Just How Correct is Political Correctness? A Critique of the Opposition's Arguments

I begin by examining three factors which enable the term political correctness (hereafter PC) itself to feed into the hands of its opponents: namely, the trivialization of the actual issues which are attributed to PC, the villainization of those involved in the PC movement, and the conferring of a sense of legitimacy on the opposition movement.The bulk of the paper provides a detailed summary and critique of every single articulated Canadian position I encountered against such PC measures as fair language policies. I have distinguished between arguments directed at the ideological content and the methodology of PC. Arguments directed at the ideological content are divided into the threat to freedom of expression argument, the threat to academic freedom argument, and the degeneration into triviality argument; arguments directed at the methdology are divided into the argument that PC commits the very evils that it addresses and the argument that PC uses unjust means to get its way.The paper ends by claiming that if PC means minimizing sexual and racial harrassment, discourgaing homophobic, racist, and sexist discourse within educational settings, and curtailing policies which victimize oppressed groups, then political correctness is not merely correct, but morally obligatory as well.     

Children’s understanding of the mind’s involvement in pretense: do words bend the truth?

Many have thought that children have an early appreciation of the role of the mind in pretense, fitting with the notion that pretend play is, in general, a ‘zone of proximal development’ ( Vygotsky, 1978 ). Although results from several experiments are against this hypothesis, the evidence from that line of research has been questioned because the experiments thus far have always used the word ‘pretend’. Young children might have a perfectly clear understanding that pretense involves the mind, but have mismapped the word ‘pretend’ onto non‐mental correlates of pretending, like action and costume. Two experiments tested this possibility. Four‐year‐olds were shown videos of people engaging in real and pretend activities and asked questions regarding the role of mind; for half the children the word ‘pretend’ was used to describe the activity, and for half it was not. Contrary to the hypothesis, even when the word ‘pretend’ was not used, roughly half of the 4‐year‐olds failed to designate pretense as involving mental activity. Consistent with prior work, more children of this age were cognizant of the mind’s involvement in pretense than were cognizant of the mind’s involvement in physical actions.     

Just How Unlawful is “Euthanasia”?

Those who campaign for law reform to permit "euthanasia" may seek different things and at least some of what they seek may already be permissible under the criminal law of England and Wales. In this paper I examine one means whereby the criminal law delivers outcomes acceptable to the euthanasia lobby, that is the curious notion of "causation" deployed by the law, which adds a value override to the more usual notion of factual causation such that, for example, if medical treatment falls within the acceptable range as normal and proper, the pre–existing injury or illness is treated as exclusively the cause of death and the doctor escapes criminal liability, even where the medical treatment will shorten life to the certain knowledge, possibly even the wish, of the doctor. Thus the law may already be delivering a range of outcomes — euthanasia in a weak sense — acceptable to the euthanasia lobby. If so, it achieves this by stealth. That is inappropriate to the doctor–patient relationship, which is one of trust. So there is a strong case for greater transparency. Moreover, there are limits to the acceptable outcomes which an unreformed criminal law can deliver and in a range of cases the criminal law condemns the doctor to impotence and the patient to a prolonged, miserable and undignified death. So there is also a case for going beyond the current law and legalising euthanasia in a strong sense.     

How is the arrival of things possible?

Ancient Chinese thought inquired primarily into how the achievement of things is possible rather than into what a thing as a thing is. It held that man should participate in the achieving or generation of things in order to realize his self-achievement. A thing is understood as an event. Because all things and man are united as one, it is possible for man to enter into things by tasting and feeling rather than by relying on the sense of sight. This may provide a possible new means of rescuing things from the numericalization and phenomenalization that sweep over the world today. Translated by Liu Liangjian from Renwen Zazhi 人文杂志 (The Journal of Humanities), 2007, (2): 14–21     

Jung's understanding of schizophrenia: is it still relevant in the ‘era of the brain’?

Jung was highly committed to grasping the meaning of psychotic thinking, and left behind precious insights to treatment scattered through his works written between 1906 and 1958. The tendency of today's psychiatry is to attribute the psychotic process to alteration in the brain's anatomy, biochemistry and electrophysiology, thus exempting the subject, i.e. the afflicted person, from responsibility for attachment to reality and their sanity. Jung understood schizophrenia as an ‘abaissement du niveau mental’, a similar phenomenon to the one encountered in dreams, and caused by a peculiar ‘faiblesse de la volonté’. He contested that complexes in schizophrenia, in contrast with neurotic disorders, are disconnected and can either never reintegrate to the psychic totality or can only join together in remission ‘like a mirror broke into splinters’ (Jung 1939 , para. 507). Accordingly, a person who does not fight for the supremacy of ego consciousness and has let themself be swayed by the intrusion of alien contents arising from the unconscious (even to the point of becoming fascinated by regression) is exposed to the danger of schizophrenia. The contemporary relevance of these notions and their necessity in understanding the psychotic process in the light of modern scientific findings are discussed.     

False recognition of associates: How robust is the effect?

False recognition of nonpresented words that were strong associates of 12 words in a study list was examined. Six lists were read to subjects; each list contained the 12 strongest associates to a critical nonpresented word. False-alarm rates to the 6 critical nonpresented words were obtained under several different conditions. The manipulations included varying the level of processing done to the study lists, varying the recognition-test procedure, repeating each of the study lists three times, and mixing the words from the six study lists together. A reliable false-recognition effect for critical nonpresented words was obtained in all conditions. However, the effect was not impervious to all of the manipulations. Significantly lower false recognition was obtained when learning was incidental as well as when the words on the six lists were mixed together. Neither level of processing nor repetition significantly influenced false recognition. This last result is inconsistent with Hintzman’s (1988) MINERVA 2 global memory model, but agrees with predictions from Shiffrin, Ratcliff, and Clark’s (1990) SAM model.     

How is phonological processing related to individual differences in children’s arithmetic skills?

While there is evidence for an association between the development of reading and arithmetic, the precise locus of this relationship remains to be determined. Findings from cognitive neuroscience research that point to shared neural correlates for phonological processing and arithmetic as well as recent behavioral evidence led to the present hypothesis that there exists a highly specific association between phonological awareness and single‐digit arithmetic with relatively small problem sizes. The present study examined this association in 37 typically developing fourth and fifth grade children. Regression analyses revealed that phonological awareness was specifically and uniquely related to arithmetic problems with a small but not large problem size. Further analysis indicated that problems with a high probability of being solved by retrieval, but not those typically associated with procedural problem‐solving strategies, are correlated with phonological awareness. The specific association between phonological awareness and arithmetic problems with a small problem size and those for which a retrieval strategy is most common was maintained even after controlling for general reading ability and phonological short‐term memory. The present findings indicate that the quality of children’s long‐term phonological representations mediates individual differences in single‐digit arithmetic, suggesting that more distinct long‐term phonological representations are related to more efficient arithmetic fact retrieval.     

Memory for the Experience of Donating Blood: Just How Bad Was It?

A field experiment investigated the accuracy of blood donor's memory for the emotions they experienced during blood donation. Compared to what they reported at the time of donation, the donors remembered a greater contrast between predonation and postdonation emotions. The donors also remembered experiencing more anxiety than they actually did. The bias in memory was especially pronounced among relatively inexperienced donors who had not been asked to report on their emotion prior to their actual donations. The memory boas was also related to donors' attitudes at the time of recall. Donors' intentions to donate blood again were reliably predicted by a combination of attitude and emotion measures. Discussion considers a potential intervention for improving donor return rates.     

Helping the Homeless: What About the Spirit of God?

This paper argues that the Holy Spirit is missing from services for the homeless. Spirituality is reviewed as a concept, and it is argued that the transforming Spirit that Paul described is not often present in discussions. Instead, the Social Gospel and Modernism have replaced the role of the Holy Spirit, and people who are homeless are being provided with very limited options to transform their lives and escape the desperation they so often feel.     

“God is the creator of all life and the energy of this world”: German intersex Christians’ reflection on the image of God and being created in God’s image

ABSTRACT

Intersex individuals are often told they are not human beings because they do not neatly fit into the categories of “female” and “male.” Many are made to feel like monsters. Christianity enforces this model of sexual dimorphism with the notion that to be a human being means to be created clearly “female” or clearly “male” in the image of God. This paper draws on interviews with German intersex Christians to explore their diverse images of God and what it means to be created in God’s image with the goal of creating new “conditions of possibility” that represent the full range of human sex/gender.     

How new is the new philosophy of psychiatry?

In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford University Press series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry,” an international book series begun in 2003 focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at the interface of philosophy and psychiatry. According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series represents a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing lately. Philosophers and psychiatrists face a “new philosophy of psychiatry”. However, the optimism which the “new” philosophy of psychiatry celebrates is precisely the exiling of philosophy from the foundations of psychiatry. The 150 year old belief that psychopathology cannot do without philosophical reflection has virtually disappeared from common psychiatric education and daily clinical practice. Though the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from philosophy, the impact of philosophy on psychiatry nowadays remains limited. With some exceptions, philosophical papers are embedded in a philosophical context inscrutable to ordinary psychiatrists. Much current philosophical work is perceived by psychiatrists as negativistic. I would encourage the field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philosophical attitudes which render possible true dialogue with philosophy and enrich both disciplines. The views developed here should not discredit the value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton’s paper and the excellent series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.” As Jaspers said “Everybody inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by philosophy in an unperceived way”.     

How social is the social psychology of emotion?

Two classic studies published 50 years ago showed how other people provide information that shapes the activation and interpretation of emotions. The present paper traces development of the social psychology of emotions from this starting point. Subsequent research into group-based and social appraisal has advanced understanding of the impact of social information on emotions and suggested new ways of investigating associated phenomena. Although potential integrations of interpersonal and group-oriented approaches offer promise for the future, the continuing focus on emotions as cognitively mediated effects of social factors should broaden to encompass dynamic relational processes.     

How Homeric is the Aristotelian Conception of Courage?

When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries to demarcate his ideal of genuine courage from the paradigmatic examples of courageous actions derived from the Homeric epics. It remains questionable, though, whether Aristotle is truly earnest in his efforts to distance himself from Homer. It will be argued that Aristotle's attempt to associate with Homer the two forms of specious courage—courage of the citizen troops and spirit‐caused courage—fails to provide sufficient criteria for the demarcation in question. All the essential elements of the Aristotelian account of courage, such as a voluntary choice, a noble goal, and a thumos‐driven reaction guided by reason are exemplified by a number of Homeric characters as well. It is thus likely that the philosopher's account of courage largely incorporates the poetic tradition at a new level, rather than supersedes it.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.