Why not give your client a counter: A survey of what happened when we did

A perusal of the recent literature of behavior modification shows an increasing emphasis on the use of self-recording as a research tool (see for example, Barlow et al., 1969; Duncan, 1969; McFall, 1970; Johnson and White, 1971 ; and Ackerman, 1972). In addition, self-recording is being more frequently utilized as a method of teaching students, clients and patients to (a) observe themselves more precisely, (b) assess the effects of treatments which they apply to themselves, with or without the guidance of a counsellor or therapist, and finally (c) provide the latter with objective information (see for example, Stuart. 1967; Lindsley, 1969; Kanfer, 1970; Duncan, 1971; Watson and Tharp, 1972; Mahoney and Thoresen, 1974; Thoresen and Mahoney, 1974; Zimmerman, 1975).

Several researchers have suggested and provided evidence for the notion that self-recording of one's own behavior can be a reactive measure which leads to behavior change on the part of the recorder without the addition of further treatment (see for example, McFall, 1970; Johnson and White, 1971; McFall and Hammen, 1971; Kazdin, 1974; and Lipinski and Nelson, 1974). Preliminary results which each of the present authors have observed with some self-recording clients confirms the above observation. Furthermore, we have also observed that self-recording can sometimes lead to unexpected, therapeutic side-effects. For example, the junior author recently gave a golf counter to a 17-year-old female patient who reported having many impulses to “go back and check” things before leaving her home. These impulses were usually acted upon and one of the consequences of this was that the patient usually kept her parents waiting when the three had to go out. This patient was asked to wear a golf counter, which was given to her, to count the number of times each day that she had an “impulse to check”. In an interview with her following a 7-day counting period, she reported that she had not been aware that she had so many impulses (103 the first day of counting); she actually felt revulsion with herself upon clearly seeing how frequently she had these impulses; she had more impulses when nervous and fewer when relaxed; and finally, both the number of impulses and the actual number of times she acted upon them were markedly reduced over the 7-day counting period. This set of results, together with other (albeit less dramatic) results, suggested to us that some clients can benefit merely by self-recording their own behavior. For some the benefit may be greater awareness or knowledge of the self-recorded behavior, for some it could be actual behavior change, and for some both benefits might be achieved.

To our knowledge, no study has been conducted which has surveyed such possible benefits of self-recording across a number of clients and under conditions in which many therapists are involved. The purpose of the present study was to explore the effects of self-recording, per se, across many clients who were being seen by many different therapists. We did so by recruiting therapists who would be interested in trying out the procedure of having one or more clients self-record.     

Letter to a genetic counselor

The author describes her personal experience terminating a pregnancy after receiving an abnormal amniocentesis result: While still waiting for the results, she and her husband attempted to deny the importance of the pregnancy, an approach which they subsequently regretted. When they received the abnormal result, they found themselves able to make necessary decisions quickly, despite being in shock. It then took some time before they realized what a major loss they had actually suffered. The painful aftermath included accepting emotional responsibility for their decision to abort, as well as explaining that difficult decision to their older children. Thoughts of a possible subsequent pregnancy could not be faced at once. Over time, the author found the support of friends and colleagues, and even of a support group, to be invaluable. All in all, the entire experience was more painful than she would have predicted, and she hopes that this account will prove helpful both to genetic counselors and to other patients who receive abnormal results from prenatal diagnosis. A list of suggested readings is appended.Rose Green is a pseudonym.     

The development of the experience and anticipation of regret

Although recent studies have established that children experience regret from around 6 years, we do not yet know when the ability to anticipate this emotion emerges, despite the importance of the anticipation of regret in decision-making. We examined whether children will anticipate they will feel regret if they were to find out in a box-choosing game that, had they made a different choice, they would have obtained a better prize. Experiment 1 replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's study in which children were asked what they hoped was in a non-chosen box. Even 8- to 9-year olds find this question difficult. However, when asked what might make them feel sadder, 7- to 8-year olds (but not younger children) predicted that finding the larger prize in the unchosen box would make them feel this way. In Experiments 2 and 3, children predicted how they would feel if the unchosen box contained either a larger or smaller prize, in order to examine anticipation of both regret and of relief. Although 6- to 7-year olds do experience regret when they find out they could have won a better prize, they do not correctly anticipate feeling this way. By around 8 years, the majority of children are able to anticipate both regret and relief.     

A study of the comparative structure of guilt and shame in a Chinese society.

On the basis of previous theoretical and empirical analyses of the comparative structures of guilt and shame, the authors hypothesized that antecedent condition (personal inadequacy vs. moral norm violation), audience presence, and personal responsibility attribution would distinguish shame from guilt. Although the subject population was Hong Kong Chinese, evidence from previous studies suggests that the comparative structures of guilt and shame are quite similar across cultures. The subjects were asked to recall either a guilt or a shame incident, and their responses were then coded into the predictor variables. The results of the study indicated that guilt was most likely to emerge when individuals had violated a moral norm and held themselves responsible for their conduct. In contrast, shame emerged more frequently when subjects felt personally inadequate than when they had violated moral norms. Moreover, when a guilt incident was reported, and audience was rarely mentioned, whereas subjects who reported a shame incident would generally feel personally responsible and often mentioned being looked at or evaluated. However, neither personal responsibility nor the presence of an audience seemed to be essential for a person to experience shame.     

Group performance and interpersonal evaluations as determinants of egotistical attributions in groups1

Group members often try to claim personal credit for the successes of their group while avoiding blame for group failures. Two experiments examined the effects of evaluations from their fellows on such egotism in groups. In Experiment 1, 96 subjects participated in four-person, problem-solving groups, and, after completing the group tasks, rated the competency and worth of each of the other group members. Subjects then received bogus written feedback indicating that the group had either succeeded or failed, and that the other members had considered them: (a) the most competent member of the group, (b) the least competent, or (c) of average competence. Group performance and personal evaluations interacted in influencing subjects' perceptions of their personal performances, relative responsibility for the group performance, and potency within the group, generally supporting predictions derived from self-esteem and equity theory. Subjects claimed more responsibility for success than for failure only when they were favorably evaluated by their peers, and claimed the least responsibility for group success when they were unfavorably evaluated. The latter acceptance of negative peer evaluations was examined in Experiment 2, which manipulated the consensus of the evaluations given 76 high or low self-esteem subjects. Regardless of their self-esteem or the consensus of the evaluations, subjects again seemed to accept unfavorable evaluations. High self-esteem subjects did, though, rate their personal performance and relative responsibility higher than low self-esteem subjects.     

On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. I am grateful to Barbara Herman, T. M. Scanlon, and two anonymous reviewers for The Journal of Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Pamela Hieronymi and the members of her Fall 2201 graduate seminar on moral responsibility at UCLA, and to the audience members at Simon Fraser University, for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this material. My biggest debt of gratitude goes to Jean Roberts, for stimulating discussion and insightful commentary on multiple drafts of this paper.     

Attributing Responsibility to Female Victims After Exposure to Sexually Violent Films1

We investigate the possibility that the degree to which female abuse victims are held accountable by other women who have been exposed to sexually violent mass media is primarily dependent upon 3 factors: situational relevance, personal similarity, and emotional arousal. Female subjects participated in an experiment. Factors were: film dose; film viewing/victim judgment time interval; victim-subject similarity; and situational relevance of the assault. The results showed less attribution of responsibility to similar victims and high attributions of responsibility to dissimilar victims in the personally relevant assault situation (rape). Women identified least with dissimilar rape victims and most with similar victims when they had not been desensitized. When subjects were desensitized, the defensive attribution effect failed to emerge. There was also a significant tendency among low film dose subjects to perceive more psychological injury and to attribute more distress to the victim than among high film dose subjects.     

Should a school honor a student's DNR order? A lawyer responds: a student's right to forgo CPR.

...Instead of and certainly before advising the school or S.A. to go into court, I would urge them to try to resolve the question where it arises -- in the classroom, not the courtroom. And I would ask school officials to try to place themselves in S.A.'s shoes, and to imagine how she feels about her situation; and to ask themselves how they will feel if they administer CPR against her and her parents' wishes. Is there no way that they can do more than nothing, but less than CPR? Which image would we prefer to attach to S.A.'s case, that of some lawyers giving a press conference on the courthouse steps or of a story about a school that made it possible for one of its students to spend her precious time with her friends, classmates, and teachers, as they learn together that death does not need to separate the living from the dying?     

The response to injustice: Effects of varying levels of social support and position of advantage or disadvantage

This study investigated the effects of varying levels of social support as well as position of advantage or disadvantage on subjects' response to injustice. Conditions of advantage and disadvantage were established by randomly assigning one member of each experimental dyad to a method of working which prevented him/her from earning points for prizes. Three levels of social support (“none,” “peer,” “authoritative”) were created. Advantaged and disadvantaged subjects receiving authoritative support for the possibility of change and disadvantaged subjects receiving peer support in the form of divided opinion statements rated the system as less fair than either group in the absence of support or the advantaged receiving only peer support. Disadvantaged subjects evidenced a tendency to assume personal responsibility for their lower outcomes. Social support reduced this tendency but did not eliminate it.     

Active Defending and Passive Bystanding Behavior in Bullying: The Role of Personal Characteristics and Perceived Peer Pressure

This study examined the role of pro-victim attitudes, personal responsibility, coping responses to observations of bullying, and perceived peer normative pressure in explaining defending the victim and passive bystanding behavior in bullying. A total of 462 Italian early adolescents (mean age = 13.4 years, SD = 9 months) participated in the study. The behaviors were measured through two informants: each individual student and the teachers. The findings of a series of hierarchical regressions showed that, regardless of the informant, problem solving coping strategies and perceived peer normative pressure for intervention were positively associated with active help towards a bullied peer and negatively related to passivity. In contrast, distancing strategies were positively associated with passive bystanding, whereas they were negatively associated with teacher-reported defending behavior. Moreover, self-reported defending behavior was positively associated with personal responsibility for intervention, but only under conditions of low perceived peer pressure. Finally, the perception of peer pressure for intervention buffered the negative influence of distancing on passive bystanding tendencies. Future directions are discussed.     

Male responses to female competence

This study investigated the conditions under which a male would denigrate a female because of her competence. Sixty-four male subjects either cooperated or competed on anagram tasks with high/low competence male or female co-workers in the presence of a male or a female experimenter. Subsequently, these subjects evaluated their co-workers. No evidence was found to support the notion that males rejected a female partner because of her competence. In fact, some measures revealed that competent females were valued over their male counterparts in the cooperative conditions. Unexpectedly, sex of the experimenter interacted significantly with sex of the co-worker to determine the subject's responses to his partner's competence on two of the dependent measures. The discrepancies between these findings and earlier research findings are addressed. The implications for females in a mixed-sex work context are discussed.     

The role of attribution in the experience of crowding

The theory that the subjective experience of crowding results from an attribution of arousal process was examined. Specifically, it was predicted that subjects who were aroused by having their personal space violated would experience less crowding if they were led to believe that some other environmental factor was responsible for the arousal. Groups of subjects were placed in a room in which their personal space was either violated or not violated. Some subjects were told that either an arousing or a relaxing subliminal noise would be played into the room. (Actually there was no noise.) Other subjects were told nothing about subliminal noise. The subjects worked on a number of tasks and were then asked to report how crowded they felt. The noise manipulation had no effect on subjects' performance nor on feelings of crowdedness when their personal space was not being violated. However, when there was a violation of personal space, subjects who felt the noise would arouse them reported being less crowded and performed better than subjects in the relaxing noise or no explanation conditions. It was suggested that subjects attributed their arousal to the “arousing noise” and hence felt less crowded.     

儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响

为考察儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响,本研究采用现场实验的方法探讨了小学5年级学生内疚情绪与其亲社会行为的关系。结果显示：（1）内疚情绪能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高,难过情绪不能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高;（2）当儿童将注意力集中于自己对团体造成的不良影响,产生内疚情绪,但如果其将注意力集中于自己的不良结果时,则产生难过情绪。结论：儿童的消极情绪是否能促进其亲社会行为水平的提高,取决于其将注意力集中于自己还是他人。     

Misattribution of arousal and attraction: Effects of salience of explanations for arousal

Based on previous research demonstrating that salience of a plausible cause increases the likelihood of causal attribution (S. E. Taylor & S. T. Fiske, in J. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 11), New York: Academic Press, 1978) it was predicted that salience of plausible causes of arousal would affect romantic attraction. Male subjects were differentially aroused by running in place. Aroused subjects were particularly likely to be attracted to an attractive female confederate if they expected to meet her (high salience of confederate) and if cues associated with the running in place were minimized (low salience of exercise). Though results are consistent with a misatribution of arousal hypothesis, it is suggested that emotion schemata are a potentially more useful explanation.     

“Say Your Favorite Poet in the World is Lying There”: Eileen Myles,James Schuyler,and the Queer Intimacies of Care

This article closely reads “Chelsea Girls,” an autobiographical short story by Eileen Myles that depicts her experience caring for the diabetic, bipolar poet James Schuyler when she was a young writer getting started in East Village in the late 1970s. Their dependency relationship is a form of queer kinship, an early version of the caring relations between lesbians and gay men that HIV/AIDS would demand over the next two decades as chosen families emerged to nurture gay men and lesbians rejected by their families of origin. The representation of queer kinship offers an alternative to more traditional portrayals of care in literature that focus on the heteronormative family, a site of care that feminist dependency theory also paradoxically privileges. This article synthesizes insights from queer theory and critical disability studies in order to expand our understanding of the roles participants in care can play, the ways they can feel, and the outcomes they can achieve. Myles and Schuyler’s dependency relationship was sustaining for both of them and also critical for her development as a pioneering lesbian poet in an art world still dominated by men.     

Striatal sensitivity to personal responsibility in a regret-based decision-making task

Regret and relief are complex emotional states associated with the counterfactual processing of nonobtained outcomes in a decision-making situation. In the “actor effect,” a sense of agency and personal responsibility is thought to heighten these emotions. Using fMRI, we scanned volunteers (n = 22) as they played a task involving choices between two wheel-of-fortune gambles. We examined how neural responses to counterfactual outcomes were modulated by giving subjects the opportunity to change their minds, as a manipulation of personal responsibility. Satisfaction ratings to the outcomes were highly sensitive to the difference between the obtained and nonobtained outcome, and ratings following losses were lower on trials with the opportunity to change one’s mind. Outcome-related activity in the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex was positively related to the satisfaction ratings. The striatal response was modulated by the agency manipulation: Following losses, the striatal signal was significantly lower when the subject had the opportunity to change his/her mind. These results support the involvement of frontostriatal mechanisms in counterfactual thinking and highlight the sensitivity of the striatum to the effects of personal responsibility.     

Looking after Iris: John Bayley’s Elegy for the Living

John Bayley’s Elegy for Iris, his memoir about living with Iris Murdoch after the onset of dementia, unsettles models of mind and agency that ignore human relationship, dependency, and the vulnerabilities of the cared for and the carer. Experiencing Iris as ambiguously absent and present while he attentively cares for her, Bayley frames his memoir as an elegy, a reflection on love and loss that conventionally represents two subjects—the author and the one he lost. Bayley’s acts of care and his stories about his wife, both as she was and as she has become, sustain her moral worth as a person. Writing as an elegist, a survivor entitled to be heard, Bayley moves his experience of caring and loss from personal to social realms, from speaker to listener, opening ethical space for consolation and for social responsibility for the vulnerable.     

Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist over Generations?

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity.     

Reasons-responsiveness,control and the negligence puzzle

A longstanding puzzle about moral responsibility for negligence arises from three plausible yet jointly inconsistent theses: (i) an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for some outcome O, even if her behavior with respect to O is negligent (i.e., even if she never adverted to the possibility that the behavior might result in O), (ii) an agent can be morally responsible for O only if she has some control over O, (iii) if an agent acts negligently with respect to O, then she has no control over O. This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons-responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason-responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons-responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons-responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right—and each can solve the negligence puzzle.