Cognitive bias modification: induced interpretive biases affect memory

Previous research has shown that it is possible to experimentally induce interpretive biases using ambiguous scenarios. This study extends past findings by examining the effects of cognitive bias modification for interpretation on subsequent scenario recall. Participants were trained to interpret emotionally ambiguous passages in either a positive or negative direction. Transfer of the training to novel scenarios was tested. After training, participants were also asked to recall details from these novel scenarios. The results indicate that the training was effective in inducing the intended group differences in interpretive bias. Importantly, participants exhibited memory biases that corresponded to their training condition. These results suggest that manipulating interpretive biases can result in corresponding changes in memory. Findings from this study highlight the importance of future research on the relation among cognitive biases and on the possibility of modifying cognitive biases in emotional disorders.     

Gender-related differences in moral judgments

The moral sense is among the most complex aspects of the human mind. Despite substantial evidence confirming gender-related neurobiological and behavioral differences, and psychological research suggesting gender specificities in moral development, whether these differences arise from cultural effects or are innate remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of gender, education (general education and health education) and religious belief (Catholic and non-Catholic) on moral choices by testing 50 men and 50 women with a moral judgment task. Whereas we found no differences between the two genders in utilitarian responses to non-moral dilemmas and to impersonal moral dilemmas, men gave significantly more utilitarian answers to personal moral (PM) dilemmas (i.e., those courses of action whose endorsement involves highly emotional decisions). Cultural factors such as education and religion had no effect on performance in the moral judgment task. These findings suggest that the cognitive–emotional processes involved in evaluating PM dilemmas differ in men and in women, possibly reflecting differences in the underlying neural mechanisms. Gender-related determinants of moral behavior may partly explain gender differences in real-life involving power management, economic decision-making, leadership and possibly also aggressive and criminal behaviors.     

Subjective probabilities and moral judgments

The two experiments reported here examined the relationship between subjective probability estimates and moral judgments (credit and blame assignment, trait attributions, and behavior evaluations). Subjects read about situations that varied in outcome valence (moral or immoral); in addition, the nature of situational demands (Experiment 1) or behavior frequency (Experiment 2) was varied. In the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to judgments of immoral behaviors (but not moral behaviors), whereas the situational demands only had an impact on judgments of moral behaviors. Experiment 2 included a wider range of behavioral situations, and the probability estimates and moral judgments were assessed independently. In contrast to the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to trait and behavior ratings of both moral and immoral acts. Consistent with the first experiment, however, subjective probabilities predicted blame but not credit. Across both studies, the prior expectancies were more strongly related to evaluations of immoral acts than moral acts. Implications for understanding the determinants of judgments of moral and immoral acts are discussed.     

Moral realism and moral judgments

For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.     

Cognitive biases and depression

Compared symptomatically depressed, clinically remitted, and normal controls using cognitive measures designed to be traitlike and statelike in cross-sectional and longitudinal designs, respectively. Remitted depressives and normal subjects did not differ in their attributional biases, endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes, or interpretation of schema-relevant ambiguous events, but both groups differed from symptomatic depressives. Depressive episodes thus affect cognition, but cognitions measured by self-reports are more statelike than traitlike.     

Biases in children's and adults' moral judgments

Two experiments examined biases in children's (5/6- and 7/8-year-olds) and adults' moral judgments. Participants at all ages judged that it was worse to produce harm when harm occurred (a) through action rather than inaction (omission bias), (b) when physical contact with the victim was involved (physical contact principle), and (c) when the harm was produced as a direct means to an end rather than as an unintended but foreseeable side effect of the action (intention principle). The youngest participants, however, did not incorporate benefit when making judgments about situations in which harm to one individual resulted in benefit to five individuals. Older participants showed some preference for benefit resulting from action (commission) as opposed to inaction (omission). The findings are discussed in the context of the theory that moral judgments result, in part, from the operation of an inherent, intuitive moral faculty compared with the theory that moral judgments require development of necessary cognitive abilities.     

Blind ethics: Closing one's eyes polarizes moral judgments and discourages dishonest behavior

Four experiments demonstrate that closing one’s eyes affects ethical judgment and behavior because it induces people to mentally simulate events more extensively. People who considered situations with their eyes closed rather than open judged immoral behaviors as more unethical and moral behaviors as more ethical. In addition, considering potential decisions with closed eyes decreased stated intentions to behave ethically and actual self-interested behavior. This relationship was mediated by the more extensive mental simulation that occurred with eyes closed rather than open, which, in turn, intensified emotional reactions to the ethical situation. We discuss the implications of these findings for moral psychology and ethical decision making.     

Cognitive biases in blaming the victim

Past research on cognitive biases has demonstrated the existence of a hindsight effect, whereby the receipt of outcome knowledge increases the perceived likelihood of the reported event. Three experiments were conducted that tested and supported the hindsight effect as a cause of victim blaming. Subjects read detailed accounts that were identical except for the concluding sentence, which provided outcome information. Half the subjects in each experiment were informed that the woman narrating the account was raped; the other half read a neutral outcome. Experiment 1 demonstrated that subjects were unable to ignore the influence of outcome knowledge, leading to an exaggerated perception of how likely the outcome appeared. In Experiment 2, the woman was blamed more by subjects who read the rape outcome than by those who read the neutral outcome, despite the presentation of identical behaviors and personality traits prior to outcome information. The increased blame attributed by rape outcome subjects was behavioral, and not characterological, in nature. Experiment 3 found a direct association between the hindsight effect and victim blaming and also demonstrated that an attempt to reduce the negative impact of the hindsight effect on victim blaming was ineffective due to the salience of the rape outcome. Explaining how a neutral outcome was possible given the same account did not reduce victim blaming by subjects who received a rape outcome. Rather, those who received a neutral outcome increased their victim blaming when asked to explain a rape outcome. The implications for victims are discussed.     

Cognitive biases in human causal learning

The main aim of this work was to look for cognitive biases in human inference of causal relationships in order to emphasize the psychological processes that modulate causal learning. From the effect of the judgment frequency, this work presents subsequent research on cue competition (overshadowing, blocking, and super-conditioning effects) showing that the strength of prior beliefs and new evidence based upon covariation computation contributes additively to predict causal judgments, whereas the balance between the reliability of both, beliefs and covariation knowledge, modulates their relative weight. New findings also showed "inattentional blindness" for negative or preventative causal relationships but not for positive or generative ones, due to failure in codifying and retrieving the necessary information for its computation. Overall results unveil the need of three hierarchical levels of a whole architecture for human causal learning: the lower one, responsible for codifying the events during the task; the second one, computing the retrieved information; finally, the higher level, integrating this evidence with previous causal knowledge. In summary, whereas current theoretical frameworks on causal inference and decision-making usually focused either on causal beliefs or covariation information, the present work shows how both are required to be able to explain the complexity and flexibility involved in human causal learning.     

Motives, values and moral judgments

This study examined McClelland's (1981) hypothesis that operant and respondent measures of personality are orthogonal and assess different dimensions of personality structure. An operant measure of motives, a sentence completion test, and two respondent measures of cognitive schema variables, the Rokeach Value Survey and the Defining issues Test, were administered to 311 subjects. As predicted and in support of McClelland's hypothesis, 69% of the correlations between the respondent measures were significant at the alpha .05 level of probability versus 14% of the correlations between the operant and respondent measures. Further, within the domain of cognitive schema variables, it was theoretically possible to predict which values would correlate with different levels of moral judgment. The findings were discussed in terms. of their implications for person x situation models of social interaction and the prediction of criterion variables from typologies of personality.     

Factors that affect action possibility judgments: The assumed abilities of other people

Judging what actions are possible and impossible to complete is a skill that is critical for planning and executing movements in both individual and joint actions contexts. The present experiments explored the ability to adapt action possibility judgments to the assumed characteristics of another person. Participants watched alternating pictures of a person's hand moving at different speeds between targets of different indexes of difficulty (according to Fitts' Law) and judged whether or not it was possible for individuals with different characteristics to maintain movement accuracy at the presented speed. Across four studies, the person in the pictures and the background information about the person were manipulated to determine how and under what conditions participants adapted their judgments. Results revealed that participants adjusted their possibility judgments to the assumed motor capabilities of the individual they were judging. However, these adjustments only occurred when participants were instructed to take the other person into consideration suggesting that the adaption process is a voluntary process. Further, it was observed that the slopes of the regression equations relating movement time and index of difficulty did not differ across conditions. All differences between conditions were in the y-intercept of the regression lines. This pattern of findings suggests that participants formed the action possibility judgments by first simulating their own performance, and then adjusted the “possibility” threshold by adding or subtracting a correction factor to determine what is and is not possible for the other person to perform.     

When "light" and "dark" thoughts become light and dark responses: affect biases brightness judgments

Metaphors link positive affect to brightness and negative affect to darkness. Research has shown that such mappings are "alive" at encoding in that word-meaning evaluations are faster when font color matches prevailing metaphors (positive = bright; negative = dark). These results, however, involved reaction times, and there are reasons to think that evaluations would be unlikely to influence perceptual judgments, the current focus. Studies 1-3 establish that perceptual judgments were biased in a brighter direction following positive (vs. negative) evaluations, and Study 4 shows that such biases are automatic. The results significantly extend the metaphor representation perspective. Not only do evaluations activate metaphors, but such metaphoric mappings are sufficient to lead individuals to violate input from visual perception when judging an object's brightness.     

Cognitive biases and decision making in gambling

Heuristics and cognitive biases can occur in reasoning and decision making. Some of them are very common in gamblers (illusion of control, representativeness, availability, etc.). Structural characteristics and functioning of games of chance favor the appearance of these biases. Two experiments were conducted with nonpathological gamblers. The first experiment was a game of dice with wagers. In the second experiment, the participants played two bingo games. Specific rules of the games favored the appearance of cognitive bias (illusion of control) and heuristics (representativeness and availability) and influence on the bets. Results and implications for gambling are discussed.     

Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe

Highly hypnotizable participants were given a posthypnotic suggestion to feel a flash of disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word. They were then asked to rate moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies show that moral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust. These findings suggest that moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden moral intuitions.     

Cognitive styles: errors in directional judgments

Previous studies on spatial memory have shown that, in judging direction, participants are more accurate and faster when a map is aligned with the perspective of the spatial layout they had learned (alignment effect). Rossano and Warren (1989 Perception 18 215-229) have shown that when participants have to do a contra-aligned judgment they can either answer correctly, or make alignment or mirror-image errors. We think that the kind of response depends on the different way in which people acquire environmental knowledge: landmark, route, and survey. We hypothesise that landmark and route participants show alignment effects and make, respectively, alignment errors and mirror-image errors, whereas survey participants do not show an alignment effect. An experiment is reported in which participants performed three tasks in order to distinguish their cognitive style. We selected thirty landmark, thirty route, and twenty-eight survey participants. They were then submitted to directional judgment tasks to verify whether the alignment effect was present and to observe the kind of responses. The results revealed that survey participants did not show an alignment effect, and that the kind of errors could depend on the directional judgment task participants had to do, and not only on the cognitive style.