Changing False Beliefs from Repeated Advertising: The Role of Claim‐Refutation Alignment

This research addresses refutation of false beliefs formed on the basis of repeated exposure to advertisements. Experiment 1 explores belief in the refutation as a function of the perceptual details shared (alignment) between the claim and the refutation as manipulated by whether the original claim was direct (assertion) or indirect (implication). Experiment 2 then examines whether this effect will carry through to belief in the original claim after exposure to the refutation. Findings indicate that direct refutations of indirect claims are believed more than refutations of direct claims. However, direct refutations of direct claims are more effective in reducing belief in the original claim. We argue that recollection of the original claim facilitates automatic updating of belief in that claim. Experiment 3 demonstrates that an alternative cue (a logo) in a refutation that facilitates recall of the original claim enables reduction of belief in the original indirect claim; this finding helps to pin down the mechanism—recall of the original claim—underlying belief updating. Further, Experiment 3 finds that multiple cues to recalling the original claim may prevent the automatic updating process. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.     

Identity Hierarchy Within the Sudanese Superordinate Identity: Political Leadership Promoting and Demoting Subordinate Groups

Social psychology often emphasizes the link between superordinate identities and intergroup harmony. Other research, however, has illuminated the possible pitfalls of such approaches, pointing at the potentially hierarchical nature of superordinate identities. Yet the research largely ignores who invokes and mobilizes specific definitions of superordinate identities. Using interviews with political leaders and participants from the general population, this article explores a non‐Western conflict case with a hierarchical government‐defined superordinate identity: Sudan. Focus is on the government demoting and promoting different subordinate identities within the superordinate. The criteria for the highest‐level subordinate category within the superordinate identity are discussed as pertaining to three factors—Muslim, Arabic speaking and Arab. Most participants discuss this superordinate identity as yielding an identity hierarchy and strengthening subordinate identities, thereby demonstrating the potential detrimental nature of superordinate identities. The article highlights the context dependency of the link between superordinate identity and intergroup harmony and adds to the void in research on the role of leadership in constructing superordinate identities.     

Making sense of memory.

The current work explores how people make recognition and belief judgments in the presence of obvious repetition primes. In two experiments, subjects received a 200-ms prime ("cheetah"), either before or after reading a trivia question ("What is the fastest animal?") but always before being presented with the target answer ("cheetah"). Results showed that repetition priming decreased "old" claims (Recognition--Experiment 1), while it increased truth claims (Belief--Experiment 2). Furthermore, repetition prime placement affected recognition but not belief. Combined, these results suggest that dissociations in memory performance are a natural outcome of task and processing demands and reflect the dynamic, flexible nature of memory.     

Reasons for Belief

Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While 1 focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief.     

What are you dieting for? The role of lay theories in dieters' goal setting

Through a qualitative study of a sample of Weight Watchers dieters, this research provides insight about the relationship between goal setting and lay theories—people's basic assumptions about the malleability of their personal attributes. We find that dieters set very different types of superordinate and subordinate goals depending on the lay theory (entity vs. incremental) they hold. Dieters who hold entity theory, which underscores immutability of abilities, set superordinate goals focused on avoiding negative social evaluations. These dieters also seem to set subordinate goals that minimize effort in diet, physical activity, and the use of group meetings necessary for weight loss. Among dieters holding incremental theory, which emphasizes malleability of abilities through learning, weight loss is guided by superordinate goals that promote change in the self. Incremental‐theory dieters also set subordinate goals that encourage rather than limit revamping lifestyle. These findings offer contributions to lay theories and goal setting in consumer research as well as implications for developing more successful weight‐loss practices. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge,Safety, and Meta‐Epistemic Belief

This article raises problems both for the view that safe belief is necessary for knowledge and for the view that it is sufficient. Focusing on ‘meta‐epistemic beliefs,’ or beliefs about the epistemic status of one's own beliefs, it is shown that the necessity claim has counterintuitive implications and that the sufficiency claim implies a contradiction. It is then shown that meta‐epistemic beliefs raise similar problems for a wide range of accounts of knowledge, and hence that they provide a powerful test for theories of knowledge.     

Seeing Things Unseen: Fantasy Beliefs and False Reports

Whereas past research has demonstrated that children's beliefs about the real world can influence their memory for events, the role of fantasy beliefs in children's recall remains largely unexplored. We examine this topic in 5- and 6-year-olds by focusing on how belief in a familiar fantasy figure, namely the Tooth Fairy, is related to children's memory for their most recent primary tooth loss. Although children who fully believed in the reality of the Tooth Fairy provided more voluminous and complex accounts than those with less strong beliefs, they also provided the most fictitious reports, frequently characterized by claims of hearing or seeing the Tooth Fairy. Belief in the Tooth Fairy did not affect the accuracy of children's reports of the mundane elements of their tooth loss, and many fantastic claims were linked to real events. Exposure to seemingly tangible evidence of the Tooth Fairy's existence was associated with the provision of fantastic claims.     

Promoting a Brand's Emotion Benefits: The Influence of Emotion Categorization Processes on Consumer Evaluations

Research in psychology has demonstrated that people have a shared knowledge of emotion categories. Building on this research and our understanding of categorization processes, this article proposes a mechanism by which consumers utilize information about a brand's “emotion benefits” in forming attitudes. The results of 2 experimental studies show that (a) consumers’ processing of a brand's emotion benefit information is consistent with categorization processes such that emotion category congruity effects are large in basic—versus subordinate—level conditions, (b) associating a brand with certain emotions can influence brand and ad attitudes without necessarily eliciting emotions during exposure to advertising, (c) emotion category congruity “works” through attitude‐toward‐the‐ad and emotion benefit beliefs in influencing brand attitudes, and (d) subjective product category knowledge moderates the strength of these effects. Taken together, these results explicate the process by which a knowledge‐based consideration of a brand's emotional benefits can influence consumers’ beliefs about the brand and brand attitudes.     

The ineffectiveness of counterclaim advertising for increasing consumer sentiment

When a brand is disliked, one strategy used to improve consumer sentiment is to make counter‐claims against the reason for dislike. But little is known about the effectiveness of this strategy, or the effect this strategy has on differential judgements towards the brand. Two experimental studies are conducted to shed light on the effectiveness of counterclaim advertising. The results find evidence to suggest that counter‐claim advertising may actually worsen sentiment towards the brand, when the brand is already disliked. The findings suggest that brands do not try to directly counter known reasons for dislike, but instead formulate alternative ways to rebuild trust. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Belief inhibition in children's reasoning: memory-based evidence

Adult reasoning has been shown as mediated by the inhibition of intuitive beliefs that are in conflict with logic. The current study introduces a classic procedure from the memory field to investigate belief inhibition in 12- to 17-year-old reasoners. A lexical decision task was used to probe the memory accessibility of beliefs that were cued during thinking on syllogistic reasoning problems. Results indicated an impaired memory access for words associated with misleading beliefs that were cued during reasoning if syllogisms had been solved correctly. This finding supports the claim that even for younger reasoners, correct reasoning is mediated by inhibitory processing as soon as intuitive beliefs conflict with logical considerations.     

Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferentially justified first‐order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non‐inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non‐inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non‐inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non‐inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non‐inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non‐inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism's core claim.     

The link between logic,mathematics and imagination: evidence from children with developmental dyscalculia and mathematically gifted children

This study examined performance on transitive inference problems in children with developmental dyscalculia (DD), typically developing controls matched on IQ, working memory and reading skills, and in children with outstanding mathematical abilities. Whereas mainstream approaches currently consider DD as a domain‐specific deficit, we hypothesized that the development of mathematical skills is closely related to the development of logical abilities, a domain‐general skill. In particular, we expected a close link between mathematical skills and the ability to reason independently of one's beliefs. Our results showed that this was indeed the case, with children with DD performing more poorly than controls, and high maths ability children showing outstanding skills in logical reasoning about belief‐laden problems. Nevertheless, all groups performed poorly on structurally equivalent problems with belief‐neutral content. This is in line with suggestions that abstract reasoning skills (i.e. the ability to reason about content without real‐life referents) develops later than the ability to reason about belief‐inconsistent fantasy content.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90DWY3O4xx8     

Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief

In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.     

The effect of hierarchical levels of categories on children's deductive inferences about inclusion

Although the hierarchical levels of categories have been recognized as a major factor of variation in categorical reasoning, few studies have examined its effect on the understanding of inclusion. This issue was approached by varying the levels (subordinate, basic, and superordinate) of categories involved in inference tasks assessing 5‐, 7‐, and 9‐year‐old children's understanding of transitivity and asymmetry of inclusive relations in the dog hierarchy. Children were administered both a qualitative inference task and a quantitative class‐inclusion task, each presenting different hierarchical levels. Results showed that the ability to make qualitative inferences assessing transitivity varied with age. Although children of all ages demonstrated a high rate of success at these inference questions, 7‐ and 9‐year‐olds had better performance than 5‐year‐olds, suggesting that the capacity to understand the transitivity of inclusive relations still develops until at least 7 years. However, the hierarchical levels of categories had no effect on children's performance either in qualitative inferences requiring transitivity understanding or in class‐inclusion problems. In contrast, for qualitative inferences assessing asymmetry, children's performance varied with the hierarchical level of the categories involved. Inferring from a superordinate to a basic level category, inferring from a superordinate to a subordinate level category, and inferring from a basic to a subordinate level category appeared as three levels of increasing difficulty. Our analyses also revealed that 7‐year‐olds were better at grasping the asymmetry in the superordinate‐to‐basic relation than in any other relation between categories of different hierarchical levels, and that their 9‐year‐old peers mastered the asymmetric nature of inclusion in both superordinate‐to‐basic and superordinate‐to‐subordinate relations. This might indicate that the different levels of difficulty observed are developmentally grounded. Though exploratory, these findings help to clarify the steps through which the child comes to grasp the difficult concepts of inclusion and asymmetry and give some indications on the possible constraints that may affect their acquisition.     

Demonic Influence: The Negative Mental Health Effects of Belief in Demons

Many religious traditions include a belief in the reality of demonic beings and evil powers. Previous research demonstrates that comforting beliefs, such as believing in an afterlife, can benefit mental health, but less is known about the potentially negative mental health effects of belief in evil supernatural powers. In cross‐sectional analyses, we find that among young adults, believing in demons is one of the strongest (negative) predictors of mental health. More importantly, using three waves of the National Study of Youth and Religion and a cross‐lagged structural equation model, we find that belief in demons can lead to lowered mental health in later waves but low mental health does not lead to greater belief in demons. In fact, when predicting changes in mental health from wave 2 to wave 3 of the study, the negative effect size of belief in demons on mental health is larger in magnitude than all other religion‐related predictors.     

A Process Analysis of the Effects of Humorous Advertising Executions on Brand Claims Memory

We report 2 studies that examined how the strength of humorous advertising executions and their relevance to the brand claims in the advertisement influence consumer memory for the claims. We infer the underlying memory processes by testing claims memory using recall, recognition, and indirect tests following incidental exposure to advertisements manipulating humor strength and claims relevance. Memory for the humor component was checked as corroborating evidence. We also validated these inferences by contrasting these effects on claims and humor memory with those under instructed elaboration. Study 1 shows that for humor of low claims relevance, brand claims memory is an inverted U‐shaped function of humor strength. Compared to both nonhumor and high‐strength humor, moderate humor facilitates both encoding and retrieval of the claims. The patterns of humor memory and instructed elaboration effects suggest that low‐relevance humor is not spontaneously linked to the claims even when processing resources are available. Study 2 shows that when strong humor is made more relevant, brand claims memory improves even during incidental exposure. Corresponding humor memory and instructed elaboration effects imply that relevance encourages the formation of humor‐claims links that facilitate encoding and retrieval of the claims. The results show that although strong humor inhibits the processing received by the brand claims, enhancing its claims relevance can compensate for such inhibition.     

汉语儿童6岁前范畴层次词汇的发展研究

本研究利用个案跟踪语料和控制实验数据,考察了汉语儿童6岁前范畴层次词汇的发展情况。研究表明,基本层次词汇在产出和理解方面均占优势,名词层级的发展主要表现为下位层次词语的增加。儿童对范畴层次词汇的正确产出和理解率从高到低排序依次为基本层次、下位层次和上位层次词汇。本研究为佐证基本层次词语在汉语儿童早期语言发展中占据概念的主导地位提供了经验支持,并支持原型理论对儿童范畴分类能力发展的阐释。