Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications

In this paper, I discuss the current state of theorising about dual processes in adult performance on reasoning and decision making tasks, in which Type 1 intuitive processing is distinguished from Type 2 reflective thinking. I show that there are many types of theory some of which distinguish modes rather than types of thinking and that assumptions about underlying cognitive architecture vary. I show that some dual-system theories have been replaced recently by the idea that we have two or more distinct ‘minds’ with different evolutionary histories. I also present the most recent formulation of my own account of dual processing within hypothetical thinking theory, at a level more easily applied to performance on specific tasks. I then consider implications for cognitive development, pointing out that while Type 2 thinking is clearly linked to the development of cognitive ability, it combines and competes with multiple Type 1 processing systems which persist in adult cognition, each of which could have their own developmental time course. Hence, while dual-process theories can and should inspire much research and theory in cognitive development, the derivation of predictions for cognitive development is far from straightforward.     

Children,childhood, and development in evolutionary perspective

We examine children, childhood, and development from an evolutionary perspective. We begin by reviewing major assumptions of evolutionary–developmental psychology, including the integration of “soft” developmental systems theory with ideas from mainstream evolutionary psychology. We then discuss the concept of adaptive developmental plasticity and describe the core evolutionary concept of developmental programming and some of its applications to human development, as instantiated in life history theory and the theory of differential susceptibility to environmental influence. We then discuss the concept of adaptation from an evolutionary–developmental perspective, including ontogenetic and deferred adaptations, and examine the development of some adaptations of infancy and childhood from the domains of folk psychology and folk physics. We conclude that evolutionary theory can serve as a metatheory for developmental science.     

Rape and evolutionary psychology: a critique of Thornhill and Palmer's theory

In this article, we present a critical evaluation of Thornhill and Palmer's [(2000). Rape: a natural history. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.] evolutionary theory of rape. This theory attempts to explain rape in terms of evolutionary theory and asserts that rape is either directly or indirectly associated with inherited mechanisms that increased our ancestors' reproductive success. We first provide an introduction and overview of some of the fundamental concepts in the field of evolutionary psychology (EP) and then summarize the major elements of Thornhill and Palmer's theory. Thornhill and Palmer offer two main lines of argument in support of their theory — a positive and a negative argument. The positive argument involves the development of an explicit case for the coherency, scope, empirical adequacy, and explanatory depth of their evolutionary account of rape. The negative argument relies upon refuting what Thornhill and Palmer call the “standard social science model” (SSSM) of rape. The present paper advances some general criticisms of Thornhill and Palmer's theory and then specifically addresses both their positive and negative arguments. We conclude that Thornhill and Palmer have not established that their evolutionary theory of rape is a better theory than social science explanations. At best, their argument presents a strong case for the important, but not exclusive, role of biological factors in the etiology of rape and gender relationships. At this point in time, there are too many unanswered questions concerning the nature of the relevant adaptations and the contribution of environmental and cultural factors to conclude that evolutionary theories are sufficient to explain sexual aggression.     

Raising Our Game: The Necessity and Progression of Expertise-Based Training in Applied Sport Psychology

At present, training in applied sport psychology chiefly targets and accelerates professional competence. However, theory and evidence suggests that our clients would experience significant benefit if our training targeted and accelerated professional expertise rather than just competence. Specifically, we argue that expertise-based training can (a) help trainees to go on to break the “thinking ceiling” of competence; (b) foster a more independent, flexible, and creative form of practice; and (c) support a longer term and more practitioner-centered training philosophy. To deliver these benefits, we then conclude by outlining some key principles for the progression of expertise-based training in applied sport psychology.

Lay Summary: In light of the inconsistencies that still surround professional training in ASP, we discuss the merits that a more expertise-based agenda can bring to practitioners and, most important, our clients. We also discuss ways in which this agenda can be progressed to support an evidence-informed evolution of ASP training systems.     

Modern application of evolutionary theory to psychology: key concepts and clarifications

Darwinian selection has become the centerpiece of biology, and in the past few decades many psychologists and anthropologists have recognized the value of using an evolutionary perspective to guide their work. With a focus on evolved psychological mechanisms and associated information processing features, evolutionary psychology has risen as a compelling and fruitful approach to the study of human psychology and behavior. In this article we review the instrument of evolution: natural selection, the products of evolution, and the impact of evolutionary thinking on modern psychological science. We conclude that as prejudicial barriers are overcome, as more evolutionary psychological work is conducted, and as hypothesized psychological mechanisms are substantiated in other disciplines, evolutionary psychology will emerge as the metatheory for psychology.     

Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience

According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.     

Conflict detection,dual processes,and logical intuitions: Some clarifications

Recent studies on conflict detection during thinking suggest that reasoners are sensitive to possible conflict between their heuristic judgement and elementary logical or probabilistic principles. I have argued that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical intuitions and has implications for the way we conceive the interaction between System-1 and System-2 in dual process theories. In this paper I clarify potential misconceptions about this work, discuss the link with other approaches, and sketch directions for further research.     

Consumer decisions in relationships

Most research on consumer choice assumes that decisions are usually made by individuals, and that these decisions are based on an individual's personal attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. Yet, much consumer behavior—from joint decisions to individual choices—is directly or indirectly shaped by people with whom we have some relationship. In this target article, we examine how each member in a relationship can affect how consumer decisions are made. After reviewing foundational work in the area, we introduce a powerful and statistically sophisticated methodology to study decisions within relationships—a dyadic framework of decision-making. We then discuss how the study of consumer decisions in relationships can be informed by different theories in the relationships field, including attachment, interdependence, social power, communal/exchange orientations, relationship norms, and evolutionary principles. By building on the seminal foundations of prior joint-decision making research with theories and methods from contemporary relationship science, we hope to facilitate the integration of the consumer and relationships literature to better understand and generate novel hypotheses about consumer decisions in relationships.     

The Discursive Frames of Political Psychology

The aim of this article is to apply elements of contemporary social theory to the major theoretical, methodological, and ideological divisions across political psychology and to consider both the origins and the impact of a range of theories and models. In so doing, we clarify some of the complexity surrounding the discursive and cultural origins of political psychology. On the basis of this analysis, we aim to overcome the redundant binaries and dualisms—both conceptual and geo‐spatial—that have characterized the field up to now. These binary pairs relate to matters of epistemology, ideology, and methodology, and we show how each pair has been the basis of claims made regarding continental differences. As we shall see, such black‐and‐white thinking limits our capacity to understand the nature and potential of political psychology. Instead we wish to encourage a greater degree of universalism and globalism that is appropriate to political psychology as it evolves into a broader global discipline. We argue that political psychology as a field must attempt to deal with the consequences of an increasingly borderless world in which political identities are becoming more fluid, increasingly hybridized, and open to transformation.     

Examining the acceptance of and resistance to evolutionary psychology

The field of psychology remains a divided one. Several different sub-disciplines (e.g., developmental, cognitive, behaviorism, social, etc.) form what could be a unified scientific area. However, there is no widely accepted theory of unification. Charles Darwin once theorized that evolutionary theory would change the foundation of psychology; but over the years, evolutionary psychology has been met with hostile resistance from some of the prominent psychologists within the other sub-disciplines. Yet in recent years, all of the divided sub-disciplines of psychology have been slowly implementing evolutionary principles into their literature and research. This slow integration of evolutionary psychology into the other sub-disciplines indicates the possibility of a unified psychology with evolution as its foundation. This paper briefly reviews the literature within each major sub-discipline of psychology to show their implementation of evolutionary psychological theories, indicating the possibility of evolutionary psychology becoming the unifying paradigm upon which the entire field of psychology can be based. A call for action to continue this process is also discussed.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.     

亲缘利他的不对称性：进化视角的分析

内含适应性理论是进化生物学和进化心理学中最重要的理论之一。该理论假设, 个体的亲属是其适应性的载体, 但亲属们的价值有所不同。大量研究发现, 亲属的利他行为表现出不对称性, 即遗传相关系数相同的亲属表现出不同的利他倾向。如祖父母对孙辈的投资中, 外祖母往往投入最多, 外祖父和祖母次之, 祖父投入最少。研究者用内含适应性理论来解释这种亲缘利他差异, 进而提出了“父亲身份不确定性”等具体的进化假设。未来研究中, 国内研究者应在正确理解内含适应性理论的基础上, 更多关注亲缘利他的不对称性, 采用多种数据采集方法和统一的评定指标。     

Bringing relationships into consumer decision‐making

The primary purpose of our target article was to stimulate further interest in and research on consumer decision-making in close relationships. In this response, we discuss some of the major comments provided by each set of commentators by highlighting their main points, clarifying some misconceptions, and explaining why our dyadic framework is a logical starting-point for research on how relationships affect consumer decisions.     

Trade-offs and individual differences in evolved traits

Comments on Evolutionary psychology: Controversies, questions, prospects, and limitations (see record 2010-02208-001) by Confer et al. We applaud Confer et al.'s (February-March 2010) clarifications of the many misconceptions surrounding the use of evolutionary analyses in psychology. As they noted, such misunderstandings are common and result in a curious tendency of some of our colleagues to criticize evolutionary psychology without a firm understanding of evolution itself. Confer et al. also did an admirable job acknowledging current unresolved issues among evolutionary psychologists (e.g., the relative importance of group selection on humans). The above said, we disagree with their view that a current limitation of evolutionary psychology is its inability to explain phenomena "that appear to reduce an individual's reproductive success, and cannot be explained by mismatches with, or hijacking of, our psychological mechanisms by modern-day novel inputs" (Confer et al., 2010, p. 122). Mismatches between modern environments and environments of evolutionary adaptedness are only one set of explanations for seemingly maladaptive traits (Nesse, 2005). Another set involves evolutionary trade-offs.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: The test of development

Dual-process theories have become increasingly influential in the psychology of reasoning. Though the distinction they introduced between intuitive and reflective thinking should have strong developmental implications, the developmental approach has rarely been used to refine or test these theories. In this article, I review several contemporary dual-process accounts of conditional reasoning that theorize the distinction between the two systems of reasoning as a contrast between heuristic and analytic processes, probabilistic and mental model reasoning, or emphasize the role of metacognitive processes in reflective reasoning. These theories are evaluated in the light of the main developmental findings. It is argued that a proper account of developmental phenomena requires the integration of the main strengths of these three approaches. I propose such an integrative theory of conditional understanding and argue that the modern dual-process framework could benefit from earlier contributions that made the same distinction between intuition and reflective thinking, such as Piaget’s theory.     

Ekman's basic emotions: Why not love and jealousy?

Paul Ekman's view of the emotions is, we argue, pervasive in psychology and is explicitly shaped to be compatible with evolutionary thinking. Yet, strangely, jealousy and parental love, two emotions that figure prominently in evolutionary psychology, are absent from Ekman's list of the emotions. In this paper we examine why Ekman believes this exclusion is necessary, and what this implies about the limits of his conception of emotion. We propose an alternative way of thinking about emotion that does not exclude jealousy and parental love.     

The interpretation of dreams a classic revisited

In this centenary of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams it is important to revisit this classic, to discuss why it is a classic, to consider what has been learned since its publication, and to discuss what changes in our understanding of dreams and dreaming are called for. To this end, we briefly discuss some of the main themes of the book. Then we review both changes in psychoanalytic thinking and theory and the results of many studies made possible by the discovery of the electro‐encephalographic changes that occur during sleep and their relevance for understanding dreams and their function. We suspect that Freud would have been delighted to know about this explosion of information about the physiology of dreaming. With this in mind, we consider the need for modification of some of Freud's theories while noting that his basic contribution, that dreams are meaningful and understandable, has been amply confirmed. We then discuss these observations in relation to how we approach working with dreams.     

进化心理学取向与当代心理学

进化心理学以进化论为理论基础,用适应的观点来解释人类的心理机制及其行为方式。本文通过阐明进化心理学的产生背景,重点论述了进化心理学的思维方式及其与心理学主要学科分支的联系,并指出了进化心理学对当代心理学发展的影响。     

从进化心理学视角看两性冒险行为

进化心理学研究发现, 男性比女性更冒险, 男性冒险行为有社会助长和性别助长效应, 求偶动机与异性高魅力均可助长男性冒险行为。按照进化心理学观点, 冒险行为能表现男性作为潜在配偶的积极特征, 可增加其获得异性配偶的几率。择偶偏好研究也证实, 女性青睐敢于冒险的男性。作者认为, 女性冒险行为与求偶动机的关系主要受社会文化影响, 如中国女性在中意的异性面前更避险, 冒险行为领域中进化和文化的交互作用可能成为未来研究焦点。