Territorial Loss as a Challenge for World Governance

Abstract

National governments have failed spectacularly to mitigate anthropogenic climate change and a sustainable approach to mitigation remains out of sight. This circumstance alone demonstrates the need for institutional reform. However, climate change is causing and will continue to cause large-scale loss and damage. Perhaps the most striking kind of that loss is territorial. Climate change induced sea level rise threatens not only vast coastal areas but also entire states. Therefore, mitigation is no longer sufficient. From the collective failure to mitigate climate change arises the collective duty to compensate. Compensating for territorial loss puts the spotlight on institutional deficiencies—which is why I explore them here. Specifically, I argue that (i) providing compensation for territorial loss is both morally required and politically advantageous and that (ii) it cannot be implemented effectively or efficiently without creating a global institution in charge of coordinating the process. Further, I (iii) make design recommendations for creating a global compensatory climate fund, (iv) situate my proposal within the debate on ideal and non-ideal theory, and (v) contend that the proposed institution would be a tool of world governance rather than a form of world government.     

Ecological Refugees,States Borders,and the Lockean Proviso

Ecological refugees are expected to make up an increasing percentage of overall refugees in the coming decades as predicted climate change related disasters will displace millions of people. In this essay, I focus on those rights ecological refugees may claim on the basis of collective self‐determination. To this end, I will focus on a few specific cases that I call cases of ‘ecological refugee states’. Tuvalu, the Maldives, and to a certain extent, Bangladesh are predicted to be ecological refugee states in the near future. These are states whose entire (or close to it) geographical territory is predicted to be lost to rising sea levels; the collective body of the people will itself become an ecological refugee. The question is: what may the people of an ecological refugee state legitimately claim on the basis of their right to self‐determination? Should we redraw state borders to accommodate a New Tuvalu? I argue that a plausible position regarding territorial rights is that when (1) a people clearly is (or recently was) self‐determining and has a legitimate claim to continue to be self‐determining, and (2) the self‐determination of a people is existentially threatened because the people lacks territorial rights, that (3) the people becomes a candidate for sovereign over a new territory. The result is that existing state borders may need to change to accommodate something like a New Tuvalu. To generate these results on behalf of ecological refugee states, I examine the principles of the system of territorial states. Because the system of territorial states is a system of exclusive rights over goods, especially land, it is possible that it is subject to the conditions of a Lockean proviso mechanism. This paper is dedicated mainly to adapting a version of the Lockean proviso for use in territorial rights theory.     

Qui bono? Justice in the Distribution of the Benefits and Burdens of Avoided Deforestation

In this paper, I explore the question of how the costs of undertaking an important type of climate change mitigation should be shared amongst states seeking an environmentally effective and equitable response to global climate change. While much of the normative literature on climate mitigation has focused on burden sharing within the context of reductions in emissions of greenhouse gas, I explore the question of how the costs of protecting tropical forests in order to harness their climate mitigation potential should be distributed amongst developing and developed states. In response to this question, I outline and defend a ‘beneficiary pays’ account of forestry mitigation burden sharing that requires affluent states to finance measures supporting avoided deforestation while less affluent states, within whose territory these forests tend to be located, implement these measures. The normative basis for this account, I argue, is a principle of ‘unjust enrichment’ according to which developed states must bear much of the cost of avoided deforestation for its climate mitigation potential because of the huge economic benefits their citizens have accumulated from productive activities that have contributed to climate change.     

Floating Provisos and Sinking Islands

Rising sea levels may sink entire countries. Individualistic solutions to this climate catastrophe, such as those proposed by Meisels and Risse, are inadequate on both Kantian and Lockean criteria. This article concurs with Cara Nine's recent argument that such ‘ecological refugee states’ are entitled to territorial remedies. But Nine's proposal, founded on Locke's ‘sufficiency’ proviso and Nozick's famous application of it to waterholes in the desert, is instructively incorrect. Careful consideration of the distinction between land and territory, and of the structure of Proviso arguments, supports a new theory of how territorial claims can be positive‐sum — how the amount of territory can increase even as the land base remains constant or decreases. This normative conception of territory as the ratio of justice to land use provides a better foundation for a political solution to the problem of ecological refugee states and also generates deeper insight into the nature of territory itself. The article thus contributes not only to our thinking about redress for ecological refugees, but also to the burgeoning literatures on territory and on the Lockean Provisos.     

Compensation for Historical Emissions and Excusable Ignorance

This article defends the idea of applying principles of corrective justice to the matter of climate change. In particular, it argues against the excusable ignorance objection, which holds that historical emissions produced at a time when our knowledge of climate change was insufficient ought to be removed from the equation when applying rectificatory principles to this context. In constructing my argument, I rely on a particular interpretation of rectificatory justice and outcome responsibility. I also address the individualism objection by showing why we should view states as relevant agents of climate change. This argument is built on the assumption that states are institutions set up to coordinate and regulate human interaction, so as to protect their citizens from the unwanted consequences of such interaction.     

Understanding global climate change: paleoclimate perspective from the world's highest mountains

Glaciers are among the world's best recorders of, and first responders to, natural and anthropogenic climate change and provide a time perspective for current climatic and environmental variations. Over the last 50 years such records have been recovered from the polar regions as well as low-latitude, high-elevation ice fields. Analyses of these ice cores and of the glaciers from which they have been drilled have yielded three lines of evidence for past and present abrupt climate change: (1) the temperature and precipitation histories recorded in the glaciers as revealed by the climate records extracted from the ice cores; (2) the accelerating loss of the glaciers themselves; and (3) the uncovering of ancient fauna and flora from the margins of the glaciers as a result of their recent melting, thus illustrating the significance of the current ice loss. The current melting of high-altitude, low-latitude ice fields is consistent with model predictions for a vertical amplification of temperature in the tropics. The ongoing rapid retreat of the world's mountain glaciers, as well as the margins of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, is not only contributing to global sea level rise, but also threatening fresh-water supplies in many of the most populous regions. More recently, strong evidence has appeared for the acceleration of the rate of ice loss in the tropics, which especially presents a clear and present danger to water supplies for at-risk populations in South America and Asia. The human response to this issue, however, is not so clear, for although the evidence from both data and models becomes more compelling, the rate of global CO2 emissions continues to accelerate. Climatologically, we are in unfamiliar territory, and the world's ice cover is responding dramatically. The loss of glaciers, which can be viewed as the world's water towers, threatens water resources that are essential for hydroelectric power, crop irrigation, municipal water supplies, and even tourism. As these glaciers are disappearing, we are also losing very valuable paleoclimate archives.     

Settler Colonialism,Decolonization, and Climate Change

The article proposes that climate change makes enduring colonial injustices and structures visible. It focuses on the imposition and dominance of colonial concepts of land and self-determination on Indigenous peoples in settler states. It argues that if the dominance of these colonial frameworks remains unaddressed, the progressing climate change will worsen other colonial injustices, too. Specifically, Indigenous self-determination capabilities will be increasingly undermined, and Indigenous peoples will experience the loss of what they understand as relevant land from within their own ontologies of land. The article holds that even if settler states strive to repair colonial injustices, these efforts will be unsuccessful if climate change occurs and decolonization is pursued within the framework of a settler colonial ontology of land. Therefore, the article suggests, decolonization of the ontologies of land and concepts of self-determination is a precondition for a just response to climate change.     

Carbon Sink Conservation and Global Justice: Benefitting,Free Riding and Non-compliance

It is often assumed that in order to avoid the most severe consequences of global anthropogenic climate change we have to preserve our existing carbon sinks, such as for instance tropical forests. Global carbon sink conservation raises a host of normative issues, though, since it is debatable who should pay the costs of carbon sink conservation, who has the duty to protect which sinks, and how far the duty to conserve one’s carbon sinks actually extends, especially if it conflicts with other duties one might have. According to some, forested states like Ecuador have a duty to preserve their tropical forests while the rich states of the global North have a duty of fairness to compensate states like Ecuador for the costs they incur. My aim in this paper is to critically analyse this standard line of argument and to criticise its validity both internally (i.e. with regard to its normative conclusion based on its premises) and externally (i.e. with regard to the argument’s underlying assumptions and its lack of contextualisation). As I will argue, the duty to conserve one’s forests is only a particular instantiation of a wider, more general duty to contribute towards global climate justice for which the context in which one operates (e.g. whether other agents are complying with their duties of global climate justice or not) matters significantly.     

Bridging the reductive and the synthetic: some reflections on the clinical implications of synchronicity

When Jung introduced the concepts of synchronicity and the psychoid unconscious, he expanded analytical psychology into decidedly uncanny territory. Despite the early interest shown by Freud, anomalous phenomena such as telepathy have become a taboo subject in psychoanalysis. Today, however, there is an increasing interest in thought transference and synchronicity, thus opening the way for a fruitful exchange between different psychoanalytical schools on their clinical implications. I propose to examine some of the ambiguities of Jung's thinking, to clarify how we define synchronicity, the relationship between synchronicities and parapsychological events, and their clinical significance. At the present moment, we are still unsure if such events should be considered as normal and a way of facilitating individuation, or as an indication of psychopathology in the patient or in the analyst, just as we are uncertain about the particular characteristics of the intersubjective field that can lead to synchronicities. Making use of the typology of mind‐matter correlations presented by Atmanspacher and Fach, and the distinction they draw between acategorial and non‐categorial states of mind, I will use two clinical vignettes to illustrate the different states of mind in analyst and analysand that can lead to synchronicities. In particular I will focus on the relationship between analytical reverie and synchronicity.     

The Unfair Burdens Argument Against Carbon Pricing

Carbon pricing is one of the most politically important approaches for the mitigation of climate change in the world today. Most political actors who are not committed to climate change denial favor carbon pricing, either as emissions trading or carbon taxation. In this article, I argue that carbon pricing should be considered unfair in most of its forms. I present a line of criticism called the Unfair Burdens Argument. It states that the most politically relevant ways to price carbon needlessly burden the less affluent more than the more affluent. This is unfair because, among other things, the more affluent have on average done more to create the problem of climate change in the first place. Principles for the fair distribution of burdens under climate change mitigation like the Polluter Pays Principle, which were thought to support carbon pricing, turn out to speak against it, when interpreted properly. Although the Unfair Burdens Argument on its own cannot show that carbon pricing is impermissible, it offers important clues for what a morally permissible form of climate change mitigation would look like.     

Adapting to Climate Change: What We Owe to Other Animals

In this article, I expand the existing discourse on climate justice by drawing out the implications of taking animal rights seriously in the context of human‐induced climate change. More specifically, I argue that nonhuman animals are owed adaptive assistance to help them cope with the ill‐effects of climate change, and I advance and defend four principles of climate justice that derive from a general duty of adaptation. Lastly, I suggest that even if one can successfully argue that the protection of human interests in adaptation ought to be prioritised, nonhuman animal rights will continue to place significant constraints on climate change action.     

Land as a Global Commons?

Land is becoming increasingly scarce relative to the demands of the global economy; a problem significantly exacerbated by climate change. In response, some have suggested that land should be conceptualised as a global commons. This framing might seem like an appealing way to promote sustainable and equitable land use. However, it is a poor fit for the worldʼs land because global commons are generally understood as resources located beyond state borders. I argue that land can be seen to fit the definition of a global commons, if viewed in a particular way; namely, as a biogeochemical resource system that sequesters carbon emissions. The question then arises whether land should be conceptualised as a global commons. I consider this question by reference to three contemporary problems of land justice (land grabbing, forced displacement, and unfairness in land-based climate mitigation); arguing that the global-commons framing will not be conducive to understanding or responding to these problems. I leave the question of how the global community should conceptualise land in the context of climate change open, claiming that any answer must include the voices and perspectives of those whose livelihoods and identities are closely connected to the land.     

Climate Change is Unjust War: Geoengineering and the Rising Tides of War

Climate change is undeniably a global problem, but the situation is especially dire for countries whose territory is comprised entirely or primarily of low‐lying land. While geoengineering might offer an opportunity to protect these states, international consensus on the particulars of any geoengineering proposal seems unlikely. To consider the moral complexities created by unilateral deployment of geoengineering technologies, we turn to a moral convention with a rich history of assessing interference in the sovereign affairs of foreign states: the just war tradition. We argue that the just war framework demonstrates that, for these nations, geoengineering offers a justified form of self‐defense from an unwarranted, albeit unintentional, aggression. This startling result places our own carbon‐emitting activities in a stark new light: in perpetrating climate change, we are, in fact, waging war on the most vulnerable.     

Reinventing Buddhist Practices to Meet the Challenge of Climate Change

A number of thinkers have argued that ethicists have gone about responding to climate change in the wrong way, i.e., by ‘greening’ their religious worldviews and hoping for conversion. Instead, we should be examining existing moral reform projects that can be learning experiences. In response, this article looks at three forms of Buddhist practice from below: ‘tree ordination’ by Thai ‘ecology monks,’ Joanna Macy’s ‘work that reconnects,’ and Gary Snyder’s practice of reinhabitation. Each of these practices is both promising and inadequate in meeting the moral challenge of climate change. For each of these ecological practices I will: (1) describe the practice in its social context; (2) indicate its Buddhist roots; (3) present what I see as the efficacy of the practice and its inadequacies; and (4) offer one way in which this practice might evolve towards greater efficacy.     

Representational change and children's numerical estimation

We applied overlapping waves theory and microgenetic methods to examine how children improve their estimation proficiency, and in particular how they shift from reliance on immature to mature representations of numerical magnitude. We also tested the theoretical prediction that feedback on problems on which the discrepancy between two representations is greatest will cause the greatest representational change. Second graders who initially were assessed as relying on an immature representation were presented feedback that varied in degree of discrepancy between the predictions of the mature and immature representations. The most discrepant feedback produced the greatest representational change. The change was strikingly abrupt, often occurring after a single feedback trial, and impressively broad, affecting estimates over the entire range of numbers from 0 to 1000. The findings indicated that cognitive change can occur at the level of an entire representation, rather than always involving a sequence of local repairs.     

Mind,State, and Metaphor

This article examines the post‐Ryle developments in philosophy of mind and psychology, in particular tracing the emergence of the concept of a mental state. The climate immediately following the large‐scale rejection of Descartes seems rather hostile to the idea of mental properties as internal states that cause behaviour. In this context, the emergence of the reificatory view of mental states is quite surprising, and it appears to stem from Putnam's adoption of the Turing machine (including the Turing state) as a model for human psychology. I conclude that the success of the “mental state” is down to the fact that it neatly conforms to the picture painted by the metaphorical expressions we use when talking about minds and mental things, and that its success is more accidental than inevitable.     

Implementing climate equity: the case of Europe

For over two decades, international environmental equity – the fair and just sharing of the burdens associated with environmental changes – has been the subject of much debate by philosophers, activists and diplomats concerned about climate change. It has been manifested in many international environmental agreements, notably the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The question arises as to whether it is being put into practice in this context. Are the requirements of international environmental equity merely words and principles in international instruments, or are they having a practical effect on the policies of state governments? This article aims to start answering these questions. It examines whether the European Union (EU) and its member states are sharing the burdens of climate change. The article introduces equity in the context of the climate change agreements and looks at some normative and practical considerations. It suggests that Europe has been a leader on international equity in the climate change negotiations over the last decade, and it points to what European states and the EU have done to take on some of the burdens of climate change. Europe's actions are briefly assessed from practical and normative perspectives. Europe is doing more than any other part of the world to address climate change and to share the burdens associated with it. Nevertheless, Europe is not doing as much to address this problem as it can and should do. Both practical and normative imperatives demand more urgent action by Europe to implement climate equity.     

Individual Responsibility for Climate Change

As we become more aware of the potential causes and consequences of climate change we are left wondering: who is responsible? Climate change has the potential to harm large portions of the global population and, arguably, is already doing so. Further, climate change is argued to be human‐caused. If this is true, then it seems to be the case that we can analyze climate change in terms of responsibility. I argue that we can approach environmental harms, such as climate change, through a theory of collective responsibility. I propose an account of reductive collective responsibility that can apply to the unstructured collective causing climate change and determine what we are each individually morally responsible for. To avoid the critiques of reductive collective responsibility for large unstructured harms, I propose we separate the determination of membership and eligibility for responsibility from the attribution of responsibility. Through this method, I can speak to the individual responsibility of each member who contributes to climate change without holding them responsible for that which is outside their control.     

The lived experience of disability

In this paper I reflect upon my personal experience of chronic progressive multiple sclerosis in order to provide a phenomenological account of the human experience of disability. In particular, I argue that the phenomenological notion of lived body provides important insights into the profound disruptions of space and time that are an integral element of changed physical capacities such as loss of mobility. In addition, phenomenology discloses the emotional dimension of physical disorder. The lived body disruption engendered by loss of mobility includes a change in the character of surrounding space, an alteration in one's taken-for-granted awareness of (and interaction with) objects, the disruption of corporeal identity, a disturbance in one's relations with others, and a change in the character of temporal experience. The loss of upright posture is of particular significance since it not only concretely diminishes autonomy but affects the way one is treated by others. Such a change in posture is, therefore, particularly disruptive in the social world of everyday life. An understanding of the lived body disruption engendered by disability has important applications for the clinical context in devising effective therapies, as well as for the social arena in determining how best to resolve the various challenges posed by chronic disabling disorders.I should like to thank Frances Chaput Waksler for her helpful comments on my work.     

Evil and Justice: An Experiential Personal Construct Approach

George Kelly (1955) made a philosophical assumption that the universe is integral or interconnected. This assumption, often overlooked by scholars, has profound implications for global issues facing the world today, including the perpetration of acts that can be considered evil. I first give an experiential personal construct psychology definition of evil (the perpetration of acts, out of our own woundedness, that harm another's central ways of being). I then discuss the ways that evil acts are manifested: objectifying others, denying connectedness, numbing of inner experiences, and a limited ability to introspect. Using these manifestations of evil, I illustrate the ways that evil acts are being perpetrated against others (e.g., travel bans, border walls) as well as the greater universe (e.g., ignoring climate change, exploiting the natural world). I conclude by discussing steps each person can take to minimize the perpetration of evil in the world today. Some of these actions are public (e.g., political, speaking up); others are more personal (e.g., maintaining an attitude of humility and reverence for the greater world). I advocate that people carefully and thoughtfully consider the implications of each action for all of our fellow humans as well as the entire planet.