On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction

This work compares conscious thought and unconscious thought in relation to quality of choice. Earlier work [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586-598] has shown that people make better choices after engaging in unconscious thought (i.e., unconscious activity during a period of distraction) rather than in conscious thought. However, the evidence was obtained for choices between hypothetical alternatives with quality of choice operationalized normatively. As quality of decision is essentially subjective, in the current experiment participants chose between real objects with quality operationalized as post-choice satisfaction. In a paradigm based on work by Wilson and colleagues [Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339], participants were briefly presented with five art posters, and chose one either (a) immediately, (b) after thorough conscious thinking about each poster, or (c) after a period of distraction. Participants took their favorite poster home and were phoned 3-5 weeks later. As hypothesized, unconscious thinkers were more satisfied with their choice than participants in the other two conditions.     

Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It!

Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post‐choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining effects of preconscious mere exposure: An inattentional blindness approach

An increase in affective preference for stimuli, which a person has been repeatedly exposed to, is known as mere exposure effect. This effect has been shown for stimuli that are processed subliminally, that is, below the threshold of awareness. This study fills a current research gap by investigating mere exposure effects under processing that is preconscious, which follows from a high stimulus strength but absence of top-down amplification. In three experiments (N = 240 in total) preconscious processing was evoked using an inattentional blindness paradigm, which allowed the processing of stimuli (nonwords or Chinese symbols) under complete inattention. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find a mere exposure effect in our experiments. We expand the current state of knowledge by discussing the distractor devaluation effect and the attentional set of participants as possible reasons for the absence of the mere exposure effect. Directions for future investigations are outlined.     

Negative emotion words are less susceptible to repetition blindness

Repeated and orthographically similar words are vulnerable in RSVP, as observed using the repetition blindness (RB) paradigm. Prior researchers have claimed that RB is increased for emotion words, but the mechanism for this was unclear. We argued that RB should be reduced for words with properties that capture attention, such as emotion words. Employing orthographic repetition blindness, our data showed that words with negative emotional valence had a report advantage when they were the second of two similar words (e.g., less RB occurred with HORSE curse than with HORSE purse). This renders emotion RB similar to the use of emotion words in the attentional blink phenomenon. The findings demonstrate the neglected role of competition in conscious recognition of multiple words under conditions of brief display and masking.     

External focus of attention and autonomy support have additive benefits for motor performance in children

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to examine the combined effects of external focus instructions and autonomy support on motor performance of children. In addition, we sought to provide evidence for an increased focus on the task goal under the external focus condition by using an inattentional blindness manipulation.DesignWithin-participant design.MethodThirty-six children (mean age = 8.5 ± 1.3 years) were asked to perform a bowling task with their dominant hand. Each participant performed 8 trials under external focus (path of the ball), internal focus (hand), or control conditions. In each attentional focus condition, they performed half of the trials under a choice (autonomy support) condition, in which they were able to choose among 4 bowling balls, and a no-choice condition (white ball).ResultsThe external focus instruction resulted in greater bowling accuracy (i.e., more pins knocked down) than internal focus and no instructions (control). Furthermore, choice resulted in more effective performance than no choice. Thus, both factors had additive benefits for performance. There was some evidence for an increased task focus in the external condition.ConclusionsThe present results show that, within the same individuals, instructions to adopt an external focus and the provision of a small choice contributed independently to enhance motor performance in children.     

选择盲：你不一定知道自己在选择什么

选择盲是指个体不能觉察他们的偏好与决策结果之间的不匹配, 即人们不能发现真实偏好被操纵, 这一现象在行为经济学中普遍存在。记忆表征理论主要从记忆表征编码的角度分析人们为什么不能发现选择的改变, 选择偏好理论则着重分析人们偏好反转的原因。选择盲的影响因素主要包括选项相似性和虚假反馈等。未来的研究需要从选择盲的心理机制与产生根源、影响因素和应用研究等方面进一步探讨。     

Differential effect of distractor timing on localizing versus identifying visual changes

When visual changes are accompanied by visual transients, such as in the case of saccades, eye blinks, and brief flickers, they often go unnoticed; this phenomenon is called change blindness (Rensink, R. A. (2002). Change detection. Annual Review of Psychology 53, 245; Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1997). Change blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1, 261). Change blindness occurs even when the position of visual transients does not cover the location of the change (as in the 'mudsplash' paradigm) (O'Regan, J. K., Rensink, R. A., & Clark, J. J. (1999). Nature 398, 34). By using a simplified mudsplash display, the present study investigated whether change blindness depends on (a). the timing of visual transients, and (b). the task that observers perform. Eight Gabor elements with random orientations were presented. One element (target) was rotated 45 degrees clockwise or counterclockwise without a temporal gap. High contrast visual transients, not overlapping with the elements, appeared at various times with respect to the target change. Observers reported where the change was (change localization), or in which direction the target rotated (change identification). Change localization was impaired primarily when the onset of the transient was at or after the change. In contrast, change identification was impaired mainly when the transient preceded the change. These results suggest that change localization and change identification are mediated in part by different mechanisms.     

A general area theorem for the same—different paradigm

According to a well-known theorem in psychophysics (Green & Swets, 1966), the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) for the yes—no paradigm equals the proportion of correct responses of an unbiased observer in the two-interval, two-alternative, forced choice paradigm (2I2AFC). Here, we demonstrate a similar relationship between the ROC area in the two-interval same—different (AX or 2IAX) paradigm, and the proportion correct in the four-interval same—different (4IAX, also known as dual-pair comparison) paradigm. The theorem demonstrated here is general, in the sense that it does not require that the sensory observations have a specific distribution (e.g., Gaussian), or that they be statistically independent.     

Introspective reports of reaction times in dual-tasks reflect experienced difficulty rather than timing of cognitive processes

Reports of introspective reaction times (iRTs) have been used to investigate conscious awareness during dual-task situations. Previous studies showed that dual-task costs in RTs (the psychological refractory period, PRP, effect) are not reflected in participants’ introspective reports. This finding has been attributed to conscious awareness of Task 2 being delayed while Task 1 is centrally processed. Here, we test this Temporal model and compare it to an alternative that assumes participants base their iRTs on experienced difficulty. We collected iRTs and difficulty estimates after each trial of a PRP paradigm in which the perceptual difficulty of either Task 2 (Experiment 1) or Task 1 (Experiment 2) was manipulated. Our results largely support the difficulty-based account, suggesting that in a dual-task situation, iRTs do not reflect timing of cognitive processes but are strongly influenced by the experience of difficulty.     

The effect of cueing on change blindness and same blindness

We used the change blindness paradigm of Landman, Spekreijse, and Lamme (2003) to measure the effect of cues on the ability to detect changes between two presentations of an array of eight rectangles separated by an interstimulus interval (ISI). Next, we measured the ability to detect sameness as the target rectangle remained the same when all of the others changed orientation. We were surprised to find no difference between change-detection and same-detection performance. These results (1) are consistent with the notion that some kind of internal representation was cued during the ISI, (2) mitigate against the recruitment of grouping strategies and/or forming a Gestalt, and (3) imply that under conditions facilitated by cues same-detection performance can be as good as change-detection performance.     

Dissociation of processing time and awareness by the inattentional blindness paradigm

Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness (i.e., explicit versus implicit processes). The inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the critical stimulus. This reveals a dissociation between processing time and awareness, consistent with the possibility of separate processing streams for explicit and implicit visual perception.     

意外刺激的意义性及位置对大学生无意视盲的影响

无意视盲是指由于专注于某项任务而对视野中的其他事物视而不见的现象,它同时受意外刺激低水平的物理特性、语义相关性以及观察者自身因素的影响。无意视盲是联系知觉、意识和注意的重要桥梁。本文采用静态的无意视盲范式,随机选取80名在校大学生为被试,同时考察了意外刺激的位置和意义性对无意视盲的影响。结果表明:(1)意外刺激的呈现位置对无意视盲没有显著的影响,呈现在外周和中央的探测率无显著差异。说明无意视盲可能是受基于注意区域而不是基于注视点的位置因素的影响;(2)意外刺激的意义性对无意视盲有显著的影响,相比于无意义刺激,有意义的卡通笑脸不管呈现在中央还是外周,都更易获得探测。     

On the role of rarity information in speakers’ choice of frame

In this article, we examine conversational behaviors when people describe the outcomes of uncertain events. We propose a new hypothesis, frame choice based on rarity information, that is built on the basis of one prominent measure of informativeness (i.e., self-information). The hypothesis predicts that when speakers can choose one of two logically equivalent frames for describing the outcome of an uncertain event (e.g., the results of the roll of a die or a medical operation), they prefer the frame denoting an event that is known or perceived to be rare. Four experiments using frame choice tasks provide evidence that speakers’ choice of frame is explained well by the rarity hypothesis.     

Bodies capture attention when nothing is expected

Functional neuroimaging research has shown that certain classes of visual stimulus selectively activate focal regions of visual cortex. Specifically, cortical areas that generally and selectively respond to faces (Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: a module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. Journal of Neuroscience, 17(11), 4302-4311; Puce, A., Allison, T., Asgari, M., Gore, J. C., & McCarthy, G. (1996). Differential sensitivity of human visual cortex to faces, letterstrings, and textures: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Neuroscience, 16(16), 5205-5215.) and to the human body (Downing, P. E., Jiang, Y., Shuman, M., & Kanwisher, N. (2001). A cortical area selective for visual processing of the human body. Science, 293(5539), 2470-2473.) have recently been described using fMRI. A parallel body of research has focused on the ability of faces to "capture" the focus of attention, compared to other kinds of objects (Lavie, N., Ro, T., & Russell, C. (2003). The role of perceptual load in processing distractor faces. Psychological Science, 14(5), 510-515; Ro, T., Russell, C., & Lavie, N. (2001). Changing faces: a detection advantage in the flicker paradigm. Psychological Science, 12(1), 94-99; Vuilleumier, P. (2000). Faces call for attention: evidence from patients with visual extinction. Neuropsychologia, 38(5), 693-700.). The present study uses Mack and Rock's "inattentional blindness" paradigm to investigate whether unexpected, task-irrelevant human body stimuli capture awareness when attention is occupied by a primary task (Mack, A., & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional blindness. London: MIT Press). Silhouettes and stick figures of human bodies, and silhouettes of hands, were compared to control stimuli including object silhouettes, object stick figures, and scrambled silhouettes of bodies, body parts, and objects. Participants were significantly better able to detect a human figure relative to the control stimuli. These results suggest that the human body, like the face, may be prioritized for attentional selection. More generally, they are consistent with the proposal that the visual system assigns attentional priority to types of stimuli that are also represented in strongly selective cortical regions.     

‘This Is the Person You Selected’: Eyewitnesses' Blindness for Their Own Facial Recognition Decisions

The aim of the current research was to identify conditions under which choice blindness in facial recognition decisions occurs. In five experiments, participants watched four mock‐crime videos and made choices that were either evaluative (Experiment 1) or absolute in nature (Experiments 2a–c and 3). When participants were subsequently asked to motivate their choice, they were sometimes presented with choices they had not made. For evaluative decisions, concurrent (27%) and retrospective blindness rates (21%) were relatively low compared with previous studies. For absolute decisions, choice‐blindness rates varied, depending on when exposure to the manipulated outcome took place (immediate: concurrent 32–35%, retrospective 0–6% [Experiments 2a–c]; 48 hours' delay: concurrent 68%, retrospective 39% [Experiment 3]). We argue that blindness for facial recognition decisions is more likely for evaluative decisions and for longer intervals between decision and manipulation and also for conditions of increased task complexity, which we interpret in terms of ambiguity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Crossmodal change blindness between vision and touch

Change blindness is the name given to people's inability to detect changes introduced between two consecutively-presented scenes when they are separated by a distractor that masks the transients that are typically associated with change. Change blindness has been reported within vision, audition, and touch, but has never before been investigated when successive patterns are presented to different sensory modalities. In the study reported here, we investigated change detection performance when the two to-be-compared stimulus patterns were presented in the same sensory modality (i.e., both visual or both tactile) and when one stimulus pattern was tactile while the other was presented visually or vice versa. The two to-be-compared patterns were presented consecutively, separated by an empty interval, or else separated by a masked interval. In the latter case, the masked interval could either be tactile or visual. The first experiment investigated visual-tactile and tactile-visual change detection performance. The results showed that in the absence of masking, participants detected changes in position accurately, despite the fact that the two to-be-compared displays were presented in different sensory modalities. Furthermore, when a mask was presented between the two to-be-compared displays, crossmodal change blindness was elicited no matter whether the mask was visual or tactile. The results of two further experiments showed that performance was better overall in the unimodal (visual or tactile) conditions than in the crossmodal conditions. These results suggest that certain of the processes underlying change blindness are multisensory in nature. We discuss these findings in relation to recent claims regarding the crossmodal nature of spatial attention.     

Preferential processing of threatening facial expressions using the repetition blindness paradigm

Background: Neuroanatomical evidence suggests that the human brain has dedicated pathways to rapidly process threatening stimuli. This processing bias for threat was examined using the repetition blindness (RB) paradigm. RB (i.e., failure to report the second instance of an identical stimulus rapidly following the first) has been established for words, objects and faces but not, to date, facial expressions. Methods: 78 (Study 1) and 62 (Study 2) participants identified repeated and different, threatening and non-threatening emotional facial expressions in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) streams. Results: In Study 1, repeated facial expressions produced more RB than different expressions. RB was attenuated for threatening expressions. In Study 2, attenuation of RB for threatening expressions was replicated. Additionally, semantically related but non-identical threatening expressions reduced RB relative to non-threatening stimuli. Conclusions: These findings suggest that the threat bias is apparent in the temporal processing of facial expressions, and expands the RB paradigm by demonstrating that identical facial expressions are susceptible to the effect.     

多通道变化盲:理论、方法与进展

人们在特定条件下通常难以探测到事物的变化,这种现象发生在视、听、触感觉通道分别称为变化盲视、变话盲听和变化盲触。文章主要对以下四个方面进行详细的探讨:变化盲视及视觉表征理论、变化盲听及听觉信息加工机制、变化盲触及体表空间表征、多通道变化盲及空间注意和空间表征跨通道一致性本质。此外,文章还对多通道变化盲的理论深度和拓展方向及相关应用研究进行了展望。     

The desirability bias in predictions: Going optimistic without leaving realism

Does desire for an outcome inflate optimism? Previous experiments have produced mixed results regarding the desirability bias, with the bulk of supportive findings coming from one paradigm—the classic marked-card paradigm in which people make discrete predictions about desirable or undesirable cards being drawn from decks. We introduce a biased-guessing account for the effects from this paradigm, which posits that people are often realistic in their likelihood assessments, but when making a subjectively arbitrary prediction (a guess), they will tend to guess in a desired direction. In order to establish the validity of the biased-guessing account and to distinguish it from other accounts, we conducted five experiments that tested the desirability bias within the paradigm and novel extensions of it. In addition to supporting the biased-guessing account, the findings illustrate the critical role of moderators (e.g., type of outcome, type of forecast) for fully understanding and predicting desirability biases.