Culture in the context of intercultural negotiation.

This study explores culture's effect on behaviors and outcomes in intercultural negotiation and examines how those effects are moderated by role. Eighty U.S. and international students took part in a previously developed negotiation task (Pruitt, 1981) and completed Hui and Triandis's (1986) individualism‐collectivism (INDCOL) scale. Negotiation interactions were coded for information sharing, offers, and distributive tactics. Findings show that a negotiation dyad's collectivism is positively associated with higher joint profit. The effects of culture on both communication behaviors and joint outcomes, however, differ by role of the negotiator. In particular, seller collectivism has larger and more consistent effects on communication behavior and joint profit than buyer collectivism. Results support a ‘culture in context’ perspective of negotiation that takes into account negotiator qualities, contextual and structural features of the negotiation, and mediating processes in addition to cultural values.     

Are cultural differences overrated? Examining the influence of national culture on international buyer‐seller relationships

The notion that differences in national culture influence international buyer‐seller relationships (and, indeed, all aspects of international management) is not only held as true but also axiomatic. This study questions the degree to which cultural differences impact upon buyer‐seller relations for seven key dimensions using Hofstede's indices of culture. Via two stages of data collection using two methodological approaches (seven interviews and 322 useable responses from a mail survey), the impact of culture on international buyer‐seller relationships was examined. The study's findings identified little evidence to support the popular idea that culture exerts a significant influence on international business relationships. Instead, the findings suggest that some managers perceived factors such as communication/language barriers, political barriers, geographic distance, economic factors, industry barriers, time differences, technology barriers, legal differences and infrastructure barriers as being more likely to have a greater impact on cross‐national relationships. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications.     

买卖交易中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的机制

现实生活中的谈判通常发生在特定的社会情境中, 谈判者也总在扮演着某种角色。本研究探索了买卖交易谈判中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制。研究提出了一个关于谈判者角色诱发框架效应的理论模型, 然后通过两个模拟谈判实验对这一模型进行验证。实验1表明, 买家知觉到的馅饼大于卖家知觉到的馅饼, 且谈判者知觉到的馅饼在谈判者角色与谈判者绩效间起部分中介作用。实验2发现, 即使保留买家与卖家的角色标签, 如果剥离了金钱作为交易介质这一重要特征, 两个谈判角色知觉到的馅饼也没有差异。研究揭示了谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制, 对谈判者如何利用情境因素取得更好的谈判结果具有实践意义。     

Cultural norms and cultural agents in buyer–seller negotiation processes and outcomes

Although a good number of studies have significantly investigated the role of culture in buyer–seller negotiation processes and outcomes, fewer studies have investigated the role of individual negotiators and organizations in shaping the cultural norms that affect negotiation processes and outcomes. Through a multi-case study of buyer–seller negotiations in five organizations that are illustrative of the informal economy of Nigeria, the study unpacks the role of individuals and organizations in shaping the cultural norms that affect the scope and outcomes of negotiation in an emerging market economy. We find that buyers and sellers play the role of inhabiting cultural norms which in turn narrow the scope of the negotiation to price considerations. On the other hand, the templates used by organizations to execute selling activities either maintain or deter the cultural norms that influence negotiation outcomes. Insights from the study extend the literatures on institutional work, culture and negotiation, sales negotiation in emerging markets.     

Market forces,negotiator frames and transaction outcomes

Although implicit framing differences have been advanced as an explanation of the buyers advantage, two necessary preconditions must be met to sustain this model: a demonstration that negatively-framed negotiators are advantaged in negotiations and that buyer role labels invoke a negative frame. A modification of Neale, Northcraft, Magliozzi and Bazerman s (1986) simulation created a role-neutral setting in which positively-framed negotiators bargained against negatively-framed negotiators, thus testing the first of these preconditions. Experiment 1 found no differences in the outcomes of positively- and negatively-framed negotiators, a finding that could be attributed to relatively low market competitiveness. A second experiment, by creating power imbalanced negotiation markets, sought to increase market distributiveness and strengthen framing effects. Results showed that both high power and negatively-framed negotiators were significantly advantaged, providing conditional support for the implicit framing model, However unlike role, frame interacted with power suggesting that the two variables are not functionally equivalent. These findings are interpreted to suggest that factors other than implicit framing differences account for the buyers advantage. More generally these results suggest that frame is responsive to situational variables and that such variables, by influencing negotiation processes, mediate the relationship between negotiator frames and negotiation outcomes.     

"Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior

In negotiation, information about the other party may be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the context, the type of information, its availability and quality, and how a negotiator uses it. An empirical study examines the way negotiators use "inside" information specifically designed to increase bargaining strength. The scoop-privileged information about the other party′s deadline-does not inform negotiators about possible deals; rather, it suggests a process of negotiating agreement. Misuse of the scoop, therefore, poses potential costs that may diminish its possible advantages. In a two-party negotiation exercise, access to inside information affected negotiators′ thoughts and behaviors. It enhanced their feelings of success and shifted the criterion for success away from final price toward a relative, interpersonal standard. Furthermore, informed negotiators used the scoop appropriately to manage the negotiation process and enhance both joint and individual profits.     

An Evaluation of Two Mediation Techniques,Negotiator Power,and Culture in Negotiation1

This study examines the effects of 4 factors in a mediated transfer‐pricing negotiation: (a) the mediator's suggestion that negotiators have concern for the other (opposing) negotiator; (b) the mediator's proposal of moderate goals; (c) negotiator power; and (d) culture. In the simulated negotiations that were mediated by a corporate official, participants were 374 subjects from Hong Kong and the United States. Negotiators obtained lower joint outcomes when urged by the mediator to show concern for the other than when not given this admonition. When the mediator proposed moderate (vs. high) goals, the negotiators received lower joint outcomes but had a higher opinion of the mediator. While we expected negotiator power (equal vs. unequal) to interact with suggested concern for the other, it did so only for the negotiators' individual outcomes. Finally, culture produced a main effect: Hong Kong negotiators obtained higher joint outcomes than did their U. S. counterparts.     

First offers as anchors: the role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus

Three experiments explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across 3 experiments, whichever party, the buyer or seller, made the 1st offer obtained a better outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. However, when the negotiator who did not make a 1st offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of the opponent's 1st offer, the advantageous effect of making the 1st offer was eliminated: Thinking about one's opponent's alternatives to the negotiation (Experiment 1), one's opponent's reservation price (Experiment 2), or one's own target (Experiment 3) all negated the effect of 1st offers on outcomes. These effects occurred for both face-to-face negotiations and E-mail negotiations. Implications for negotiations and perspective-taking are discussed.     

Integrative bargaining in a competitive market

The behavioral decision theory literature was used to identify the determinants of negotiation success in an integrative bargaining, free-market exercise. This study provides a novel methodology for studying negotiation. Specifically, buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in negotiations with as many competitors as possible in a fixed time period. The results suggest that integrative bargaining behavior increases and the market converges toward a Nash equilibrium as negotiators gain experience. In addition, the results suggest that (1) positively framed negotiators (“What will be my net profit from the transaction?”) complete more transactions than negatively framed negotiators (“What will be my expenses on this transaction?”), (2) negotiators who are given moderately difficult profit constraints in order to be allowed to complete a transaction achieve more profitable transactions than negotiators without such constraints, and (3) both framing and the existence of constraints affect the total profitability of the negotiator.     

Information‐Seeking Behavior in Intercultural and Intergroup Communication

This review essay analyzes the current status of information‐seeking research and theory in the field of intercultural communication writ broadly. After drawing distinctions between different types of intercultural communication research (cross‐cultural, intercultural, intergroup), the authors discuss how information seeking might be relevant across types and different between types of intercultural communication. Finally, the authors recommend directions for future research.     

The Price Is Right—Or Is It? A Reference Point Model of Two-Party Price Negotiations

This paper develops a social cognitive, reference point model of two-party price negotiations. The theoretical focus is on the role that reference points play as a means of calibration in the individual negotiator's decision processes and as a means of social influence in bargaining. Three studies are presented which examine how reference points based on personal preferences and budget constraints (i.e., reservation values) are combined with reference points based on available market information to affect outcomes. These studies support the interpretation that in captive transactions, contextual cues determine the extent to which market information versus reservation values influence outcomes. Certain contextual cues trigger perceptions of low versus high price variance, which in turn, lead negotiators to weight market information more or less heavily in internal processing and bargaining. When perceptions of low price variance are present, market information influences outcomes more than private reservation values. When perceptions of high price variance are present, reservation values tend to be more dominant in determining outcomes.     

Third Party Power: Some Negative Effects of Positive Incentives

The present study simulated an organizational dispute to examine the effects of reward and coercive third party power on negotiator concessions and negotiator perceptions of the third party. The results indicated that the possibility of third party rewards inhibited negotiator concessions, and the possibility of third party punishments facilitated concessions. This effect was enhanced by negotiator limit. When negotiators had high limits, they made the fewest concessions if the third party could compensate; when negotiators had low limits, they made the greatest concessions if the third party could press. Taken together, the results suggest that negotiators sometimes use concession making as a strategy to affect third party behavior. When negotiators want third parties to provide compensation, as when they have high limits, they reduce their concession making as a way of eliciting the compensation; when they want to avoid third party behavior that is punitive, and they have low limits and room to make concessions, they hasten their concessions to reach agreement quickly and thereby stem the third party's involvement.     

影响整合式谈判的情境因素和过程因素

从“情境因素”和“过程因素”两个方面对整合式谈判影响因素的研究动态和研究成果进行了归纳和分析。其中“情境因素”是指在正式谈判一开始时就已经存在的因素,主要包括：（1）谈判者的文化价值观,如个人主义与集体主义、权力距离和沟通的高、低语境;（2）社会动机,研究谈判组的动机构成如何影响谈判过程和结果;（3）情绪因素,研究谈判中的积极情绪、消极情绪各自对达成整合式谈判的影响。对“过程因素”的研究考察了谈判沟通的过程,包括谈判过程中各种策略的使用频次、次序和谈判各个阶段的策略使用情况     

Beyond commitment: entrenchment in the buyer–seller exchange

A specific empirical finding in the buyer–seller literature – initially discovered by Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande and subsequently replicated by Grayson and Ambler – still suffers from incomplete explanation. In business-to-business marketing, why do some long-term buyers appear to trust their providers a great deal but not use the service provided? This research endeavours to more fully explain this ‘dark side’ of relationship selling by integrating work on the economic theory of entrenchment with Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh's seminal buyer–seller framework. The result is a modified conceptual model of the buyer–seller exchange in which potential seller entrenchment follows Dwyer et al.'s courting and commitment stages. Motivated by Dwyer et al.'s urging to examine their model using a negotiation lens, this research then borrows two contrasting orientations from the negotiation literature and offers propositions regarding how buyers and sellers interact at each stage of the exchange. In addition to enriching understanding of how buyers and sellers negotiate in the courting and commitment stages, this research is the first to offer insight into how both sides might negotiate when faced with seller entrenchment.     

Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final deadlines in negotiation

Three studies explored the psychology of social prediction by examining negotiators’ predictions of the effects of time pressure and comparing those predictions with actual outcomes. The results show that revealing final deadlines in negotiation can lead to better outcomes for the negotiator with the deadline because revelation speeds concessions by the other side. However, both naïve and experienced negotiators consistently predicted the opposite. As a result, when given the choice of revealing their final deadlines to their negotiating opponents, negotiators chose not to. The reasons for these erroneous expectations can be explained by myopic processes of prediction in which people anticipate the effects of constraints like deadlines more on their own behavior than on the behavior of others.     

Working Together but in Opposition: An Examination of the "Good-Cop/Bad-Cop" Negotiating Team Tactic

Unlike solo negotiators, members of negotiating teams may for strategic reasons choose to play different roles; the familiar “good cop/bad cop” distributive bargaining tactic is one example of role differentiation designed to enhance a team's success at the bargaining table. In two empirical studies about a hypothetical three-person work group, we examined the cognitive processes underlying this tactic using a social-cognitive decision model (Brodt & Duncan, 1998) that conceptualizes the negotiators' decision tasks and persuasion processes. Results generally supported the model except for an intriguing asymmetry depending on a person's initial inclination (accepting, rejecting). This research extends findings on the tactic and on contrast effects (Cialdini, 1984) and supports the model's usefulness as an approximate representation of negotiator cognition.