A mechanism for elliptic-like bursting and synchronization of bursts in a map-based neuron network

A system consisting of two Rulkov map-based neurons coupled through reciprocal electrical synapses as a simple phenomenological example is discussed. When the electrical coupling is excitatory, the square-wave bursting can be well predicted by the bifurcation analysis of a comparatively simple low-dimensional subsystem embedded in the invariant manifold. While, when the synapses are inhibitory due to the artificial electrical coupling, a fast–slow analysis is carried out by treating the two slow variables as two different bifurcation parameters. The main result of this paper is to present a mechanism for the occurrence of a kind of special elliptic bursting. The mechanism for this kind of elliptic-like bursting is due to the interaction between two chaotic oscillations with different amplitudes. Moreover, the generation of antiphase synchronization of networks lies in the different switching orders between two pairs of different chaotic oscillations corresponding to the first neuron and the second neuron, respectively.     

The scope of formal explanation

The existence of multiple modes of explanation means that a crucial step in the process of generating explanations has to be selecting a particular mode. The present article identifies the key conceptual, as well as some pragmatic and epistemological, considerations that license the use of the formal mode of explanation, and thus that enter into the process of selecting and generating a formal explanation. Formal explanations explain the presence of certain properties in an instance of a kind by reference to the kind of thing it is (e.g. That has four legs because it is a dog). As such, this mode of explanation is intrinsically tied to kind representations and is applicable domain-generally. Although it is possible for formal explanation to apply domain-generally, for any given kind it is selective in its application, in that it can explain some, but not all, properties of the instances of a kind. It also appears that different types of properties can receive formal explanations across different domains. This article provides a sketch of a theory of the selectivity of formal explanation that results from the manner in which kinds of different types are distinguished. The present discussion also suggests how the mechanisms underlying formal explanations may contribute to the illusion of explanatory depth Keil (Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 368–373,2003), the operation of the inherence heuristic Cimpian & Salomon (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 461–480, 2014a; Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 506–527,2014b), and psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003).     

Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Computerized Cognitive Training on Executive Functions: a Cross-Disciplinary Taxonomy for Classifying Outcome Cognitive Factors

The growing prevalence of neurodegenerative disorders associated with aging and cognitive decline has generated increasing cross-disciplinary interest in non-pharmacological interventions, such as computerized cognitive training (CCT), which may prevent or slow cognitive decline. However, inconsistent findings across meta-analytic reviews in the field suggest a lack of cross-disciplinary consensus and on-going debate regarding the benefits of CCT. We posit that a contributing factor is the lack of a theoretically-based taxonomy of constructs and representative tasks typically used. An integration of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) taxonomy of broad and narrow cognitive factors and the Miyake unity-diversity theory of executive functions (EF) is proposed (CHC-M) as an attempt to clarify this issue through representing and integrating the disciplines contributing to CCT research. The present study assessed the utility of this taxonomy by reanalyzing the Lampit et al. (2014) meta-analysis of CCT in healthy older adults using the CHC-M framework. Results suggest that: 1) substantively different statistical effects are observed when CHC-M is applied to the Lampit et al. meta-analytic review, leading to importantly different interpretations of the data; 2) typically-used classification practices conflate Executive Function (EF) tasks with fluid reasoning (Gf) and retrieval fluency (Gr), and Attention with sensory perception; and 3) there is theoretical and practical advantage in differentiating attention and working-memory tasks into the narrow shifting, inhibition, and updating EF domains. Implications for clinical practice, particularly for our understanding of EF are discussed.     

Reichenbach on the relative a priori and the context of discovery/justification distinction

Hans Reichenbach introduced two seemingly separate sets of distinctions in his epistemology at different times. One is between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connections. The other distinction is between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The status and nature of each of these distinctions have been subject-matter of an ongoing debate among philosophers of science. Thus, there is a significant amount of works considering both distinctions separately. However, the relevance of Reichenbach’s two distinctions to each other does not seem to have enjoyed the same amount of interest so far. This is what I would like to consider in this paper. In other words, I am concerned with the question: what kind of relationship is there between his two distinctions, if there is any?     

Determination of the number of independent parameters of a score matrix from the examination of rank orders

Two ordinal consequences are drawn from the linear multiple-factor analysis model. First, the numberR(s, d) of distinct ways in whichs subjects can be ranked by linear functions ofd factors is limited by the recursive expressionR(s, d)=R(s?1,d)+(s?1)R(s?1,d?1). Second, every setS ofd+2 subjects can be separated into two subsetsS* andS ? S* such that no linear function ofd variables can rank allS* over allS ? S*, and vice versa. When these results are applied to the hypothetical data of Thurstone's “box problem,” three independent parameters are found. Relations to Thurstone's suggestion for a non-correlational factor analysis are discussed.     

Contextual-Hierarchical Reconstructions of the Strengthened Liar Problem

In this paper we shall introduce two types of contextual-hierarchical (from now on abbreviated by ‘ch’) approaches to the strengthened liar problem. These approaches, which we call the ‘standard’ and the ‘alternative’ ch-reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem, differ in their philosophical view regarding the nature of truth and the relation between the truth predicates T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ of different hierarchy-levels. The basic idea of the standard ch-reconstruction is that the T r ⁿ⁺¹-schema should hold for all sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\). In contrast, the alternative ch-reconstruction, for which we shall argue in section four, is motivated by the idea that T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ are coherent in the sense that the same sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\) should be true according to T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹. We show that instances of the standard ch-reconstruction can be obtained by iterating Kripke’s strong Kleene jump operator. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how instances of the alternative ch-reconstruction can be obtained by a slight modification of the iterated axiom system KF and of the iterated strong Kleene jump operator.     

Subjunctive Conditional Probability

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

The Concept of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krisis</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology</Emphasis>

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl argues that the only way to respond to the scientific Krisis of which he speaks is with phenomenological reflections on the history, method, and task of philosophy. On the assumption that an accurate diagnosis of a malady is a necessary condition for an effective remedy, this paper aims to formulate a precise concept of the Krisis of the European sciences with which Husserl operates in this work. Thus it seeks an answer to the question: What exactly, according to Husserl, is “the ‘crisis’ [Krisis] of the European sciences”? There are two different tendencies in the literature on this question. According to the traditional interpretation, the Krisis of the European sciences lies not in the inadequacy of their scientificity but in the loss of their meaningfulness for life. According to an innovative suggestion, the Krisis lies not in the loss of their meaningfulness for life but in the inadequacy of their scientificity. These readings are mutually exclusive because each claims that the other misidentifies the Krisis as something that it is not. The argument of this paper, however, is that, given the many different senses of Krisis in The Crisis, an adequate understanding of the Krisis that Husserl identifies requires not a disjunctive but an inclusive approach. Therefore the paper proposes that Husserl’s Krisis of the European sciences is both a crisis of their scientificity and a crisis of their meaningfulness for life. The relevance of this result to Husserl’s philosophical and historical sense-investigations in The Crisis—as well as to the present critical situation of philosophy—is self-evident.     

Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations

According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York, 1965) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative.     

Substance concepts and personal identity

According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal, but not person, is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal, on the other hand, can provide such criteria. This argument has been defended by Eric Olson, among others. I argue that this line of reasoning fails to show Animalism to be superior to the Psychological Approach, for the following two reasons: (1) human animal, animal, and organism are all functional concepts, and (2) the distinction between what something is and what it does is illegitimate on the reading that the argument needs.     

Changes Over Time in the Comprehension of <Emphasis Type="Italic">He</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">They</Emphasis> as Epicene Pronouns

An epicene pronoun is a gender-neutral singular pronoun used in sentences when the gender of the subject is unknown or unspecified. In English, he and they are commonly-used epicene pronouns. Until recently, he has been widely accepted as being grammatically correct. However, many have argued that he is sexist because it may bias people to think about males. Two experiments were performed using a lexical decision task in which participants reacted to gendered words (e.g., aunt and uncle) after reading sentences using he, they, or unrelated epicene pronouns. We conducted the experiments 15 years apart in order to explore whether change in pronoun usage and the social significance of pronouns would be associated with different priming effects. Both experiments demonstrated that pronouns influence the processing of gendered nouns. However, in Experiment 1 they facilitated the processing of feminine nouns whereas in Experiment 2, he slowed the processing of feminine nouns. We discuss these results with respect to language change and conclude that they is a more effective epicene.     

The location-, word-, and arrow-based Simon effects: An ex-Gaussian analysis

Task-irrelevant spatial information, conveyed by stimulus location, location word, or arrow direction, can influence the response to task-relevant attributes, generating the location-, word-, and arrow-based Simon effects. We examined whether different mechanisms are involved in the generation of these Simon effects by fitting a mathematical ex-Gaussian function to empirical response time (RT) distributions. Specifically, we tested whether which ex-Gaussian parameters (μ, σ, and τ) show Simon effects and whether the location-, word, and arrow-based effects are on different parameters. Results show that the location-based Simon effect occurred on mean RT and μ but not on τ, and a reverse Simon effect occurred on σ. In contrast, a positive word-based Simon effect was obtained on all these measures (including σ), and a positive arrow-based Simon effect was evident on mean RT, σ, and τ but not μ. The arrow-based Simon effect was not different from the word-based Simon effect on τ or σ but was on μ and mean RT. These distinct results on mean RT and ex-Gaussian parameters provide evidence that spatial information conveyed by the various location modes are different in the time-course of activation.     

Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga

We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga (Philos Sci, forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.     

The Factor Structure of the Forms of Self-Criticising/Attacking &amp; Self-Reassuring Scale in Thirteen Distinct Populations

There is considerable evidence that self-criticism plays a major role in the vulnerability to and recovery from psychopathology. Methods to measure this process, and its change over time, are therefore important for research in psychopathology and well-being. This study examined the factor structure of a widely used measure, the Forms of Self-Criticising/Attacking & Self-Reassuring Scale in thirteen nonclinical samples (N?=?7510) from twelve different countries: Australia (N?= 319), Canada (N?= 383), Switzerland (N?= 230), Israel (N?=?476), Italy (N?=?389), Japan (N?=?264), the Netherlands (N?=?360), Portugal (N?=?764), Slovakia (N?=?1326), Taiwan (N?=?417), the United Kingdom 1 (N?=?1570), the United Kingdom 2 (N?=?883), and USA (N?=?331). This study used more advanced analyses than prior reports: a bifactor item-response theory model, a two-tier item-response theory model, and a non-parametric item-response theory (Mokken) scale analysis. Although the original three-factor solution for the FSCRS (distinguishing between Inadequate-Self, Hated-Self, and Reassured-Self) had an acceptable fit, two-tier models, with two general factors (Self-criticism and Self-reassurance) demonstrated the best fit across all samples. This study provides preliminary evidence suggesting that this two-factor structure can be used in a range of nonclinical contexts across countries and cultures. Inadequate-Self and Hated-Self might not by distinct factors in nonclinical samples. Future work may benefit from distinguishing between self-correction versus shame-based self-criticism.     

The Multilevel Modality-Switch Effect: What Happens When We See the Bees Buzzing and Hear the Diamonds Glistening

Previous studies demonstrated that the sequential verification of different sensory modality properties for concepts (e.g., BLENDER-loud; BANANA-yellow) brings about a processing cost, known as the modality-switch effect. We report an experiment designed to assess the influence of the mode of presentation (i.e., visual, aural) of stimuli on the modality-switch effect in a property verification and lexical decision priming paradigm. Participants were required to perform a property verification or a lexical decision task on a target sentence (e.g., “a BEE buzzes”, “a DIAMOND glistens”) presented either visually or aurally after having been presented with a prime sentence (e.g., “the LIGHT is flickering”, “the SOUND is echoing”) that could either share both, one or none of the target’s mode of presentation and content modality. Results show that the mode of presentation of stimuli affects the conceptual modality-switch effect. Furthermore, the depth of processing required by the task modulates the complex interplay of perceptual and semantic information. We conclude that the MSE is a task-related, multilevel effect which can occur on two different levels of information processing (i.e., perceptual and semantic).     

A Definition Framework for the Terms <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanomaterial</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanoparticle</Emphasis>

Scientific writings and policy documents define the terms nanomaterial and nanoparticle in various ways. This variation is considered problematic because the absence of a shared definition is understood as potentially hindering nanomaterial knowledge production and regulation. Another view is that the existence of a shared definition may itself cause problems, as rigid definitions arguably exclude important aspects of the studied phenomena. The aim of this paper is to inform this state of disagreement by providing analytical concepts for a systematic understanding of how, and even whether, nanomaterial and nanoparticle could and should be defined. To do this, we review definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle presented in research articles and policy documents. Definitions were identified by first conducting a Scopus search and then tracing cited definitions back to their sources. In total, 36 definitions were identified. Theories of definition from philosophy and linguistics provide analytical guidance for structuring and categorizing the identified definitions, and the main analytical dimensions of the definitions are then identified and discussed. Finally, we propose a framework for understanding the process of defining nanomaterial and nanoparticle. This framework considers both the generality needed for a shared understanding (by suggesting proto-definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle) and the level of precision required for different purposes (by allowing for various explications of the proto-definitions).     

Family Exploration: The Contribution of Stability and Change Processes

Building upon the redefinition of exploration as a family process, this study analyses how the processes of family stability and change may favour exploration by members of multiple family relational contexts. Sixty non-clinical family triads (mother, father, child) participated in an experimental observational study and were video-recorded while playing in different interactive configurations. The children (37 females and 23 males) were 4–5 years old (M?=?55 months). The mothers’ ages ranged from 29 to 45 (M?=?38) and the fathers’ ages ranged from 29 to 46 (M?=?39). All the parents were employed and were living together. All participants were Caucasians of Italian nationality. Using the Triadic Interactions Analytical Procedure (TIAP), the family morphostatic processes and the family morphogenetic processes were analysed in relation to the family members’ exploration. Data analyses showed that family stability continual construction (morphostasis) and family change (morphogenesis) involve different interactive and relational dynamics (χ²(8)?=?13.84, p?>?.05; CFI?=?.97, TLI?=?.94, SRMR?=?.06), even if they are intertwined processes (p?<?.001). Both morphostatic and morphogenetic processes were correlated to the level of exploration showed by family members (respectively r?=?.32, p?<?.05, and r?=?.59, p?<?.001), even if the morphogenetic processes had a stronger relation with family exploration (z?=?1.85, p _one-tailed ?<?.05).     

Natural,Artifactual, and Moral Goodness

In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot (2001) aims to provide an account of moral evaluation that is both naturalistic and cognitivist. She argues that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation in the sense that moral judgments of human action and character have the same “grammar” or “conceptual structure” as natural judgments of the goodness (e.g., health) of plants and animals. We argue that Foot’s naturalist project can succeed, but not in the way she envisions, because her central thesis that moral evaluation is a variety of natural evaluation is not entirely correct. We show that both moral and natural evaluation are species of kind evaluation, which encompasses moral, natural, and artifact evaluation. Kind evaluation is a form of evaluation, according to which things are evaluated qua members of a kind, in such a way that the kind into which something is classified informs the standards of evaluation (or norms) for things of that kind. Because the source of the normative standards for moral evaluation is different from the source of the normative standards for natural evaluation, moral evaluation is not a species of natural evaluation. However, both are varieties of kind evaluation. This account of moral evaluation as a variety of kind evaluation is still an effective response to non-naturalism and to non-cognitivism.