An Optimized Design of Choice Experiments: A New Approach for Studying Decision Behavior in Choice Task Experiments

In this paper, we present a new approach for the optimal experimental design problem of generating diagnostic choice tasks, where the respondent's decision strategy can be unambiguously deduced from the observed choice. In this new approach, we applied a genetic algorithm that creates a one‐to‐one correspondence between a set of predefined decision strategies and the alternatives of the choice task; it also manipulates the characteristics of the choice tasks. In addition, this new approach takes into account the measurement errors that can occur when the preferences of the decision makers are being measured. The proposed genetic algorithm is capable of generating diagnostic choice tasks even when the search space of possible choice tasks is very large. As proof‐of‐concept, we used this novel approach to generate respondent‐specific choice tasks with either low or high context‐based complexity that we operationalize by the similarity of alternatives and the conflict between alternatives. We find in an experiment that an increase in the similarity of the alternatives and an increase in the number of conflicts within the choice task lead to an increased use of non‐compensatory strategies and a decreased use of compensatory decision strategies. In contrast, the size of the choice tasks, measured by the number of attributes and alternatives, only weakly influences the strategy selection. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attention and attribute overlap in preferential choice

Attributes that are common, or overlapping, across alternatives in two-alternative forced preferential choice tasks are often non-diagnostic. In many settings, attending to and evaluating these attributes does not help the decision maker determine which of the available alternatives is the most desirable. For this reason, many existing behavioural theories propose that decision makers ignore common attributes while deliberating. Across six experiments, we find that decision makers do direct their attention selectively and ignore attributes that are not present in or associated with either of the available alternatives. However, they are as likely to attend to common attributes as they are to attend to attributes that are unique to a single alternative. These results suggest the need for novel theories of attention in preferential choice.     

The role of attitudes in memory-based decision making

Frequently, considerable knowledge of the attributes of decision alternatives is available in memory so as to permit a thoughtful and deliberate choice. However, in many instances, individuals neglect to use such knowledge and instead rely on "attitude-based" strategy to make a memory-based decision. The findings from two experiments suggest that as to the motivation to make a correct decision or the opportunity to use the available attribute knowledge decreases, the likelihood that attitudes will guide a memory-based decision increases. The findings illustrate the functional role attitudes play in guiding decisions and behavior. By providing a ready means of evaluating choice alternatives, attitudes enable an individual to make a decision relatively quickly and effortlessly.     

Anticipations of Effort and Accuracy in Multiattribute Choice

Research on multiattribute choice strategies suggests that decision makers adapt to variations in task features by switching decision strategies. One perspective is that strategy selection is determined by a trade-off between the goals of minimizing effort and maximizing accuracy. However, since strategy selection is based on anticipated effort and accuracy, empirical evidence is needed on the nature of these anticipations. An experiment examines how well decision makers anticipate the influence of two particular task features, information display organization and number of alternatives, on effort and accuracy. Subjects chose the best alternative from sets of loan applications described by six relevant attributes. Prior to each choice, they prospectively judged the effort required and the accuracy that would result. Results suggest that anticipated consequences deviate substantially from experienced consequences for both effort and accuracy. Neither task experience nor explicit feedback brought anticipations and experiences closer together. These findings underscore the importance of anticipation judgments in multiattribute choice.     

Post-decision consolidation: group members in different social settings compared to individual decision makers

Two experiments were conducted to examine how making decisions in a 3-member group affects the degree of post-decision consolidation, defined as attractiveness changes in favor of the chosen alternative. Both experiments were conducted in two sessions one week apart. In the first session (decision phase), participants estimated the importance of each of four different attributes describing two decision alternatives. They were then shown predetermined attractiveness ratings on each of the attributes and were to decide on the two alternatives, either individually or as a group. In the second session (post-decision phase), the participants were to attempt to recall the attractiveness ratings for the attributes as presented to them in session one. In both experiments, significant post-decision consolidation was found for individual decision makers but not for group members. In experiment 2, this result was replicated, no difference in consolidation being found between group members with face-to-face interaction and without.     

Self–other differences in multiattribute decision making: Compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies

When making decisions where options involve multiple attributes, a person can choose to use a compensatory, utility maximizing strategy, which involves consideration and integration of all available attributes. Alternatively, a person can choose a noncompensatory strategy that extracts only the most important and reliable attributes. The present research examined whether other‐oriented decisions would involve greater reliance on a noncompensatory, lexicographic decision strategy than self‐oriented decisions. In three studies (Mturk workers and college students), the difference in other‐oriented versus self‐oriented decisions in a medical decision context was explained by a subsample of participants that chose the death minimizing operation on all 10 decisions (Study 1) and a subsample of participants who self‐reported that they used a strategy that minimized the chance of death on every decision (i.e., a lexicographic mortality heuristic; Study 2). In Study 2, tests of mediation found that self‐reported use of the mortality heuristic completely accounted for the self–other effect on decisions. In Study 3, participants were more likely to report prospectively that they would adopt the mortality heuristic when making decisions for others than for themselves, suggesting that participants were not mistakenly inferring a lexicographic decision strategy from their past behavior. The results suggest that self–other effects in multiattribute choice involve differential use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies and that beyond this group difference, individual differences in the use of these strategies also exist within self‐oriented and other‐oriented decisions.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

Conflict and the Stochastic-Dominance Principle of Decision Making

One of the key principles underlying rational models of decision making is the idea that the decision maker should never choose an action that is stochastically dominated by another action. In the study reported in this article, violations of stochastic dominance frequently occurred when the payoffs produced by two actions were negatively correlated (in conflict), but no violations occurred when the payoffs were positively correlated (no conflict). This finding is contrary to models which assume that choice probability depends on the utility of each action, and the utility for an action depends solely on its own payoffs and probabilities. This article also reports, for the first time ever, the distribution of response times observed in a risky decision task. Both the violations of stochastic dominance and the response time distributions are explained in terms of a dynamic theory of decision making called multiattribute decision field theory.     

Optimal cue aggregation in the absence of criterion knowledge

The study of multi‐cue judgment investigates how decision makers aggregate cues to predict the value of a criterion variable. We consider a multi‐cue judgment task in which decision makers have prior knowledge of inter‐cue relationships but are ignorant of how the cues correlate with the criterion. In this setting, a naive judgment strategy prescribes weighting the cues equally. Although many participants are well described via an equal weighting scheme, we find that a substantial minority of participants make predictions consistent with a weighting scheme based on a low‐dimensional projection of the cue space that optimally takes into account inter‐cue correlations. The use of such a weighting scheme is consistent with minimizing maximal error in prediction when the cue‐criterion relationships are unknown.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

Reliance on Numerical Precision: Compatibility between Accuracy versus Efficiency Goals and Numerical Precision Level Influence Attribute Weighting in Two‐Stage Decisions

This research examines how the weighting of an attribute is jointly affected by attribute precision and decision stage. Building on prior work suggesting (a) that less (more) precise numerical values are easier to process (more accurate), (b) that decision‐makers' motivation to be efficient (accurate) is greater when creating a consideration set (making a final choice), and (c) that decision‐makers tend to overweight information that is compatible with their goals, we hypothesize that when creating a consideration set (making a choice) participants tend to assign greater weight to less (more) precise attributes. Five studies (two of them reported in the Appendix S1) offer triangulating evidence for these predictions. Overall, this work contributes to research on numerical cognition, efficiency versus accuracy trade‐offs, attribute weighting, and two‐stage decisions.     

Component processes of phased decision strategies

It is often assumed that decision makers apply mixtures of strategies including heuristic processes in complex choice tasks. In support of this assumption the component processes involved in phased strategies were investigated. Expectations for an experimental investigation were generated by simulations within the effort-quality framework. Effort-quality trade-off functions for tasks of different complexity favor compensatory dimension-based strategies for binary choice. For multialternative choice, a combination of initial dimension-based elimination procedures followed by alternative-based final processing would be expected. These expectations were tested in two experiments. While choosing between two, four, or eight alternatives, subjects could successively retrieve parts of the available information. Depending on their menu selection, either all features of one alternative were displayed together (alternative-based retrieval), or all features on one dimension were displayed together (dimension-based retrieval). Vincent averaging was used to analyze the retrieval sequences with respect to their stationarity. While the stationary sequences for binary choice are compatible with single processing strategies, non-stationarity of the sequences obtained for multialternative choice indicates the use of phased strategies. In particular, non-stationarity due to decreasing dimension-based retrievals over time suggests that subjects first applied dimensional elimination and later derived their choices by more thorough, alternative-based processing of the remaining alternatives.     

The use of decision analysis for organizational design: reorganizing a community hospital.

Organizational design is presented as a decision process, with specific structures seen as providing alternative choices. To illustrate this, the authors present the case of a major metropolitan hospital that used the process to coordinate service delivery (nursing care versus patient care) and service focus (product oriented versus function oriented). Through interviews with more than 40 hospital administrators and staff, the authors created a list of 20 attributes, and used simple multi-attribute utility analysis to generate six design alternatives. The decision makers unanimously chose one alternative, even though potential for significant conflict existed because of differing values and objectives. The authors find decision analytic techniques useful for both the problem formulation and for generating and evaluating structural alternatives, and conclude that in this case consensus was facilitated by the decision process used.     

Better Safe than Sorry: Risking Irresponsibility by Seeking Uncertainty

Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The present article investigates the putative relationship between risk‐taking and responsibility by drawing a distinction between being responsible for the outcome (R1) versus acting responsibly (R2). Four experiments were performed, in which participants were presented with scenarios describing decision makers facing a choice between a risky (uncertain) option and a riskless (certain) option, framed in terms of losses or equivalent gains. The results showed that decision makers who chose the risky alternative were judged to have acted in a less responsible manner (R2), while still being held equally responsible for the outcome (R1), unless they were ignorant of the risks involved. Choosing risk did not absolve decision makers from blame, despite being less causal and less in control than those who chose the riskless option. Risky decision makers were also judged to be more personally involved. The dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings confirms earlier findings and serves to clarify an alleged relationship between risky choices and responsibility aversion. Framing effects for own choices were found in both scenarios. In contrast, responsibility ratings were only slightly affected by frame. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which is the compromise option? Information format and task format as determinants

When consumers must make a decision but are uncertain of their preferences, they often select a compromise choice. Early studies emphasized the relational properties of choice alternatives and indicated that the middle option, whose attribute values fall between the values of other alternatives, is always the compromise option. More recent studies have suggested that when consumers rate two attributes with the same metrics, the attribute–balance choice whose two attributes have equal ratings, might represent the compromise choice. We propose that the different characteristics of the middle and attribute–balance options—which may be compatible with certain determinants such as information and task formats—might be more salient and affect the relative attractiveness of each option. The results of three experiments confirmed this prediction: the middle option was more attractive in list‐by‐attributes and rejecting conditions, whereas the attribute–balance option was more attractive in list‐by‐alternatives and choosing conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers’ memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7–10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making

Three studies are presented that examine the decision-making processes that lead advisors to have preferences distinct from personal decision makers (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Advising and personal decision making were hypothesized to invoke different interpersonal frames, which lead to different weighting of decision attributes. Alternatively, advisors might simply exert less effort in decision making for others than do personal decision makers. In Study 1, the contingent weighting of attributes was examined in two decision-making tasks (choice vs. matching). Advisors were more likely to choose in a manner consistent with "what most people would prefer" than personal decision makers, but no differences in preferences were observed in the matching task. Advisors subsequently reported experiencing less regret and blame and more strongly preferred the chosen alternative than did personal decision makers. In Study 2, advisors considered more decision attributes to be important in the abstract compared to personal decision makers, and the choice pattern of Study 1 was replicated. In Study 3, advisors and personal decision makers generated more considerations when making a decision compared to individuals making decisions in the abstract. Finally, the preferences of personal decision makers were more consistent with their reported attribute importance judgments than were those of advisors. In total, the results suggest advisors incorrectly infer others' preferences, rather than suffer from a deficit of motivation, when giving advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Factors influencing the use of internal summary evaluations versus external information in choice

Decision makers cope with more demanding tasks by shifting their cognitive strategies, balancing effort expenditure against the desire to produce an accurate response. In choice tasks, one method for reducing effort while simultaneously maintaining accuracy is to shift from a reliance on information obtained from the external environment to that retrieved from memory, particularly summary evaluations (i.e. relatively stable evaluative reactions to the overall attractiveness of individual alternatives) acquired from previous decision-making experience. We examined four factors that should all encourage decision makers to rely to some extent on internal summary evaluations rather than external information search: (1) increased external search costs, (2) greater time pressure, (3) increased incentives to make an accurate choice, and (4) increased levels of prior experience with the choice context. Sixty experimental subjects chose their preferred alternative from a set of women's magazines. Decision processes were inferred from verbal protocols, computer-generated search records, and decision times. Only increased external search costs led to a greater reliance on summary evaluations. Although increased time pressure, increased incentives, and increased experience with the context did lead to changes in search and evaluation processes, contrary to initial expectations decision makers did not shift to a greater reliance on summary evaluations. These results suggest that while decision makers do sometimes use summary evaluations as a substitute for external search, this is only one of several mechanisms available for effort reduction. Understanding when and where decision makers rely upon summary evaluations probably requires a broader conceptualization of knowledge structures, particularly a consideration of the knowledge that decision makers possess about different choice strategies and their effectiveness.     

Information search and mental representation in risky decision making: The advantages first principle

In three experiments the problem is investigated how people identify early in the decision process those alternatives that are worthwhile to be examined in more detail. We assume that decision makers employ the Advantages first Principle: They first search for information about positive outcomes and then focus their information search (e.g., for negative consequences or for risk defusing operators) on those alternatives that appear attractive after this initial evaluation. In Experiment 1 (120 participants), initial information about consequences was varied for eight alternatives (no information, positive consequences, negative, or mixed for four alternatives). In all conditions, the great majority of participants followed both aspects of the Advantages first Principle. In Experiment 2, 60 participants decided in two quasi‐realistic scenarios with two alternatives each. Initial information was presented so that one alternative had better positive consequences, worse negative consequences, or both. In all conditions, more information was searched for in the initially better alternative. In Experiment 3 (20 participants) the Advantages first Principle was not only confirmed for a scenario but also for choices in traditional gambling tasks with two and eight alternatives, respectively. Participants could win or lose real money. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers' memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7-10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.