Cross-modal priming and explicit memory in patients with verbal production deficits

Implicit memory is often thought to reflect an influence of past experience on perceptual processes, yet priming effects are found when the perceptual format of stimuli changes between study and test episodes. Such cross-modal priming effects have been hypothesized to depend upon stimulus recoding processes whereby a stimulus presented in one modality is converted to other perceptual formats. The present research examined recoding accounts of cross-modal priming by testing patients with verbal production deficits that presumably impair the conversion of visual words into auditory/phonological forms. The patients showed normal priming in a visual stem completion task following visual study (Experiment 1), but showed impairments following auditory study in both implicit (Experiment 2) and explicit (Experiment 3) stem completion. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that verbal production processes contribute to the recoding of visual stimuli and support cross-modal priming. The results also indicate that shared processes contribute to both explicit memory and cross-modal implicit memory.     

Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role

It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.     

联想启动与知觉启动的比较研究

采用快速命名方法探讨不同加工水平对联想启动效应的影响。被试分别在深、浅加工条件下学习一系列颜色词,然后完成颜色命名和再认任务,并设立词命名任务,以比较联想启动和知觉启动的异同。结果表明,在颜色命名任务中,深、浅加工条件下均可形成对颜色词的启动效应,但浅加工条件下的再认成绩明显低于深加工,出现了联想启动和再认的分离现象。词命名表现出与颜色命名相似的结果,但它们在有意识回忆方面仍存在一定的差异,提示知觉表征系统单独并不能支持联想启动,联想启动可能是多个记忆系统共同作用的结果。     

Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mechanisms? A review and integration of conflicting views

Negative priming has traditionally been viewed as a reflection of an inhibitory mechanism of attention. However, recent accounts have suggested that negative priming does not reflect inhibitory mechanisms. Rather, slowed reaction times on negative priming trials are either due to retrieval of incompatible response tags or of mismatching perceptual information, or due to extra processes needed to distinguish past from present information. In contrast, it is proposed that there is no firm evidence to discount inhibition models. In fact, although retrieval processes can be implicated in negative priming effects, understanding of these requires consideration of the inhibitory processes involved in selecting information for goal-directed behaviour.     

Object- and feature-based priming in visual search

Two contrasting accounts for priming in visual search have been proposed. The main difference between the two is the level of perceptual processing at which the priming effects are assumed to occur, whether priming is assumed to operate through the selective facilitation of features or at the level of selection of objects for response. The aim of the experiments here was to contrast these accounts. In the first two experiments, observers performed a search for the odd diamond in the midst of two distractor diamonds. Each diamond had two colors, but the configurations of the colors within the diamonds were different for the two experiments in ways previously shown to lend themselves differently well to object formation. The results show that priming can be both feature- and object-based, depending on the topological properties of the stimuli. This was confirmed in a third experiment, in which a quite dissimilar stimulus set was used to address the same question, once again yielding similar results. We thus show that priming operates at various levels of perceptual processing, a result consistent with new findings from neuroimaging and neuropsychology.     

Perceptual and response components in repetition priming of spoken words and pseudowords

Two experiments explored repetition priming effects for spoken words and pseudowords in order to investigate abstractionist and episodic accounts of spoken word recognition and repetition priming. In Experiment 1, lexical decisions were made on spoken words and pseudowords with half of the items presented twice (～12 intervening items). Half of all repetitions were spoken in a “different voice” from the first presentations. Experiment 2 used the same procedure but with stimuli embedded in noise to slow responses. Results showed greater priming for words than for pseudowords and no effect of voice change in both normal and effortful processing conditions. Additional analyses showed that for slower participants, priming is more equivalent for words and pseudowords, suggesting episodic stimulus–response associations that suppress familiarity-based mechanisms that ordinarily enhance word priming. By relating behavioural priming to the time-course of pseudoword identification we showed that under normal listening conditions (Experiment 1) priming reflects facilitation of both perceptual and decision components, whereas in effortful listening conditions (Experiment 2) priming effects primarily reflect enhanced decision/response generation processes. Both stimulus–response associations and enhanced processing of sensory input seem to be voice independent, providing novel evidence concerning the degree of perceptual abstraction in the recognition of spoken words and pseudowords.     

Transfer between vision and haptics: Memory for 2-D patterns and 3-D objects

Explicit memory tests such as recognition typically access semantic, modality-independent representations, while perceptual implicit memory tests typically access presemantic, modality-specific representations. By demonstrating comparable cross- and within-modal priming using vision and haptics with verbal materials (Easton, Srinivas, & Greene, 1997), we recently questioned whether the representations underlying perceptual implicit tests were modality specific. Unlike vision and audition, with vision and haptics verbal information can be presented in geometric terms to both modalities. The present experiments extend this line of research by assessing implicit and explicit memory within and between vision and haptics in the nonverbal domain, using both 2-D patterns and 3-D objects. Implicit test results revealed robust cross-modal priming for both 2-D patterns and 3-D objects, indicating that vision and haptics shared abstract representations of object shape and structure. Explicit test results for 3-D objects revealed modality specificity, indicating that the recognition system keeps track of the modality through which an object is experienced.     

The ineluctable modality of the audible: perceptual determinants of auditory verbal short-term memory

Classical cognitive accounts of verbal short-term memory (STM) invoke an abstract, phonological level of representation which, although it may be derived differently via different modalities, is itself amodal. Key evidence for this view is that serial recall of phonologically similar verbal items (e.g., the letter sounds b, c, g, and d) is worse than that of dissimilar items, regardless of modality of presentation. Here we show that the effect of such phonological similarity in STM can be fully accounted for by the joint action of articulatory similarity, leading to errors in speech planning processes, and acoustic similarity within auditorily presented lists, which modulates their perceptual organization. The results indicate that key evidence used to argue for the existence of abstract phonological representation can in fact be fully accounted for by reference to modality-specific perceptual and motor planning mechanisms.     

Visual-auditory events: cross-modal perceptual priming and recognition memory.

Modality specificity in priming is taken as evidence for independent perceptual systems. However, Easton, Greene, and Srinivas (1997) showed that visual and haptic cross-modal priming is comparable in magnitude to within-modal priming. Where appropriate, perceptual systems might share like information. To test this, we assessed priming and recognition for visual and auditory events, within- and across- modalities. On the visual test, auditory study resulted in no priming. On the auditory priming test, visual study resulted in priming that was only marginally less than within-modal priming. The priming results show that visual study facilitates identification on both visual and auditory tests, but auditory study only facilitates performance on the auditory test. For both recognition tests, within-modal recognition exceeded cross-modal recognition. The results have two novel implications for the understanding of perceptual priming: First, we introduce visual and auditory priming for spatio-temporal events as a new priming paradigm chosen for its ecological validity and potential for information exchange. Second, we propose that the asymmetry of the cross-modal priming observed here may reflect the capacity of these perceptual modalities to provide cross-modal constraints on ambiguity. We argue that visual perception might inform and constrain auditory processing, while auditory perception corresponds to too many potential visual events to usefully inform and constrain visual perception.     

Stimulus and response representations underlying orthogonal stimulus-response compatibility effects

One of the most important findings in recent years regarding response selection is that stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effects occur for situations in which stimulus and response sets vary along orthogonal dimensions. For two-choice tasks, two types of orthogonal SRC effects are found: an overall advantage for the up-right/down-left mapping, and mapping preferences that vary as a function of position of the response apparatus and responding hand. We review evidence regarding the nature of both types of orthogonal SRC effects. Only asymmetric coding accounts have been proposed for the up-right/down-left advantage, and the evidence indicates that this asymmetry is a property of both verbal and spatial codes. Motoric and coding accounts, as well as a hybrid account based on end-state comfort, have been proposed for the second type of orthogonal SRC effect. In this case, the effects of response-apparatus position, hand, and hand posture conform more closely to predictions of the asymmetric coding accounts than to those of the motoric accounts. We also evaluate the mechanisms proposed by the alternative accounts in terms of related literature on the properties of spatial and verbal codes. Evidence indicates that spatial information is represented in categorical and coordinate codes, and both categorical spatial codes and verbal codes are asymmetric. Experiments on mental rotation suggest that it is unlikely that the direction of rotation is determined automatically by movement constraints, as the end-state comfort hypothesis suggests. An explanation in terms of salient features and referential coding can accommodate the range of orthogonal SRC effects.     

Semantic priming without awareness: Some methodological considerations and replications

Previous studies of subliminal semantic priming effects are considered. The distinction between subjective and objective detection thresholds proposed by Cheesman and Merikle (1984) is accepted, and it is concluded that no convincing evidence has been adduced to support or deny the existence of semantic priming effects at or below objective threshold. New criteria for the assessment of objective thresholds are proposed, and four experiments are reported in each of which pattern-masked primes were presented 10% below objective threshold. The first three experiments presented primes, mask, and targets binocularly; the fourth used dichoptic presentation. Data were analysed using both conventional F ratios and the quasi F ratio advocated by Clark (1973). Results showed that significant subliminal semantic priming effects occurred in each experiment when conventional F ratios were used, and significant effects occurred in all but the first experiment when quasi F was used. Binocular and dichoptic presentation of stimuli gave semantic priming effects whose magnitudes did not differ significantly. It is concluded that semantic priming effects can be obtained below objective detection threshold. It is also concluded that replication with different participants and different stimuli is preferable to the use of quasi F ratios in investigations where verbal stimuli are used.     

Implicit memory for novel associations between pictures: effects of stimulus unitization and aging

Studies of implicit memory for novel associations have focused primarily on verbal materials and have highlighted the contribution of conceptually unitized representations to such priming. Using pictorial stimuli in a perceptual identification task, we examined whether new association priming can occur at a purely perceptual level. By manipulating the spatial contiguity of stimuli, we also evaluated whether such priming requires the creation of perceptually unitized representations. Finally, we examined the status of such priming in aging. In Experiment 1, we found that spatial contiguity of stimuli is not necessary for novel pictorial association priming to emerge, although such contiguity does enhance the magnitude of associative priming. In Experiment 2, we found that new association priming is age invariant, regardless of spatial contiguity. In Experiment 3, we provide additional evidence that pictorial association priming is perceptually based. These findings expand the scope and delineate the conditions of novel association priming and inform theories about the nature of implicit memory for new associations.     

How to switch on and switch off semantic priming effects for natural and artifactual categories: activation processes in category memory depend on focusing specific feature dimensions

"Semantic priming" refers to the phenomenon that people react faster to target words preceded by semantically related rather than semantically unrelated words. We wondered whether momentary mind sets modulate semantic priming for natural versus artifactual categories. We interspersed a category priming task with a second task that required participants to react to either the perceptual or action features of simple geometric shapes. Focusing on perceptual features enhanced semantic priming effects for natural categories, whereas focusing on action features enhanced semantic priming effects for artifactual categories. In fact, significant priming effects emerged only for those categories thought to rely on the features activated by the second task. This result suggests that (a) priming effects depend on momentary mind set and (b) features can be weighted flexibly in concept representations; it is also further evidence for sensory-functional accounts of concept and category representation.     

Enhanced perceptual priming for neutral stimuli occurring in a traumatic context: two experimental investigations

Intrusive memories in posttraumatic stress disorder are often triggered by stimuli that are perceptually similar to those present shortly before or during the trauma. The present study aims to examine the possible role of perceptual priming in this phenomenon. It further investigates whether the degree of perceptual priming is associated with dissociation and whether both perceptual priming and intrusive memories can be reduced through elaboration. Two experiments measured perceptual priming for neutral stimuli that immediately preceded a "traumatic" event. Volunteers (N=46, 92) watched a series of "traumatic" and neutral picture stories, and completed a blurred object identification (perceptual priming) memory task, and a recognition memory task. Participants in Experiment 1 were selected to score either high or low on the Trait Dissociation Questionnaire [Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou (2002). Dissociation and posttraumatic stress disorder: Two prospective studies of motor vehicle accident survivors. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 363-368]. They also completed a state dissociation measure in the session. Experiment 2 randomly allocated participants to an experimental condition designed to increase elaboration or to a control condition. This experiment also included a measure of intrusive memories. Both experiments found enhanced perceptual priming for the stimuli that immediately preceded the "traumatic" stories compared to those preceding neutral stories. Participants with high trait dissociation showed relatively stronger perceptual perceptual priming. The degree of perceptual priming for stimuli from the "traumatic" stories also correlated with state dissociation (Experiment 1). Experimental manipulation of the elaboration of the stories showed that elaboration reduced the enhanced perceptual priming effect and the relative probability of reexperiencing symptoms (Experiment 2). The results support the role of perceptual priming in intrusions after traumatic events.     

Priming on verbal perceptual tests: Roles of lexical,surface, and conceptual processes

According to a lexical-access hypothesis, priming on verbal-completion tests requires previous access to higher-order nodes such as morphemes or words. In two experiments, subjects studied words presented in printed color, either by reading the words or by naming the printed colors. In Experiment 2, some of the words were to be ignored in both study conditions. The words presented in Experiment 2 were either conceptually related or unrelated to each other. And the cues in the test phase for repeated targets were either printed in the studied color or in a different color. In both experiments, the word stems of nouns studied and of new targets were presented with word-completion instructions (implicit test of memory). Consistent with the hypothesis, the amount of priming obtained was greater in the reading than in the color-naming condition. The least amount of priming was observed for targets that were to be ignored at study. In addition, Experiment 2 showed considerable effects of surface similarity (i.e., stronger priming effects with cues whose color was not changed from the study to the test phase) and some effects of conceptual processing, as was indicated by different amounts of priming for unrelated and for related nouns. Because these two effects were observed with both types of study task, it is concluded that perceptual and conceptual processes may make independent contributions to priming effects in verbal perceptual tests. This conclusion modifies and extends the original hypothesis, according to which previous lexical access is required in order to obtain effects of perceptual or conceptual processes on the priming scores.     

Negative priming and stimulus repetition: A reply to Neill and Joordens (2002)

Negative priming is reliably obtained with repeated items, but not with novel items. Here, we review why these stimulus repetition effects raise problems for memorybased theories of negative priming. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence casting doubt on Neill and Joordens’s (2002) claim that perceptual facilitation masks the effects of episodic retrieval with novel items. Finally, we discuss several theoretical and methodological issues raised in the reply by Neill and Joordens. We conclude that a more straightforward interpretation of these stimulus repetition effects is one based on activation-sensitive inhibition.     

IMPLICIT MEMORY IN THE TACTILE MODALITY:

Abstract— Research on perceptual priming has previously focused exclusively on priming in the visual and auditory modalities. The present study explored whether perceptual priming also extends to the tactile modality. Tactile priming for Braille words was examined in a group of blind participants, using a Braille analogue of the stem-completion task. The results for tactile priming paralleled previous stem-completion results in other modalities. Manipulating the encoding task at study (semantic vs nonsemantic) dissociated implicit and explicit Braille stem-completion performance, and priming was unaffected by the number of study presentations (one vs three). Finally, Braille stem-completion priming was found in a cross-modal paradigm to have both a specifically tactile component and a cross-modal component. These results demonstrate for the first time that verbal priming can occur in the tactile domain and that tactile priming has basic functional similarities with stem-completion priming in the visual and auditory domains.     

What colour is the car? Implicit memory for colour information in children

Three experiments were conducted to examine age-related differences in colour memory. In Experiment 1, preschool age and elementary school age children were given a conceptual test of implicit colour memory (a colour-choice task). They were presented with the names or achromatic versions of previously studied coloured line drawings and asked to select an appropriate colour. Significant priming could be demonstrated: The children chose the previously seen colours more often than was expected by chance. Equivalent priming was found for both versions (pictorial and verbal) suggesting that colour priming may be conceptually mediated. Moreover, colour priming proved to be age invariant. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding by using a wider age group (preschool, elementary school, and young adults) and by giving a perceptual implicit task (picture identification) in addition to a verbal colour-choice task. Colour did not affect priming in the perceptual task. Whereas priming showed no developmental change, agerelated improvements were observed on an explicit colour memory task that differed only in the test instructions from the implicit colour-choice task (Experiments 2 and 3). Taken together, the results suggest that implicit colour memory may be mediated by conceptual processes that are age invariant.     

Effects of color on perceptual and conceptual tests of implicit memory

Two experiments are reported that explore why recent investigations of implicit memory failed to find any effects of color information on test performance. In the first experiment, participants studied colored pictures as well as words printed in colored ink without any memory instructions. During the test phase, a verbal and a pictorial version of a color-choice task (a conceptual priming test) were compared to two perceptual tests (word-stem completion and picture-fragment identification). Similar and significant amounts of priming to color occurred in both color-choice tasks. The perceptual tests were found to be sensitive to changes in the stimulus-presentation mode from study to test, but stimuli remaining the same color and those changed to black-and-white did not differ in the priming scores. In the second experiment, a mild division of attention was introduced in the study phase. Once again, priming to color was observed only in the verbal version of a color-choice test and not in the word-stem completion test. Dividing attention did not decrease performance on both implicit tests, whereas an explicit test of color recall for studied pictures suffered from dividing attention at encoding. It is concluded that a perceptual attribute such as color may be represented and coded by conceptual processing. Furthermore, automatic (or not attention-demanding) encoding processes may suffice for later conceptual tests of implicit memory. Previous failures to find any effects of color information on implicit performance are attributed to the use of perceptual priming tests. Received: 30 June 1997 / Accepted: 20 April 1998