Reasoning about the height and location of a hidden object in 4.5- and 6.5-month-old infants

The present experiments examined 6.5- and 4.5-month-old infants' ability to represent and to reason about the height and location of a hidden object. In Experiments 1 and 2, the infants were habituated to a screen that rotated back and forth through a 180 degree arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. Following habituation, a box was placed behind the screen, and the infants saw two test events. In one (possible event), the screen rotated until it reached the occluded box; in the other (impossible event), the screen rotated through either the top 80% or the top 50% of the space occupied by the box. The results indicated that (a) the 6.5-month-old infants were surprised when the screen rotated through the top 80%, but not the top 50%, of the box and (b) the 4.5-month-old infants failed to be surprised even when the screen rotated through the top 80% of the box (4.5-month-old infants do show surprise, however, when the screen rotates through the entire (100%) box (Baillargeon, 1987a]. Experiments 3 and 4 tested whether infants would be better at detecting that the screen rotated farther than it should if provided with a second, identical box to the side of the box behind the screen. This second box stood out of the screen's path and so remained visible throughout the test trials. The results indicated that with the second box present (a) the 6.5-month-old infants showed surprise when the screen rotated through the top 50% of the occluded box and (b) the 4.5-month-old infants were surprised when the screen rotated through either the top 80% or the top 50% of the box. The results of Experiment 5 revealed that the improvement in performance brought about by the second box disappeared when this box was no longer in the same fronto-parallel plane as the box behind the screen. Different models are considered to describe the impressive quantitative and qualitative physical reasoning abilities revealed by these findings.     

Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

Infants' representations of three-dimensional occluded objects

Infants' ability to represent objects has received significant attention from the developmental research community. With the advent of eye-tracking technology, detailed analysis of infants' looking patterns during object occlusion have revealed much about the nature of infants' representations. The current study continues this research by analyzing infants' looking patterns in a novel manner and by comparing infants' looking at a simple display in which a single three-dimensional (3D) object moves along a continuous trajectory to a more complex display in which two 3D objects undergo trajectories that are interrupted behind an occluder. Six-month-old infants saw an occlusion sequence in which a ball moved along a linear path, disappeared behind a rectangular screen, and then a ball (ball-ball event) or a box (ball-box event) emerged at the other edge. An eye-tracking system recorded infants' eye-movements during the event sequence. Results from examination of infants' attention to the occluder indicate that during the occlusion interval infants looked longer to the side of the occluder behind which the moving occluded object was located, shifting gaze from one side of the occluder to the other as the object(s) moved behind the screen. Furthermore, when events included two objects, infants attended to the spatiotemporal coordinates of the objects longer than when a single object was involved. These results provide clear evidence that infants' visual tracking is different in response to a one-object display than to a two-object display. Furthermore, this finding suggests that infants may require more focused attention to the hidden position of objects in more complex multiple-object displays and provides additional evidence that infants represent the spatial location of moving occluded objects.     

Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event-monitoring paradigm

Recent results indicate that, when tested with an event-monitoring task, 7.5- and 9.5-month-olds give evidence that they can individuate objects in different-objects occlusion events – events in which two distinct objects appear successively on either side of an occluder (Wilcox and Baillargeon, in press). The present research sought to confirm and extend these findings. The experiments examined 7.5- and 4.5-month-olds’ ability to correctly interpret a different-objects (ball-box condition) and a same-object (ball-ball condition) occlusion event. The infants in the ball-box condition saw a test event in which a ball disappeared behind the left edge of a screen; after a pause, a box emerged from behind the screen's right edge. For half of the infants (wide-screen event), the screen was wide and could occlude the ball and box simultaneously; for the other infants (narrow-screen event), the screen was narrow and should not have been able to occlude the ball and box at the same time. The infants in the ball-ball condition saw identical wide- and narrow-screen events except that the ball appeared on both sides of the screen. The infants in the ball-box condition looked reliably longer at the narrow- than at the wide-screen event, whereas those in the ball-ball condition tended to look equally at the events. These results suggest that the ball-box infants (a) were led by the featural differences between the ball and box to view them as distinct objects; (b) judged that the ball and box could both be occluded by the wide but not the narrow screen; and (c) were surprised in the narrow-screen event when this judgment was violated. In contrast, the ball-ball infants (a) assumed, based on the featural similarities of the balls that appeared on either side of the screen, that they were one and the same ball, and (b) realized that the ball could be occluded by either the wide or the narrow screen. These results indicate that, by 4.5 months of age, infants are able to use featural information to correctly interpret different-objects and same-object occlusion events. These findings are discussed in the context of the newly-drawn distinction between event-monitoring and event-mapping paradigms (Wilcox and Baillargeon, in press).     

Object individuation: infants' use of shape, size, pattern, and color.

Recent research indicates that when an event-monitoring paradigm is used, infants as young as 4.5 months of age demonstrate the ability to use featural information to individuate objects involved in occlusion events (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a, Object individuation in infancy: The use of featural information in reasoning about occlusion events. Cognitive Psychology 37, 97-155; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event monitoring task. Developmental Science 1, 127-142). For example, in one experiment (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event monitoring task. Developmental Science 1, 127-142) 4.5-month-old infants saw a test event in which a green ball with colored dots disappeared behind one edge of a narrow or wide screen, and a red box with silver thumbtacks appeared at the other edge; the narrow screen was too narrow to hide both objects simultaneously, whereas the wide screen was sufficiently wide to hide both objects at the same time. The infants looked reliably longer at the narrow- than at the wide-screen test event. These and control results suggested that the infants had: (a) used the featural differences between the ball and box to conclude that two objects were involved in the event; (b) judged that both objects could fit simultaneously behind the wide but not the narrow screen; and hence (c) were surprised by the narrow-screen event. The present experiments build on these initial findings by investigating the features to which infants are most sensitive. Four experiments were conducted with infants 4.5-11.5 months of age using the same procedure, except that only one feature was manipulated at a time: shape, size, pattern, or color. The results indicated that 4.5-month-olds use both shape and size features to individuate objects involved in occlusion events. However, it is not until 7.5 months that infants use pattern, and 11.5 months that infants use color, to reason about object identity. It is suggested that these results reflect biases in the kind of information that infants attend to when reasoning about occlusion events. Possible sources of bias are discussed.     

2.5-month-old infants' reasoning about when objects should and should not be occluded.

The present research examined 2.5-month-old infants' reasoning about occlusion events. Three experiments investigated infants' ability to predict whether an object should remain continuously hidden or become temporarily visible when passing behind an occluder with an opening in its midsection. In Experiment 1, the infants were habituated to a short toy mouse that moved back and forth behind a screen. Next, the infants saw two test events that were identical to the habituation event except that a portion of the screen's midsection was removed to create a large window. In one event (high-window event), the window extended from the screen's upper edge; the mouse was shorter than the bottom of the window and thus did not become visible when passing behind the screen. In the other event (low-window event), the window extended from the screen's lower edge; although the mouse was shorter than the top of the window and hence should have become fully visible when passing behind the screen, it never appeared in the window. The infants tended to look equally at the high- and low-window events, suggesting that they were not surprised when the mouse failed to appear in the low window. However, positive results were obtained in Experiment 2 when the low-window event was modified: a portion of the screen above the window was removed so that the left and right sections of the screen were no longer connected (two-screens event). The infants looked reliably longer at the two-screens than at the high-window event. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that, at 2.5 months of age, infants possess only very limited expectations about when objects should and should not be occluded. Specifically, infants expect objects (1) to become visible when passing between occluders and (2) to remain hidden when passing behind occluders, irrespective of whether these have openings extending from their upper or lower edges. Experiment 3 provided support for this interpretation. The implications of these findings for models of the origins and development of infants' knowledge about occlusion events are discussed.     

Increased visual interest and affective responses to impossible figures in early infancy

This research evaluated infants’ facial expressions as they viewed pictures of possible and impossible objects on a TV screen. Previous studies in our lab demonstrated that four-month-old infants looked longer at the impossible figures and fixated to a greater extent within the problematic region of the impossible shape, suggesting they were sensitive to novel or unusual object geometry. Our work takes studies of looking time data a step further, determining if increased looking co-occurs with facial expressions associated with increased visual interest and curiosity, or even puzzlement and surprise. We predicted that infants would display more facial expressions consistent with either “interest” or “surprise” when viewing the impossible objects relative to possible ones, which would provide further evidence of increased perceptual processing due to incompatible spatial information. Our results showed that the impossible cubes evoked both longer looking times and more reactive expressions in the majority of infants. Specifically, the data revealed significantly greater frequency of raised eyebrows, widened eyes and returns to looking when viewing impossible figures with the most robust effects occurring after a period of habituation. The pattern of facial expressions were consistent with the “interest” family of facial expressions and appears to reflect infants’ ability to perceive systematic differences between matched pairs of possible and impossible objects as well as recognize novel geometry found in impossible objects. Therefore, as young infants are beginning to register perceptual discrepancies in visual displays, their facial expressions may reflect heightened attention and increased information processing associated with identifying irreconcilable contours in line drawings of objects. This work further clarifies the ongoing formation and development of early mental representations of coherent 3D objects.     

Location of a missing object and detection of its absence by infants: Contribution of an eye‐tracking system to the understanding of infants' strategies

Previous research has demonstrated infants' capacity to discriminate between situations in which all the objects successively hidden behind a screen are present, or not, after the removal of the screen. Two types of interpretation have been proposed: counting capacity or object memorization capacity. In the usual paradigm, the missing object in the impossible event is usually the last object which is placed behind the screen. Following this, a third interpretation can be offered: infants' exploration is first directed to this object's location, and its presence or absence is noticed. Two experiments using Wynn's (Nature 1992; 358 :749) paradigm were performed to test the third hypothesis. The first experiment involved four objects (teddy bears) placed in four squares. Infants looked longer at the impossible event (3 objects, the last one missing) than at the possible event (4 objects) when the impossible event was presented first. No difference in looking duration was observed for the opposite order. In the second experiment, the four objects were disposed in a line and an eye‐tracking system was used. No difference in the number of looks was observed between the impossible event (3 objects, the second one missing) and the possible event (4 objects). Therefore, it appears that at least in this complex situation (4 objects used instead of 2 usually), the location of the missing object is a key factor for event discrimination. Eye‐tracking also indicated in the second experiment that infants looked less at the second location during an impossible event (object missing) than during the possible event (object present), indicating that the impossibility of the event was not a determining factor for looking durations. Altogether, the data indicate the potential usefulness of eye‐tracking analysis in this type of situation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Development of infants’ intuitions about support relations: sensitivity to stability

Can infants perceive stability when a supported box is put on a supporting box in a balanced position? In Experiment 1, 41 infants saw three events. In a stable event, the supported box was put on a wide supporting box in a balanced position. In an unstable event, the supported box was put on a narrow supporting box in a balanced position. In an impossible event, the supported box was put on the extreme end of a wide supporting box. Infants 4 to 6.5 months old looked equally at all three events. Infants 6.5 to 10 months old looked slightly longer at the impossible event than at the other events. Infants 10 to 13 months old looked reliably longer at the unstable and impossible events than at the stable event. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that these differences in looking times did not come from differences in stimulus configurations between the events. These results suggest that infants above 10 months old are sensitive to stability of support relations.     

Young infants’ reasoning about physical events involving inert and self-propelled objects

The present research examined whether 5- to 6.5-month-old infants would hold different expectations about various physical events involving a box after receiving evidence that it was either inert or self-propelled. Infants were surprised if the inert but not the self-propelled box: reversed direction spontaneously (Experiment 1); remained stationary when hit or pulled (Experiments 3 and 3A); remained stable when released in midair or with inadequate support from a platform (Experiment 4); or disappeared when briefly hidden by one of two adjacent screens (the second screen provided the self-propelled box with an alternative hiding place; Experiment 5). On the other hand, infants were surprised if the inert or the self-propelled box appeared to pass through an obstacle (Experiment 2) or disappeared when briefly hidden by a single screen (Experiment 5). The present results indicate that infants as young as 5 months of age distinguish between inert and self-propelled objects and hold different expectations for physical events involving these objects, even when incidental differences between the objects are controlled. These findings are consistent with the proposal by Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and the animate–inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive Science, 14, 79–106, Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 119–148). New York: Cambridge University Press, and others that infants endow self-propelled objects with an internal source of energy. Possible links between infants’ concepts of self-propelled object, agent, and animal are also discussed.     

Object individuation and labelling in 6-month-old infants

The ability to determine how many objects are involved in physical events is fundamental for reasoning about the world that surrounds us. Previous studies suggest that infants can fail to individuate objects in ambiguous occlusion events until their first birthday and that learning words for the objects may play a crucial role in the development of this ability. The present eye-tracking study tested whether the classical object individuation experiments underestimate young infants’ ability to individuate objects and the role word learning plays in this process. Three groups of 6-month-old infants (N = 72) saw two opaque boxes side by side on the eye-tracker screen so that the content of the boxes was not visible. During a familiarization phase, two visually identical objects emerged sequentially from one box and two visually different objects from the other box. For one group of infants the familiarization was silent (Visual Only condition). For a second group of infants the objects were accompanied with nonsense words so that objects’ shape and linguistic labels indicated the same number of objects in the two boxes (Visual & Language condition). For the third group of infants, objects’ shape and linguistic labels were in conflict (Visual vs. Language condition). Following the familiarization, it was revealed that both boxes contained the same number of objects (e.g. one or two). In the Visual Only condition, infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects at test, showing that they could individuate objects using visual cues alone. In the Visual & Language condition infants showed the same looking pattern. However, in the Visual vs Language condition infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects according to linguistic labels. The results show that infants can individuate objects in a complex object individuation paradigm considerably earlier than previously thought and that linguistic cues enforce their own preference in object individuation. The results are consistent with the idea that when language and visual information are in conflict, language can exert an influence on how young infants reason about the visual world.     

The development of young infants' intuitions about support

Previous research has shown that 3-month-old infants, like adults, expect a box to be stable when it is in full contact with a platform, and to fall when it loses all contact with the platform. Do young infants also have expectations about what should happen when the box is only in partial contact with the platform? The present research was designed to address this question. In Experiment 1, 6.5-month-old infants saw two test events: a full-contact and a partial-contact test event. In both events, the infants watched the extended finger of a gloved hand push a box along the top of a platform. In the full-contact event, the box was pushed until its leading edge reached the end of the platform. In the partial-contact event, the box was pushed until only 15% or 70% of its bottom surface remained on the platform. The infants looked reliably longer at the partial-than at the full-contact event when 15%, but not 70%, of the box rested on the platform. These results suggested that the infants were able to judge how much contact was needed between the box and the platform for the box to be stable. A control condition provided evidence for this interpretation. In Experiment 2, 5.5- to 6-month-old infants were found to look equally at the full- and the partial-contact events, even when only 15% of the box's bottom surface remained on the platform. This result suggested that prior to 6.5 months of age infants perceive any amount of contact between the box and the platform to be sufficient to ensure the box's stability. Interpretations of this developmental sequence are considered in the Conclusion.     

Cued visual attention does not distinguish between occluded and occluding objects

Does visual attention spread from the cued end of an occluded object to locations occupied by inferred portions of that object? We investigated this question by using a probe detection paradigm with two-dimensional (2-D) displays of occluded objects. Probes could appear in occluded or nonoccluded locations on either a cued or noncued object. Participants responded faster to probes appearing within the region of space occupied by the cued object. This was true not only when the probe appeared in positions separated from the cued location by an occluder (as demonstrated by Moore, Yantis, & Vaughan, 1998), but also when it appeared in positions on the occluder itself. Thus, results suggest that cued facilitation spreads to regions of noncued occluding objects that overlap cued occluded objects in 2-D space.     

Infants’ use of category knowledge and object attributes when segregating objects at 8.5 months of age

The current research investigates infants’ perception of a novel object from a category that is familiar to young infants: key rings. We ask whether experiences obtained outside the lab would allow young infants to parse the visible portions of a partly occluded key ring display into one single unit, presumably as a result of having categorized it as a key ring. This categorization was marked by infants’ perception of the keys and ring as a single unit that should move together, despite their attribute differences. We showed infants a novel key ring display in which the keys and ring moved together as one rigid unit (Move-together event) or the ring moved but the keys remained stationary throughout the event (Move-apart event). Our results showed that 8.5-month-old infants perceived the keys and ring as connected despite their attribute differences, and that their perception of object unity was eliminated as the distinctive attributes of the key ring were removed. When all of the distinctive attributes of the key ring were removed, the 8.5-month-old infants perceived the display as two separate units, which is how younger infants (7-month-old) perceived the key ring display with all its distinctive attributes unaltered. These results suggest that on the basis of extensive experience with an object category, infants come to identify novel members of that category and expect them to possess the attributes typical of that category.     

The drawbridge phenomenon: representational reasoning or perceptual preference?

Two experiments investigated whether infants would look longer at a rotating "drawbridge" that appeared to violate physical laws because they knew that it was causally impossible, as claimed by R. Baillargeon, E. S. Spelke, and S. Wasserman (1985) and R. Baillargeon (1987a). Using a habituation paradigm, they reported that infants looked longer at a display that appeared impossible (rotated 180 degrees while an obstructing box was behind it) than at one that appeared possible (rotated only 112 degrees, appearing to stop at the box). Experiment 1 eliminated habituation to 180 degree screen rotations. Still, infants looked longer at the 180 degree impossible rotations. Critically, however, infants also looked longer at possible 180 degree rotations in Experiment 2, in which no obstruction was present. Moreover, no difference in effect size was found between the 2 experiments. These findings indicate that infants' longer looking at 180 degree rotations is due to simple perceptual preference for more motion. They question R. Baillargeon's (1987a) claim that it is due to infants' representational reasoning about physically impossible object permanence events.     

Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.     

Limits to Infants' Knowledge of Objects: The Case of MagicalAppearance

Young infants have an impressive knowledge of material objects. They appreciate that distinct objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, are internally cohesive units that maintain their boundaries, and exist continuously in space and time. We report a surprising limit to this body of understanding: Although 8-month-olds responded to the "magical" disappearance of an object as an unexpected event, they did not so respond to a magical appearance. These results suggest that infants' understanding of objects differs from adult cognition in important respects. We discuss four possible ways in which this finding can be reconciled with evidence that infants appreciate the spatiotemporal continuity of objects.     

Identification of objects in 9‐month‐old infants: integrating ‘what’ and ‘where’ information

Following Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet and Scholl (1998) , we distinguish between individuation (the establishment of an object representation) and identification (the use of information stored in the object representation to decide which previously individuated object is being encountered). Although there has been much work on how infants individuate objects, there is relatively little on the question of when and how property information is used to identify objects. Experiment 1 shows that 9‐month‐old infants use shape, but apparently not color, information in identifying objects that are each moved behind spatially separated screens. Infants could not simply have associated a shape with a location or a screen without regard to objecthood, because on alternate trials the objects switched locations/screens. Infants therefore had to bind shape information to the object representation while tracking the objects’ changing location. In Experiment 2, we tested if infants represented both objects rather than ‘sampled’ only one of them. Using the same alternation procedure, infants again succeeded in using shape (but not color) information when only one of the screens was removed – the screen that occluded the first‐hidden object (requiring the longer time in memory). Finally, we relate our behavioral findings both to a cognitive model and to recent neuroscientific studies, concluding that ventral ‘what’ and dorsal ‘where’ pathways may be functionally integrated by 9 months.     

Object perception and object-directed reaching in infancy

Five-month-old infants were presented with a small object, a larger object, and a background surface arranged in depth so that all were within reaching distance. Patterns of reaching for this display were observed, while spatial and kinetic properties of the display were varied. When the infants reached for the display, they did not reach primarily for the surfaces that were nearer, smaller, or presented in motion. The infants reached, instead, for groups of surfaces that formed a unit that was spatially connected and/or that moved as a whole relative to its surroundings. Infants reached for the nearer of two objects as a distinct unit when the objects were separated in depth or when one object moved relative to the other. They reached for the two objects as a single unit when the objects were adjacent or when they moved together. The reaching patterns provided evidence that the infants organized each display into the kind of units that adults call objects: manipulable units with internal coherence and external boundaries. Infants, like adults, perceived objects by detecting both the spatial arrangements and the relative movements of surfaces in the three-dimensional layout.     

Event-mapping tasks: investigating the effects of prior information and event complexity on performance

Infants younger than 11.5 months typically fail in event-mapping tasks with complex event sequences, yet succeed when the event sequences are made very simple and brief. The present research explored whether younger infants might succeed at mapping complex event sequences if infants were given information to help them organize and structure the event. Three experiments were conducted with 7.5-month-olds. In all of the experiments, the infants were shown a two-phase test event. In the first phase, infants saw a box–ball occlusion sequence in which the objects emerged at least once to each side of the screen, reversing direction each time to return behind the screen. In the second phase, infants saw a one-ball display. Prior to the test trials, infants were shown an “outline” of the test event that contained the basic components of the event. The experiments varied in (a) the kind of information included in the event outline and (b) the complexity of the box–ball test sequence (i.e., the number of object reversals). The results revealed that the 7.5-month-olds benefitted from viewing an event outline, although the performance of the males was more robust than the females. These results add to a growing body of research indicating that young infants can succeed on event-mapping tasks under more supportive conditions and provide insight into why event mapping is such a difficult task for young infants.