Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity

A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, proponents of narrative accounts typically reject Reductionist metaphysics that (ontologically) reduce persons to aggregates of person stages. In contrast to this trend, we seek to develop a narrative account of personal identity from within Reductionist metaphysics: we think person stages are unified into persons in virtue of their narrative continuity with one another. We argue that this Reductionist version of the narrative account avoids some serious problems facing non-Reductionist versions of the narrative account.     

Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival

The standard version of the psychological criterion or theory of personal identity takes it that psychological connectedness is not necessary for personal identity, or for what matters in survival. That is, a future person can be you, and/or have what matters in survival for you, even though there is no psychological connectedness between you and that future person. David Lewis, however, holds that psychological connectedness is necessary to both identity and what matters (which he takes to coincide). This entails, Lewis acknowledges, that if a human body were to live longer than connectedness lasts, then that body would 'embody' or 'constitute' a different person later on than it did to begin with. Moreover, Lewis accepts, a body may embody more than one person at any one time. Lewis claims that this can be reconciled to some degree with common sense if we count by person stages rather than by persons. I show, though, that Lewis' view cannot be salvaged in this way, and, moreover, that it leads to further absurdities. I conclude that as an account of identity and of what matters in survival, it is highly implausible, and most unsatisfactory.     

ON THE VERY IDEA OF CRITERIA FOR PERSONHOOD

I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self‐consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre‐identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre‐identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science‐fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons.     

Clinical Decision Making in Alzheimer's Disease

In the treatment of Alzheimer's Disease the occupational therapy goal is to enable persons to function as optimally as possible. Maximizing the patient's functioning in daily life necessitates a framework for clinical reasoning. Clinical reasoning currently emphasizes what persons can do but may fail to recognize the complex factors involved in what a person actually will do. A framework to guide clinical decision making for persons with Alzheimer's disease based on the model of human occupation was developed. The use of this framework is illustrated through a case application.     

Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity

In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.     

A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.     

Who is My Neighbor?: The Good Samaritan as a Source for Theological Anthropology

As the title of this essay suggests, the author's aim is to offer a reading of Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan in the context of contemporary debates over the nature of personhood. The essay argues that our identity as persons is bound up with our relationship with Jesus in whose life is disclosed both the identity of the three divine persons of the Trinity and the form of human personhood they make possible. To know what it means to be a person, one needs to look to Jesus who provides, through the parable of the Good Samaritan, both the model and the source of our own personhood. [Editors]     

Charity Begins at Home: Cultural Differences in Social Discounting and Generosity

People often consider how their actions influence others when making decisions. However, we are not equally generous to everyone alike. Our willingness to share resources declines as a function of social distance between the decision maker and the recipient. This function is likely to be influenced by culture, but research on behavioral decision making is still lacking empirical evidence. In Western societies, individuals generally perceive themselves as autonomous and independent from others, whereas the distinction between self and close others is less sharply defined by Eastern individuals where relationships and group membership are more centralized. Therefore, the social discount function should reflect this difference in the distinction of self and others by a reduced decline in generosity over close social distances. A social decision‐making task was adapted to the intercultural context, and data were collected in Germany and China. For seven different social distances, we estimated how much money German and Chinese subjects were willing to forego to give a certain reward to another person. A hyperbolic model was fitted to the data. We found that other‐regarding generosity declines as a function of social distance independent of cultural identity. However, German subjects showed a marked drop in generosity across close social distances, which was significantly less pronounced in Chinese participants. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Model and interactive algorithm of bi‐level multi‐objective decision‐making with multiple interconnected decision makers

Furthering a prior research on two‐person bi‐level multi‐objective decision‐making problems of the leader‐follower Stackelberg game, we present an extended model of bi‐level multi‐objective decision‐making with multiple interconnected decision makers at the lower level. In the model, the upper level decision maker acts as a leader and the lower level decision makers behave as the followers, and inter‐connections and interactions exist among these followers in decision‐making scenarios. Following the rules of leader‐follower Stackelberg game, we develop an interactive algorithm of the model for solving multi‐objective decision‐making problems and reflecting the interactive natures among the decision makers. Finally, the authors exemplify the model and algorithm, and draw a conclusion on points of contributions and the significance of this study in decision‐making and support. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem

Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

人事决策信息利用和效能预测模型

本研究以 1 2 2名人事管理人员为被试 ,采用问卷测量法 ,分析了企业人事决策信息利用的现状 ,信息利用指标和效能的关系。结果发现 :1企业人事决策中比较重视能力要求信息、组织环境信息和个人档案材料 ,忽略心理特点信息的利用 ;2非程序信息、人职匹配信息对效能指标的直接预测力较强 ,其他指标的预测力较弱 ;3能力要求、考核成绩、个人档案材料等信息通过人职匹配信息的利用对效能指标产生影响。文章还构建了人事决策的效能预测模型 ,并讨论了研究结果对企业人事决策诊断和发展的理论和实际意义。     

Preference‐expectation reversal in the ratings of independent and interdependent individuals: A USA–Japan comparison

We predicted and supported the prediction that a ‘preference‐expectation reversal’ would occur among Japanese but not among Americans. American and Japanese participants evaluated ideal‐typical independent and interdependent persons on the negative–positive dimension, and estimated how others would evaluate these persons. They also indicated their preference for acting like each of the target persons; that is, which of the two target persons they would prefer to act like. Both the American and Japanese participants wanted to act like the typical independent person rather than the typical interdependent person. However, the Japanese participants expected that others would evaluate the interdependent person more positively than the independent person. This preference‐expectation reversal was not observed among the American participants. Further analysis demonstrated that the American participants' personal evaluations of the two targets were consistent with their preferences. The Japanese participants' personal evaluation represented a compromise between their preferences and the expected responses of others. These results suggest that the culturally shared belief in Japan that interdependent persons would receive more positive evaluations than independent persons created an incentive for them to behave interdependently despite their preferences.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Generating consensus priority interval vectors for group decision‐making in the AHP

Many practical and important decision‐making problems are complicated by at least two factors: (1) the qualitative/subjective nature of some criteria often results in uncertainty in the individual ratings; and (2) group decision‐making is involved and some means of aggregating individual ratings is required. Traditionally, both individual and group priorities have been represented as point estimates, but this approach presents severe limitations for accommodating imprecision in the decision‐making process. This paper examines the group decision‐making problem in the context where priorities are represented as numeric intervals. A set of techniques that could be used at some of the phases of an analytic hierarchy process (AHP)‐based group decision‐making process, which has the objective of generating a ‘consensus’ priority that represents the group's opinion with regards to the relative importance of a set of N objects (e.g. criteria, alternatives), is presented. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity

Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real human beings, and sometimes ‘us’ refers to selves or fictional characters. Second, I consider Schechtmann’s view that self-narratives create persons (in the sense that she calls ‘characterization’ or personality. I argue that the sense in which a self-narrative creates a person cannot stand on its own: a person must already exist (in the sense of numerical identity) in order for there to be a self-narrative. Finally, I offer my own account of persons.     

Literally Like a Different Person: Context and Concern in Personal Identity

It is not the case that there is only one literal sense of “same person.” When presented in different contexts, “she is/is not the same person” can have different answers concerning the same entity or set of entities across the same period of time. This is because: (1) Persons are composed of many parts, and different parts have different persistence conditions. This follows from a reductionist view of the self. (2) When we ask about sameness of persons, or “personal identity,” we are asking because of certain practical concerns. (3) Different concerns will look to the persistence of different parts of the person for criteria of sameness. (4) No single criterion of sameness tracks all concerns. By combining reductionism with contextualism, the disparate answers to the personal identity question can be clarified without losing the practical concerns motivating them.     

Person and consciousness.

My interlocuter is Locke with his reduction of person to personal consciousness. This reduction is a main reason preventing people from acknowledging the personhood of the earliest human embryo, which lacks all personal consciousness. I show that Catholic Christians who live the sacramental life of the Church have reason to think that they are, as persons, vastly more than what they experience themselves to be, for they believe that the sacraments work effects in them as persons that can only be believed but that cannot be experienced within themselves in this life. I also show that Christians and non-Christians alike have an experience of moral good and evil in themselves that implies that they are, as moral persons, far more than they find in their conscious self-presence. It is, therefore, natural to think that if my being a person so far exceeds my consciousness, I may well have once existed as person even before the awakening of consciousness.     

EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD,HUMAN NATURE,AND RATIONAL ENSOULMENT

This essay briefly describes a few of the problems associated with using personhood language to defend the right to life of the pre‐implantation embryo. Arguing that an immaterial soul explains the personal identity of an embryo is problematic for many people because there is no apparent spiritual activity in the unborn. While some scholars argue that the embryo has the potential to act as an adult person and thus should be protected from harm, others contend that potentiality alone is insufficient reason to ascribe special moral worth to the embryo in utero. For Thomas Aquinas, the soul is not only the life‐principle that organizes the human body, but it is also that by which the human being thinks and wills. By making suitable corrections to Aristotle's hylomorphic depiction of the soul–body relation, I suggest that a rational soul must be present from the moment of conception and that it is at the service of the (embryonic) person. What is of critical importance here is to accept that a human being is present from the moment of conception, something the vast majority of embryologists maintain, notwithstanding the inveiglement of those who state that the pre‐implantation blastocyst is simply a disorganized clump of cells.