Cross‐cultural differences in object recognition: Comparing asylum seekers from Sub‐Saharan Africa and a matched Western European control group

Nowadays, more and more people report about their memories in cross‐cultural contexts. In international criminal settings and asylum procedures, object recognition tests can provide valuable information, for example, about weapons used during a crime or landmarks from the claimed region of origin. This study was the first to compare object recognition performance by asylum seekers from Sub‐Saharan Africa to a matched Western European control group. African participants performed worse than European participants on perceptual tests involving transformations from two‐ to three‐dimensional representations, but both groups performed equally well on an object recognition test that involved transformation from three‐ to two‐dimensional representations. However, African participants were significantly more likely to respond “yes” on the recognition test (i.e., an acquiescence response style) than European participants. Our findings elucidate cultural differences in responding on an object recognition test. Judges, juries, and immigration officials would be wise to take these differences into account when evaluating recognition performance in cross‐cultural contexts.     

Self‐awareness and self‐understanding

In this paper, I critically examine Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self and show how the distinction he makes among “pre‐reflective minimal,” “interpersonal,” and “normative” dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call “pre‐reflective self‐understanding.” The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person's pre‐reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this gap in his explanatory taxonomy, I draw upon Heidegger, Merleau‐Ponty, and Frankfurt in order to sketch an account of pre‐reflective self‐understanding. I end by raising an objection to Zahavi's claim for the primitive and foundational status of pre‐reflective self‐awareness. To carve off self‐awareness from the self's practical immersion in a situation where things and possibilities already matter and draw one to act is to distort the phenomena. A more careful phenomenology of pre‐reflective action shows that pre‐reflective self‐awareness and pre‐reflective self‐understanding are co‐constitutive, both mutually for each other and jointly for everyday experience.     

“OPENNESS TO THE WORLD”: KARL BARTH'S EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY OF CHRIST AS THE PRAY‐ER1

What is at stake in accounts of “prayer” is reflection on a practice that cannot be readily spoken of free from the most important considerations of God, world, human identity and the shape of its performance. Instead, if prayer “is not to become a harmless game and an endlessly babbling chatter” (Karl Rahner), attention needs to be paid to the god or gods that practices of so‐called “prayer” encounter, and it may be that much of what moves in the name of the God of Jesus Christ is, in Barth's terms, no‐god. For Barth not only has the knowledge of the practice of prayer, in a sense, been taken out of our hands in its Christ‐grounding, but its Christ‐shaped performance involves the determination of Christian life and its self‐reflective thought in the pattern of the new life that might be characterised as the properly ordered freedom of self‐dispossessing obedience.     

Meaning‐making in women's tattooed bodies

Tattooed women's practices of resistance and conformity are constituted within social, cultural, and historical contexts that produce normative values around “good” and “bad” tattoos. Tattoos enable the performance of multiple femininities, constructing the female body in a way that is personal and meaningful to that individual and opening an agentic space in which they can do so. The vast majority of research that is available on tattoos concerns mostly men or, at least, does not fully understand the implications of specific gendered discourses that regulate the (feminine) body. In this paper, we argue that meaning‐making for women's tattoos serves to function as legitimating, producing tattooed feminine bodies as more acceptable. We argue for a closer examination of the regulatory discourses that feed into the choices that women make in relation to their tattooed bodies.     

Children's Understanding of the Natural Numbers’ Structure

When young children attempt to locate numbers along a number line, they show logarithmic (or other compressive) placement. For example, the distance between “5” and “10” is larger than the distance between “75” and “80.” This has often been explained by assuming that children have a logarithmically scaled mental representation of number (e.g., Berteletti, Lucangeli, Piazza, Dehaene, & Zorzi, 2010 ; Siegler & Opfer, 2003 ). However, several investigators have questioned this argument (e.g., Barth & Paladino, 2011 ; Cantlon, Cordes, Libertus, & Brannon, 2009 ; Cohen & Blanc‐Goldhammer, 2011 ). We show here that children prefer linear number lines over logarithmic lines when they do not have to deal with the meanings of individual numerals (i.e., number symbols, such as “5” or “80”). In Experiments 1 and 2, when 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds choose between number lines in a forced‐choice task, they prefer linear to logarithmic and exponential displays. However, this preference does not persist when Experiment 3 presents the same lines without reference to numbers, and children simply choose which line they like best. In Experiments 4 and 5, children position beads on a number line to indicate how the integers 1–100 are arranged. The bead placement of 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds is better fit by a linear than by a logarithmic model. We argue that previous results from the number‐line task may depend on strategies specific to the task.     

Culture and perceptions of self—other similarity

In testing possible cultural effects of the use of the self as an habitual reference point to which others are compared, we expected that: (a) individualistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to personal goals) would rate self—other similarity higher when asked “How similar is X to you?” than when asked “How similar are you to X?”, whereas nondirectional similarity judgements (“How similar are these two people?”) would resemble the former directional comparison; (b) collectivistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to in‐group goals) would show a weaker or, possibly, reversed pattern, especially using in‐group comparison others. Neither hypothesis was upheld. However, the individualists perceived the in‐group to be relatively more similar to themselves as compared to the collectivists. This difference cannot be explained by response bias, status asymmetry, or role differentiation. We propose an explanation in terms of the differential relationship between self and other representations for people from collectivist versus individualist cultures.     

Concepts as Semantic Pointers: A Framework and Computational Model

The reconciliation of theories of concepts based on prototypes, exemplars, and theory‐like structures is a longstanding problem in cognitive science. In response to this problem, researchers have recently tended to adopt either hybrid theories that combine various kinds of representational structure, or eliminative theories that replace concepts with a more finely grained taxonomy of mental representations. In this paper, we describe an alternative approach involving a single class of mental representations called “semantic pointers.” Semantic pointers are symbol‐like representations that result from the compression and recursive binding of perceptual, lexical, and motor representations, effectively integrating traditional connectionist and symbolic approaches. We present a computational model using semantic pointers that replicates experimental data from categorization studies involving each prior paradigm. We argue that a framework involving semantic pointers can provide a unified account of conceptual phenomena, and we compare our framework to existing alternatives in accounting for the scope, content, recursive combination, and neural implementation of concepts.     

No sign of quitting: incidental exposure to “no smoking” signs ironically boosts cigarette‐approach tendencies in smokers

The unconscious mind tends to disregard negations in its processing of semantic meaning. Therefore, messages containing negated concepts can ironically prime mental representations and evaluations that are opposite to those intended. We hypothesized that the subtle presentation of a negated concept (e.g., “no smoking”) would activate ironic motivational orientations as well. We tested this hypothesis in a public health context. Smokers viewed photographs in which “no smoking” signs were either inconspicuously embedded (prime condition) or edited out (control condition). Primed smokers showed amplified automatic approach tendencies toward smoking‐related stimuli, but not toward smoking‐unrelated stimuli: an ironic motivational response to exposure to the signs. Since passive priming effects generally serve to facilitate forms of action, not inhibit them, antismoking and other public health campaigns may ironically increase the very behaviors they seek to reduce.     

Resolving Multiple Visions of Nature, Science, and Religion

Abstract. I argue for the centrality of the concepts of biophysical and human nature in science‐and‐religion studies, consider five different metaphors, or “visions,” of nature, and explore possibilities and challenges in reconciling them. These visions include (a) evolutionary nature, built on the powerful explanatory framework of evolutionary theory; (b) emergent nature, arising from recent research in complex systems and self‐organization; (c) malleable nature, indicating both the recombinant potential of biotechnology and the postmodern challenge to a fixed ontology; (d) nature as sacred, a diffuse popular concept fundamental to cultural analysis; and (e) nature as culture, an admission of epistemological constructivism. These multiple visions suggest the famous story of the blind men and the elephant, in which each man made the classic mistake of part‐whole substitution in believing that what he grasped (the tail, for example) represented the elephant as a whole. Indeed, given the inescapability of metaphor, we may have to admit that the ultimate truth about the “elephant” (nature, or the reality toward which science and religion point) is a mystery, and the best we can hope for is to confess the limitations of any particular vision.     

Both Earlier Times and the Future Are “Front”: The Distinction Between Time‐ and Ego‐Reference‐Points in Mandarin Speakers’ Temporal Representation

Mandarin speakers, like most other language speakers around the world, use spatial terms to talk about time. However, the direction of their mental temporal representation along the front‐back axis remains controversial because they use the spatial term “front” to refer to both earlier times (e.g., front‐year means “the year before last”) and the future (e.g., front‐road means “prospect”). Although the linguistic distinction between time‐ and ego‐reference‐point spatiotemporal metaphors in Mandarin suggests a promising clarification of the above controversy, there is little empirical evidence verifying this distinction. In this study, Mandarin speakers’ time‐ and ego‐reference‐point temporal representations on three axes (i.e., sagittal, lateral, and vertical) were separately examined through two tasks. In a time‐reference‐point task, Mandarin speakers judged whether the time point of the second picture was earlier or later than the time point of the first picture, while in an ego‐reference‐point task, they judged whether an event or phase had happened in the past or would happen in the future. The results indicate that Mandarin speakers construe an earlier‐times‐in‐front‐of‐later‐times temporal sequence and adopt the front‐to‐the‐future orientation.     

For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving beyond the grounding issue

Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to “embodiment” or “grounding.” We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations, is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations “interact,” and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized—the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to “grounding.” Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations—conceptual vs. sensory-motor—from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specificity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions, intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of “grounding” or “embodiment,” because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.     

Priming effect in affirmative complex conditional connectives

We report the results of an experiment that examined the mental representations underlying the comprehension of complex conditional connectives (such as “A, on condition that B”) and the conditional if (such as “A, if B”). The mental representations during the comprehension stage were analysed using a “priming methodology”. The experiment showed that participants read the possibility “A and not-B” faster when it was primed by “A, if B” than when it was primed by “A, on condition that B”. The finding suggests that people understand the sentence “A, on condition that B” as biconditional; other possibilities (“A and B”, “not-A and B”, “not-A and not-B”) were primed equally by both connectives. We discuss the implications of this for current theories of reasoning.     

“The Thing Happened as He Wished”: Recovering an American Indian Cultural Psychology

One of the chief questions confronting mental health professionals who serve American Indian communities is how best to offer genuinely helpful services that do not simultaneously and surreptitiously reproduce colonial power relations. To ensure that counselors and therapists do not engage in psy‐colonization, it is crucial to recognize the sometimes divergent cultural foundations of mental distress, disorder, and well‐being in “Indian Country.” In this article, I will consider four excerpts from a research interview undertaken among my own people, the Aaniiih Gros Ventres of north‐central Montana. At a superficial level, these excerpts seem to reinforce reigning sensibilities that are readily familiar within the mental health professions. And yet, closer analysis of these interview excerpts reveals several tantalizing facets of an indigenous cultural psychology that may well continue to shape life and experience among tribal members in this setting. I recover this distinctive cultural psychology through archival representations of cultural and community life, including analysis of an important tribal myth. This analysis makes possible an alterNative interpretation of these interview excerpts, grounded in an aboriginal cosmology, that yields important implications for conceiving a more inclusive knowledge base for psychology that only robust community engagement can reveal.     

NÉCESSITÉ ET SIGNIFICATION DES RECHERCHES COMPARATIVES EN PSYCHOLOGIE GÉNÉTIQUE

Need and meaning of comparative studies in genetic psychology. — The comparative studies in the field of genetic psychology are indispensable for Psychology in general and also for Sociology, because only such studies allow us to separate the effects of biological or mental factors from those of social and cultural influences on the formation and the socialization of individuals. Relevant to this discussion is the well-known issue between culturalistic psychoanalysts like Fromm, Horney, etc., and classical freudian psychoanalysts who reduce the whole individual development to an endogenous evolution of « instinct ». In the field of cognitive functions to which this paper is devoted, at least four kinds of various factors must be distinguished, the respective influences of which can be separated through comparative studies : I. Biological factors depending on the “epigenetic” system (maturation of nervous system, etc.). These factors probably explain the sequential aspects (constant and necessary order) of the stages in the development of operative intelligence. However, if only these factors were acting, the stages would not only appear in a sequence, but at the same ages, whereas in fact, the ages where a stage appears differ from one environment to another. 2. Equilibration or autoregulation factors, determining behavior and thought in their various specific activities. They correspond to the sequential forms in general coordination of the actions of individuals as interacting with their physical environment; such intervening regulations are probably at the origin of the mental operations themselves, especially logical - mathematical operations. 3. General socialization factors, which are identical for all societies : cooperations - discussions - oppositions - exchanges, etc., between children or between adults or between adults and children. These factors 3 are closely related with the factors 2, because the general coordination of actions concerns inter-individual as so as intra-individual actions. 4. Factors related to educational and cultural transmission, which differ from one society to another; they are those we usually have in mind when we say briefly “social factors”. To discuss the influence of these four factors, Mohseni's study on Teheran school children and illiterate rural children is given as an example. Three results were obtained : (1) For “conservation” tasks, the same stages of intellectual development are observed for urban and rural children, in Iran as well as in Europe. (2) For these same tasks, a systematic delay of two to three years is observed among rural children with respect to Teheran children. (3) For performance tests (i.e. Porteus, Goodenough, etc.) there is a delay of four and primarily five years. These data seem to show that there is some sequential order of the stages which depends partially on the factors I. But, the ages for each stage are not constant, showing the factors 2 and 3 are intervening in a probably inseparable way. On the other hand, the difference between the actual operative results and the performance tests seems to indicate that a distinction might be made between the factors of general coordination (factors 2 and 3) and the educational transmissions (factors 4). About these last factors, the three and four year delays observed by Canadian psychologists working in Martinique with school children (French curriculum) in operative tasks (like conservations) seem to indicate that the general operations depend less on school than on the activities themselves of children or in general on the adult stimulations in the environment. We must pay special attention to the problems raised by language. In some precise and systematic experiments in Geneva, Sinclair shows children on the “preoperative” level (i.e. with no conservation…) do not spontaneously use the same language as operative children : the former use chiefly “scale” words (“much” or “many”, “little” or “few”, “large”, “small”) and the latter use chiefly “vector” words (“more”, “less”). If the younger subjects are submitted to a verbal training, they do learn to use the older children's language, but it only results in very little operative improvement (about one case out of 10 subjects on the average). Therefore, replicating the same experiments in countries speaking different languages would be very interesting. For instance, in the Turkish language, there is only one “vector” word, i.e. “again”; so that the Turk says “again much, again many” to say “more”. Then, the question is to know whether a change will be observed for the stages of logical-mathematical operations or whether these operations will be found everywhere with their identical common background; it seems that this last conclusion has already been observed in Aden (Hyde), Hong Kong (Goodnow), South Africa (Price-Williams). In conclusion, the kind of psychology we develop in our social environments, remains conjectural as long as comparative extensive and systematical research is not available; a great effort is still to be made in this direction.     

“Growing your own herbs” and “cooking from scratch”: Contemporary discourses around good mothering,food, and class‐related identities

In a cultural climate of “intensive parenting” and concerns about the “obesity epidemic,” parents are expected to take responsibility for their children's health, particularly through the provision of a “healthy” diet. This study involved intergenerational dyad interviews with both middle‐class and working‐class mothers and daughters from the United Kingdom. Analysing the data using discourse analysis informed by feminist poststructuralist theory, we found that mothers were positioned as having prime responsibility for the nurturing of family members, including the provision of a healthy diet. However, providing a healthy diet alone was insufficient; mothers needed to demonstrate that time and effort had been taken in the preparation of meals using fresh ingredients. Those who failed to do so were positioned as “lazy,” thus inviting the blaming of mothers for any current or future health problems encountered by family members (especially children). However, talk from some of the working‐class mothers pointed to the unattainable and “classed” ideals that are set by such cultural expectations.     

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as “paleo‐logicans” in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations‐between‐relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the “analogical ape,” like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated.     

Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons

Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like ‘having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children’. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning in general. Christine Korsgaard relates the rational binding force of practical reasons to the various identities or self-conceptions under which we value ourselves. The problem is that it is not clear why such self-conceptions would necessitate us rationally, given the fact that most of our identities are simply given. Perhaps, Harry Frankfurt is right in arguing that we are not only necessitated by reason, but also, and predominantly by what we love. I argue, however, that “the necessities of love” (in Frankfurt’s phrase) are not to be separated from, but should be seen as belonging to the necessities of reason. Our loves, concerns and related identities provide for a specific and important structure to practical reflection. They function on the background of reasoning, having a specific default role: they would lose their character as concerns, if there was a need for them to be cited on the foreground of deliberation or if there was a need to justify them. This does not mean that our deep concerns cannot be scrutinised. They can only be scrutinised in an indirect way, however, which explains their role in grounding the normativity of agent-relative reasons. It appears that this account can provide for a viable interpretation of Korsgaard’s argument about the foundational role of practical identities.     

Einstein’s jacket: Evidence for long-term perceptual specificity in mental imagery

To what extent are visual fantasies constrained by our perceptual experience of the real world? Our study exploits the fact that people’s knowledge of the appearance of individuals from the early 20th Century (e.g., Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill) derives predominantly from viewing black-and-white media images. An initial experiment shows that mental imagery for individuals from this period are experienced as significantly less colourful than imagery for individuals from the era of colour media. A second experiment manipulated whether participants were instructed to explicitly imagine using colour or not (i.e., “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a green jacket” vs. “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a jacket”). Results show that colour manipulation only influences imagery for black-and-white era individuals, with no comparable effect on imagery for colour era individuals. This finding is replicated in a third experiment that includes an additional control condition of imagining generic characters (i.e., “Imagine a knight wearing a cloak” vs. “imagine a knight wearing a red cloak”). Again, only imagery for black-and-white era individuals is affected by the colour manipulation. Overall these results provide evidence for long-term perceptual specificity effects in mental imagery. We argue that visual fantasies can be constrained by surface features of underlying representations in memory, even when imagining something we have never directly perceived.     

The Efficacy of Systemic Therapy for Childhood and Adolescent Externalizing Disorders: A Systematic Review of 47 RCT

Systemic (family) therapy is a widely used psychotherapy approach. However, most systematic efficacy reviews have focused solely on “family‐based treatment” rather than on the theoretic orientation “systemic therapy.” We systematically review trials on the efficacy of systemic therapy for the treatment of childhood and adolescent externalizing disorders. All randomized (or matched) controlled trials (RCT) evaluating systemic/systems‐oriented therapy in various forms (family, individual, group, multi‐family group therapy) with child or adolescent index patients (0–17 years) suffering from mental disorders were identified by data base searches and cross‐references. Inclusion criteria were as follows: index patient diagnosed with a DSM‐ or ICD‐listed mental disorder, and trial published in any language up to the end of 2011. The RCTs were analyzed for their research methodology, interventions applied, and results (postintervention; follow‐up). A total of 47 trials from the United States, Europe, and China, published in English, German, and Mandarin, were identified. A total of 42 of them showed systemic therapy to be efficacious for the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorders, conduct disorders, and substance use disorders. Results were stable across follow‐up periods of up to 14 years. There is a sound evidence base for the efficacy of systemic therapy for children and adolescents (and their families) diagnosed with externalizing disorders.