Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind1

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet.     

Mind the Gap

Journal of Philosophical Logic - In debates about the metaphysics of material objects examples of colocated objects are commonly taken to be examples of coincidence too. But the argument that...     

Deducing the Mind

Frank Jackson has argued that, in principle, all mental truths are deducible from all physical science truths: 'deducibility'. Jackson's defence of deducibility relies upon the method for producing naturalistic definitions of mental states championed in the analytical functionalism of himself, David Lewis, and others. Two arguments are presented. The first contends that the particular naturalistic definitions of analytical functionalism fail because they do not take account of the extraordinary kind of bodily animation displayed by human beings, which I argue is necessary to (at least one kind of) mentality; machines lacking (at least this one kind of) mentality can satisfy the naturalistic definitions of analytical functionalism. So Jackson's defence of deducibility fails as it stands. The second argument contends that no naturalistic conceptual analysis of the mental can be adequate, because understanding (certain) mental concepts requires a special kind of affective reaction here named 'personal response', while understanding naturalistic concepts does not require this- therefore no naturalistic analysis can ever capture our common-sense mental concepts. The upshot is that Jackson's defence of deducibility cannot be repaired. No defence of deducibility will work which relies upon the possibility of naturalistic conceptual analyses of mentality.     

Mending the Mind

Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) offers an alternative paradigm to psychoanalysis for understanding human behavior and the mechanisms of change. Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) grew out of this tradition conceived originally for the treatment of suicidal patients with borderline personality disorder. Unlike psychoanalysis, DBT does not recognize unconscious meanings or motivations and instead focuses on sequences of measurable behavior and the contingencies that reinforce them. The treatment protocol emphasizes a deficit model and is structured around specific targets and goals combined with “skills” training (i.e., specific skill sets to help with emotional, cognitive, and behavior dysregulation) Combining an overarching dialectical philosophy, emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and mindfulness, DBT offers a comprehensive therapeutic approach including individual sessions and group work.

The directive methods of CBT have often been viewed as antithetical to analytic reflection; such active therapeutic techniques on the part of the psychoanalyst are often seen as impeding the necessary free associative processes necessary for the acquisition of insight and for change. Whereas psychoanalysts help patients recognize dysfunctional patterns of behavior within the transference and alternative ways to view the transaction, they often do not help a patient implement new behaviors into their lives in systematic ways.

Both psychoanalysis and DBT have much to offer and to gain. In time translation and mutual inclusion of new ideas may help bridge the gap.     

Mind the Gap

Abstract

Monogamy and polygamy are often considered to be a binary pair. Yet this binary is only possible under very particular conditions. This essay explores those conditions which are elided in order to sustain the binary through analyses of cases from across Christian history. In doing so, we are able to see places were monogamy and polygamy blur and create what I term polygamous monogamy. In particular I pay attention to the way time — which is impacted by other elements from Christianity such as divorce, remarriage, and the afterlife — factors into numbering marriages.     

Stereotypes,Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind1

How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit (roughly, nonconscious or involuntary). This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural systems. On this basis, some have also argued that interventions to reduce discrimination should combat implicit stereotypes and prejudices separately. We propose an alternative (anti‐Humean) framework. We argue that all putative implicit stereotypes are affect‐laden and all putative implicit prejudices are “semantic,” that is, they stand in co‐activating associations with concepts and beliefs. Implicit biases, therefore, consist in “clusters” of semantic‐affective associations, which differ in degree, rather than kind. This framework captures the psychological structure of implicit bias, promises to improve the power of indirect measures to predict behavior, and points toward the design of more effective interventions to combat discrimination.     

Decade of the Mind

In the Fall of 2007, ten neuroscientists published a proposal for an interdisciplinary research initiative, the Decade of the Mind, that would focus on four "broad but intertwined areas": mental health, research on high-level cognitive functions, education, and computational applications (such as intelligent machines). I review the basic ideas behind the proposal and discuss the four proposed areas of research. I argue that for research on higher cognitive functions and in particular, for research and practice in education, the Decade of the Mind is a welcome initiative that may change our lives for the better. Therefore, the proposal, which is scientifically interdisciplinary in nature, has to be politically international.     

Stairways of the Mind

Our materialist culture has turned buildings into objects of utility devoid of any mytho-poetic content. However, in addition to providing physical shelter, buildings should also house our souls, memories and dreams. Like all art, architecture expresses the human existential condition, and our lived space and mind define each other reciprocally. Architecture addresses the body and is experienced multi-sensorily. Fundamental architectural experiences are encounters that appear as verbs rather than nouns. One of the most potent images of architecture is the stair, which possesses a wealth of metaphoric and symbolic connotations. The stair is the symbolic spine of the house, whereas ascending a stair in dream-imagery signifies copulation. The qualitative differences of ascending and descending derive from the images of Heaven and Hell. Stairs appear frequently in literature, cinema and painting due to their extraordinary image power. The staircase is simultaneously a stage and an auditorium. It is also a vertical configuration of the labyrinth with consequent associations of vertigo, and getting lost. Our human reality has become threateningly concrete and one-dimensional as the environment has lost its symbolic dimension. One of the most demanding tasks of architects today is to re-mythologize and re-poetisize the built environment. Is it feasible that stairs would again come to express the existence of Heaven and Hell?     

Mind and the Environment

Intuitively, an object is something that coheres internally and is largely independent of its environment. But what is the environment? Viewed at one scale, it surrounds and separates objects and differentiates them. Viewed at another scale, it is itself a collection of objects surrounded by (more) environment. At all scales, we describe the world in terms of objects in an environment. I examine the nature of the environment and its role in mediating the object-subject relation. This dedicated analysis of the environment provides a new perspective on the notion of objectivity.     

Trends of the Voter's Mind

Abstract

Casual conversations were recorded as elderly persons routinely walked their dogs through a familiar mobile home park in the United States. Control observations included walks without dogs by owners and non-owners of dogs. All owners talked to and about their dogs. Transcribed conversations indicated that dogs were a primary focus of conversation. A majority of sentences to dogs were imperatives; the owners were instructing the dogs. Dog owners frequently included dogs' names or nicknames in their sentences when they spoke to the dogs and made reference to the dogs' wishes or needs. Speaking to dogs was also associated with frequent repetition of sentences. Passersby talked to the owners about their dogs whether or not the dogs were present. When dog owners spoke with other people, their conversations often concerned activities that were occurring in the present, whereas conversations of non-owners focused on stories about past events. Dog owners reported taking twice as many daily walks as non-owners. Dog owners also reported significantly less dissatisfaction with their social, physical, and emotional states.     

Dennett's Mind

Drawing on data from contemporary experimental psychology and research in artificial intelligence, Dennett argues for a multiple drafts model of human consciousness, which he offers as an alternative to what he calls Cartesian materialism. I argue that the considerations Dennett advances do not, in fact, call for the abandonment of Cartesian materialism. Moreover, the theory presented by Dennett does not, as he claims, succeed in explaining consciousness; in particular, it fails to do justice to qualia. Illuminating though Dennett's discussion is, in many ways, it nevertheless leaves the traditional mind‐body problem intact.