Aristotle On Well-Being And Intellectual Contemplation: David Charles

Aristotle, it appears, sometimes identifies well-being (eudaimonia) with one activity (intellectual contemplation), sometimes with several, including ethical virtue. I argue that this appearance is misleading. In the Nicomachean Ethics , intellectual contemplation is the central case of human well-being, but is not identical with it. Ethically virtuous activity is included in human well-being because it is an analogue of intellectual contemplation. This structure allows Aristotle to hold that while ethically virtuous activity is valuable in its own right, the best life available for humans is centred around, but not wholly constituted by, intellectual contemplation.     

Christianity and Eudaimonia,Luck and Eudaimonism

I argue that Christians have at least two reasons to reject eudaimonism, interpreted as the view that attaining eudaimonia—or happiness—is what fulfills the moral life. First, I contend Christian conceptions of eudaimonia should encompass more than realized moral excellence and its requirements. Second, I claim Christians should construe the love at the heart of their moral life as fully realizable even if it is not evidently reciprocated. Both affirmations contradict eudaimonism by implying that eudaimonia depends on more than fulfilling the moral life—the former by rendering eudaimonia more subject to luck than eudaimonists can allow, the latter by depicting the moral life as less subject to luck than eudaimonists can accept. These affirmations also enable Christians to regard God’s love integral to eudaimonia apart from its role in realizing moral excellence and to deny all inability to attain eudaimonia manifests moral failure.     

Are Events and Affordances Commensurate Terms?

In this article, I argue that the dichotomy between events and affordances as Stoffregen (target article, this issue) devises is unwarranted and potentially misleading. I challenge the notion that the role of the actor distinguishes events from affordances in any useful way. The research labeled event perception is neither less ecological nor qualitatively different from research on affordances. Instead, the main distinction is constituted by affordance being a perceptual property, whereas event pertains to a different semantic category. Nonetheless, the contemplation of these concepts, in particular an elaboration of the concept of affordance, is desperately needed.     

The Implications of Two Conceptions of Happiness (Hedonic Enjoyment and Eudaimonia) for the Understanding of Intrinsic Motivation

The distinction between hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia was evaluated in three data sets involving use of the Personally Expressive Activities Questionnaire—Standard Form (PEAQ-S) with college student samples (n > 200 in each sample). Indices of these two conceptions of happiness were strongly and reliably related across the three samples. Differences between these two conceptions of happiness were evaluated in two ways. First, we examined and compared correlations of hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia with variables related to intrinsic motivation. Zero-order correlations involving hedonic enjoyment were significantly stronger with respect to measures of self-determination and interest than were the corresponding correlations involving feelings of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia). In contrast, correlations involving eudaimonia were significantly stronger with measures of the balance of challenges and skills, self-realization values, effort, and importance than were the corresponding correlations with hedonic enjoyment. Second, we empirically distinguished between activities for which both hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia are present (intrinsically motivated activities) and activities for which hedonic enjoyment alone is present (hedonically enjoyed activities). Intrinsically motivated activities were judged to be significantly higher with respect to measures of the balance of challenges and skills, self-realization values, effort, importance, interest, and flow experiences. No differences between the two categories of activities were found for self-determination and the frequency with which activities were performed. Given these distinguishable patterns in the two conceptions of happiness, a reconceptualization for the understanding of intrinsic motivation is proposed.     

A Historical Perspective on the Distinction Between Basic and Applied Science

The traditional distinction between basic (“pure”) and applied science has been much criticized in recent decades. The criticism is based on a combination of historical and systematic epistemic argument. The present paper is mostly concerned with the historical aspect. I argue that the critics impose an understanding at odds with the way the distinction was understood by its supporters in debates on science education and science policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And I show how a distinction that refers to difference on several epistemic and social dimensions makes good sense of representative historical cases. If this argument is tenable it suggests more continuity in the epistemology and politics of science than has been claimed by a new paradigm of science studies and politics during recent decades.     

WHEN BETTER IS WORSE. On the therapy/enhancement distinction in sports

The standard therapy/enhancement distinction is usually related to health purposes and some sense of normality. In this paper, I will challenge the basis of the distinction arguing that only the first part of it is related to health and, consequently, the distinction should be better understood as differentiating between qualitative and quantitative consequences of interventions. As health and normality are broad concepts inside of which it is possible to make some ulterior distinctions, I will propose three different senses of normality in order to more easily grasp the therapy/enhancement distinction. As with the distinction between therapy and enhancement, the difference between sports- and non-sports-persons is usually stated in terms of health and normality. I will challenge this assumption, too. In my opinion, the main difference between people, sportspeople and athletes should be related to the practice itself. Once the practice of a sport is taken seriously, along with its tough and demanding lifestyle, it is possible to properly analyse the distinction between people who practice and do not practice sport; the different levels at which they participate—quite obviously—have little to do with health purposes. Finally, I will revisit the standard therapy/enhancement distinction in sport in order to provide a way to easily reformulate this distinction allowing embarrassing blunders to be avoided and athletes’ health to be adequately cared for. I will conclude this paper with two open questions related to the use of the therapy/enhancement distinction for sport purposes and the challenge that it represents for some basic values of sport.     

IV—Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's Challenge, Frege's Answer

Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.     

Defending Luck Egalitarianism

abstract    This article defends luck egalitarianism as an interpretation of the egalitarian ideal against two major criticisms levelled against it by Elizabeth Anderson — that it is trapped in the distributive paradigm, and that it treats the victims of bad option luck too harshly to be considered an egalitarian theory. Against the first criticism, I argue that luck egalitarianism will condemn non-material inequalities and injustices if an appropriate conception of well-being is adopted. I demonstrate this by showing how the approach is sensitive to the five faces of oppression developed by Iris Young. Although the second criticism is more troubling, it does not defeat luck egalitarianism, either. I will show that few of the inequalities that arise in the real world result from option luck. Further, if cases do occur, rather than abandoning the theory, the best response is to combine luck egalitarianism with another egalitarian principle that will ensure that the basic needs of all citizens are satisfied. The paper concludes by defending the appeal of the distinction between option luck and brute luck, in light of the preceding discussion.     

A modest solution to the problem of religious disagreement

Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against (i) I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are only exacerbated when applied to God. Against (ii) I argue that broadly Kantian considerations give a better explanation of the moral differences in paradigm cases than the doing-allowing distinction and, when applied to God, effectively dissolve the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction. The upshot of this is that those who claim God does evil are no worse off than those who claim God allows evil regarding the PoE.     

Linking Peoples’ Pursuit of Eudaimonia and Hedonia with Characteristics of their Parents: Parenting Styles, Verbally Endorsed Values, and Role Modeling

Research on eudaimonia (seeking to use and develop the best in oneself) and hedonia (seeking pleasure, enjoyment, comfort), two dominant ways of pursuing the good life, has previously focused on their well-being consequences and correlates. Little is known about their predictors. Two retrospective studies with undergraduates began investigating the links between the behavior of one’s parents when one was a child, and the degree to which one pursues eudaimonia and/or hedonia and derives well-being from these pursuits. Study 1 (n = 105) showed that participants engaged in eudaimonic pursuits if their parents had been high on responsiveness and/or demandingness, the two dimensions that define positive parenting. Hedonic pursuits did not relate to either parenting dimension. Study 2 (n = 110) showed that people engaged in eudaimonic pursuits if their parents had either verbally endorsed eudaimonia or actually role modeled it by pursuing eudaimonia themselves. However, people derived well-being from eudaimonic pursuits only if their parents had role modeled eudaimonia, not if their parents had merely verbally endorsed it. The same pattern was found for engaging in hedonic pursuits and deriving well-being from them. It was also found that parents who role modeled eudaimonia had children who grew up to derive well-being not only from eudaimonia but also from hedonia. Parents who role modeled hedonia had children who grew up to derive well-being only from hedonia and not from eudaimonia.     

How eudaimonic and hedonic motives relate to the well-being of close others

Past research has examined the link of eudaimonic and hedonic motives with personal well-being, but less is known about their link with the well-being of close others. Also, empirical data on the link with the well-being of close others would address an ongoing debate regarding whether eudaimonia is egoistic and possibly detrimental to others. Participants completed self-report measures of their typical degrees of eudaimonic and hedonic motivation. We then asked their friends and relatives to tell us how the participant affected their well-being. When entering eudaimonia and hedonia simultaneously as predictors of close other well-being in multiple regressions, only eudaimonia related positively to the well-being of close others. Thus, eudaimonia had a positive, not negative, impact on other people. Furthermore, while past research shows that both eudaimonic and hedonic motives benefit personal well-being, this study suggests that eudaimonic motivation has more positive influences on close others.     

What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?

In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti‐psychologism’ and ‘non‐psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti‐psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non‐psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought and communication.     

Kant's Synthetic and Analytic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Distinction between Philosophical and Mathematical Syntheses

This article addresses Kant's distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method in philosophy. I will first consider how some commentators have accounted for Kant's distinction and analyze some passages in which Kant defined the analytic and the synthetic method. I will suggest that confusion about Kant's distinction arises because he uses it in at least two different senses. I will then identify a specific way in which Kant accounts for this distinction when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical syntheses. I will examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind. I will evaluate if he uses the analytic or the synthetic method and if the synthetic method is able to identify, without a previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our knowledge.     

Neo-Aristotelian Social Justice: An Unanswered Question

In this paper I assess the possibility of advancing a modern conception of social justice under neo-Aristotelian lights, focussing primarily on conceptions that assert a fundamental connection between social justice and eudaimonia. After some preliminary remarks on the extent to which a neo-Aristotelian account must stay close to Aristotle’s own, I focus on Martha Nussbaum’s sophisticated neo-Aristotelian approach, which I argue implausibly overworks the aspects of Aristotle’s thought it appeals to. I then outline the shape of a deeper and more general, and as yet unanswered, problem facing neo-Aristotelian accounts: how to justify the claim that the point of a just society is to assist or enable its members to flourish.     

Ronald Dworkin on Abortion and Assisted Suicide

In the first part of this article, I raisequestions about Dworkin's theory of theintrinsic value of life and about the adequacyof his proposal to understand abortion in termsof different ways of valuing life. In thesecond part of the article, I consider hisargument in ``The Philosophers' Brief on AssistedSuicide', which claims that the distinctionbetween killing and letting die is morallyirrelevant, the distinction between intendingand foreseeing death can be morally relevantbut is not always so. I argue that thekilling/letting die distinction can be relevantin the context of assisted suicide, but alsoshow when it is not. Then I consider why theintention/foresight distinction can be morallyirrelevant and conclude by presenting analternative argument for physician-assistedsuicide.     

The Loop Case and Kamm’s Doctrine of Triple Effect

Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Loop Case is particularly significant in normative ethics because it questions the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect, according to which there is a significant difference between harm that is intended and harm that is merely foreseen and not intended. Recently, Frances Kamm has argued that what she calls the Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE), which draws a distinction between acting because-of and acting in-order-to, can account for our judgment about the Loop Case. In this paper, I first argue that even if the distinction drawn by DTE can be sustained, it does not seem to apply to the Loop Case. Moreover, I question whether this distinction has any normative significance. The upshot is that I am skeptical that DTE can explain our judgment about the Loop Case.     

Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?: Andre Gallois

I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second.     

Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction

The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground.     

Three-year-olds' difficulty with the appearance--reality distinction: is it real or is it apparent?

Four experiments investigated 3-year-olds' understanding of the appearance-reality distinction using both J. Flavell, F. Green, and J. Flavell's (1986) typical verbal response paradigm and a new, nonverbal response paradigm. Both paradigms require verbal questioning, but the former involves a verbal response and the latter a nonverbal one. In the nonverbal paradigm, children were shown a deceptive object and asked to respond, nonverbally, to 2 different functional requests, 1 concerning the object's apparent property and 1 its real property. In the verbal paradigm, children were asked to state what the object looked like and what it really was. In the verbal paradigm, children were about 30% correct (a rate matching that in the literature), whereas over 90% of the same children were correct in the nonverbal paradigm. Participating in the verbal paradigm first had a detrimental effect on the children's performance in the nonverbal paradigm, but the reverse order had no effect. These results suggest that 3-year-olds can represent two conflicting properties of a deceptive object and thus understand the appearance-reality distinction in the nonverbal domain.