Rawlsian Justice and non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT In his book, A Theory of Justice , John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections.     

Is Health (Really) Special? Health Policy between Rawlsian and Luck Egalitarian Justice

In recent work, Norman Daniels extends the application of Rawls's principle of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ from health care to health proper. Crucial to that account is the view that health care, and now also health, is special. Daniels also claims that a rival theory of distributive justice, namely luck egalitarianism (or ‘equal opportunity for welfare’), cannot provide an adequate account of justice in health and health care. He argues that the application of that theory to health policy would result in an account that is, in a sense, too narrow, for it denies treatment to imprudent patients (e.g. lung cancer patients who smoked). In a different sense, Daniels argues, luck egalitarian health policy would be too wide: it arguably tells us to treat individuals for such brute‐luck conditions as shyness, stupidity, ugliness, and having the ‘wrong’ skin colour. I seek to advance three claims in response to Daniels's revised theory, and in defence of a luck egalitarian view of health policy. First, I question Daniels's assertion regarding the specialness of health. While he is right to abandon his insistence on the specialness of health care, it is doubtful that health proper can be depicted as special. Second, I try and meet Daniels's objections to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarian health policy escapes being too narrow for it does not in fact require denying basic care to imprudent patients. As for it being allegedly too wide, I try to show that it is not, after all, counterintuitive to rid individuals of unfortunate and disadvantageous biological traits (say, a disadvantageous skin colour). And third, I question whether Daniels's own Rawlsian account is in fact wide enough. I argue that fair equality of opportunity fails to justify some standard medical procedures that many health systems do already practice.     

Rowlands,Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation

Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments).     

Rawlsian and Confucian Distributive Justice and the Worst Off

Philosophia - In any complex human society, distinct persons may have strikingly different standards of living. Those who lead the most undesirable, poorest lives in society can be called the worst...     

社会正义是对健康的最好保障

健康是公民的一项基本权利,社会或政府有义务保障公民的这一权利。公民的健康除了由医疗卫生和生理因素决定外,还由诸多社会因素决定。这些健康的社会决定因素所反映的实际上是社会正义问题,因此要保障公民的健康权利,最根本的是要营造一个正义的社会环境,并建立一个正义的社会保障支持系统。     

社会正义是对健康的最好保障

健康是公民的一项基本权利,社会或政府有义务保障公民的这一权利.公民的健康除了由医疗卫生和生理因素决定外,还由诸多社会因素决定.这些健康的社会决定因素所反映的实际上是社会正义问题,因此要保障公民的健康权利,最根本的是要营造一个正义的社会环境,并建立一个正义的社会保障支持系统.     

Justice as Fairness: Luck Egalitarian, Not Rawlsian

I assess G. A. Cohen’s claim, which is central to his luck egalitarian account of distributive justice, that forcing others to pay for people’s expensive indulgence is inegalitarian because it amounts to their exploitation. I argue that the forced subsidy of such indulgence may well be unfair, but any such unfairness fails to ground an egalitarian complaint. I conclude that Cohen’s account of distributive justice has a non-egalitarian as well as an egalitarian aspect. Each impulse arises from an underlying commitment to fairness. Cohen’s account of distributive justice is therefore one of justice as fairness.     

社会因素对心理健康的影响研究进展

国内外有关民族、文化、生活环境、社会支持、社会阶层、经济收入不均、社会资本等社会因素对心理健康影响的相关研究表明这些社会因素都与心理健康之间有明显关联,不同的社会因素对心理健康的影响程度各不相同.有关社区环境因素与心理健康之间的关系正成为国外社会流行病学的研究热点,国内这方面研究较少,值得深入探索.