On Robert Jenson’s Trinitarian Thought

This paper addresses Robert Jenson’s critique of impassibility along with his Trinitarian formulations. Jenson’s decision to eschew a doctrine of divine impassibility leads him to adopt a Kantian conception of subjectivity in order to explicate the traditional concept of hypostasis. In turn, Jenson advocates a Hegelian notion of determinate negation to relate to a concept of being dependent upon a German Idealist figuration of temporality. The final section of the paper contrasts Jenson’s modernist immanentism with the positive perichoretic movement of Jonathan Edwards’ trinitarian thought. For Edwards, the Trinity cannot be known as a repeatable object of knowledge reflected within human consciousness, but as a non‐identical repletion of eternal love to which univocal categories do not apply.     

Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic and the Old Testament

In this study, the author shows that Luther’s trinitarian understanding is shaped by the royal Psalms’ dialogical model as well as informed by a hermeneutics that moors a trinitarian semantics in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament. The analysis concentrates on Luther’s translation into German of two Hebrew names for God and of passages classically associated with the trinitarian doctrine (Psalm 110:1; Psalm 2:2.12). The result is a trinitarian structure of transparency. The text’s syntax, narrative and direct speech mirror literally the transparency of the divine essence through the distinguishing characteristics of each trinitarian person.     

Holy Scripture under the Auspices of the Holy Trinity: On John Webster’s Trinitarian Doctrine of Scripture

As he approached the monumental task of writing his own systematic theology, John Webster gave strategic attention to constructing a doctrine of Scripture that was adequate to support such a project. In contrast to some well‐respected modern systematic theologies that got by with less robust bibliologies (those of Pannenberg and Jenson), Webster saw the need to establish from the outset a more fully elaborated doctrine of Holy Scripture. He framed that doctrine of Scripture by appealing above all to his central dogmatic commitment, the doctrine of the Trinity. The trinitarian contours of Webster’s doctrine of Scripture are most conspicuous in his treatment of the missions of the Son and the Spirit. Webster understands the entire Bible as the self‐testimony of the risen Christ (mission of the Son), and explains its cognitive effectiveness in terms of the full range of the work of the Holy Spirit in inspiration and illumination (mission of the Spirit). The trinitarian grounding of his doctrine of Scripture enabled Webster to retrieve the Protestant orthodox doctrine of Scripture’s inspiration.     

Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

The aim of this paper is to explore Merleau‐Ponty’s ambivalent relationship with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I begin by looking at several points of convergence between Kant and Merleau‐Ponty, focusing on the affinities between Kant’s account of transcendental realism and Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of objective thought. I then show how Merleau‐Ponty’s analysis of Kant’s paradox of asymmetrical objects points to a parallel in Kant’s thought to Merleau‐Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception. In the second part of the paper, I show why Merleau‐Ponty believes that, despite the promise of Kant’s thought, he fails to adequately escape from objective thought. After presenting the central claims of the transcendental deduction, I piece together Merleau‐Ponty’s criticism of it by answering three questions: For Merleau‐Ponty, how do we encounter the world prior to reflection? How is experience constituted? And what leads Kant to mischaracterise experience in his own transcendental philosophy?     

Editor’s Introduction

The theme of the 2018 Spindel Conference was “Decolonizing Philosophy.” In this introduction, I will elaborate on this theme as a way to set the stage for the essays in this volume. Beginning with the question of what it means to consider philosophy “colonized” in the first place, I will focus on the subfield of the history of philosophy as a way to draw out my account. After elaborating what I take the claim that philosophy is colonized/colonizing to mean, I will turn to ways one might approach its decolonization. Again, my principle focus will be on the history of philosophy, though I take my analysis to extend beyond this subfield. Finally, I will elaborate four key tasks that I take to be essential to the decolonization of philosophy.