it is not their fault, rather the fault of the ‘father’ who should have done his job better. This ties in with the fashionable appeal of ‘victimhood’. Everybody today seems to want to cast themselves as a ‘victim’, for reasons similar to those mentioned above. If you are a ‘victim’, then there must be an ‘oppressor’– and some ‘parent’ organization that should have guided, directed, and protected you against the oppressor, but again did not do its job adequately. It is striking how many individuals and groups around the world today choose to perceive themselves, and to present themselves to others, as ‘victims’; it has indeed become a preferred characterization of our age, for it carries with it a rhetorical advantage that trumps all others. If you are able to cast yourself as a ‘victim’, and have others accept this, you disarm and neutralize criticism, not only of what you are, but of what you are currently doing – because the latter can be presented as a just ‘compensation’ for what you have suffered. As with guilt, there is no built‐in quota or statute of limitations. This rhetoric was not as common thirty or forty years ago. There is an added factor here in America and the New World generally where, according to a whispered criticism, as our ancestors crossed the ocean, they experienced a ‘drop in civilization’. Life here was initially without some of the structures and institutions which had evolved over thousands of years in the Old World, which could thus be presumed there but here were absent. As we won with difficulty our independence, we unconsciously repudiated much of the ‘higher culture’ of the colonial master, throwing out the baby with the bathwater. As the ‘economic bubble’ of having won the Second World War has gradually dissipated, we discover we are handicapped by an absence of the forms of maturation and self‐realization that arise in and are necessary for dealing with prolonged peace. In our ‘ideology of liberty’, our adults become essentially grown children, unschooled in anything higher, and thus have particular difficulty assuming the responsibilities of parenthood. They are forced to fall back upon a military style of giving orders, because on this side of the water, ‘final causes’ in the form of commonly admired or agreed on goals for striving are not in place. In this sense there is an absence of the ‘adequate father’. Further, as ‘American Culture’ expands through publicity and the media, we spread the same disease. There is another relevant factor, the ‘celebrity‐liberationist’ lifestyle that has been diffused into the general population since the 1960's and has become a default secular ethic of our time, replacing the traditional Judeo‐Christian decalogue. The former is invoked as a justification for aggressively seeking fame and fortune, and making no attempt to conceal this; rather than worrying that such an attitude will cause offense, it is worn proudly and defiantly in the hope that others will identify with it, thereby branding the performer a cultural hero. This popular strategy towards fulfilment itself rests on a metaphysic of ‘expressive individualism’, a position that holds that the supreme ethical imperative to which other obligations must be subordinated is for each to bring forward their hidden noumenal core, the only source of value, into phenomenal appearances where it may be admired and benefit others and such that creation will for the first time be complete. This change in Western culture made possible by greater affluence and security represents a trickle‐down phenomenon and democritization of the awe reserved for the artist revered as a genius during the nineteenth century, now spread to the entire population. Anything that constrains this expansion, which interrupts or limits this transfer, is to be rejected as parental abuse, psychological repression, or cultural imperialism.     

Intrapsychic-Interpsychic

The ‘interpsychic’ is an extended psychic dimension, regarding the joint functioning and reciprocal influences of two minds. The concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘person’ can be included in the ‘interpsychic’. They can also overlap with each other, and sometimes all three can overlap together, but they do not necessarily coincide. In the different contemporary perspectives, how can we modify the intrapsychic ‘through’ (and ‘with’ and ‘by’) the interpsychic? Presenting four clinical vignettes, the author progressively moves from the theoretical positions that emphasise the exploration and the elaboration of the intrapsychic mainly through the intrapsychic, to the positions that emphasise the same operations mainly through the interpsychic. The last part of the paper deals with the technical use of the interpsychic dimension: the analytic dialogue, when interpsychically experienced (from inside), gains a new, more specific effectiveness, first in containing and then in symbolising. In an intense mental ‘cohabitation’ inside the analytic working pair, it is very often clearly experienced as ‘true’ (as in dreams).     

WHY SHOULD IDEAL REASONERS BECOME EVIL COMPUTERS?

In his article on ‘Technophobic themes in pre-1990 computer films’, Anton Karl Kozlovic provides an insightful analysis of the theme of ‘evil computers’ in many popular culture films (Kozlovic, 2003). Kozlovic’s focus is on finding the broad, negative categories such as ‘humanity’s rivals’ and ‘humanity’s dominators’ which reappear throughout computer films (p. 4). Kozlovic urges science educators to become aware of the history of these negative pop culture images and engage in ‘consciousness raising activities’ with the aim of correcting fictional excesses and perhaps influencing future depictions of computers in a more positive, engaging direction. Interestingly enough, Kozlovic points out that despite the very negative and unflattering portrayal of robotics and AI, computer films are nevertheless ‘enthusiastically enjoyed by real world professionals in the computer, robotics, and AI fields...’ and cites several sources to document this point (p. 3). Kozlovic says that for these professionals the film is a form of ‘waking dream fueling the desire for the power of imagination and the act of construction’ (p. 3).