Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation

I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) need to assign moral agents such as a motive, and (ii) that possession of this motive, when properly understood, is morally admirable.     

Impression management motive and voice: Moderating effects of self‐monitoring,self‐efficacy,and voice instrumentality

The purpose of this study is to examine how employees’ impression management motive influences their voice by considering dispositional and situational variables. Drawing on the theory of self‐motive, we hypothesized that voice would be more positively related to impression management motive than prosocial motive. In addition, based on the interactional approach of motive and trait and trait activation theory, we hypothesized that the relationship between impression management motive and voice would be moderated by self‐monitoring, self‐efficacy, and voice instrumentality. Using a sample of 307 supervisor–subordinate dyads from South Korea, we found that, although prosocial motive had a positive influence on voice, impression management motive had a stronger influence on voice than prosocial motive. We also found that the positive influence of impression management motive on voice was stronger for employees with high levels of self‐monitoring, self‐efficacy, and voice instrumentality. This study helps verify the boundary conditions as to when impression management motive is strongly related to voice. In addition, this study will provide theoretical clues for resolving the inconsistent findings on the relationship between impression management motive and voice.     

ON THE VERY IDEA OF CRITERIA FOR PERSONHOOD

I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self‐consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre‐identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre‐identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science‐fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons.     

Would you post that picture and let your dad see it? Culture,honor, and Facebook

Honor means “high respect; esteem,” but it has different associations for different cultures. In honor cultures (Turkey), esteem depends on one's own perception of self‐worth and on other people's opinions. In those cultures, honor is easily lost and difficult to regain. In dignity cultures (northern America), esteem mainly depends on the individual and cannot be taken away by others. One way to lose honor in Turkey is through behaviors that may be seen as “potentially improper.” Thus, we expected that posting pictures of such behaviors on Facebook (e.g., at a party; with one's boyfriend/girlfriend) and letting others see them would be less likely in Turkey than in the northern United States. Moreover, we investigated whether honor endorsement was the reason for this difference. We examined participants' posting intentions and actual Facebook behaviors. As expected, Turkish participants were less willing to post and let others (especially their relatives) see their potentially improper pictures compared with northern Americans. Moreover, honor endorsement negatively predicted the willingness to post such pictures only in Turkey, especially for women. This suggests that in honor cultures, the concern for losing honor could be the underlying reason for avoiding social media postings that could be potentially perceived as improper. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do

Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in saying that desire is essential for motivating us. The right response to the Humean theory of motivation is to see that moral knowledge is desire-related rationality or thought-related desire. Moral knowledge is neither knowing that nor knowing how but rather a third species of knowledge which we may call “knowing to do.” Knowing to do is to be rationally disposed to do the right thing. This understanding of moral knowledge is exactly what we can learn from Aristotle’s ethics.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

Possibility,chance and necessity

Those who deny the usefulness of the concept of “motive” for psychology commonly bring two arguments in support of theirview. The first is that the whole notion of “motive” is “animistic” and “folklorish”, since a motive cannot be directly observed. The second is that “motives” cannot be accurately observed, and therefore are beyond the scope of scientific study, because (a) they are “the secret of the agent”, and (b) the agenthimself has no indubitable knowledge of his “motives”.

In a recent article, Professor MacIver defends the view that the imputation of “motives” is necessary to a complete explanation of behaviour. To the first of the above criticisms, he replies that such a view neglects a part of reality and that since “motives” exist they should be studied by psychology. This reply does nothing to demonstrate the necessity of imputing motives in order to obtain a complete explanation of behaviour. To the second criticism he replies (a) “motives” are not the secret of the agent, and (b) we can only assert that the agent has mistaken his “motive” if we can gain indepen-dent knowledge of it. We can do this, Professor MacIver asserts, by observing typical behaviour in typical circum-stances, and making inferences from the coherence of total situations.

Professor MacIver's replies to the second of the above criticisms are valid only if “motive” is defined as equivalent to “need”, so that we can say “under such-and-such conditions, such-and-such behaviour occurs”. A statement of this type says nothing about the agent's awareness of his goal. When the term “consciousness” is carefully defined along the lines suggested by Boring, the methods of imputation described by Professor MacIver can be seen to lead us only to the agent's “drives”, or “needs”, defined without reference to the agent's awareness of his goal. Professor MacIver uses “motives” to mean “awareness of the goal”, but gives us no clue as to how they may be imputed, and adduces no proof that their imputation is necessary.

A possible criterion of the presence of a “motive” is the degree of direction observable in the organism's varied reac-tions in response to frustration, though the more precise definition of such a criterion must await further experiment.

In view of the ambiguity of the term “motive” and its penumbra of false suggestion, it is desirable that the term be dropped from psychology.     

Intentional (Nation‐)States: A Group‐Agency Problem for the State’s Right to Exclude

Most philosophical defences of the state’s right to exclude immigrants derive their strength from the normative importance of self‐determination. If nation‐states are taken to be the political institutions of a people, then the state’s right to exclude is the people’s right to exclude – and a denial of this right constitutes an abridgement of self‐determination. In this article, I argue that this view of self‐determination does not cohere with a group‐agency view of nation‐states. On the group‐agency view that I defend, a nation‐state is the kind of group‐agent that does not supervene on the intentionality of member/citizens. If we think that a nation‐state is an intentional group‐agent in its own right, then we should think that self‐determination resides with the institutions of the state rather than with the citizens. If nation‐states do not supervene on the intentionality of citizens, then it is unclear why citizens might have the right to control membership in the state as a feature of self‐determination.     

社会风气·荣辱观·羞耻感

改善社会风气是树立社会主义荣辱观的目标。愈益泛滥的不良社会风气表明,荣耻不辨,耻感消解已成群体性的现象,出现了一种“去羞耻化”(实质是“去道德化”)倾向。“耻不从枉”,知耻而后正;要树立正确的荣辱观,关键在于“知耻”、“有耻”,在于要激发和培育“耻感”。耻感或羞耻心是人之为人的底线,是人格的基本点,人有耻感,是保持做人尊严的自因。因此,在提高物质生活水平的前提下,尊重和保障公民的基本权利,尊重人格,保护和激发全体社会成员的耻感,培育公民的自尊心,是树立社会主义荣辱观,从而促进良好社会风气的形成和发展的必要条件。     

Self‐Improvement

This article approaches the topic of improvement from a self‐evaluation perspective, namely the interplay between the self‐improvement motive and social or evaluative feedback. The self‐improvement motive is reflected in conscious desire. It is also reflected in preferences for continuous upward feedback trajectories, upward comparison feedback, and feedback that may be self‐threatening in the present but is likely to be useful in the future. The last type of feedback preference is stronger following a resource‐bolstering experience (e.g., good mood, success feedback, self‐affirmation). Moreover, both direct and indirect activation of the self‐improvement motive facilitates recall of improvement‐oriented feedback. Such feedback is associated with increased satisfaction or positive affect, a pattern qualified by individual differences (e.g., self‐esteem, self‐theories). Finally, improvement‐oriented feedback yields better performance, a pattern also qualified by individual differences (e.g., self‐enhancement, self‐appraisal) as well as feedback attributes (gradual versus sudden). This territory‐mapping review will hopefully prove useful to future theorizing and research.     

Crossing the bridge: the first-person and time

Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally-figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary.     

Kierkegaard,Repetition and Ethical Constancy

How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of crisis, in which our ethical self‐understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self‐transformation.     

Whose personality is better,mine or my partner's? Self‐enhancement bias in relationships

Previous research has documented self‐enhancement and relationship partner‐enhancement motivations, but not examined whether individuals view themselves or their partners more favorably, overall. The authors conducted three studies that revealed a general tendency to favor oneself over one's partner in direct self–partner personality comparisons. This illustrated a motivational precedence of self‐enhancement over partner‐enhancement goals. In Study 1, participants rated self‐only traits more favorably than partner‐only traits. In Studies 2 and 3, participants rated desirable traits as more characteristic of themselves than their partner, particularly when traits were more relevant to personal than relationship success. The authors also found that this self‐favoring bias was weaker (typically nonexistent) among those with higher relationship satisfaction, lower self‐esteem, or lower self‐deceptive tendencies. The authors discuss practical, theoretical, and methodological implications.     

Quantifying self‐motives: Functional links between dispositional desires

Previous research has sought to establish the existence, or gauge the relative strength, of key self‐evaluation motives (i.e., self‐enhancement, self‐verification, self‐assessment, self‐improvement). Here, we attempted, across five samples, to quantify individual differences in self‐motive strength and explore their empirical ramifications. We devised brief self‐report indices for each self‐motive and checked their factor structure, reliability, and validity. We found that self‐enhancement covaried mainly with self‐verification, and that self‐assessment covaried mainly with self‐improvement, thus validating key hypotheses regarding their functional links. Moreover, self‐enhancement and self‐verification covaried with positive personality traits, as well as with preferences for receiving positive feedback and perceptions of its accuracy. In sum, self‐reported variations in dispositional self‐motive strength form theoretically meaningful patterns. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Orthodoxy,Orthopraxis, and Orthopathy: Evaluating the Feminist Kenosis Debate

This study examines the feminist kenosis debate, tracing its development through Daphne Hampson, Sarah Coakley, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Carolyn Chau, Jennifer Newsome Martin and Anna Mercedes. Given the diversity of theologies put forth in this debate, it is necessary to have a method of evaluation. In order to do this, I will introduce the theology of Jon Sobrino to the feminist kenosis conversation. Sobrino's notions of orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy are essential tools for assessing different interpretations of kenosis and advancing an adequate theology of “self‐emptying.” This analysis leads to a proposal for a comprehensive feminist theological view of kenosis.     

Luck,propositional perception,and the Entailment Thesis

Looking out the window, I see that it’s raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell, in Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell on mind and world, 2002; Turri, Theoria 76(3):197–206, 2010; Pritchard, Philos Issues (Supplement to Nous) 21:434–455, 2011; Pritchard, Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.     

Unpacking East–West Differences in the Extent of Self‐Enhancement from the Perspective of Face versus Dignity Culture

The question of whether or not the need for self‐enhancement is culturally universal has been a controversial issue in cultural psychology. Though there have been numerous studies arguing that East Asians also have the need for self‐enhancement, the controversy remained. We contend that the field is ready to see a cohesive theory that integrates and explains when and why East Asians do and do not manifest their need for self‐enhancement. In this paper, we provide the theoretical logics of and rationales behind face and dignity cultures as the new theoretical proxies that integrate and explain East Asians' self‐enhancing behaviors, supplementing the former approach that uses the individualism‐collectivism dichotomy. In particular, four representative properties of face culture — humility, public (versus private) concern, prevention regulatory focus, and harmony — are discussed to explain cross‐cultural differences in the extent and ways of manifestations of self‐enhancement motivation between European Americans and East Asians. Theoretical corroborations and empirical findings supporting this approach are also discussed.     

On ‘disclosing new worlds’

The framework presented by Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (henceforth SFD) centres on a new view of entrepreneurship. This sees the entrepreneur not simply as the instrumentally rational agent of economic maximization, but as someone committed to new modes of practice. This rescues the entrepreneur from the misleading stereotype which both right and left have conspired to accredit in our society. It allows us to see that there is more than one type of entrepreneur, and it defines one which is potentially very benign in democratic society (and also social‐democratic societies). SFD propose to see political initiative‐taking in democratic societies as analogous to this kind of entrepreneurship, and they extend their analysis to deal with the maintenance and fostering of solidarity. The framework is very illuminating for the first case, and partially, although less so, for the second.     

Rousseau's Other Woman: Collette in Le devin du village

The life and work of Rousseau the musician and aesthetician has been forgely neglected in the debate about Rousseau's views on women. In this paper, I shall introduce a new text and a new female figure into the conversation: Collette, the shepherdess in Le devin du village, an opera written by Rousseau in 1752. We see an ambiguity in Collette‐the text often expresses one view while the music expresses another. When we take Collette s music seriously the following picture emerges: the natural desire of women to be free, a fairly active female agency, an incipient rebellion against the social role of women, and a final acceptance of the role of wife. This view of Collette supports the thesis that for Rousseau women are not naturally subordinate to men but are taught to be subordinate because it is required for the maintenance of the patriarchal family, the cornerstone of civil society. We see many glimpses of Collette's true, unsocialized, nature, especially in the melodies she sings, it is in song, the first and hence most natural language of humans, that we see Collette's longing for freedom. But she ends by singing the praises of civil society, albeit a rural society, and thus implicitly accepting the subordination she is destined to suffer at Colins hands.