Are indefinite descriptions ambiguous?

I have benefited greatly from discussing the issues addressed in this paper with Michael Liston, John Vickers and Mark Wilson.     

To reverse or not to reverse: when is an ambiguous figure not ambiguous?

The role of bottom-up processes in our perception of reversible figures was examined. In Experiment 1 the overlapping squares figure and nonsense reversible figures were used. The effects of adapting subjects for differing durations to an unambiguous version of the figure before presentation of the traditional reversible figure were determined under conditions of varying precision of fixation. In Experiment 2 the research was expanded to other examples of reversible figures. In both experiments, results with two dependent measures (the subject's first percept and the number of reversals reported) were generally consistent with the interpretation of bottom-up processes underlying the adaptation effects. However, the crucial role of stimulus and procedural variables and the differential sensitivity of the two dependent measures was demonstrated.     

How do speakers avoid ambiguous linguistic expressions?

Three experiments assessed how speakers avoid linguistically and nonlinguistically ambiguous expressions. Speakers described target objects (a flying mammal, bat) in contexts including foil objects that caused linguistic (a baseball bat) and nonlinguistic (a larger flying mammal) ambiguity. Speakers sometimes avoided linguistic-ambiguity, and they did so equally regardless of whether they also were about to describe foils. This suggests that comprehension processes can sometimes detect linguistic-ambiguity before producing it. However, once produced, speakers consistently avoided using the same linguistically ambiguous expression again for a different meaning. This suggests that production processes can successfully detect linguistic-ambiguity after-the-fact. Speakers almost always avoided nonlinguistic-ambiguity. Thus, production processes are especially sensitive to nonlinguistic- but not linguistic-ambiguity, with the latter avoided consistently only once it is already articulated.     

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.     

How do respondents construe ambiguous response formats of affect items?

Ambiguous response formats predict correlations from -.467 to -1 between opposite items, depending on whether the respondent's interpretation of the format is unipolar or bipolar. The authors present a procedure to investigate the proper interpretation in each case. It consists of applying nonparametric and parametric item response theory models (the Mokken and the graded response models) to pairs of opposite items in order to find the locations of the response options along the latent scale and, therefore, identify the response format construction. The authors tested this procedure on 4 samples (Ns=142-1,150) and 2 item pairs ("relaxed"-"tense" and "optimistic"-"pessimistic"). The results revealed that respondents constructed the formats as bipolar and supported the bipolarity of the item pairs.     

Lexical processing of ambiguous words: dominance or associative strength?

Four experiments examined the role of meaning frequency (dominance) and associative strength (measured by associative norms) in the processing of ambiguous words in isolation. Participants made lexical decisions to targets words that were associates of the more frequent (dominant) or less frequent (subordinate) meaning of a homograph prime. The first two experiments investigated the role of associative strength at long SOAs (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony) (750 ms.), showing that meaning is facilitated by the targets' associative strength and not by their dominance. The last two experiments traced the role associative strength at short SOAs (250 ms), showing that the manipulation of the associative strength has no effect in the semantic priming. The conclusions are: on the one hand, semantic priming for homographs is due to associative strength manipulations at long SOAs. On the other hand, the manipulation of the associative strength has no effect when automatic processes (short SOAs) are engaged for homographs.     

Effect of size of angle on the ambiguous Müller-Lyer illusion

The ambiguous Müller-Lyer illusion was measured as a function of the angle formed by the oblique lines. The illusion was found to increase with an increase in the size of the angle. This result confirmed the validity of the attentive field postulate of the assimilation theory of geometric illusions.     

Effects of adults’ contingent responding on infants’ behavior in ambiguous situations

We examined the effect of adults’ contingency in responding to infants’ behavior in an ambiguous situation in two experiments. In Experiment 1, forty-four 12-month-old infants were exposed to an ambiguous toy. An unfamiliar adult responded either contingently or non-contingently to the infant’s bids and then presented the toy and provided positive information. During toy presentation, infants in the non-contingent condition looked less at the experimenter than infants in the contingent condition. In a concluding free-play situation infants in the non-contingent condition played less and tended to touch the toy less. In Experiment 2 (forty-four 12-month-old infants), the parent either responded promptly or with a delay each time the infant made contact initiatives and then presented an ambiguous toy and delivered the positive information. The infants in the non-contingent condition tended to look less at the parent during toy presentation and also tended to play less with the toy during the concluding free-play situation. The findings show that adults’ contingency in responding influences infants’ behavior in ambiguous situations.     

Ghosted?: Navigating strategies for reducing uncertainty and implications surrounding ambiguous loss

Ghosting is the unilateral dissolution process of ceasing communication through media. When ghosted, non‐initiators are often left without the ability to navigate the resulting uncertainty or impending dissolution processes. Utilizing uncertainty reduction theory and ambiguous loss, this investigation explores effective and ineffective strategies used to find answers, reduce uncertainty, and navigate post‐dissolution consequences. Employing two studies from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, a thematic analysis to delineate and affirm categories—7 effective and ineffective strategies and 11 categories of personal and relational implications after being ghosted—was used. These studies provide insight about non‐initiators process to resolve their uncertainty and highlight ramifications from ambiguity that non‐initiators experience after being ghosted. These findings discuss connections to knowledge acquisition, closure processing, and consequences of ghosting.     

When does the brain distinguish between genuine and ambiguous smiles? An ERP study

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded to assess the processing time course of ambiguous facial expressions with a smiling mouth but neutral, fearful, or angry eyes, in comparison with genuinely happy faces (a smile and happy eyes) and non-happy faces (neutral, fearful, or angry mouth and eyes). Participants judged whether the faces looked truly happy or not. Electroencephalographic recordings were made from 64 scalp electrodes to generate ERPs. The neural activation patterns showed early P200 sensitivity (differences between negative and positive or neutral expressions) and EPN sensitivity (differences between positive and neutral expressions) to emotional valence. In contrast, sensitivity to ambiguity (differences between genuine and ambiguous expressions) emerged only in later LPP components. Discrimination of emotional vs. neutral affect occurs between 180 and 430 ms from stimulus onset, whereas the detection and resolution of ambiguity takes place between 470 and 720 ms. In addition, while blended expressions involving a smile with angry eyes can be identified as not happy in the P200 (175–240 ms) component, smiles with fearful or neutral eyes produce the same ERP pattern as genuinely happy faces, thus revealing poor discrimination.     

Is “Σ” purple or green? Bistable grapheme-color synesthesia induced by ambiguous characters

People with grapheme-color synesthesia perceive specific colors when viewing different letters or numbers. Previous studies have suggested that synesthetic color experience can be bistable when induced by an ambiguous character. However, the exact relationship between processes underlying the identity of an alphanumeric character and the experience of the induced synesthetic color has not been examined. In the present study, we explored this by focusing on the temporal relation of inducer identification and color emergence using inducers whose identity could be rendered ambiguous upon rotation of the characters. Specifically, achromatic alphabetic letters (W/M) and digits (6/9) were presented at varying angles to 9 grapheme-color synesthetes. Results showed that grapheme identification and synesthetically perceived grapheme color covary with the orientation of the test stimulus and that synesthetes were slower naming the experienced color than identifying the character, particularly at intermediate angles where ambiguity was greatest.     

Children's understanding of ambiguous figures: Which cognitive developments are necessary to experience reversal?

In two experiments involving one hundred and thirty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds we examined the claim that a complex understanding of ambiguity is required to experience reversal of ambiguous stimuli [Gopnik, A., & Rosati, A. (2001). Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations. Developmental Science, 4, 175–183]. In Experiment 1 a novel Production task measured the ability to acknowledge both interpretations of ambiguous figures. This was as easy as and significantly correlated with a False Belief task, and easier than a Droodle task. We replicated this finding in Experiment 2, and also found that perceiving reversal of ambiguous figures was harder than either the False Belief or Production tasks. In contrast to previous findings, the Reversal and Droodle tasks were not specifically related. We conclude that children only attempt reversal once they can understand the representational relationship between the figure and its two interpretations. The process resulting in reversal however is hard, probably requiring additional developments in executive functioning and imagery abilities.     

Collisions between moving visual targets: what controls alternative ways of seeing an ambiguous display?

When identical visual targets move directly toward and then past one another, they appear either to stream past one another or to bounce off each other. Bertenthal et al (1993 Perception 22 193-207) accounted for the relative strengths of these two percepts by invoking a directional bias, arising from cooperative interactions within a network of motion detectors. We tested this explanation by devising conditions that would enhance or diminish the strength of such a directional bias. In separate experiments we varied (i) the presence or absence of temporal transients (pausing, disappearance, occlusion); (ii) the distances travelled by the targets; and (iii) their acceleration or deceleration before and after collision. The tendency to see the objects stream past one another was not related to the strength of an hypothesized directional bias, suggesting that the perception of this ambiguous motion display was not mediated by directional recruitment. Instead, the results suggest that perceived direction reflects the operation of neural constraints that mirror the constraints operating upon moving objects in the three-dimensional natural world.     

Can being scared cause tummy aches? Naive theories, ambiguous evidence, and preschoolers' causal inferences

Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theories with domain-general statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, the authors presented preschoolers with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard 2 stories in which 2 candidate causes co-occurred with an effect. Evidence was presented in the form: AB?E; CA?E; AD?E; and so forth. In 1 story, all variables came from the same domain; in the other, the recurring candidate cause, A, came from a different domain (A was a psychological cause of a biological effect). After receiving this statistical evidence, children were asked to identify the cause of the effect on a new trial. Consistent with the predictions of a Bayesian model, all children were more likely to identify A as the cause within domains than across domains. Whereas 3.5-year-olds learned only from the within-domain evidence, 4- and 5-year-olds learned from the cross-domain evidence and were able to transfer their new expectations about psychosomatic causality to a novel task.     

Impressions at the intersection of ambiguous and obvious social categories: Does gay + Black = likable?

How do perceivers combine information about perceptually obvious categories (e.g., Black) with information about perceptually ambiguous categories (e.g., gay) during impression formation? Given that gay stereotypes are activated automatically, we predicted that positive gay stereotypes confer evaluative benefits to Black gay targets, even when perceivers are unaware of targets' sexual orientations. Participants in Study 1 rated faces of White straight men as more likable than White gay men, but rated Black men in the opposite manner: gays were liked more than straights. In Study 2, participants approaching Whites during an approach–avoidance task responded faster to straights than gays, whereas participants approaching Blacks responded faster to gays than straights. These findings highlight the striking extent to which less visible categories, like sexual orientation, subtly influence person perception and determine the explicit and implicit evaluations individuals form about others.     

Satiation or availability? Effects of attention,memory, and imagery on the perception of ambiguous figures

The prolonged-inspection technique has been used to demonstrate effects of satiation on the perception of ambiguous figures. We propose that the inspection phase, in which subjects view an unambiguous version of the stimulus prior to observing the ambiguous figure, does not create neural fatigue but rather provides a context in which the alternative percept is apprehended and gains perceptual strength through processes such as imagination or memory. The consequent availability of the alternative organization drives the perceptual phenomena that have been thought to reflect satiation. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that (1) preexperimental exposure to the target figures and (2) allocation of attention to the-inspection figures-were both necessary in order to obtain results similar to those predicted by the satiation model. In Experiment 2, we obtained similar results, finding that effects of prior inspection were greater the greater the amount and availability of information regarding the alternative percept during the inspection phase. Subjects who generated visual images of the noninspected alternative during inspection yielded results comparable to those from subjects to whom both versions were presented isuaily.     

Why do you like Arcimboldo’s portraits? Effect of perceptual style on aesthetic appreciation of ambiguous artworks

Visual aesthetic experience reflects the states of the mind and the brain when visual artworks are being viewed. In the present study, we investigated whether perceptual style affects the aesthetic appreciation of ambiguous artworks, such as those of Arcimboldo, which are characterized by part–whole ambiguity. Participants were classified as having a global or local perceptual style and were asked to aesthetically judge two different types of artworks: portraits by Arcimboldo and by Renaissance painters. We found that perceptual style affected both the aesthetic appreciation and the degree of perceived ambiguity in Arcimboldo’s artworks. Our findings suggest that aesthetic judgment is a consequence of the interaction between individual personal perceptual style and the perceptual features of artworks.     

Théodule Ribot's ambiguous positivism: philosophical and epistemological strategies in the founding of French scientific psychology

Théodule Ribot (1839-1916) is regarded by many historians of psychology as the "father" of the discipline in France. Ribot contributed to the development of a "new psychology" independent from philosophy, relying on the methods of the natural sciences. However, such an epistemological transition encountered fierce opposition from both the champions of the old-fashioned metaphysical psychology and the representatives of the "scientific spirit." This article focuses on the objections raised by the latter, and especially philosophers of science, against the possibility of a scientific psychology. For instance, according to Auguste Comte, psychology does not satisfy certain basic methodological requirements. To overcome these objections, Ribot, in his La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine (1870/1914), devised an epistemological strategy that amounted to invoking criticisms of Comte's views made by other representatives of the positivist school, such as John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer.     

Seeing and liking: Biased perception of ambiguous figures consistent with the “inward bias” in aesthetic preferences

Aesthetic preferences are ubiquitous in visual experience. Indeed, it seems nearly impossible in many circumstances to perceive a scene without also liking or disliking it to some degree. Aesthetic factors are only occasionally studied in mainstream vision science, though, and even then they are often treated as functionally independent from other aspects of perception. In contrast, the present study explores the possibility that aesthetic preferences may interact with other types of visual processing. We were inspired, in particular, by the inward bias in aesthetic preferences: When an object with a salient “front” is placed near the border of a frame (say, in a photograph), observers tend to find the image more aesthetically pleasing if the object faces inward (toward the center) than if it faces outward (away from the center). We employed similar stimuli, except that observers viewed framed figures that were ambiguous in terms of the direction they appeared to be facing. The resulting percepts were influenced by the frames in a way that corresponded to the inward bias: When a figure was placed near a frame’s border, observers tended to see whichever interpretation was facing inward. This effect occurred for both abstract geometric figures (e.g., ambiguously-oriented triangles) and meaningful line drawings (e.g., left-facing ducks or right-facing rabbits). The match between this new influence on ambiguous figure perception and the previously studied aesthetic bias suggests new ways in which aesthetic factors may relate not only to what we like, but also to what we see in the first place.     

Am I blue? Depressed mood and the consequences of self-focus for the interpretation and recall of ambiguous words

In two experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric students first concentrated on either self-focused or other-focused phrases and then performed an ostensibly unrelated task involving the interpretation of homographs with both personal and impersonal meanings. In Experiment 1, they constructed sentences for the homographs; dysphoric students' sentences were more emotionally negative (although not more personal) in the self-focused condition than in the other-focused condition. In Experiment 2, they freely associated to the homographs, and the percentage of personal meanings reflected by the associations revealed an effect of self versus other focus that depended on mood group. Following free associations, they attempted to recall the homographs. Dysphoric students (but not nondysphoric students) recalled a greater percentage of personally interpreted homographs if they had focused on self than if they had focused on other matters. In general, these results suggest that ruminative or self-focused thinking by people in depressed moods transfers to novel ambiguous situations, encouraging more negative interpretations and better recall of personal interpretations.