Autonomy and Conjugal Love: A Reply to Golash

In my response to Golash I distinguish between two steps in my original argument. The first relates to the special value of conjugal (two-person) love relationships. I defend this step against criticisms, arguing that the two-person relationship provides a form of recognition that is of special importance to us and cannot be found in other sorts of relationship. The two-person relationship is one that, at least as private individuals, we have special reason to pursue. The second step concerns the claim that the special value of such relationships tends to promote the autonomy of those who have them. It is this second step that is important for the argument that a liberal state – one, at any rate, that takes itself to be in the business of safeguarding the pre-conditions of autonomy – could have reason to favour marriage or some form of civic partnership over other forms of intimate adult tie. However, I admit that Golash puts forward plausible – if anecdotal – arguments against this second step. I therefore agree that I need to be more tentative about this step than I was in the original paper.     

Intellectual Perfectionism about Schooling

In education, character education is a burgeoning field; however, it is also the target of considerable criticism. Amongst criticisms of character education, the political criticism that character education is a form of indoctrination stands out. In particular, the charge is made against character education that it breaches the principle of liberal neutrality about the good. In this article I discuss liberal approaches to character education. I outline the two most prominent liberal approaches to character education in school, liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism, as we find it in the work of Clayton (neutralism) and Levinson (liberal perfectionism). I hold that the two standard liberal approaches do not distinguish carefully enough between two possible forms of character education – moral character education and intellectual character education. Drawing on recent work in virtue epistemology, I hold that the liberal position tacitly demands intellectual character education. Regarding moral character education, however, I hold that the picture appears different. In the final analysis, I advocate a new form of perfectionism regarding character education that I call ‘intellectual perfectionism’. According to intellectual perfectionism, schools should be perfectionist regarding children's intellects, but neutralist regarding their morals.     

Liberalism,Autonomy and Conjugal Love

Res Publica - This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships of conjugal love – the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage...     

There is No Sacrum in it Any More: Revisiting Formalist Statehood and Religious/Civic Education on Baltic–Barents Borders

ABSTRACT

Even under globalised and hyper-diverse cultural and social conditions, representative liberal democracy conceives of itself as non-involved in issues to do with ethics, faith and belief. Drawing on a formalist systemic state identity it advocates a neutralist, secularist, generalist and non-biased approach to education in state schools. Building on a current research project on religious/civic education in the Baltic–Barents area, this article argues that this self-image is flawed and that representative liberal democracy cannot avoid being ethically biased. There is thus, the article argues, a need to better frame our understanding of different modes of religious/civic education as well as the logic of ethical neutralism characteristic of contemporary democratic statehood.     

Back to the Future: Marriage as Friendship in the Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft

If liberal theory is to move forward, it must take the political nature of family relations seriously. The beginnings of such a liberalism appear in Mary Wollstonecraft's work. Wollstonecraft's depiction of the family as a fundamentally political institution extends liberal values into the private sphere by promoting the ideal of marriage as friendship. However, while her model of marriage diminishes arbitrary power in family relations, she seems unable to incorporate enduring sexual relations between married partners.     

International Justice,Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the United States: a social science perspective

Whether and how civil society should recognize committed relationships between same-sex partners has become a prominent, often divisive, policy issue. The present article reviews relevant behavioral and social science research to assess the validity of key factual claims in this debate. The data indicate that same-sex and heterosexual relationships do not differ in their essential psychosocial dimensions; that a parent's sexual orientation is unrelated to her or his ability to provide a healthy and nurturing family environment; and that marriage bestows substantial psychological, social, and health benefits. It is concluded that same-sex couples and their children are likely to benefit in numerous ways from legal recognition of their families, and providing such recognition through marriage will bestow greater benefit than civil unions or domestic partnerships. Trends in public opinion toward greater support for legal recognition of same-sex couples are discussed.     

Realism,morality, and liberal democracy

Conclusions The picture of liberal democratic realism that we have presented can withstand a powerful set of criticisms that have emerged in the last two decades. We have argued that realism does not misconstrue the value of the state, it does not justify the ruthless suppression of every domestic threat that could face the state, it does not depend upon a conception of international politics that rules out moral constraints, and it does not misunderstand the relationship between self-interest and morality. The defense of liberal democratic reason of state depends upon the state protecting and securing the values and welfare of individuals and groups living within its domain. Realism cannot be justified if the state has lost its legitimacy.This version of realism, however, generates its own distinctive problems. The most significant of these is that it does not offer a clean, unambiguous solution to the problems raised by the survival of the liberal democratic regime. Unlike extreme realist or idealist conceptions of the role of morality in international relations, we have argued that for the liberal democratic state this problem cannot be settled without moral remainders. On this account, realism presents leaders with a moral dilemma that is theoretically unresolvable. But this is not a failure of realism. Indeed, it is an acknowledgement that the liberal democratic state can be seen as no more, and no less, than a necessary condition of value.     

Are Religions for Sale? Evidence from the Swedish Church Revolt Over Same‐Sex Marriage

Religious leaders sometimes condemn progressive social norms. This article revisits David Hume's hypothesis that secular states can “bribe” churches into adopting less strict religious doctrines. The hypothesis is difficult to test due to reverse causality: more liberal theologies may attract more political support in the first place. The empirical strategy used to circumvent this problem focuses on a theological conflict over same‐sex marriage within the Church of Sweden and takes advantage of political regulations that effectively make some parishes shareholders of the church's state‐protected property. The shares used for statistical identification are tied to property rights assigned more than 300 years ago, and they cannot be sold, traded, or amended by the individual parishes. The results show that priests in shareholding parishes are less likely to publicly oppose same‐sex marriage. The impact of political protection is stronger in parishes with more conservative members. The results are consistent with a model of clerical opportunism, in which income protection makes priests less likely to pander to the stricter followers.     

Religion,Democracy and the ‘Dawla Madaniyya’ of the Arab Spring

The object of this article is to review and evaluate a debate that has been taking place among Muslim and Arab writers for some time now about the concept of ‘dawla madaniyya’ (‘civil state/government’), and the place of religion in democratic politics. More precisely, it will be suggested that the current popularity of the term ‘dawla madaniyya’ signifies only a partial meeting of minds between Islamists and their liberal and secular opponents. By and large, the concept seems to have an instrumental value as part of an on-going discursive struggle between various political orientations about the place of Islam in the social–political order. On the basis of our discussion of the terms of the debate, a new approach to conceptualizing the disagreement will be suggested. The goal of this is not to resolve the disagreement, but rather to sharpen it in a way that shows what is required to achieve significant progress. The final resolution of the disagreement must await a more radical convergence of ideas than currently exists – a convergence that touches not only on standards of reasonableness but also on substantive beliefs and values.     

PLURALISM,LIBERALISM, AND THE ROLE OF OVERRIDING VALUES

While it is often thought that pluralism is best accommodated by a liberal state, John Kekes has recently argued that pluralism and liberalism involve inconsistent commitments. He maintains that liberalism is committed to the idea that one or more of the “liberal values” must override all other values, while pluralism is committed to the idea that there are no overriding values whatsoever. In this paper I challenge Kekes' position by arguing that ethical pluralism does not require an absence of overriding values, and that liberalism does not require that one or more of the liberal values must override all others.     

Sexual behavior, drugs, and relationship patterns on a college campus over thirteen years

Three samples of college students at a small New England liberal arts college received questionnaires regarding their sexual philosophies, behavior, relationship with most recent partner, self-perceived attractiveness, relationship with parents, use of drugs and alcohol, attitudes toward marriage and abortion, and other subjects. The college was sampled in 1974, 1979, and 1986. Sexual behavior increased dramatically from 1974 to 1979 and then decreased in 1986 to approximately where it was in 1974. The reason for this change, and findings regarding the relationships between sexual behavior and many of the variables cited above are discussed.     

Protected or Unprotected Sex: The Conceptions and Attitudes of the Youth in Bolgatanga Municipality,Ghana

The youth in Bolgatanga municipality in Ghana have relatively less knowledge of sexual and reproductive health (SRH) compared to the youth in other parts of Ghana. More fundamental knowledge is needed of the factors that influence young people to have protected and unprotected sex in specific social and cultural contexts, in order to protect them from adverse consequences, such as sexually transmitted diseases (STIs), HIV/AIDS and unintended pregnancies. This study therefore analyzed the conceptions and attitudes of the youth toward protected and unprotected sex, and particularly condom use, in Bolgatanga municipality. Semi-structured and focus group interviews were held with 71 young males and females and 17 adults. The results indicated that many of them lack a comprehensive knowledge of STIs, contraceptives and pregnancy, while a group of them had a negative attitude towards contraceptives. Not all parents, schools and organisations provide young people with a comprehensive education about SRH, and some even discourage such education because they believe it would encourage young people to have sex before marriage. In addition, young people also inform each other about SRH issues, sharing stories and personal experiences with their peers. The information they exchange is not always correct, however; sometimes it merely reflects their own personal preferences. The unequal power in the sexual relationships of young people—related to the traditional value system that gives men, but not women, “sexual freedom, both in and outside marriage”—is another determining factor for unprotected sex.     

Individual,Marital, and Family Therapy

Two therapists have recently suggested that marital therapy is either a shadow of individual therapy (Robert Harper) or eclipsed by family therapy (Jay Haley). We offer an apologia for marital therapy. We suggest that empirical evidence shows that it works. Further, clients often request it and resist a redefinition of marital concerns as individual or family problems. Finally, people value a focus on the marriage because (a) it blends individual rights and communal responsibilities and (b) it is the only voluntary relationship between dyads with the family. We conclude that marital therapy, when requested and appropriate, is legitimate and effective.     

The Young and the Restless? The Liberalization of Young Evangelicals

This study examines popular and scholarly perceptions that young American evangelicals are becoming more liberal than older evangelicals. Young evangelicals are more likely to have more liberal attitudes on same‐sex marriage, premarital sex, cohabitating, and pornography, but not abortion. This analysis is situated within the theoretical context of emerging adulthood, and considers higher education, delayed marriage, and shifts in moral authority as potential mediating factors accounting for age differences. A new method for operationalizing evangelical as a religious identity is suggested and three different classification schemes are examined: religious tradition, self‐identified evangelicals, and theologically conservative Protestants. The data come from the 2006 Panel Study of American Religion and Ethnicity.     

基于心理控制源视角的女公务员婚姻质量研究

目的:研究女公务员心理控制源和婚姻质量的关系。方法:采用《Olson婚姻质量问卷》和《控制圈量表》对551名女公务员进行调查。结果:不同职级的女公务员心理控制源差异显著,其婚姻质量差异不显著;不同年龄的女公务员心理控制源和婚姻质量差异不显著;影响女公务员婚姻满意度的主要因素是性生活、与亲友的关系、子女和婚姻、业余活动、信仰一致性、经济安排、夫妻交流、人际控制。结论:不同职级的女公务员心理控制源差异显著,其婚姻质量差异不显著;影响女公务员婚姻满意感的主要因素是婚际因素和外界因素,个人因素贡献不显著;基于控制源的视角,人际控制对女公务员婚姻满意度贡献显著,个人实力和社会政治控制对其婚姻满意度贡献不显著。     

Reforming Marriage: A Comparative Approach

In this article, I examine the case for privatising marriage and replacing civil marriage with inclusive civil union policies. I argue against this proposal because of its likely detrimental impact on the social standing of women and girls. In order to assess the importance of civil marriage historically and cross‐culturally, I examine a contemporary debate over marriage reform in some predominantly Islamic societies in regard to temporary marriage. I also propose a policy to protect the interests of children of both married and unmarried parents, so that this issue will be less of a stumbling block to proposals for inclusive civil marriage.     

The State, Marriage and Divorce

ABSTRACT This essay advances several interrelated arguments concerning the proper role of the state with regard to marriage and divorce but my main contention is that 'pure'no-fault divorce laws are unjust—or, at least, they are unjust if marriage involves a genuinely contractual element, and there seems to be very little doubt that it does. Locke, Kant and Hegel are three eminent thinkers who are alike in viewing marriage as a contract (though in the case of Hegel, it is a 'contract to transcend the standpoint of contract') and in the first two sections of the essay I consider their views on the role of contract in marriage. Whilst holding (with Hegel) that marriage is more than a contract, I also hold (with Kant) that it is not less than a contract. In section three I consider the implications of this 'not less than', the most important one being that 'pure'no-fault divorce laws are unjust. I shall contend that whilst the irretrievable breakdown of marriage may be regarded as a suitable ground for divorce, it simply cannot, and certainly ought not to, be regarded as a justificatory basis for the laying aside of rights acquired by individuals as a result of their having entered into a marital contract. However minimal one might wish the role of the state to be, or however averse one might be from allowing the state any role at all in purely personal and confidential relationships, yet to allow the expression 'the irretrievable breakdown of marriage'to be employed as a olanket to cover over the infringement of personal, contractually engendered and civilly recognised rights, is not to exercise commendable restraint but is, rather, to condone what is simply an abnegation by the state of its basic responsibility to ensure that justice prevails.     

What Lies Beyond Same‐Sex Marriage? Marriage,Reproductive Freedom and Future Persons in Liberal Public Justification

In this article I consider whether the legalization of sex-same marriage implies a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the 'marriage' business by leveling down to a universal civil union status. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient.     

A State to Call Their Own: Insurrection, Intervention, and the Communal Integrity Thesis

Many reasons have been given as to why humanitarian intervention might not be justified even where rebellion with similar aims would be a morally legitimate option. One of them is that intervention involves the imposition of alien values on the target society. Michael Walzer formulates this objection in terms of a people's right to a state that 'expresses their inherited culture' and that they can truly 'call their own'. I argue that this right can plausibly be said to extend sovereignty to at least some illiberal governments, and therefore to impose at least some moral constraints on humanitarian intervention. The problem for Walzer is that this right cannot form the basis of a constraint that applies to foreign intervention exclusively. Once the details of Walzer's argument are teased out, it becomes apparent that civil war and revolution must be equally restricted by this right. Hence a people's prerogative to be governed in accordance with familiar traditions cannot coherently be invoked to show that intervention is impermissible in cases where insurrection is taken to be justified.