Social Affordances and the Possibility of Ecological Linguistics

This paper includes an effort to extend the notion of affordance from a philosophical point of view the importance of ecological approach for social psychology, ethics, and linguistics. Affordances are not always merely physical but also interpersonal and social. I will conceptualize affordance in general and social affordance in particular, and will elucidate the relation between intentional action and affordances, and that between affordances and free will. I will also focus on the relation between social institution and affordance. An extended theory of affordances can provide a way to analyze in concrete ways how social institution works as an implicit background of interpersonal interactions. Ecological approach considers social institution as the producer and maintainer of affordances. Social institutions construct the niches for human beings. Finally, I will argue the possibility of the ecological linguistics. Language is a social institution. The system of signs is the way to articulate and differentiate interpersonal affordances. Language acquires its meaning, i.e. communicative power in the interpersonal interactions, and interpersonal interactions, in turn, develop and are elaborated through the usage of signs. Communication is seen as never aimed to transmit inner ideas to others, but to guide and adjust the behaviors of others thorough articulating the affordance of responsible-ness.     

Affordances,context and sociality

Affordances, i.e. the opportunity of actions offered by the environment, are one of the central research topics for the theoretical perspectives that view cognition as emerging from the interaction between the environment and the body. Being at the bridge between perception and action, affordances help to question a dichotomous view of perception and action. While Gibson’s view of affordances is mainly externalist, many contemporary approaches define affordances (and micro-affordances) as the product of long-term visuomotor associations in the brain. These studies have emphasized the fact that affordances are activated automatically, independently from the context and the previous intention to act: for example, affordances related to objects’ size would emerge even if the task does not require focusing on size. This emphasis on the automaticity of affordances has led to overlook their flexibility and contextual-dependency. In this contribution I will outline and discuss recent perspectives and evidence that reveal the flexibility and context-dependency of affordances, clarifying how they are modulated by the physical, cultural and social context. I will focus specifically on social affordances, i.e. on how perception of affordances might be influenced by the presence of multiple actors having different goals.

     

What’s Inside Your Head Once You’ve Figured Out What Your Head’s Inside Of

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.     

Scaling-up skilled intentionality to linguistic thought

Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and computational operations carried out on internal mental representations. Radical approaches propose to reconceive cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. An outstanding challenge for such a philosophical project is how to scale-up from perception and action to cases of what is typically called ‘higher-order’ cognition such as linguistic thought, the case we focus on in this paper. Perception and action are naturally described in terms of agent-environment dynamics, but can a person’s thoughts about absent, abstract or counterfactual states of affairs also be accounted for in such terms? We argue such a question will seem pressing so long as one fails to appreciate how richly resourceful the human ecological niche is in terms of the affordances it provides. The explanatory work that is supposedly done by mental representations in a philosophical analysis of cognition, can instead be done by looking outside of the head to the environment structured by sociomaterial practices, and the affordances it makes available. Once one recognizes how much of the human ecological niche has become structured by activities of talking and writing, this should take away at least some of the motivation for understanding linguistic thinking in terms of content-bearing internal representations. We’ll argue that people can think about absent, abstract or counterfactual because of their skills for engaging with what we will call “enlanguaged affordances”. We make use of the phenomenological analysis of speech in Merleau-Ponty to show how the multiple affordances an individual is ready to engage with in a particular situation will typically include enlanguaged affordances.

     

Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency

The concept of agency has been central to ecological approaches to psychology. Gibson, one of the founders of this movement, made room for this concept by arguing against the mechanistic conceptions in psychology. In his view, the environment is not a collection of causes that pushes the animal around, but consist of action possibilities, which he coined affordances. In making their way in the world, animals regulate their behavior with respect to these possibilities. Reed later developed this ecological conception of agency, following Gibson in conceiving of affordances as action possibilities. However, drawing upon industrial design, architecture, and phenomenology, we argue that affordances are not mere action possibilities but that they can also invite behavior. We suggest a mutualist perspective on invitations, suggesting that they depend on the animal-environment relationship in multiple dimensions. The implications of this new conception of affordances for the ecological account of agency are explored.     

Collective Affordances

Abstract

This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her “embodied social identity” of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.     

The Essential Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Perception

ABSTRACT

Traditional theories of perception developed for centuries before Darwin conceived his theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Although many areas of psychological theory and research now have mainstream approaches strongly influenced by evolutionary thinking, mainstream perceptual theory remains close to its pre-Darwinian roots. This paper draws on insights from ecological psychology, especially as represented in J. J. Gibson's The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), to identify 4 elements that any future evolutionary approach to perception should be expected to include: (a) an ecological analysis of ambient energy, (b) a comparative understanding of the perceptual abilities of different species, (c) a dynamic understanding of organism–environment interaction as essential for perception, and (d) an understanding of perceptual attunement based on the concept of affordances. Each of these elements serves an essential theoretical role while also pointing toward lines of research where much work remains to be done. The presence of these elements explains, in part, the affinity between ecological psychology and other evolutionarily grounded approaches to psychology, including the emerging fields of enactivism and embodied cognition.     

Determining sociability, social space, and social presence in (a)synchronous collaborative groups.

The effectiveness of group learning in asynchronous distributed learning groups depends on the social interaction that takes place. This social interaction affects both cognitive and socioemotional processes that take place during learning, group forming, establishment of group structures, and group dynamics. Though now known to be important, this aspect is often ignored, denied or forgotten by educators and researchers who tend to concentrate on cognitive processes and on-task contexts. This "one-sided" educational focus largely determines the set of requirements in the design of computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL) environments resulting in functional CSCL environments. In contrast, our research is aimed at the design and implementation of sociable CSCL environments which may increase the likelihood that a sound social space will emerge. We use a theoretical framework that is based upon an ecological approach to social interaction, centering on the concept of social affordances, the concept of the sociability of CSCL environments, and social presence theory. The hypothesis is that the higher the sociability, the more likely that social interaction will take place or will increase, and the more likely that this will result in an emerging sound social space. In the present research, the variables of interest are sociability, social space, and social presence. This study deals with the construction and validation of three instruments to determine sociability, social space, and social presence in (a)synchronous collaborating groups. The findings suggest that the instruments have potential to be useful as measures for the respective variables. However, it must be realized that these measures are "first steps."     

Perceiving affordances for another person's actions

The perception of affordances for the actions of other people (actors) was examined. Observers judged the maximum and preferred sitting heights of tall and short actors. Judgments were scaled in centimeters, as a proportion of the observer's leg length, and as a proportion of each actor's leg length. In Experiment 1 observers viewed live actors standing next to a chair. When judgments were scaled by actor leg length, they reflected the actual ordinal relation between the capabilities of the actors. The perception of affordances from kinematic displays was then evaluated. Observers differentiated tall and short actors, but only when the displays contained direct information about relations between the actors and the chair. It is concluded that observers can perceive affordances for the actions of actors and that kinematic displays can be enough to support such percepts if they preserve actor-environment relations that define affordances.     

权力基础理论:对应生存需要的权力

权力是社会关系和社会活动的核心,对应于生存需要,与人们的生活品质息息相关。采用心理–生态途径,权力基础理论将其界定为个体依据环境限制与供给满足自身需要的能力,并识别出6种基本权力类型,同时阐述了权力动态性如何通过增生性交易导致或加剧社会不平等。该理论试图从人际和群际心理层面探讨权力的起源问题,并将其与一般社会不平等现象建立联系,为权力的社会心理学研究提供了一个崭新的视角。     

Inviting affordances and agency

Recently several authors have suggested that affordances are not mere possibilities for action but can also invite behavior. This reconceptualization of affordances asks for a reconsideration of the ecological approach to agency. After a portrayal of the role of agency in ecological psychology, we draw upon phenomenology to reveal what it means for an agent to be invited by affordances. We sketch a dynamical model of the animal-environment relationship that aims to do justice to this analysis. In the model, agency is conceptualized as the capacity to modulate the coupling strength with the environment—the agent can influence to what extent he or she is influenced by the different invitations. This account of agency keeps us far from the Cartesian idea that the agent imposes behavior. Indeed, by modulating the coupling strength, the agent simply alters the dynamics of the animal-environment interactions and thus the behavior that emerges.     

Influence of Approach Angle on Estimates of Time-To-Contact

What distinguishes affordances from events depends on the capacities of the perceiver, in the sense of distinction between open versus closed behavioral programs (Popper, 1978, p. 353). Recent evolutionary history has rendered human perceptual capacities uniquely open. As well as formalization, deeper consideration of mutuality relations will enrich the concept of affordance and link the ecological approach to recent developments in psychology.     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

The Social Constitution of Perceiver-Environment Reciprocity

Although animal—environment reciprocity is central to ecological psychology, one facet of this viewpoint remains underappreciated: organisms alter environments so as to better function in them. In many species this activity of “niche construction” includes coordinated actions by individuals jointly working toward common ends. Mounting paleontological and archeological evidence indicates that human evolution should be viewed in the light of such social considerations. The environment of our immediate human ancestors was marked by, among other things, group settlements, manufactured stone tools, and extensive migration. An emerging species such as ours, whose distinctive psychological qualities offered a selective advantage relative to these conditions, would flourish particularly if it could preserve the gains of prior generations even as its members continued to transform econiche features in functionally significant ways. This evolutionary perspective, with its due recognition of sociocultural processes, highlights 3 factors of importance for ecological psychology: (1) the history of person-environment reciprocity results in human environments whose natural and sociocultural factors are inextricably intertwined. (2) developing individuals enter human environments not as solitary explorers but through the guidance of more experienced persons with the result that much development takes shape through social mediation; and (3) a distinguishing and ubiquitous feature of human environments that is a product of collective human actions is places. Nearly all human activity, including most psychological research, occurs in places, and owing to their psychological significance, it would seem impossible to disentangle psychological and social processes. These 3 factors illuminate that a fully-realized ecological psychology will be one that includes recognition of the constitutive role played by social processes.     

Affordances and infant learning: A reply to Horowitz

We reply to three major points made by F. Horowitz (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 405–409) in her commentary on the ecological approach to infant knowing presented by E. Goldfield (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 371–404). We first clarify the relation between perceiving and acting from an ecological perspective, and distinguish between affordances as environmental properties scaled to the perceiver/performer and representations as mental structures. We then present a critique of the process of association offered by Horowitz as an explanation of infant learning. Association fails to specify the constraints on what is learned, while the ecological process of noticing affordances, presented by Goldfield, considers such constraints. We conclude by presenting operational criteria for measuring affordances and evidence that perception is scaled to the perceiver/performer.     

Making Big Communities Small: Using Network Science to Understand the Ecological and Behavioral Requirements for Community Social Capital

The concept of social capital is becoming increasingly common in community psychology and elsewhere. However, the multiple conceptual and operational definitions of social capital challenge its utility as a theoretical tool. The goals of this paper are to clarify two forms of social capital (bridging and bonding), explicitly link them to the structural characteristics of small world networks, and explore the behavioral and ecological prerequisites of its formation. First, I use the tools of network science and specifically the concept of small‐world networks to clarify what patterns of social relationships are likely to facilitate social capital formation. Second, I use an agent‐based model to explore how different ecological characteristics (diversity and segregation) and behavioral tendencies (homophily and proximity) impact communities’ potential for developing social capital. The results suggest diverse communities have the greatest potential to develop community social capital, and that segregation moderates the effects that the behavioral tendencies of homophily and proximity have on community social capital. The discussion highlights how these findings provide community‐based researchers with both a deeper understanding of the contextual constraints with which they must contend, and a useful tool for targeting their efforts in communities with the greatest need or greatest potential.     

The Ecology of Human-Machine Systems I: Introduction

A symposium entitled, The Ecology of Human-Machine Systems, was held at the Fifth International Conference on Event Perception and Action. This sympo- sium examined the challenges that human-machine systems hold for an ecological approach to perception, cognition, and action and the promises that an ecological approach holds for problems that traditionally have been the domain of human factors psychology. The presenters from this symposium have been invited to submit articles about an applied ecological psychology to Ecological Psychology. Articles that are accepted for publication will be appearing in future issues of this journal. It is hoped that these articles will stimulate productive interaction between ecological and human factors psychology. This correspondence reflects the natural affinity between ecological and human factors psychology. It examines some of the issues that distinguish basic and applied research. It also considers the contribution that ecological physics can make for improving tradi- tional approaches to task analysis. Finally, this article speculates about emerging areas of research in which the ecological approach may contribute to the design of human-machine systems.     

Psychological jurisprudence and the information processing paradigm

The purpose of this article is to further recent work in the psychology of jurisprudence. After summarizing the value positions that are central to a jurisprudence that emphasizes the role of law in the everyday lives of individuals, we examine the interaction between the tenets of that philosophy and the paradigmatic content of psycholegal research. We propose that one dominant perspective, information processing, assumes that legal actors are imperfect processors of social information and proceeds to document biases and propose ways for the law to minimize shortcomings in human cognition. After summarizing the emerging theory of psychological jurisprudence, we discuss the information processing paradigm in psychology and law, illustrating its contributions with three recent studies. Next, we present an empirical analysis of abstracts from the last 5 years of empirical research to demonstrate that there is a representative body of information processing research in psychology and law. Following this is an in-depth assessment of a sample of cognitive and social cognitive studies, detailing the scientific and normative issues that make up this literature. Finally, we conclude with some recommendations for jurisprudential theorists and psycholegal researchers which will integrate the philosophy of psychology and law with its empirical underpinnings.