The Significance of Re-Doing Experiments: A Contribution to Historically Informed Methodology

This essay is a contribution to the history of methodological thought. I focus on key methodological criteria for successful experimentation, replication and multiple determinations of empirical evidence. Drawing on reports of experiments with viper venom from the late seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries, as well as on present-day methodological thought I examine whether past experimenters regarded repetition, replication, and multiple determinations as criteria for validity; what exactly they meant by this; what they hoped to gain by repeating, varying, triangulating, and replicating; and how relevant these criteria were for them. I also consider if this analysis has implications for current philosophical work on the methodology of experimental practice.     

Anticipation and variation in visual content

This article is composed of three parts. In the first part of the article I take up a question raised by Susanna Siegel (Philosophical Review 115: 355–388, 2006a). Siegel has argued that subjects have the following anticipation: (PC) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will change as a result of this change. She has left it an open question as to whether subjects anticipate a specific kind of change. I take up this question and answer it in the affirmative. By appealing to a widely held view of perceptual content, the view that we represent ‘factual’ properties in perception, I argue that (PC) can be refined as follows: (PC’) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will present different views of o’s factual properties. In the second part of the article I argue that (PC’) implies that there are cases in which normal perceivers have different perceptual content under identical viewing conditions. The differences in perceptual content are due to differences in the determinacy of visual anticipation. I draw the conclusion that perceptual content is rich in the sense that it includes a unique contribution from individual perceivers. In the final part of the article, I discuss some open issues regarding the way in which (PC’) relates to the personal/sub-personal distinction, empirical models, and the distinction between perception and cognition.     

The dynamics of Orthodox and Muslim religiosity in Russia, 1989–2012

In this article I focus on the changing religious consciousness and behaviour of Orthodox Christians in Russia over the period from 1989 to 2012, comparing these where appropriate with the situation among Muslims. In the first part of the article I identify three periods in the development of attitudes to religion between 1989 and 2011: from 1989 to the mid-1990s; from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s; and from the mid-2000s to 2011. In the second part I survey attitudes to religion among the Russian population from 2011 from a range of perspectives. In the third part I look in more detail at the religious practice of Russians from 2011, using the concept of votserkovlennost’ (‘enchurchedness’) as developed by the sociologist Valentina Chesnokova. My data are derived from public opinion surveys, particularly surveys conducted in 2006, 2011 and 2012.     

Cognitive Transformation,Dementia, and the Moral Weight of Advance Directives

Abstract

Dementia patients in the moderate-late stage of the disease can, and often do, express different preferences than they did at the onset of their condition. The received view in the philosophical literature argues that advance directives which prioritize the patient’s preferences at onset ought to be given decisive moral weight in medical decision-making. Clinical practice, on the other hand, favors giving moral weight to the preferences expressed by dementia patients after onset. The purpose of this article is to show that the received view in the philosophical literature is inadequate and is out of touch with real clinical practice. I argue that having dementia is a cognitive transformative experience and that preference changes which result from this are legitimate and ought to be given moral weight in medical decision-making. This argument ought to encourage us to reduce our confidence in the moral weight of advance directives for dementia patients.     

Two sorts of natural theology

Usually, natural theology is understood as the project of providing arguments for the existence of God. This project is endorsed by Moreland and Craig. McGrath, on the other hand, says that this project fails. In the first part of this article, I show how McGrath’s dismissal of arguments for the existence of God follows from his view of natural theology. In the second part, I argue that McGrath’s natural theology contains an accurate critique of Moreland and Craig’s way of doing natural theology, a critique that exposes two major problems in their treatment of the moral argument for the existence of God. In the third part, I propose a way of providing arguments for the existence of God that avoids the problems pointed out by McGrath, namely a way of arguing that seeks to show how theology may improve a certain non-theistic understanding of a natural phenomenon.     

Models and theories I: The semantic view revisited

The paper, as Part I of a two‐part series, argues for a hybrid formulation of the semantic view of scientific theories. For stage‐setting, it first reviews the elements of the model theory in mathematical logic (on whose foundation the semantic view rests), the syntactic and the semantic view, and the different notions of models used in the practice of science. The paper then argues for an integration of the notions into the semantic view, and thereby offers a hybrid semantic view, which at once secures the view's logical foundations and enhances its applicability. The dilemma of either losing touch with the practice of science or yielding up the benefits of the model theory is thus avoided.     

Engineering Good: How Engineering Metaphors Help us to Understand the Moral Life and Change Society

Engineering can learn from ethics, but ethics can also learn from engineering. In this paper, I discuss what engineering metaphors can teach us about practical philosophy. Using metaphors such as calculation, performance, and open source, I articulate two opposing views of morality and politics: one that relies on images related to engineering as science and one that draws on images of engineering practice. I argue that the latter view and its metaphors provide a more adequate way to understand and guide the moral life. Responding to two problems of alienation and taking into account developments such as Fab Lab I then further explore the implications of this view for engineering and society.     

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

Synthese - In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard...     

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue. Part 4: general conclusion

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined.     

The invisible made visible?

With the starting point in a story about a dancer with a profound disability, the topic for critical discussion in this article is prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries in light of concepts of what it means to be human and human fulfilment. More specifically, the focus is on human life with limited capabilities and how a widened view of such a life is crucial in the task of creating a society where all human beings can be perceived as desirable and of equal worth. In the first part of this article the practice of prenatal diagnosis is showed to be filled with narrow conceptions of what it means to be human and perspectives are brought to light that can be argued to have been made invisible in the introduction and implementation of prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries as well as in the ethical debate. In the second part, the vision and actualization of L'Arche is discussed as an example of how befriending people with disabilities can challenge mainstream ethical narratives and widen a narrow view of morality and what it means to be human.     

GUIDELINES FOR THEORIZING ABOUT REALIZATION

Realization can be roughly understood as a kind of role‐playing, a relationship between a property that plays a role and a property characterized by that role. This rough sketch previously received only moderate elaboration; recently, however, several substantive theories of realization have been proposed. But are there any general constraints on a theory of realization? What is a theory of realization supposed to accomplish? I first argue that a view of realization is viable, in part, to the extent that physical realization under that view explains or accounts for why instances of realized properties are necessitated by how things are physically in a modally strong sense. In this sense, I claim that physical realization should explain physical supervenience. I then call into question two alternative desiderata and raise a challenge for attempts to explicate realization in terms of isomorphism or analogy. Finally, I explain how a causal‐functional account of realization, as well as less demanding accounts, can meet the preferred desideratum.     

Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference

This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for this claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility.     

My Psychoanalytic Journey

In this article I describe the evolution of my psychoanalytic thought and my current perspective of psychoanalysis, after almost a half century of professional practice. For the most part, three ideas have guided this evolution: (1) considering the patient’s mind as the major source of knowledge; (2) my firm belief that the patient–analyst dialogue, taken from the Gadamerian point of view, is the best way to have access to the patient’s mind and also to that of the analyst himself; and (3) the notion that the mind constitutes an open, dynamic, and nonlinear system in constant interaction with the environment that surrounds it. In my writings, I have tried to show that the therapeutic action in the psychoanalytic process is formed by the therapist–patient interaction. I also propose that psychoanalysis must endeavor to be a social therapy, even as it treats individuals, and go beyond what is purely instinctual so as to emphasize what is particular to human beings and sets us apart from the other animal species.     

Socrates’ wisdom in definition

Why does Socrates favour definitional speech discussion of virtue’s instances and attributes? Why does he take such a dim view of applied ethics? In this article, I criticise the received answers to these questions and offer a different view. I argue that Socrates favours definitional dialogue because it actualises knowledge that the logic of his argument shows to be essential to virtue. By leading the interlocutor to a paradoxical definition of virtue as knowledge, Socrates engenders this knowledge in his soul.     

From General Laws To Singularities

This article comprises several sections. The first is devoted to an explanation of a number of notions stemming from work by Ilya Prigogine and others on open systems far from equilibrium. As a result of this work, I have been able to stand back from the traditional approach employed in family therapy, that of open systems at equilibrium (the theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy). The second section describes a clinical example based on elements close to Prigogine's theories. In the third part I develop an approach that--although continuing to draw on Prigogine's work--is much more closely linked to the research I have carried out with Félix Guattari over recent years. In this part I attempt to study a level that, in my view, has too often been left outside the field of inquiry: that of couplings between "singularities" of members of the family system and the therapist. A clinical case is presented in which this "semiotic" level, as Guattari terms it, is used together with that of the "intrinsic rules" of the system. Finally, I propose a few avenues of inquiry and research on the basis of the concepts presented.     

Against Matricide: Rethinking Subjectivity and the Maternal Body

In this article I critically re‐examine Julia Kristeva's view that becoming a speaking subject requires psychical matricide: violent separation from the maternal body. I propose an alternative, non‐matricidal conception of subjectivity, in part by drawing out anti‐matricidal strands in Kristeva's own thought, including her view that early mother–child relations are triangular. Whereas she understands this triangle in terms of a first imaginary father, I re‐interpret this triangle using Donald Winnicott's idea of potential space and Jessica Benjamin's idea of an intersubjective space of thirdness. I argue that this space provides a maternal third term: a relation of connection and difference between two, a relation that inherits the affective, mobile, generative qualities of the maternal body as the infant (according to Kristeva) imagines it. This connecting space allows both mothers and children to emerge as subjects in their own right. I then suggest that potential‐maternal space expands into language, so that language intrinsically allows the possibility of a speaking position of connection with the mother. Entrance into language need not entail separation or matricide: the problem is not language as such but the particular way that speech and logos have been defined historically.     

Psychotherapy with compulsively striving professional women 1: Introducing the patient group

In this paper I develop a profile of compulsively striving professional women with whom I have found myself working in private psychotherapy practice. I put them into a developmental, systemic and cultural context, and suggest a theoretical perspective. In a subsequent article (‘Clinical issues’) I shall describe the challenge they present from a clinical point of view and how these difficulties might be addressed in individual psychotherapy.     

RELIGION AND THE MODE OF PRACTICE IN MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

Michael Oakeshott's religious view of the world stands behind much of his political and philosophical writing. In this essay I first discuss Oakeshott's view of religion and the mode of practice in his own terms. I attempt next to illuminate his idea of religion by describing it in less technical language, drawing upon other thinkers such as Georg Simmel and George Santayana, who share similar views. I then evaluate Oakeshott's view as a whole, considering whether his ideas about religion can stand up to careful scrutiny and whether they have value for present-day reflection on religion.     

Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation

In this article I will consider two related questions about surrogacy and exploitation: (1) Is surrogacy exploitative? (2) If surrogacy is exploitative, what is the moral force of this exploitation? Briefly stated, I shall argue that whether surrogacy is exploitative depends on whether exploitation must be harmful to the exploited party or whether (as I think) there can be mutually advantageous exploitation. It also depends on some facts about surrogacy about which we have little reliable evidence and on our philosophical view on what counts as a harm to the surrogate. Our answer to the second question will turn in part on the account of exploitation we invoke in answering the first question and in part on the way in which we resolve some other questions about the justification of state interference. I shall suggest, however, that if surrogacy is a form of voluntary and mutually advantageous exploitation, then there is a strong presumption that surrogacy contracts should be permitted and even enforceable, although that presumption may be overridden on other grounds.     

Should Psychoanalysis Become a Science?

I wish to formulate in broad outline an approach to the conceptualization of psychoanalysis that is divested from theory. This view sees the core of psychoanalysis as a humanistic practice, first and foremost guided by the individuality of the dyadic encounter, rather than as a science. I will not argue for any particular view of psychoanalysis. Instead I marshal a series of considerations from the humanities, to frame a conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a clinically based interpretive discipline having a unique mission. Finally, I will present a futuristic hypothetical scenario whose aim is to show why psychoanalysis will remain a viable enterprise basically as conceived by Freud.