Workplace Expression of Emotions and Escalation of Commitment1

These studies examined the effects of expressions of anger and guilt in the workplace on escalation of commitment. Study 1 examined the relationship between employees' reports of coworkers' emotion expressions and continued investment in a poorly performing subordinate. Study 2 tested the effects of leader expressions of anger and guilt on continued investment in a failing project. Results of both studies demonstrate that expressions of anger lead to greater escalation of commitment, while expressions of guilt lead to de‐escalation. Experimental results indicate that the effects of emotion expressions on escalation are strongest when individuals are collectively responsible for the initial decision, a finding that was mediated by feelings of psychological safety.     

Conflict of Interests and Commitment in Groups1

Behavioral commitment levels of group members were examined under conflict of interests between individual and collective tasks in a work-group scenario. Commitment was conceptualized as the amount of time and effort resources that individuals chose to allocate to the group task. Seventeen groups of three allocated 100 time and effort resource units to individual and group tasks for each of four trials. The level of commitment to group work increased, partially because over-rewarded persons increased group contributions more than underrewarded persons decreased them. However, the variance of allocations to the group task did not decrease over trials. Potential implications of the findings for organizational research and practice concerning work groups are discussed in terms of the roles of equity, comparative referent use, and information exchange.     

Colloquy: Do Interacting Groups Perform Better Than Aggregates of Individuals?

Recent examples of research about group processes melding individual‐cognitive and social communicative factors have resulted in the application of concepts relevant to individual cognition to groups as a whole. Although based on a helpful metaphor, the practice risks resurrecting discredited “group mind” concepts. One particular concept, “transactive memory system,” implies that a group can “know” all of the knowledge of its individual members. Several studies showing that groups remember more information than do its individual members appear on their face to support this notion. However, a reanalysis of the results of these studies using Lorge‐Solomon (1955) Model B reveals that the groups were not successful at pooling their members' knowledge. This conclusion implies that group interaction does not lead to efficient group information exchange.     

承诺续扩现象及其心理机制

承诺续扩是指决策者在面对失败的结果时,仍然决定向先前的行动持续投入资源的现象。目前,自我申辩理论、前景理论和决策困境理论是承诺续扩解释机制中较有影响的三种理论。以往的相关实证研究所发现的影响承诺续扩的因素可以归为计划因素、心理因素、个体差异因素以及情境因素等四类。今后的研究有必要关注各解释机制的整合、相关变量之间关系体系的构建和因果路径的确定以及承诺续扩对决策者心理与行为可能造成的影响等问题     

The Effects of Goal Distance and Value in Escalation of Commitment

Escalation of commitment describes individuals’ tendencies to spend resources beyond the point of rationality in order to persist in a chosen course of action, and most believe that sunk cost is the primary cause. However, it has been noted that sunk costs are confounded with progress made toward a goal, and that sunk costs do not affect individuals’ tendencies to escalate as all economic information is ignored in pursuit of the goal. Thus, the apparent escalation tendency may be a consequence of goal proximity instead of sunk costs. In Experiment 1, I show that individuals’ tendencies to escalate reflect the goal-gradient effect after controlling for the sunk costs. Experiment 2 provides a psychological process model to explain why goal-gradient influences individuals’ tendencies to escalate commitment by demonstrating that as individuals progress toward their goal, they exaggerate the value difference between the object that they are pursuing and the object that they are not pursuing. This perceived value difference, in turn, influences individuals’ tendencies to commit escalation of commitment. Results suggest a new interpretation for escalation of commitment and new approaches to guiding people to avoid it.     

Escalation of Commitment and the Framing Effect: An Empirical Investigation

Research and theory are reviewed which consider two decision biases: escalation of commitment and decision framing. Some authors (Bazerman, 1986; Whyte, 1986) have suggested that escalation of commitment may be explained by the decision framing used in the research paradigms. A study was conducted which simultaneously manipulated both responsibility for a prior decision and decision frame. Results show a main effect on resource allocation for responsibility and no effect for decision frame. A follow-up study found that amount of information provided systematically affected the framing bias, and that when responsibility was added to a large amount of contextual information, the framing effect became nonsignificant. These results suggest a need to further examine the boundary conditions of framing.     

Frames of Reference in Quantity Estimations by Groups and Individuals

The superiority of group performance over performance of the average individual is relatively greater on world knowledge tasks than on quantity estimation tasks. Previous research on quantity estimations has involved judgments without an explicit frame of reference. We propose that a frame of reference converts a quantity estimation into a world knowledge inference by embedding the estimation in a larger cognitive structure. Individuals first estimated 30 pairs of quantities, such as the length of the Ohio River and the length of the Arkansas River, given either 2 statements as a frame of reference (the Mississippi River is 2340 miles long; the Colorado River is 1450 miles long), 1 of these statements as a frame of reference, or no frame of reference. Then they made the same 30 pairs of estimations again as 3-person groups or as individuals under the same frame-of-reference conditions. As predicted, group estimations were more accurate than individual estimations, both group and individual estimations were more accurate with either a 2-statement or a 1-statement frame of reference than without a frame of reference, and the frame of reference improved group estimations relatively more than individual estimations.     

A Comparison of Hindsight Bias in Groups and Individuals: The Moderating Role of Plausibility

We compared the magnitude of the hindsight bias in individuals and groups with the prediction that the plausibility of an outcome would affect the magnitude of the group–individual difference. We provided groups and individuals with outcomes of scientific studies, and asked them to predict the probability of those outcomes as if they did not know the given outcomes and to report their level of surprise at the outcomes. Overall, groups were more prone to hindsight bias than were individuals, but the group–individual difference was present only when the given outcomes were relatively implausible (Study 1). Moreover, this difference was not eliminated even when participants were asked to consider alternative outcomes (Study 2). Implications are discussed.     

Escalation of Commitment: The Effect of Number and Attractiveness of Available Investment Alternatives

Purpose  

The purpose of this study was to examine the hypothesis that decision difficulty increases the likelihood of commitment to a failing project (escalation). The hypothesis was based on findings regarding status quo bias. Three aspects of decision difficulty were tested: equivalence of options, option set size and attractiveness structure of the alternatives.     

The Role of Theory in Testing Hypothesized Interactions: An Example from the Research on Escalation of Commitment1

Theory should guide the choice of analytic strategy in testing research hypotheses. This thesis is developed primarily with respect to the testing of interaction hypotheses, with some discussion of the implications for testing hypotheses regarding main effects. Previously published data on the escalation bias (Schoorman, 1988) are re-analyzed using planned contrasts, two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), and regression analyses using dummy and effect coded variables, with both simultaneous and hierarchical entry. Each analysis yields different results, which demonstrates that different analytic strategies can lead to conflicting interpretations regarding the theory of interest. The reasons for these differences and the implications of these findings for the choice of analytic strategies are discussed.     

The Effects of Feedback Equivocality on Escalation of Commitment: An Empirical Investigation of Decision Dilemma Theory1

The effects of feedback equivocality on escalation of commitment were examined in a laboratory study. Subjects had multiple opportunities to allocate money to market a software product. During the initial phase, subjects received feedback that was of either low or high equivocality. Half of the subjects in each equivocality level were given a standard by which to judge the feedback. In the second phase, all subjects received negative feedback. Consistent with Bowen's (1987) decision dilemma theory, subjects who received low equivocality feedback did not escalate allocations, and subjects who received high equivocal feedback escalated allocations. The presence of a standard or goal attenuated escalation. These results are consonant with a dynamic, temporally based account of escalation and are discussed in a synthesis of the literatures in behavior analysis, economics, forecasting, and psychology.     

Social Comparison and Goal Setting in Brainstorming Groups1

Two studies were conducted to examine the influence of individual and group goal setting on brainstorming performance. Results from the studies indicated that the individual goals of nominal participants were higher than the individual goals of interactive participants. Group goal setting by consensus led to the lowest goals. There was no influence of goal setting on group brainstorming performance. However, participants who set goals rated their individual performance more favorably than did participants who did not set goals. The low group goals set by interactive groups are discussed in terms of assumptions made regarding the ability of other group members and the detrimental effects of group interaction.     

Goal Setting by Groups Performing an Additive Task: A Comparison With Individual Goal Setting1

This article compares goal levels and task performance of groups and individuals that are assigned or self-set goals. Groups performed an additive task that allowed for direct comparison with individuals' i]ndependent performance of the task. Consistent with predictions, groups and individuals selected goals that were less difficult than assigned goals which required only a modest increase in performance. Group members and individuals who were assigned goals attained higher levels of performance than self-set or no goal condition subjects. The prediction that group members and individuals who self-set their goals would have more positive affective reactions to the goal-setting situation than participants in assigned condition was supported. The results of this study are consistent with the existing literature on groups and individuals regarding effects of goals, performance, and affective reactions. Analyses also indicate that the group goal decision process involves a compensatory strategy in which an average of group member preferences for the goal was used to reach a group goal decision. Discussion focuses on the similarities and differences between the findings of self-set and assigned goal-setting situations for groups and individuals, with particular reference to goal choice strategies, goal expectancies, and efficacy.     

The Influence of Compensation Method and Disclosure Level on Information Search Strategy and Escalation of Commitment

In this study we examined the extent to which compensation method and public disclosure influenced information search strategy and escalation of commitment. A laboratory experiment involving 182 student subjects employed a 3 (compensation: no-pay, salary, and contingent) by 2 (disclosure level: public and private) fully randomized, crossed design. Results show that in light of negative feedback concerning performance results of an investment portfolio, subjects whose initial allocation decisions were announced publicly reduced their search for prospective information, increased the search for retrospective information, and exhibited greater escalation of commitment than subjects who did not announce their initial investment strategy. The search for retrospective information and escalation of commitment was monotonically higher across the no-pay, salary, and contingent pay conditions respectively, while the search for prospective information decreased correspondingly. This study provides evidence that escalation of commitment is positively related to the search for retrospective information and negatively related to the search for prospective information. The results obtained from this experiment complement and extend prior work in the areas of accountability, cognitive dissonance and escalation of commitment. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Goal Publicity and Self‐Monitoring on Escalation of Goal Commitment

The current research examines whether the public or private nature of consumer goals affects goal‐commitment escalation following initial goal failure. In particular, the authors explore the moderating role of self‐monitoring. Across three experiments, the authors demonstrate that high self‐monitors are more likely to persist following a public failure than a private failure. However, the public versus private nature of the goal failure does not affect low self‐monitors’ persistence. The authors also explore two boundary conditions for this effect by manipulating the timing of feedback and by testing the role of the perceived value of the incentive for achieving the goal. The article concludes with a discussion of theoretical and managerial insights from this work.     

When Thinking Rationally Increases Biases: The Role of Rational Thinking Style in Escalation of Commitment

This paper reports three studies examining the relationship between the rational thinking style (RTS, i.e. individual differences in relying on a conscious, analytical, and relatively affect‐free information processing system) and decision quality in an escalation situation. In contrast to conventional wisdom that rational thinking increases decision quality, but consistent with the predictions derived from the cognitive dissonance theory, results of Studies 1 and 2 revealed that high scorers in Pacini and Epstein's (1999 ) rationality inventory were more likely to have escalation bias than were low scorers. The results further showed that only the ability component of rationality, not the engagement component, was positively correlated with escalating commitment. Similar patterns of results were obtained for situations when participants were personally responsible for prior decisions (Study 1) and when they were not (Study 2). Results of Study 3 showed that the underlying process responsible for the effect of RTS on the escalating tendency is that RTS increases beliefs in prior decisions, which in turn increases escalation. Implications for our understanding of escalation of commitment, rationality theory, and managerial practices are discussed. Cet article rend compte de 3 études examinant la relation entre le style de pensée rationnelle (RTS i.e. les différences individuelles reposent sur un système de traitement de l’information consciente, analytique et relativement libre d’affects) et la qualité de la décision dans une situation d’escalade d’engagement. Contrairement à l’opinion communément admise pour laquelle la pensée rationnelle accroît la qualité de la décision, mais consistante avec les prédictions découlant de la théorie de la dissonance cognitive, les résultats des études 1 et 2 indiquent que des personnes obtenant un score élevéà l’Inventaire Rationnel‐Expérientiel de Pacini et Esptein (1999) sont plus enclines à tomber dans le piège de l’escalade d’engagement que celles dont le score est bas. D’autres résultats montrent que la capacitéà la rationalité, non celle à l’engagement, est positivement corrélée avec l’escalade d’engagement. Des résultats semblables sont obtenus lors de situations où les participants sont personnellement responsables de leurs décisions antérieures (Etude 1) ou non (Etude 2). Les résultats de l’étude 3 montrent que le processus responsable de l’effet du RTS sur la tendance à s’engager est le suivant: il accroît les croyances dans les décisions antérieures qui augmentent à leur tour l’engagement. Ces résultats nous permettent de mieux comprendre l’escalade d’engagement, la théorie rationnelle et les pratiques managériales.     

Escalation and De-escalation of Commitment in Response to Sunk Costs: The Role of Budgeting in Mental Accounting

Research has traditionally assumed that people increase investment (or "escalate commitment") in response to previous investments (sunk costs). This paper presents several demonstrations which show that people will incorrectly de-escalate investment in response to sunk costs. I propose that people set mental budgets to control their resource expenditures: they set a budget for a class of expenses and track their investments against their budget. A lab study with real monetary incentives shows support for de-escalation and supports a specific rule for how people set budgets - based on the breakeven of total costs and total benefits. The budgeting process suggests that people are only likely to escalate commitment when they fail to set a budget or when expenses are difficult to track. The later part of the paper organizes the previous literature on escalation around these processes and provides additional experiments to illustrate each point. For example, I argue that previous demonstrations that have shown errors of escalation exclusively involve "incidental" investments that are difficult to track. A study in the current paper shows that people are more willing to invest time than money to salvage a monetary sunk cost and more willing to invest money than time to salvage a sunk cost of time, even when the time and money investments are of equal value. The paper concludes by discussing the rationality of escalation and de-escalation.     

A Comparison of Help Giving to Individuals Versus Humanitarian Organizations1

The theories of social conduct, seriousness of need, and similarity; cost–benefit models; and individual differences in ideology are used to predict self‐reported help giving that is interpersonal or through humanitarian organizations. The results indicate that persons tend to be more helpful interpersonally than through organizations, are more responsive to characteristics of the needy when helping interpersonally than through organizations, and have stronger affective responses toward individuals than toward individuals represented by organizations. For both interpersonal and organization‐mediated assistance, perceived benefit to the donor strongly predicts help giving. Relatively conservative persons report less helpfulness, both interpersonally and through humanitarian organizations. Collectively, these findings offer an integrative approach to help giving and have implications for fundraising in the humanitarian sector.     

Escalation of Commitment and Nonorthogonal Analysis of Variance Revisited: A Comment on Schoorman, Bobko, and Rentsch

Schoorman, Bobko, and Rentsch (1991) reanalyzed previously published data (Schoorman, 1988) and claimed that, in contrast to the original analysis, the data supported Schoorman's negative escalation hypothesis. We contend that this reanalysis was conceptually and technically flawed, and that Schoorman's original analysis yielded the correct (negative) conclusion. Schoorman et al. also discussed a variety of alternatives for conducting a factorial analysis of variance with unequal cell sizes, demonstrating that different procedures can lead to different statistical conclusions. However, their discussion is misleading and overlooks recent literature that has removed much of the mystery from the unequal- n problem. We offer a brief review of the fundamental problems, and their solutions, in analysis of variance with unequal ns .