论传统儒家道德意志的修养方法

道德意志在个体德性的养成中是连接道德内在心理与外在行为的关键环节。道德意志一旦形成,在个体道德行为选择以及人格完善中,就成为道德自律精神的强大动力和调控力量。传统儒家伦理具有较为完备的道德意志理论,提出了志立善道的价值导引、正心诚意的心性修养、躬行践履的实践锻炼、抗危乐道的困境磨砺、持之以恒的习惯养成等修养方法。传统儒家道德意志的修养方法对于现代公民良善人格的培育具有重要的借鉴价值。     

组织道德践履,培养道德行为习惯

学生的道德行为习惯,是他们在道德规范的调节下在行动上对他人、对社会作出的反应。就道德行为习惯的养成来说,道德认识或知识是前提,道德情感和道德意志是两个内在的条件和力量,道德信念是核心和主导,这些因素都以道德实践活动为基础并由道德实践联系和统一起来;学生通过道德实践中的反复行动,加深认识,增强情感、意志和信念,从而养成更高一级的道德行为。     

道德定力的科学内涵、现实价值与培育路径

道德定力是个体面对不良道德风气和诱惑时,表现出一以贯之、坚定不移的道德认知、道德认同、道德意志和道德行为的能力,包含道德判断力、道德自觉力、道德意志力、道德捍卫力和道德引领力等构成要素,体现社会道德要求向道德主体内心的自觉转化,属于支撑个体道德实践的主体性力量。就其现实价值而言,道德定力表征了个体坚信道德价值、坚守道德要求的内在信念,是个体崇尚道德、维护道德与践行道德的动力之源,有助于推动个体道德由外在规制转向内在自觉、支撑个体道德适应现代社会生存新境遇、筑牢个体道德失范的双重预防屏障以及细化道德建设的目标体系与阐释框架。就其培育路径而言,当下道德定力培育路径主要包括树立理想信念与价值观念以涵养道德定力的思想根基、激发修身自律与公共意识以强化道德定力的内在规约、增强氛围营造和舆论引导以优化道德定力的形成环境、深化制度建设和协同治理以构筑道德定力的监督体系。     

先秦儒家人格教育思想的主体性意蕴

儒家教育思想虽然强调了受教育者对于既定的社会秩序和伦理规范的服从和顺从,但同时也包含着主体性的道德意蕴。尤其是在先秦儒家的人格教育思想中,其主体性的精神内涵是比较突出的。先秦儒家倡导道德的自主修养,强调道德行为选择的自为自主,主张使自我成为道德意志的主宰者,赋予道德主体在道德低线与道德高线之间选择的权利。这些都可以视作是先秦儒家人格教育思想中所具有的主体性意蕴。虽然它与当代教育所倡导的主体性精神存在差异,但是其所体现的精神旨趣依然值得我们去反思和挖掘。     

论个体道德情感

道德理性、道德情感和道德意志相互渗透,构成一个支配个人道德活动的完整的心理机制.本文着重论述了道德情感的内容、特点与功能,认为它对充实道德理性、增强道德意志、坚定道德信念、推动道德实践、培养崇高的道德人格等方面有重要的作用.     

塑造公民诚信人格的具体目标

个体诚信修养是个体实现从诚信规范的他律向自律的转化,确立高尚的诚信人格的主体性活动。塑造公民的诚信人格具体而言就是做一个道德认识求真知、道德情感求真挚、道德信念求真诚、道德意志求真笃、道德行为求真切的诚信公民。     

中小学生道德意志发展的实验研究

儿童的品德是一个完整的心理结构,有了一定的道德认识,不等于就形成了良好品德.这就是说,道德认识和道德行为往往是不一致的.一个人能否坚持道德认识的定向去行动,不仅取决于其道德认识的水平,更取决于其抗诱惑、排除内外障碍,使道德动机战胜非道德动机的意志水平.然而,目前我国关于儿童道德意志的研究十分薄弱.     

真实的道德冲突对个体道德成长的意义

个体的道德成长是在不断解决道德冲突的过程中逐步实现的。个体道德成长应该面向真实,接触真实,向真实发问,而并不仅仅是通过虚拟情景下简单的道德选择模拟实现。真实的道德冲突及其选择对个体道德成长的意义,集中表现在主体在道德选择的过程中和道德实践的基础上,主体的道德认识、道德情感、道德意志、道德信念都得到了具体实在的检验和升华,实现了道德选择和道德行为的统一。在真实的道德情境中恰当的设置道德冲突,才能真正促进个体道德的成长。     

道德内化中的各状态分析

道德内化过程中,因个体对社会道德内化程度差异而形成多种状态,每种状态都切实影响着人们的日常道德行为.我们从道德认知、道德情感和道德意志等对社会道德是否认同的角度,将道德内化中的状态大致分为六种,对这六种状态的定量分析,有利于人们更加深入地理解和把握道德内化中的一些细节以及整个道德内化过程.     

经济行为的道德价值问题

经济行为的道德价值问题王莹道德价值是指人们的道德意识和道德实践活动对于社会、阶级和个人所具有的意义。它属于精神的价值。可以说,凡是有益于他人或社会、促进人类精神文明和人的进步的道德意识和道德行为,都是具有道德价值的。那么,经济行为能不能在取得经济效益...     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.