Towards a humanistic approach to the Quran: new direction in contemporary Islamic thought

Historically, Muslim orthodoxy has regarded the Quran as God’s Word dictated to Muhammad through the mediation of the Angel Gabriel, and has thus maintained the corresponding argument that the Prophet played no role in shaping the content of the Quranic revelations. This paper discusses a project of what I shall refer to as ‘reforming theology’ within contemporary Islamic scholarship which stands in contrast to the dominant orthodox view of revelation and the nature of the Quran. In particular, the paper examines how several contemporary Muslim scholars, namely Fazlur Rahman (from Pakistan), Abdolkarim Soroush and Muhammad Mujtahed Shabestari (from Iran) and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (from Egypt), challenge the widely accepted idea about the Quran being the literal Word of God. The paper argues that the project of these scholars represents a radically new direction in Islamic theology because of its strong emphasis on the human side of the Quran. It also shows that the implications of these scholars’ re-examination of traditional theories of revelation are not only limited to theological matters, or specifically the communicative relationship between God and His Prophet, but also have a number of consequences for the practice of exegesis.     

Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.     

The Trinity in Christian‐Muslim Conversation

Abstract :  Christians need to recognize more fully the force of Muslim arguments on behalf of the oneness of God against the doctrine of the Trinity. Christians could benefit from the Islamic concept of shirk , proscribing the association of something that is not God in the honor and respect due to God alone. Christian trinitarian theology may be improved thereby; and certainly Christian‐Muslim conversation will be enriched.     

Muslim–Paulician Encounters and Early Islamic Anti-Christian Polemical Writings

This article investigates the portrayals of the Paulicians in early Islamic sources and specifically analyses the role that Paulician religious views play in Islamic anti-Christian writings. The study also gives insights into the nature of materials that were available to Muslim scholars and the strategies they applied in constructing coherent arguments to refute certain Christian religious beliefs. In doing so, the study touches upon Muslims’ religious needs and scholarly curiosity, which sheds light on their intellectual interactions with non-Islamic religious beliefs and philosophical ideas. The article demonstrates that references to Paulician religious beliefs can be found primarily in early Christian–Islamic polemics. Muslim polemicists, most of whom were Mu?tazilites, attempted to demonstrate the soundness and the coherence of Islamic tenets vis-à-vis inadequacies and contradictions in Christian doctrines. The reliance of Muslim polemicists on heresiographical discourse therefore constituted an important strategy to substantiate their polemical arguments. Two major issues stand out in Islamic portrayals of Paulician doctrines: the centrality of Paul of Samosata in the history of the sect, and his association with the view that Jesus was a human being devoid of divinity.     

Towards an interreligious understanding of Hikma

In contemporary Islamic thought the dichotomy betweenrevelation andreason has emerged as a crucial issue, reinforced by cultural conflicts between East and West. Thus S. H. Nasr puts divinely inspired knowledge —sapientia orhikma — at the heart of Muslim culture, claiming God‐less rationality,scientia, to be characteristic of the Occident. This analogy is used as an established fact in some writings of apologetic nature. At the same time, the traditional concept of ‘wisdom’,hikma, is brought up to date in order to serve a new purpose in a world of increasingly specialized sciences. Whereas many Muslim writers recognize the need for an informed approach to ‘all branches of knowledge’, most of them insist on retaining a link between science and ethical values.Hikma is now launched as the authentic Islamic answer to ‘the confusion created by profane philosophies’. As the Islamic way of making science,hikma is seen as holistic and God‐centred in contrast to the Western type of science. Not all Muslim intellectuals, however, are satisfied with one single concept for the entirety of Islamic thought. Hasan Hanafi highlightshikma and Shari ^c a as ‘twin sisters, nursed at the same bosom'; Nasr proposes a hierarchy of knowledge with ‘Divine wisdom’ at the top. Related ideas can be found among some Christian theologians of religion, who have suggested that people of living faiths try to rediscover their shared heritage in ‘the universal economy ofhokhmah’, which may come to serve as a useful interreligious concept.     

Future freedom and the fixity of truth: closing the road to limited foreknowledge open theism

Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument that fatalism logically follows from the omnitemporality of truth. Hasker believes a distinction between hard and soft facts prevents fatalism, but I argue that his defense fails in light of arguments involving divine necessity. Additionally, I point out that Hasker’s philosophy of language concerning divine names faces problems that cannot be overcome, given the versions of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge that motivate LFOT. Thus, contra Hasker, Swinburne, and van Inwagen, open theism necessitates the alethic openness of the future.     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.     

Two sorts of natural theology

Usually, natural theology is understood as the project of providing arguments for the existence of God. This project is endorsed by Moreland and Craig. McGrath, on the other hand, says that this project fails. In the first part of this article, I show how McGrath’s dismissal of arguments for the existence of God follows from his view of natural theology. In the second part, I argue that McGrath’s natural theology contains an accurate critique of Moreland and Craig’s way of doing natural theology, a critique that exposes two major problems in their treatment of the moral argument for the existence of God. In the third part, I propose a way of providing arguments for the existence of God that avoids the problems pointed out by McGrath, namely a way of arguing that seeks to show how theology may improve a certain non-theistic understanding of a natural phenomenon.     

Islamist depictions of Christianity in the twentieth century: The pluralism debate and the depiction of the other

Muslim perception of Christianity has been coloured by references to Jesus and Christianity in the Qur'an and by the great range of historical encounters between members of the two traditions over fourteen centuries. In response to colonialism and Christian missionary activity in Muslim countries, Muslim modernists depicted Christianity as a religion of the sword and cast Islam as a superior system noted for its moderate and pluralistic vision. By the second half of the twentieth century, the challenge of Marxism and Zionism gave credence to the Islamist ideology of the Islamic imperative to eliminate all other systems. Muslim society was depicted as the victim of secular, Christian and Jewish fanaticism that sought to eradicate Islam. During the eighties, a new discourse on the role of religious minorities has developed which sees pluralism as a foundational principle of Islamic society sanctioned by God since it was his will to create difference. The purpose is to promote not discord, but the perception of a sign of God's mercy.     

The end of Jesus' mission and the honor of God in the Qur'an: the search for common ground between Muslims and Christians

Jesus is important for both Muslims and Christians, and this has led some in both groups to search for common ground concerning him. Nevertheless, two important points of disagreement concern the Christian claims that Jesus is the Son of God, and that Jesus was put to death on the cross. The present article focuses on the last point, noting four key qur'anic passages (Q 3.55; 4.157–8; 5.117; and 19.33). Muslim commentators have mostly denied the historical aspect of Jesus' crucifixion, advocating some version of a substitutionist theory whereby the Jews crucified someone other than Jesus, while Jesus himself was taken alive by God into heaven. Muslim–Christian dialogue on this issue remains problematic. The present article encourages mutual exploration of a theological dimension of the end of Jesus' mission, that of the honor of God. Both Muslims and Christians affirm that God maintained his honor by thwarting the Jews' attempt to get rid of Jesus. The usual Muslim belief is that God rescued him alive to heaven before the crucifixion, while the Christian understanding is that God vindicated Jesus through the resurrection and ascension. Similar views of God's honor through his intervention regarding Jesus can contribute to positive Muslim–Christian dialogue.1 An abbreviated form of this paper was delivered at the International Symposium on Qur'an and Contemporary Issues at the University of Nairobi, 5 June 2011.      

Legislative Enforcement of Nonconsensual Determination of Neurological (Brain) Death in Muslim Patients: A Violation of Religious Rights

Death is defined in the Quran with a single criterion of irreversible separation of the ruh (soul) from the body. The Quran is a revelation from God to man, and the primary source of Islamic knowledge. The secular concept of death by neurological criteria, or brain death, is at odds with the Quranic definition of death. The validity of this secular concept has been contested scientifically and philosophically. To legitimize brain death for the purpose of organ donation and transplantation in Muslim communities, Chamsi-Pasha and Albar (concurring with the US President’s Council on Bioethics) have argued that irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness and breathing (apneic coma) in brain death defines true death in accordance with Islamic sources. They have postulated that the absence of nafs (personhood) and nafas (breath) in apneic coma constitutes true death because of departure of the soul (ruh) from the body. They have also asserted that general anesthesia is routine in brain death before surgical procurement. Their argument is open to criticism because: (1) the ruh is described as the essence of life, whereas the nafs and nafas are merely human attributes; (2) unlike true death, the ruh is still present even with absent nafs and nafas in apneic coma; and (3) the routine use of general anesthesia indicates the potential harm to brain-dead donors from surgical procurement. Postmortem general anesthesia is not required for autopsy. Therefore, the conclusion must be that legislative enforcement of nonconsensual determination of neurological (brain) death and termination of life-support and medical treatment violates the religious rights of observant Muslims.     

Jesus and the holy spirit in the writings of Nūr al‐Din al‐Raniri

In the 17th century Nūr al‐Din al‐Raniri was one of the most prominent scholars of the Sultanate of Aceh (now a province of the Indonesian Republic). In a book on Islamic law he commented critically on Hindus, Jews and Christians. In other works he contributed more positively to the Muslim debate on the significance of Jesus and the Holy Spirit. Al‐Raniri sometimes deviates from the mainstream of Muslim scholarship, especially in stating his theory of the Spirit as a mediate and independent substance between God and man. Thus, he can hardly be accepted as representing orthodox Muslim thought.     

Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument and its Reversal

The article discusses a response to Schellenberg’s atheistic ‘hiddenness argument’ (A-argument) that neither objects to its premises nor formulates a new inductive argument in favour of the existence of God. According to the proposed response, it is sufficient for the task of defending theism to reverse Schellenberg’s reasoning and present a theistic meta-argument (T-argument) that takes as its assumption the fact that there are resistant believers in the world. The paper defends the claim that both arguments (A- as well as T-argument) have similar persuasive power. However, because of their contradictory conclusions both cannot be sound. It is argued that the way to decide the dilemma is to compare the demographics of theism and atheism and to compare accommodation strategies of both arguments. The first comparison favours theism, but it does not exclude the possibility that quantitative proportions between theists and atheists can change in the future. The second comparison refers to accommodation strategies of proponents of A-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in an atheistic world there exist resistant believers and of proponents of T-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in the world governed by an all-powerful and all-loving God there exist nonresistant nonbelievers. The conclusion of the considerations is the claim that the theistic accommodation strategy compares favourably to the atheistic one.

     

Empowering Muslim children’s spirituality in Malay Archipelago: integration between National Philosophical Foundations and Tawakkul (trust in God)

Multiple studies indicated that children raised to be spiritual were found to be happier, have more resilience and positive outlook towards life events. This paper attempts to explore and integrate the value of spirituality and religious practices. It is approached through the understanding and application of the tawakkul (trust in God) concept, as perceived from an Islamic viewpoint. This aspect is explored through the consolidation of the ‘believing in God’ component, as highlighted in the National Philosophical Foundations in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia to tawakkul. It will further seek to find the prospect of empowering Muslim children’s spirituality through such integration. This theoretical paper is based on the Islamic foundations and characteristics; its implementation and implications. The outcome illustrates indication of ‘divine involvement’ as the main essence of tawakkul; resulting sustainable religious, spiritual and moral enhancement. Moreover, an internalised and implicit form of tawakkul should be encouraged to promote self-understanding.     

NIETZSCHE,THE CROSS,AND THE NATURE OF GOD

In this essay, I treat of a type of moral objection to Christian theism that is formulated by Friedrich Nietzsche. In an effort to provoke a negative moral‐aesthetic response to the conception of God underlying the Christian tradition, with the ultimate aim of recommending his own allegedly ‘healthier’ ideals, Nietzsche presents a number of distinct but related considerations. In particular, he claims that the traditional theological interpretation of the crucifixion of Jesus expresses the tasteless, vulgar, and morally objectionable character of God, thus rendering Him unworthy of belief. In response to Nietzsche's worries, I first of all argue that his account of the origins of the belief in God is both prima facie implausible and historically false. At the same time I recognize that Nietzsche is expressing, in his typically bombastic manner, a genuine and widely held worry about what the crucifixion, as an event in salvation history, says about the nature of God. In response to this worry, I draw on the work of Wilhelm Dilthey in order to support the contention that the concept of divine transcendence, which underlies Nietzsche's concern, has its proper place within the Greek metaphysical tradition, rather than in Christian faith. Building on the work of Franz Rosenzweig and Jürgen Moltmann, I outline a conception of God that more accurately reflects the claim that the cross is the definitive revelation of the divine nature while at the same time foreclosing on the possibility of the kind of response that Nietzsche articulates.     

A Comparison of Christians’ Concepts of Jesus Christ and God

In the god concept literature, little research has been conducted on how people think about and relate specifically to Jesus Christ. This study addresses the extent to which Christians distinguish between Jesus and God in terms of their concepts of Jesus and God, the pathways they use to connect with Jesus and God, and the benefits they seek and receive from Jesus and God. The study also tests whether participants’ concepts of Jesus have unique predictive power for psychological, social, and spiritual criterion variables after controlling for their concepts of God. The sample includes 165 college students and 107 church attendees who self-identified as Christians. Results indicate that although most participants view Jesus and God as being similar to each other, they perceive Jesus to be warmer but less transcendent and stern than God. Including participants’ concepts of Jesus in hierarchical multiple regressions accounted for significant additional variance after controlling for their concepts of God in predicting participants’ negative affect, social justice attitudes, spiritual emotions, and Christian orthodoxy. Participants generally used various pathways more to connect with God than with Jesus, and they reported seeking and receiving many benefits more from God than from Jesus. These results suggest that future research on god concepts among Christians ought to include separate measures of Jesus concepts and God concepts.     

The problem of evil: skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis

Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not expect to be able to understand God’s ways, and thus we should not regard it as surprising or mysterious that God would allow natural evil. I argue that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis: accepting skeptical theism would undermine our ability to make any moral judgments whatsoever. Second, and more briefly, I argue that skeptical theism would undercut our ability to accept any form of the argument from design, including recent approaches based on fine-tuning.     

Positive skeptical theism and the problem of divine deception

In a recent article, Erik Wielenberg has argued that positive skeptical theism fails to circumvent his new argument from apparent gratuitous evil. Wielenberg’s new argument focuses on apparently gratuitous suffering and abandonment, and he argues that negative skeptical theistic responses fail to respond to the challenge posed by these apparent gratuitous evils due to the parent–child analogy often invoked by theists. The greatest challenge to his view, he admits, is positive skeptical theism. To stave off this potential problem with his argument, he maintains that positive skeptical theism entails divine deception, which creates insuperable problems for traditional theism. This essay shows that Wielenberg is mistaken. Although positive skeptical theism claims that we should expect the appearance of gratuitous evil (when there is no actual gratuitous evil) given Christian theism, this does not entail divine deception. I maintain that God is not a deceiver on positive skeptical theism because God does not meet two requirements to be a deceiver: (1) God does not intend to cause people to believe any false propositions and (2) God does not provide evidence for someone to justifiably believe a false proposition. Consequently, Wielenberg’s new argument from evil fails and positive skeptical theism remains a viable response to the evidential argument from evil.     

Refashioning Islam: elite women and piety in Bangladesh

This paper attempts to explore the development of Islamic identity of a group of elite women in Dhaka, Bangladesh. These women constitute a significant group in the country where 10% of the rich control 40% of the national wealth, and the 10% of the poorest control 1.84% of the national wealth.* Socially, politically and economically, elite women and their families are powerful and have access to resources and political influence. Many of these women who did not grow up with a very strict religious orientation came to Islam and consolidated religious thoughts and practices through a weekly Quran reading class. This particular Quran class began in 2002. The classes were initiated by a foreign diplomat’s wife who was Muslim, and have continued even after her departure from the country in 2004. While Dhaka houses many meetings of Muslim men and women to discuss Islamic ideas and practices, this particular class was quite unique in its ability to attract and convert elite women whose lives were seemingly perfect. This urban elite phenomenon of Islamic revivalism has not been the subject of any in-depth research in Bangladesh, and this work therefore, is the first of its kind and largely introductory.