母亲情绪调节与幼儿情绪理解能力:母亲应对方式的中介作用

对258名幼儿进行情绪理解能力任务测查,其母亲完成情绪调节方式问卷和应对幼儿消极情绪问卷,探讨母亲情绪调节方式、母亲对幼儿消极情绪的反应方式和幼儿情绪理解能力之间的关系。结果表明,幼儿情绪理解能力随年龄增长而提高,女孩情绪理解能力高于男孩。母亲对幼儿消极情绪更多采用情感关注和问题解决,惩罚反应最少,母亲对男孩的消极情绪表现出更多的惩罚反应,对女孩表现出更多的情感关注。母亲鼓励表达在其情绪调节方式和幼儿情绪理解能力之间有中介作用。     

Self-compassion and reactions to unpleasant self-relevant events: the implications of treating oneself kindly

Five studies investigated the cognitive and emotional processes by which self-compassionate people deal with unpleasant life events. In the various studies, participants reported on negative events in their daily lives, responded to hypothetical scenarios, reacted to interpersonal feedback, rated their or others' videotaped performances in an awkward situation, and reflected on negative personal experiences. Results from Study 1 showed that self-compassion predicted emotional and cognitive reactions to negative events in everyday life, and Study 2 found that self-compassion buffered people against negative self-feelings when imagining distressing social events. In Study 3, self-compassion moderated negative emotions after receiving ambivalent feedback, particularly for participants who were low in self-esteem. Study 4 found that low-self-compassionate people undervalued their videotaped performances relative to observers. Study 5 experimentally induced a self-compassionate perspective and found that self-compassion leads people to acknowledge their role in negative events without feeling overwhelmed with negative emotions. In general, these studies suggest that self-compassion attenuates people's reactions to negative events in ways that are distinct from and, in some cases, more beneficial than self-esteem.     

Whom to help? Immediacy bias in judgments and decisions about humanitarian aid

People exhibit an immediacy bias when making judgments and decisions about humanitarian aid, perceiving as more deserving and donating disproportionately to humanitarian crises that happen to arouse immediate emotion. The immediacy bias produced different serial position effects, contingent on decision timing (Experiment 1). When making allocation decisions directly after viewing to four emotionally evocative films about four different humanitarian crises, participants donated disproportionately more to the final, immediate crisis, in contrast, when making donation decisions sequentially, after viewing each of the four crises, participants donated disproportionately to the immediate crisis. The immediacy bias was associated with “scope neglect,” causing people to take action against relatively less deadly crises (Experiments 2 and 3). The immediacy bias emerged even when participants were warned about emotional manipulation (Experiment 3). The immediacy bias diminished over time, as immediate emotions presumably subsided (Experiment 2). Implications for charitable giving, serial position effects, and the influence of emotion on choice are discussed.     

Misery has more company than people think: underestimating the prevalence of others' negative emotions

Four studies document underestimations of the prevalence of others' negative emotions and suggest causes and correlates of these erroneous perceptions. In Study 1a, participants reported that their negative emotions were more private or hidden than were their positive emotions; in Study 1b, participants underestimated the peer prevalence of common negative, but not positive, experiences described in Study 1a. In Study 2, people underestimated negative emotions and overestimated positive emotions even for well-known peers, and this effect was partially mediated by the degree to which those peers reported suppression of negative (vs. positive) emotions. Study 3 showed that lower estimations of the prevalence of negative emotional experiences predicted greater loneliness and rumination and lower life satisfaction and that higher estimations for positive emotional experiences predicted lower life satisfaction. Taken together, these studies suggest that people may think they are more alone in their emotional difficulties than they really are.     

Spatializing Emotion: No Evidence for a Domain‐General Magnitude System

People implicitly associate different emotions with different locations in left‐right space. Which aspects of emotion do they spatialize, and why? Across many studies people spatialize emotional valence, mapping positive emotions onto their dominant side of space and negative emotions onto their non‐dominant side, consistent with theories of metaphorical mental representation. Yet other results suggest a conflicting mapping of emotional intensity (a.k.a., emotional magnitude), according to which people associate more intense emotions with the right and less intense emotions with the left — regardless of their valence; this pattern has been interpreted as support for a domain‐general system for representing magnitudes. To resolve the apparent contradiction between these mappings, we first tested whether people implicitly map either valence or intensity onto left‐right space, depending on which dimension of emotion they attend to (Experiments 1a, b). When asked to judge emotional valence, participants showed the predicted valence mapping. However, when asked to judge emotional intensity, participants showed no systematic intensity mapping. We then tested an alternative explanation of findings previously interpreted as evidence for an intensity mapping (Experiments 2a, b). These results suggest that previous findings may reflect a left‐right mapping of spatial magnitude (i.e., the size of a salient feature of the stimuli) rather than emotion. People implicitly spatialize emotional valence, but, at present, there is no clear evidence for an implicit lateral mapping of emotional intensity. These findings support metaphor theory and challenge the proposal that mental magnitudes are represented by a domain‐general metric that extends to the domain of emotion.     

The perceived impact of tax and regulatory changes

People believe that shared events, events that impact everyone to the same degree, will nonetheless impact them more than others. Across four studies we examined whether this impacts people's reactions to proposed changes to tax and regulatory policies. We found that participants thought that tax (Study 1a and 1b) and regulatory (Study 2) changes would have more of an impact on their own lives than on the lives of people in their same financial situation. We then examined whether these findings are the product of a broad focalism bias or its narrower relative, egocentrism. Because we observed the bias both when participants were asked about their own financial situation or that of someone else, the former appears to be the better explanation (Study 3). We discuss the implications of this bias for people's willingness to embrace policy proposals designed to advance the common good.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

Happy,sad, scary and peaceful musical excerpts for research on emotions

Three experiments were conducted in order to validate 56 musical excerpts that conveyed four intended emotions (happiness, sadness, threat and peacefulness). In Experiment 1, the musical clips were rated in terms of how clearly the intended emotion was portrayed, and for valence and arousal. In Experiment 2, a gating paradigm was used to evaluate the course for emotion recognition. In Experiment 3, a dissimilarity judgement task and multidimensional scaling analysis were used to probe emotional content with no emotional labels. The results showed that emotions are easily recognised and discriminated on the basis of valence and arousal and with relative immediacy. Happy and sad excerpts were identified after the presentation of fewer than three musical events. With no labelling, emotion discrimination remained highly accurate and could be mapped on energetic and tense dimensions. The present study provides suitable musical material for research on emotions.Keywords.     

Individual differences in emotional creativity: structure and correlates

The structure and correlates of emotional creativity were explored in a series of six studies, using a specially constructed measure of individual differences--the Emotional Creativity Inventory (ECI). Analyses of the ECI suggest that three facets of emotional creativity can be distinguished empirically as well as theoretically, namely, preparedness (understanding and learning from one's own and others' emotions), novelty (the ability to experience unusual emotions), and effectiveness/authenticity (the skill to express emotions adroitly and honestly). Women score higher than men on emotional preparedness and effectiveness/authenticity, but not on the novelty of their responses. People who score high on the ECI are considered by their peers to be more emotionally creative, presumably on the basis of everyday behavior. Associations between emotional creativity as measured by the ECI and a variety of other personality variables (including the Big Five personality traits, mysticism, self-esteem, authoritarianism, locus of control, alexithymia, and ways of coping) are examined, as is the relation between emotional creativity and prior traumatic experiences.     

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person-causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions.     

The impact of empathy and reappraisal on emotional intensity recognition

Empathy represents a fundamental ability that allows for the creation and cultivation of social bonds. As part of the empathic process, individuals use their own emotional state to interpret the content and intensity of other people’s emotions. Therefore, the current study was designed to test two hypotheses: (1) empathy for the pain of another will result in biased emotional intensity judgment; and (2) changing one’s emotion via emotion regulation will modulate these biased judgments. To test these hypotheses, in experiment one we used a modified version of a well-known task that triggers an empathic reaction We found that empathy resulted in biased emotional intensity judgment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a bias in the recognition of emotional facial expressions as a function of empathy for pain. In experiment two, we replicated these findings in an independent sample, and further found that this biased emotional intensity judgment can be moderated via reappraisal. Taken together, our findings suggest that the novel task used here can be employed to further explore the relation between emotion regulation and empathy.     

Face the noise: embodied responses to nonverbal vocalizations of discrete emotions

Extensive prior research has shown that the perception of an emotional facial expression automatically elicits a corresponding facial expression in the observer. Theories of embodied emotion, however, suggest that such reactions might also occur across expressive channels, because simulation is based on integrated motoric and affective representations of that emotion. In the present studies, we examined this idea by focusing on facial and experiential reactions to nonverbal emotion vocalizations. In Studies 1 and 2, we showed that both hearing and reproducing vocalizations of anger, disgust, happiness, and sadness resulted in specific facial behaviors, as well as congruent self-reported emotions (Study 2). In Studies 3 and 4, we showed that the inhibition of congruent facial actions impaired listeners' processing of emotion vocalizations (Study 3), as well as their experiences of a concordant subjective state (Study 4). Results support the idea that cross-channel simulations of others' states serve facilitative functions similar to more strict imitations of observed expressive behavior, suggesting flexibility in the motoric and affective systems involved in emotion processing and interpersonal emotion transfer. We discuss implications for embodiment research and the social consequences of expressing and matching emotions across nonverbal channels.     

Preliminary evidence for an emotion dysregulation model of generalized anxiety disorder

Three studies provide preliminary support for an emotion dysregulation model of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). In study 1, students with GAD reported heightened intensity of emotions, poorer understanding of emotions, greater negative reactivity to emotional experience, and less ability to self-soothe after negative emotions than controls. A composite emotion regulation score significantly predicted the presence of GAD, after controlling for worry, anxiety, and depressive symptoms. In study 2, these findings were largely replicated with a clinical sample. In study 3, students with GAD, but not controls, displayed greater increases in self-reported physiological symptoms after listening to emotion-inducing music than after neutral mood induction. Further, GAD participants had more difficulty managing their emotional reactions. Implications for GAD and psychopathology in general are discussed.     

The fading affect bias: Effects of social disclosure to an interactive versus non-responsive listener

The intensity of negative emotions associated with event memories fades to a greater extent over time than positive emotions (fading affect bias or FAB). In this study, we examine how the presence and behaviour of a listener during social disclosure influences the FAB and the linguistic characteristics of event narratives. Participants recalled pleasant and unpleasant events and rated each event for its emotional intensity. Recalled events were then allocated to one of three experimental conditions: no disclosure, private verbal disclosure without a listener or social disclosure to another participant whose behaviour was experimentally manipulated. Participants again rated the emotional intensity of the events immediately after these manipulations and after a one-week delay. Verbal disclosure alone was not sufficient to enhance the FAB. However, social disclosure increased positive emotional intensity, regardless of the behaviour of the listener. Whilst talking to an interactive listener led unpleasant event memories to decrease in emotional intensity, talking to a non-responsive listener increased their negative emotional intensity. Further, listener behaviour influenced the extent of emotional expression in written event narratives. This study provides original evidence that listener behaviour during social disclosure is an important factor in the effects of social disclosure in the FAB.     

Self-esteem and affect as information

This research tests whether people with high self-esteem are more informed by their emotions than are people with low self-esteem. In Study 1, participants listened to a series of disturbing baby cries, rated how much distress these cries conveyed, and reported their own emotional reactions to the cries. As predicted, the relation between participants' emotional reactions and their cry ratings was strongest at higher levels of self-esteem. In Study 2, self-esteem again determined how strongly participants' own emotional reactions influenced their baby cry ratings, even though esteem was measured weeks before the experiment and even after controlling for social desirability. Study 3 manipulated self-regard and showed that the correlation between participants' emotional reactions and their cry ratings was strong for high-regard participants, moderate for control participants, and weak for low-regard participants. These results suggest that self-esteem serves to validate the informational value of feelings.     

Frequency,characteristics, and perceived functions of emotional future thinking in daily life

While many thoughts and mental images that people form about their personal future refer to emotionally significant events, there is still little empirical data on the frequency and nature of emotional future-oriented thoughts (EmoFTs) that occur in natural settings. In the present study, participants recorded EmoFTs occurring in daily life and rated their characteristics, emotional properties, and perceived functions. The results showed that EmoFTs are frequent, occur in various contexts, and are perceived to fulfil important functions, mostly related to goal pursuit and emotion regulation. When distinguishing between anticipatory and anticipated emotions (i.e., emotions experienced in the present versus emotions expected to occur in the future), a positivity bias in the frequency of EmoFTs was found to be restricted to anticipated emotions. The representational format and perceived function of EmoFTs varied according to their affective valence, and the intensity of anticipatory and anticipated emotions were influenced by the personal importance and amount of visual imagery of EmoFTs. Mood states preceding EmoFTs influenced their emotional components, which, in turn, impacted ensuing mood states. Overall, these findings shed further light on the emotional properties of future-oriented thoughts that are experienced in daily life.     

Emotions in context: pictorial influences on affective attributions

The visual illusion Terror Subterra, by Roger Shepard (1990), depicts a seemingly large creature chasing another in a tunnel, yet both creatures are physically identical. In addition to this visual illusion, the two creatures also appear to exhibit different emotions, as the background creature (the pursuer) appears angry whereas the foreground creature (the pursued) appears fearful. We explored this context effect by first establishing the magnitude of the emotional bias effect. We then modified the original drawing in various ways, such as equating for perceived size, removing one creature from the scene, and removing the pictorial context altogether. Findings suggest that the emotional bias is due to the pictorial setting and to the perceived social-emotional relationship between the two creatures. These results highlight the importance of both perceptual and social-emotional influences in driving affective attributions.     

Emotional reactions and regulatory responses to negative and positive events: Associations with attachment and gender

In two studies, we examined inter-individual variability in responses to both negative and positive events. In the first study, participants (119 college students) reported on negative and positive events from their own lives. The second was an experiment in which participants (133 college students) were given either negative or positive feedback about their personality. With negative events, more insecure individuals, especially anxiously attached, evidenced more intense negative emotional reactions and greater processing of (i.e., ruminating on) negative experiences. With positive events, securely attached individuals and less anxiously attached engaged in greater processing of positive experiences (maximized), whereas more insecure individuals tended to minimize positive experiences. Gender differences for emotion regulation were moderated by either attachment or event type. Findings for negative events generally coincide with prior research, and those for positive events provide new evidence that attachment style could affect how people react to positive events and emotions.     

Rumination,emotional intensity and emotional clarity

It has been suggested that a high tendency to ruminate presents a deficient emotion regulation. Past research found that people with high tendency to ruminate show sustained attention for negative stimuli and increased negative thinking, which may result in intensified experiences of negative emotions. Moreover, high level of rumination was associated with low emotional understanding. Accordingly, we hypothesized (1) high ruminators (HR) experience more intense emotional reactions than low ruminators (LR) for negative but not positive emotions, (2) LR have higher emotional clarity than HR, and (3) there would be the same pattern of results for brooding but not for reflective pondering. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire, a rumination response style questionnaire, and the Beck Depression Inventory-II. They also rated emotional intensity and identified emotion type for scene pictures from the CAP-D (Categorized Affective Pictures Database). The highest (HR) and lowest (LR) quarters of ruminators were compared on levels of emotional intensity and emotional clarity. We found HR experienced negative emotions more intensely than LR, with no difference for positive emotions. In contrast to our hypothesis, the two groups did not differ in their emotion understanding. This pattern of results was found for brooding but not for reflective pondering. Our research sheds light on the mechanism underlying rumination and emotion regulation.