Against Emotional Dogmatism

It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis, we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.     

Dogmatism repuzzled

Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.     

Comorbidity of test anxiety and other anxiety disorders in children

Elementary school children with clinically significant test anxiety, as determined by self-report and a clinical interview, were assessed for the incidence of other fears and anxiety. The results indicated that test-anxious children reported more fears and general worries than their non-test-anxious peers. As expected, the test-anxious children experienced more negative cognitions and subjective distress when taking a test. Furthermore, the fear of negative evaluation was not limited to an actual test, since these children also reported identical symptoms when engaged in a second social-evaluative task. Finally, 60% of the testanxious sample met DSM-III criteria for an anxiety disorder. The results are discussed in terms of the relationship of text anxiety to more complex social-evaluative dysfunctions, more pervasive anxiety conditions, DSM-III anxiety disorders, and the utility of test anxiety as an indicator of the presence of these more pervasive anxiety states.This research is based on a dissertation conducted by the first author under the direction of the second author. Thanks are expressed to Stephen B. Manuck, Scott M. Monroe, Sharon Nelson-LeGall, and Saul Shiffman, who served as committee members. This study was supported in part by National Institute of Mental Health Grants No. 30915 and No. 16804, and a grant to the first author from the Sigma Xi Foundation.     

Problems for Dogmatism

I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised.     

Neurotic nucleus and test anxiety.

Undergraduate university students (N = 103) participated in a study of the relationship between test anxiety and the variables of trait anxiety, self-esteem, locus of control, mental ability, and gender. Results indicated bivariate associations between total test anxiety and the other measures except for mental ability. Further analyses revealed independent relationships between the "worry" component of test anxiety and the variables of trait anxiety, internality, chance, and mental ability. We also found independent associations between the "emotionality" aspect of test anxiety and the measures of trait anxiety and chance.     

Group desensitization of test anxiety

Following an orientation session in which test-anxious students were instructed in the theory and method of desensitization, 18 ISU undergraduates applied for a desensitization and counseling program for test-taking anxiety. All students committed themselves to attend 7 weekly meetings and to practice daily the relaxation exercises at home. Nine of these 18 subjects were assigned to the treatment group and 9 to the wait-list control group on the basis of a free class hour at program time. Treatment consisted of 7 desensitization and counseling sessions. The treatment and control groups did not differ significantly in initial Grade Point Average or scores on the A.C.T. Test. Both groups improved their G.P.A. in the program quarter but only the treatment group demonstrated a statistically significant improvement (p< 0.05). It is concluded that counseling and group desensitization in this 7-session model is an effective and efficient technique to modify anxiety responses to test taking situations.