Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Statements

abstract    Recent legal rulings concerning the status of advance statements have raised interest in the topic but failed to provide any definitive general guidelines for their enforcement. I examine arguments used to justify the moral authority of such statements. The fundamental ethical issue I am concerned with is how accounts of personal identity underpin our account of moral authority through the connection between personal identity and autonomy. I focus on how recent Animalist accounts of personal identity initially appear to provide a sound basis for extending the moral autonomy of an individual — and hence their autonomous wishes expressed through an advance statement — past the point of severe psychological decline. I argue that neither the traditional psychological account nor the more recent Animalist account of personal identity manage to provide a sufficient basis for extending our moral autonomy past the point of incapacity or incompetence. I briefly explore how analogies to similar areas in law designed to facilitate autonomous decision, such as wills and trusts, provide at best only very limited scope for an alternative justification for granting advance statements any legal or moral authority. I conclude that whilst advance statements play a useful role in formulating what treatment is in a patient's best interests, such statements do not ultimately have sufficient moral force to take precedence over paternalistic best interests judgements concerning an individual's care or treatment.     

Autonomy,Experience, and Reflection. On a Neglected Aspect of Personal Autonomy

The aim of this paper is to suggest that a necessary condition of autonomy has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature: the capacity to critically reflect on one’s practical attitudes (desires, preferences, values, etc.) in the light of new experiences. It will be argued that most prominent accounts of autonomy—ahistorical as well as history-sensitive—have either altogether failed to recognize this condition or at least failed to give an explicit account of it.     

Personal Autonomy,Social Identity,and Oppressive Social Contexts

Attempts to articulate the ways in which membership in socially subordinated social identities can impede one's autonomy have largely unfolded as part of the debate between different types of internalist theories in relation to the problem of internalized oppression. The different internalist positions, however, employ a damage model for understanding the role of social subordination in limiting autonomy. I argue that we need an externalist condition in order to capture the ways in which membership in a socially subordinated identity can constrain one's autonomy, even if one is undamaged in one's autonomy competencies and self‐reflexive attitudes. I argue that living among those practically empowered to harass, to engage in racial profiling, and to treat as expendable is incompatible with a freedom‐condition required for unconstrained global self‐determination.     

Delusions and delusional reasoning

In 2 studies, delusional participants assigned higher probabilities to narratives of actual delusions than participants with no history of delusions; previously delusional participants did not differ significantly from delusional participants or participants with no history of delusions. In Study 2, the authors found that this reasoning bias was specific to delusions and did not generalize to "neutral" text. Familiarity with the content of the delusion narratives played a mediating role in the estimation of their probability, but delusional status also had a significant, independent effect. These findings are consistent with the Bayesian model of delusion formation proposed by D. R. Hemsley and P. A. Garety (1986), and with R. P. Bentall, P. Kinderman, and S. Kaney's (1994) concept of "emotional saliency." A productive area of future research might be to further determine the elements of "emotional saliency" and their impact on the individual steps of the Bayesian model.     

Delusions and theories of belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a branch of cognitive psychology that seeks to explain neuropsychiatric symptoms in terms of disruptions or damage to normal cognitive processes. A key objective of this approach is to use insights derived from the study of pathological symptoms to inform accounts of premorbid cognitive systems. Delusions, in particular, can be considered to represent dysfunction of the cognitive processes underlying belief formation, so studying delusions may provide unique insights into nonpathological belief. While this approach has provided compelling accounts for a range of delusions in terms of putative cognitive dysfunctions, it is less clear that it has achieved progress in its reciprocal goal of informing understanding of belief more generally. In this review, we trace the origins of the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach and consider the reasons for the lack of progress. We propose a tentative framework to overcome these challenges and suggest directions for future research.     

Autonomy and the Authority of Personal Commitments: From Internal Coherence to Social Normativity

Abstract

It has been argued – most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work – that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As an alternative, I sketch a view that focuses on intersubjective constraints of intelligibility built into social practices and on the pragmatics of how those norms are contested in an ongoing fashion.     

Self-Structure in Persecutory Delusions

There is currently limited research examining self-structure in clinical groups and no current data on the extent to which self-structure is amendable to change following psychological therapy. We address this important gap by examining self-structure in individuals with persecutory delusions using the card sort task, an established paradigm measuring key self-structure indices, including the degree to which self-structure is compartmentalized (characterized by primarily positive or negative attributes, as opposed to a mix of both), and the proportion and importance of negative attributes.In Study 1, individuals with a schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis with current persecutory delusions (clinical group, n = 27) and a healthy control group (n = 47) were compared on self-structure indices. In Study 2 (n = 27), the clinical group also completed the card sort task before and after randomization to either a 12-week mindfulness-based psychological therapy or treatment-as-usual control.In Study 1, self-structure differed significantly between the clinical and control groups. The clinical group had a greater proportion of negative attributes, assigned more importance to negative self-aspects, and had more compartmentalized self-structures compared with controls. In Study 2 there were no associations between delusion severity and self-structure. Large effect sizes for reductions in compartmentalization and proportion of negative attributes across self-aspects were found following mindfulness therapy. The findings highlight key differences in self-structure between individuals with persecutory delusions and healthy controls, and suggest that it might be possible to change self-structure following psychological therapy. These data support the central role of the self in theoretical models of paranoid thinking.     

Love and Marriage and Other Silly Delusions

Summary

This article examines the psychodynamic patterns that (11 inevitably result in a dysfunctional relationship and divorce, and (2) those necessary understandings and prerequisites which are essential for a healthy long term relationship. These themes include: how to assure a divorce, romance as the urge to merge, the role of the Trickster, the template of the Imago, understanding Transference, the Key to Happiness, how to get unstuck and some comments on loneliness and sex. It concludes with a new understanding as to “Why get married?”