CONSENT,CONVERSION, AND MORAL FORMATION: Stoic Elements in Jonathan Edwards's Ethics

The contemporary revival of virtue ethics has focused primarily on retrieving central moral commitments of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and the Neoplatonist traditions. Christian virtue ethicists would do well to expand this retrieval further to include the writings of the Roman Stoics. This essay argues that the ethics of Jonathan Edwards exemplifies major Stoic themes and explores three noteworthy points of intersection between Stoic ethics and Edwards's thought: a conception of virtue as consent to a benevolent providence, the identification of virtue as a singular and transformative good, and an account of moral formation as simultaneously self‐directed and received. Common ground between Edwards and the Stoics illustrates the value of recognizing Stoic moral thought as a philosophical framework that can enhance and undergird Christian ethicists' understandings of moral development and the nature of virtue.     

Can Lutheran Theology and Virtue Ethics Be Friends?

Lutheran theology is generally suspicious of virtue ethics. This suspicion arises from (1) the Lutheran commitment to justification by faith in God's unconditional promise; and (2) Luther's corollary understanding of sin as existential self‐absorption. Some Lutheran theologians have sought to incorporate virtue ethics by using it as an orientation for Christian life, while making sure to avoid any contamination of the doctrine of justification by virtue ethics. My project is to consider the possibility of a mutual illumination and interaction between the doctrine of justification and virtue ethics’ focus on formation by habituation. As an aid in exploring this possibility I use the distinction in Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics between the “ultimate” and the “penultimate.”     

John Calvin and Virtue Ethics

Many scholars have argued that the Protestant Reformation generally departed from virtue ethics, and this claim is often accepted by Protestant ethicists. This essay argues against such discontinuity by demonstrating John Calvin’s reception of ethical concepts from Augustine and Aristotle. Calvin drew on Augustine’s concept of eudaimonia and many aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, including concepts of choice, habit, virtue as a mean, and the specific virtues of justice and prudence. Calvin also evaluated the problem of pagan virtue in light of traditional Augustinian texts discussed in the medieval period. He interpreted the Decalogue as teaching virtue, including the cardinal virtues of justice and temperance. Calvin was not the harbinger of an entirely new ethical paradigm, but rather a participant in the mainstream of Christian thinkers who maintained a dual interest in Aristotelian and Augustinian eudaimonist virtue ethics.     

Putting on Virtue Without Putting Off Feminists

Mary Wollstonecraft's account of virtue discourse and formation, which deploys ancient and medieval ethical resources for modern purposes, challenges a prevalent narrative in Christian ethics today. Several prominent Christian virtue ethicists have left the false impression that serious reflection on the virtues depends on pre‐modern traditions and the eschewal of modern resources. Troubled by skeptical quandaries and the difficulty of adjudicating conflicting claims about virtue, they are concerned with securing a pre‐modern court of appeals. Many feminists worry that these appeals unduly constrain because they naturalize what is contingent and fix what should be open to debate. Wollstonecraft does not share the skeptical concerns and so has no need for metaethical appeals. Adapting Edmund Burke's moral philosophy, her use of virtue discourse deploys his metaphor of “the wardrobe of the moral imagination” to more religious, radical, and democratic ends. This way of proceeding signals the possibility of a rapprochement between feminists of various stripes and those interested in deploying the discourse of the virtues for contemporary Christian ethics.     

On the metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Conclusion In what precedes, I have argued that Aristotle does not, in his ethics, commit three metaphysical errors sometimes imputed to him: he does not define the good as a fact; he does not claim that human beings move by nature towards their telos; he does not claim, in the ergon argument, that human beings are fixed rather than versatile. Instead, I have shown, he does the opposite in each case: he argues that the good cannot be defined as a fact; he claims that human beings move towards their telos only if they have virtue and virtue is not by nature; he locates, in the human ergon, that which is responsible for human versatility. Finally, I have shown by example that the metaphysical commitments of Aristotle's account of human happiness are not as controversial as they seem.If all of this is true, then perhaps the disorder that has existed in ethics since the enlightenment has been misdiagnosed. Perhaps it is not due to an unhappy choice between end-neutral emotivism on the one hand and Aristotle's bad metaphysics on the other. Perhaps instead it is due, at least in part, to a too hasty rejection of Aristotle's ethics on the grounds of a rejection of his biology.     

理论和处境:汉语基督教伦理研究的基本思路探究

本文探究汉语基督教伦理研究的基本思路问题,特别关注具体处境中基督教价值的公共意义问题,论文包括:第一部分,考察1980年以来汉语基督教伦理研究的主要内容,总体上看,其中包括两大方面:一是对基本伦理概念(比如人性、爱的观念)及其与中国传统思想相关观念进行比照的研究,二是实践和具体社会处境的角度,包括从基督教角度对于中国基督徒的道德生活以及全球和本土范围的社会公共问题的研究;第二部分依据相关的基督教伦理研究成果,参照中国思想资源和当代社会的道德议题,反思汉语基督教研究的处境性问题并寻求重新阐释某些基督教教义的可能性.研究采用基督教伦理研究中的实在的和处境化的进路,将之放在一个特定的文化和社会背景下并考虑到其具体和当下的条件来展开对基督教伦理思想的论述.     

HAUERWAS AMONG THE VIRTUES

Despite the fact that Stanley Hauerwas has not taken up many of the topics normally associated with virtue ethics, has explicitly distanced himself from the enterprise known as “virtue ethics,” and throughout his career has preferred other categories of analysis, ranging from character and agency to practices and liturgy, it is nevertheless clear that his work has had a deep and transformative impact on the recovery of virtue within Christian ethics, and that this impact has largely to do with the ways in which his thought resists normalization. This essay traces the evolution of Hauerwas's reflections on virtue and the virtues over the course of his career, with special attention to how this has been bound up with an increasingly emphatic theological particularism that has remained ambivalent between what I term “comprehensive” versus “exclusive” particularism. I argue that it is important to distinguish between these, and suggest that grasping the destructive tendencies of “exclusive” particularism should cement our commitment to shouldering the responsibilities associated with comprehensive particularism.     

试论西方伦理学的科学路径

由于文化的差异,西方伦理学在发展路径上表现出明显的科学化倾向:一方面,与中国伦理学认为通达道德境界的道路只能是修身养性不同,西方伦理学却主张科学的理性有助于达到道德的理想目标;另一方面,与中国伦理学甚至认为为道与为学在根本上是对抗的相反,西方伦理学却断言美德本身就是知识。     

The Use of Narrative in Jewish Medical Ethics

Anne Jones has pointed out that over the last three decades, stories have been important to medical ethics in at least three ways: (1). Stories as cases for teaching principle-based medical ethics (2). Narratives for moral guides on what is considered living a good life (3). Stories as testimonials written by both patients and physicians. A pioneer in this effort, particularly in regard to using narratives as moral guides, has been the ethicist and philosopher Stanley Hauerwas. Heavily influenced by virtue ethics, Hauerwas believes that it is a person’s particular narrative tradition that provides one with convictions that form the basis of one’s morality. Befitting a Protestant theologian, he is particularly concerned with the Christian narrative. From a Jewish perspective, there has been much less written on the use of narrative in medical ethics. However, it is a mistake to think that narrative has little, if any, role in Rabbinic ethical decision making. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the centrality of narrative in the thought of Orthodox Jewish decisors and the problems inherent in this methodology.     

What is bioethics without Christianity?

The author uses the essays in this issue as a springboard for making three points. First, he argues that most, if not all, current institutional versions of Christianity have failed to provide a meaningful framework for the spiritual life. Second, he argues that there is no ethics other than Judeo-Christian ethics and that there can be no bioethics other than Judeo-Christian bioethics. Finally, he argues that the overriding issue we face is not whether to address bioethical issues from a Christian perspective or from a non-Christian perspective, but rather whether we shall address biological and medical issues from an ethical or a scientific-technological perspective.     

The Innocuous Legacy of Christian Ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics

I argue that even if the influence of Christian ethics on comparative religious ethics (CRE) is inevitable, it need not be problematic. The legacy would only be worrisome if it stacked the deck in favor of Christian ethics or predisposed comparative ethicists to conform to the methods or thematic concerns of Christian ethics. Following Gadamer, I suggest that the ideal of presuppositionless objectivity is an illusion that applies to not only those who emerge from a Christian cultural context but in every global context. Given the specific historical and cultural contexts of the emergence of CRE, the residue of Christian ethics in CRE is understandable and expected. Thus, the legacy of Christian ethics in CRE will only be problematic to the extent that the potential dangers of Christian hegemony remain hidden, which does not seem to be the case in the contemporary academic context.     

Toni Wolff-James Kirsch correspondence

This paper draws on the letters between Toni Wolff and James Kirsch from 1929-1933 and from 1949-1953 to highlight some aspects of Toni Wolff's relationship with her superviser and former analysand, James Kirsch. Her personality, her approach to her work as analyst, and her relationship with Jung and with colleagues are illustrated with selected quotes from the correspondence.     

The Catholic Church, the American military, and homosexual reorientation therapy.

Homosexual activist groups have targeted the Catholic Church and the American military as institutions especially in need of transformation. Associations of healthcare professionals are also under assault from homosexual activists. It is, nevertheless, appropriate for the Church and the military to defend themselves against this assault, to affirm that homosexuality is incompatible with Christian ethics and military service, and to help homosexuals free themselves from the vice of homosexuality. Arguments that homosexual reorientation therapy is unethical are unsound. Such therapy is consistent with the Christian virtue of charity.     

Demea’s Dilemmas

This paper considers how Descartes's and Hume's sceptical challenges were appropriated by Christian Wolff and Johann Nicolaus Tetens specifically in the context of projects related to Kant's in the transcendental deduction. Wolff introduces Descartes's dream hypothesis as an obstacle to his account of the truth of propositions, or logical truth, which he identifies with the 'possibility' of empirical concepts. Tetens explicitly takes Hume's account of our idea of causality to be a challenge to the `reality' of transcendent concepts in general, a challenge he addresses by locating the source of this concept in the understanding rather than in the imagination. After considering this background, I turn to Kant's deployment of apparently traditional sceptical concerns at the outset of the transcendental deduction and argue that he does not there intend to introduce a global sceptical challenge and, accordingly, that there are historical grounds for doubting that the transcendental deduction is intended as an anti-sceptical argument.     

Toward a virtue-based normative ethics for the health professions

Virtue is the most perdurable concept in the history of ethics, which is understandable given the ineradicability of the moral agent in the events of the moral life. Historically, virtue enjoyed normative force as long as the philosophical anthropology and the metaphysics of the good that grounded virtue were viable. That grounding has eroded in both general and medical ethics. If virtue is to be restored to a normative status, its philosophical underpinnings must be reconstructed. Such reconstruction seems unlikely in general ethics, where the possibility of agreement on the good for humans is remote. However, it is a realistic possibility in the professional ethics fo the health professions where agreement on the telos of the healing relationship is more likely to arise. Nevertheless, virtue-based ethics must be related conceptually and normatively to other ethical theories in a comprehensive moral philosophy of the health professions. If he really does think there is no distinction between virtue and vice, why, sir, when he leaves our house, let us count our spoons. Samuel Johnson     

Virtue Ethics,Social Difference,and the Challenge of an Embodied Politics

Following the revival of virtue theory, some moral theorists have argued that virtue ethics can provide the basis for a radical politics. Such a politics essentially departs from the liberal model of the moral agent as an autonomous reason‐giver. It instead privileges an understanding of the agent as conditioned by her community, and in the case of social oppression and marginalization, communal virtues may become a vehicle for social change. This essay compares political appropriations of virtue theory by Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas and secular feminist thinkers Lisa Tessman and Margaret Urban Walker. Hauerwas and feminist theorists both embrace a kind of embodied vulnerability as a political virtue, arguing that it enables more genuine social recognition. The virtue feminist critique is more robust than Hauerwas's, however, insofar as it understands mutual recognition to involve acknowledgment of social difference and the concomitant pursuit of justice.     

The Practicality of Ancient Virtue Ethics: Greece and China

Virtue ethics has been charged with being unable to provide solutions to practical moral issues. In response, the defenders of virtue ethics argue that normative virtue ethics exists. The debate is significant on its own, yet both sides of the controversy approach the issue from the assumption that moral philosophy has to tell us what we should do. In this essay, I would like to examine the question regarding the practicality of virtue ethics in a different way. Virtue ethics is an ancient approach shared by both ancient Greek philosophers and classic Chinese Confucians, and indeed, ancient Greeks call ethics “practical science.” How, then, do the ancients themselves view the issue of practicality? This essay shows that there is a notion of practicality which is prominent in both ancient Greek and ancient Chinese virtue ethics but is neglected in today’s ethics. According to this notion, ethics is to transform one’s life. The essay also raises a prospect of the revival of this notion.     

Medieval Consideration and Moral Pace

This essay examines the relationship between virtue and understandings of time through a comparative examination of two medieval Christian writers, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas. By locating temporal dimensions of virtue primarily in discussions of prudence, this essay compares Thomas's account of the virtue of counsel as preparatory to prudent judgment with Bernard's earlier account of consideration as an integrating virtue that coordinates an examination of physical surroundings and social responsibilities with an examination of one's own inner life and history of moral decisions. The essay argues that accounts of virtue ethics focusing on tradition‐specific views of the human good and practical reasoning are insufficient if they do not also examine how practical reasoning interprets and responds to religious interpretations of time that disclose the distinctive kinds of moral problems arising in each historical period.     

Challenging Sociological Reductionism

The author analyzes Christian Smith's What Is a Person? from a Christian theological‐ethical perspective, assessing the way in which he tackles sociological theories that reflect secularized and reductionist assumptions about the human person, and offering a friendly critique of the Christian personalist, humanist, and virtue ethic that he deploys to challenge his field.     

A sense of awe: On the differences between Confucian thought and Christianity

The fundamental importance of reverence is recognized by all major world cultures. Confucianism’s account of “The three things of which the sage is in awe” is seen in Chinese culture through the value placed on reverence. “The three things of which the sage is in awe” both manifests itself as an approach to value and is also an expression of practical ethical guidance. The essential aspect of reverence is a sincere and ethical outlook; accordingly it is a part of virtue ethics. In this kind of virtue ethics, ethical practice accords with self-conscious conduct that is guided by a sense of reverence, and this forms the guiding thought of Confucianism. From a comparative cultural perspective, the Confucian sense of reverence founded upon ethical self-awareness and Christian sense of reverence founded on divine worship are different. However, both take reverence to be the root of culture, thus proving that reverence is an element that none of the world’s major cultures can be without. In the early modern period, a sense of reverence was seen something enchanted and harmful to the rational progress of civilization. However, the contemporary reenchantment movements in some ways call up a return to such reverence.