Power and Pleasure

SUMMARY

In exploring issues of power and pleasure in relationships the author uses Erikson's (1965) developmental 'eight ages of man' as both a conceptual framework and a way of describing aspects of the developmental growth of boys as men, and he completes Erikson's (1968) epigenesis of the life cycle in relation to identity and intimacy. Drawing on literature on male psychology, his own experience and his experience as a counsellor and a Transactional Analysis (TA) psychotherapist in clinical training, the author focuses on male identity and men's capacity for intimacy in relationships. The use and abuse of power in achieving male identity, and the implications for mutual pleasure and interdependence in intimate relationships are outlined and practice issues for counselling and psychotherapy with men in relation to identity and intimacy issues are considered.     

Happiness Enrichment and Sustainable Happiness

Applied Research in Quality of Life - Sustainable happiness research has recently received renewed attention. Studies present exercises intended to enhance happiness. A comprehensive process by...     

Malicious Pleasure Evaluated: Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good?

Abstract: I examine and criticize the thinking that leads people to deny malicious pleasure's goodness.     

Feminist Pleasure and Feminine Beautification

This paper explores the conditions under which feminine beautification constitutes a feminist practice. Distinguishing between the process and product of beautification allows us to isolate those aesthetic, interapos;Subjective, and embodied elements that empower rather than disempower women. The empowering characteristics of beautification, however, are difficult and perhaps impossible to represent in a sexist context; therefore, while beautifying may be a positive experience for women, being viewed as a beautified object in current Western society is almost always opposed to women's equality and autonomy.     

Aesthetic Pleasure Explained

One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure.     

Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic , not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason.     

Pleasure,Desire and Practical Reason

This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason.     

Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects' favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views.     

Hedonism and Happiness

Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet, these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily.     

Pleasure and Complexity: Berlyne Revisited

D. E. Berlyne (1960, 1974) posited an increasing linear function for complexity with an inverted U-shaped function for pleasure. Berlyne's theory of aesthetic response was tested through the presentation of 6 color reproductions of paintings to 92 participants and the gauging of their responses. When participants' pleasure was compared with interest, that hypothesis was upheld. However, when complexity was compared with pleasure, Berlyne's theory was not supported.