Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study1

Using a method similar to that of Brigham, Maass, Snyder, and Spaudling (1982), 86 adult convenience store clerks were asked to identify 3 confederate/customers, one Anglo-American, one black-American, and one Mexican-American who had visited their stores 2 hours earlier. Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test showed that clerks were superior at identifying customers of their own racial or ethnic group, Z= 2.84, p < .002. For clerks who made an identification, the correlation between the recognition accuracy and confidence in their identification was not significant, r_pbis (56)= .05. The results of this field study paralleled those found in most laboratory experiments of cross-racial/ethnic identification and demonstrated that Mexican-Americans are subject to the own/other groups identification accuracy phenomenon as well.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.     

Test of the analysis of competing hypotheses in legal decision‐making

The analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) has been suggested to be a method that can protect against confirmation bias in the context of intelligence analysis. In the current study, we aimed to determine whether ACH could counter confirmation bias in the reasoning with evidence in the context of criminal law proceedings. Law students (N = 191) received information about the ACH method or general information about biases. They were given a case vignette with a main suspect and a list of 24 questions, 6 of which they could ask about the case. Half of the questions related to incriminating information, whereas the other half related to exonerating information. Contrary to our expectations, participants in both conditions favoured questions relating to exonerating information and rated the exonerating evidence as being more important for their decision. Despite the lack of bias observed, it seems participants failed to properly apply the ACH method.     

In beauty we trust: Children prefer information from more attractive informants

Preschool children were presented with slides on a computer screen showing a novel object, together with two informants, one with an attractive and one with a less attractive face. Children were asked which informant they would like to ask about the name of the novel object. After hearing the informants provide conflicting names, they were asked who they thought was correct. Children were more likely to endorse names provided by the person with the more attractive face, a bias that cannot be justified on epistemic grounds. The implications of this finding are discussed.     

Information-gathering processes: Diagnosticity,hypothesis-confirmatory strategies,and perceived hypothesis confirmation

Recent research has investigated the information-gathering strategies that people employ as they attempt to test hypotheses. Three such strategies of information seeking were examined. Two kinds of hypothesis-confirmation strategies were considered. The first of these concerned evidence being sought to the extent that it is more likely under the hypothesis being tested than under the alternative. The second kind of hypothesis-confirmation strategy refers to the tendency to ask questions that will have the effect of making the hypothesis under test appear to be true. In addition, a third kind of strategy is a diagnosing strategy under which people prefer evidence that is most differentially probable under the hypothesis and the alternative. Important changes in methodology from past work were made, and the data supported a predominant diagnosing strategy and a less significant, but nonetheless strong and consistent, tendency to ask hypothesis-confirming questions. In addition, subjects' choice of questions made it likely that they would perceive as confirmed the specific hypotheses they were testing. This occurred even though the questions employed were not constraining. Discussion involves the strategies of information gathering and the reasons underlying them as well as the implications of these strategies for the inferences people make about their predictive abilities.     

Limiting Underage Alcohol Purchases: An Application of the Consumer Decision Model

The consumer decision-making model is applied to store clerks faced with determining which customers should be carded for the purchase of alcohol. Manipulated decisional time pressure induced either a vigilant (high involvement) or hypervigilant (low involvement) decision state. Clerks (N = 256) rated four combined shopper–product profiles under conditions of high or low time pressure and assessed the likelihood that the shopper would be carded. Results indicated that increased time pressure reduced the likelihood of being required to present identification and that males were least likely to be asked for identification under high time pressure. The managerial implications and utility of the consumer decision model for enhancing compliance with minimum legal drinking age laws are considered.     

The timeline of threat processing in repressors: more evidence for early vigilance and late avoidance

Evidence is mixed concerning whether individuals with a repressive coping style can actually selectively avoid threatening stimuli. Recent research (Calvo & Eysenck, 2000) on repressors’ threat processing suggests that it is necessary to take into account the timeline of this bias. A spontaneous trait inference paradigm was used here to test the hypothesis that repressors would, relative to others, be less likely to infer unfavorable and threatening traits. However, if pressured to make trait inferences quickly, it was predicted that they would be less likely than others to infer favorable and unthreatening traits. Repressors and nonrepressors were presented with passages that could have supported positive or negative trait inferences. In Study 1, they were asked to respond to trait words as quickly as possible but were not held accountable for doing so. In Study 2, time pressure was increased to capture uncorrected trait inferences. Results indicated that repressors were more likely to make positive trait inferences than others when simply asked to respond quickly. Under time pressure, this bias disappeared. Results point to the importance of taking into account an important moderator between coping style and threat, namely, the stage of processing at which differences in threat processing are being assessed.     

Religious involvement and self-forgiveness

The purpose of this study is to examine the interface between involvement in religion and self-forgiveness. The data come from a recent nationwide survey of adults age 18 and older (N?=?1774). A conceptual model was developed that contains the following hypotheses: (1) Evangelicals will attend worship services more frequently than members of other faith traditions; (2) people who go to church services more often will be more likely to get spiritual support from fellow church members; (3) individuals who receive more spiritual support from religious others will be more likely to believe that they have been forgiven by God; (4) people who believe that they have been forgiven by God will have a greater sense of self-worth; and (5) individuals who have a stronger sense of self-worth will be more likely to forgive themselves for the things they have done wrong. The data provide support for each hypothesis.     

Children's trust in unexpected oral versus printed suggestions: Limitations of the power of print

Children have a bias to trust spoken testimony, yet early readers have an even stronger bias to trust print. Here, we ask how enduring is the influence of printed testimony: Can the learning be applied to new scenarios? Using hybrid pictures more dominant in one animal species (e.g., squirrel) than another (e.g., rabbit), we examined 3–6‐year‐olds' (N = 130) acceptance of an unexpected, non‐dominant label suggested only orally or via print. Consistent with previous findings, early readers, but not pre‐readers, accepted printed labels more frequently than when spoken. Children were then presented with identical but unlabelled hybrid exemplars and frequently applied the non‐dominant labels to these. Despite early readers' prior greater acceptance of text, when oral suggestions were accepted they retained a greater influence. Findings highlight potential implications for educators regarding knowledge being applied to new scenarios: For early readers, unexpected information from text may be fragile, while a greater confidence might be placed in such information gained from spoken testimony.     

Category-based Effects in Clinical Judgment

Theories of social cognition predict that counselors, once their categories are primed, more accurately recall information that is category-consistent than information that category-inconsistent. Confirmatory bias may also prompt perceivers to seek information that confirms their category hypothesis, but previous research (Hoffman, Mischel & Mazze, 1981)also suggests that task instructions might influence the magnitude of this bias.

Counselor-participants were given one of two category sets (diagnoses) about a client and one of two instructional sets. They were then shown a videotape which contained symptoms from both categories. Recall for category-consistent and -inconsistent symptoms was assessed via an incidental memory task. Participants were also asked to confer a tentative diagnosis of the client, as well as to list questions they would like to ask the client. Results indicated that participants were not affected by the type of instructions they were given, but they did recall more category-consistent symptoms than category inconsistent symptoms. Significant differences were found across tentative diagnoses conferred by participants and questions participants thought would be useful in understnading the client, but these differences did not follow predictions derived from a confirmatory bias model. Finally, correlational data demonstrated a negative relationship between recall for category inconsistent information and counseling experience.     

Matching versus optimal data selection in the Wason selection task

It has been reported as a robust effect that people are likely to select a matching case in the Wason selection task. For example, they usually select the 5 case, in the Wason selection task with the conditional “if an E, then a not-5”. This was explained by the matching bias account that people are likely to regard a matching case as relevant to the truth of the conditional (Evans, 1998). However, because a positive concept usually constructs a smaller set than its negative one does (a rarity assumption), it is more effective to get information on the truth of the conditional in a positive set than in a negative set. Thus the optimal data selection account can also explain the effect. The set size of Q and matching by introducing negation were manipulated independently in four experiments. From the results it was inferred that the so-called matching bias was an amalgam of two different cognitive components—relevance judgement by matching and optimal data selection.     

Mnemic neglect is not an artifact of expectancy: The moderating role of defensive pessimism

Research supporting the mnemic neglect model finds that people more easily recall positive than negative personality feedback, even when only asked to imagine that the feedback is real. The same bias is not found when people are asked to recall information about other people. Despite evidence that these findings reflect self‐enhancement motives, more research is needed to rule out the possibility that they instead simply reflect expectancies. Results supported the mnemic neglect model, and revealed that expectancies predicted recall only for a subgroup of participants who did not demonstrate the self–other recall bias characteristic of mnemic neglect: defensive pessimists, who are more likely than other people to process social information by comparing it to their expectancies. These findings suggest that mnemic neglect is not an artifact of expectancies, and is not driven by other self‐evaluation motives (such as self‐verification or self‐assessment). Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does medics' social identification increase handicap for mentally retarded patients?

Briefs about mentally retarded people are more negative than briefs about other social categories; professionals, such as medical doctors evaluate them most negatively of all. It was hypothesized (a) that medics' beliefs about mentally retarded people are mediated by psychological salience of their clinical social identification, rather than by personal characteristics that medics happen to share and (b) that such beliefs will bias decisions, rather than enhance accuracy. Forty-five doctors and medical students were randomly assigned to conditions designed to enhance salience of their shared clinical social identification or individual self-perceptions. Subjects completed semantic differentials about mentally retarded people and distinguished between slides of ‘mentally retarded’ and ‘normal’ children. Beliefs of subjects in the medical condition were significantly more negative than those in the personal condition. A signal detection analysis revealed no difference between conditions in subjects' ability to distinguish between children but showed that subjects in the medical condition were significantly more likely to judge a child ‘mentally retarded’ when in doubt. Results were discussed within an information processing framework and supported the idea that a salient clinical social identity can mediate beliefs that are likely to handicap patients.     

Conceptual Factors Influence Children's Distributivity Bias

Sentences such as “The girls read a book” can lead to multiple interpretations: They could be reading the same book (collective) or they could each be reading their own book (distributive). In ambiguous contexts, adults prefer the collective interpretation, and preschool children show a slight bias for a distributive interpretation. The current research investigated whether conceptual factors (number of actors) influences interpretations of these kinds of predicates. The data with children show a stronger collective bias when there are four actors compared to two actors. This may be because children are more likely to conceptualize groups of four (vs. two) as sets rather than collections of individuals. These data are discussed with reference to research on visual and conceptual integration abilities, showing that children lag behind in their ability to combine components into a whole in comparison to parsing objects into their component parts.     

Increased sensitivity to differentially diagnostic answers using familiar materials: Implications for confirmation bias

Researchers have recently pointed out that neither biased testing nor biased evaluation of hypotheses necessitates confirmation bias--defined here as systematic overconfidence in a focal hypothesis--but certain testing/evaluation combinations do. One such combination is (1) a tendency to ask about features that are either very likely or very unlikely under the focal hypothesis (extremity bias) and (2) a tendency to treat confirming and disconfirming answers as more similar in terms of their diagnosticity (or informativeness) than they really are. However, in previous research showing the second tendency, materials that are highly abstract and unfamiliar have been used. Two experiments demonstrated that using familiar materials led participants to distinguish much better between the differential diagnosticity of confirming and disconfirming answers. The conditions under which confirmation bias is a serious concern might be quite limited.     

2D location biases depth-from-disparity judgments but not vice versa

Visual cognition in our 3D world requires understanding how we accurately localize objects in 2D and depth, and what influence both types of location information have on visual processing. Spatial location is known to play a special role in visual processing, but most of these findings have focused on the special role of 2D location. One such phenomena is the spatial congruency bias, where 2D location biases judgments of object features but features do not bias location judgments. This paradigm has recently been used to compare different types of location information in terms of how much they bias different types of features. Here we used this paradigm to ask a related question: whether 2D and depth-from-disparity location bias localization judgments for each other. We found that presenting two objects in the same 2D location biased position-in-depth judgments, but presenting two objects at the same depth (disparity) did not bias 2D location judgments. We conclude that an object’s 2D location may be automatically incorporated into perception of its depth location, but not vice versa, which is consistent with a fundamentally special role for 2D location in visual processing.     

Is STEM running out of steam for Asian Americans? College admissions officers' perceptions of applicants

While many people view Asian Americans as ‘model minorities’ who excel in math, science and music, they are also negatively stereotyped as nerdy and unsociable. Research has shown that Asian Americans have to outperform other races academically to receive equal consideration by colleges. This study is the first to test whether this bias is directed towards all Asian Americans or only those who fit the model minority stereotype. The present experiment investigates the effect of race and stereotypes on perceptions of students in the college admission process. College admission officers (N = 79) were randomly assigned to view a shortened version of a college application. The participants rated the student whose application they saw according to likelihood of being accepted into college, social competence, academic competence and contribution to a college's diversity. The stereotypical Asian American student was perceived to be significantly less likely to be accepted into college and had a lower perceived social competence than the other three students. Additionally, students who participated in counter‐stereotypical Asian activities were perceived as being more likely to be accepted, more socially competent and to contribute more diversity than students who participated in stereotypical Asian activities. A multiple regression revealed that social competence was the only significant predictor of likely acceptance. This study suggests that rather than all Asian American students being disadvantaged in the college admissions process, it is only those who fit common stereotypes who are affected.     

Affective bias in visual working memory is associated with capacity

How does the affective nature of task stimuli modulate working memory (WM)? This study investigates whether WM maintains emotional information in a biased manner to meet the motivational principle of approaching positivity and avoiding negativity by retaining more approach-related positive content over avoidance-related negative content. This bias may exist regardless of individual differences in WM functionality, as indexed by WM capacity (overall bias hypothesis). Alternatively, this bias may be contingent on WM capacity (capacity-based hypothesis), in which a better WM system may be more likely to reveal an adaptive bias. In two experiments, participants performed change localisation tasks with emotional and non-emotional stimuli to estimate the number of items that they could retain for each of those stimuli. Although participants did not seem to remember one type of emotional content (e.g. happy faces) better than the other type of emotional content (e.g. sad faces), there was a significant correlation between WM capacity and affective bias. Specifically, participants with higher WM capacity for non-emotional stimuli (colours or line-drawing symbols) tended to maintain more happy faces over sad faces. These findings demonstrated the presence of a “built-in” affective bias in WM as a function of its systematic limitations, favouring the capacity-based hypothesis.     

The Impact of Depression on Self–Other Discrepancies in Decision Making

Although there is a small but growing body of literature on how people make risky decisions for others and predict others' decisions, results seem to be contradictory. The authors contribute to the understanding of these mixed results by investigating how depression affects self–other discrepancies in decision making and the psychological processes that underlie these discrepancies. In an experiment, depressed and nondepressed individuals read a series of scenarios involving decisions about health, money, and interpersonal relationships. They then indicated which of two options they would choose for themselves or for another person, or predicted which option this person would choose for himself or herself. Finally, participants reported benefits and drawbacks of the decisions (i.e., cognitions) and feelings about risk. Depressed individuals were less prone to bias when they predicted others' decisions than nondepressed individuals. Feelings about risk played a key role in determining the direction and the magnitude of this bias. In contrast, both depressed and nondepressed individuals showed bias when they made decisions for others. This bias affected their decisions in opposing ways and was determined by cognitions. This bias is consistent with literature showing that depression is associated with an increased sensitivity to social risks. The authors provide a theoretical explanation of self–other discrepancies in decision making in depressed and nondepressed individuals and conclude that the results support the assumption that depression is associated with psychological processes whose role is to increase sensitivity to social threats rather than with a more general negative bias in cognitive functioning. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.