Task switching is not cue switching

With the aim of reducing cognitive control in task switching to simpler processes, researchers have proposed in a series of recent studies that there is little more to switching tasks than switching cues. The present study addresses three questions concerning this reduction hypothesis. First, does switching cues account for all relevant variance associated with switching tasks? Second, how well does this hypothesis generalize beyond the experimental procedure from which it was developed? Third, how well does this new procedure preserve relevant measures such as task-switch cost? The answers (no; not very; not very) suggest that task switching does not reduce to cue switching.     

A slippery directional slope: Individual differences in using slope as a directional cue

Navigators rely on many different types of cues to build representations of large-scale spaces. Sloped terrain is an important cue that has received recent attention in comparative and human spatial research. However, the studies to date have been unable to determine how directional slope information leads to more accurate spatial representations. Moreover, whereas some studies have shown that the inclusion of slope cues improves performance on spatial tasks across participants (Kelly, 2011; Restat, Steck, Mochnatzki, & Mallot, 2004), other research has suggested individual differences in the benefits of slope cues (Chai & Jacobs, 2010; Nardi, Newcombe, & Shipley, 2011). We sought to clarify the role of sloped terrain in improving the representation of large-scale environments. In Experiment 1, participants learned the layout of buildings in one of two desktop virtual environments: either a directionally sloped terrain or a completely flat one. Participants in the sloped environment outperformed those in the flat environment. However, participants used slope information as an additional cue, rather than as a preferred reference direction. In Experiment 2, the two virtual environments were again either flat or sloped, but we increased the complexity of the relations between the slope and the path. In this experiment, better performance in the sloped environment was only seen for participants with good self-reported senses of direction. Taken together, the studies show that slope provides useful information for building environmental representations in simple cases, but that individual differences emerge in more complex situations. We suggest that good and bad navigators use different navigational strategies.     

When one cue is not enough: Combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) Gigerenzer, G. and Todd, P. M. 1999. “Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox”. In Simple heuristics that make us smart, Edited by: Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. and the ABC Research Group. 3–34. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar] have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

When one cue is not enough: combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

Why Equal Opportunity is not a Valuable Goal

abstract In this paper, I provide an analysis of equal opportunity. I argue that equal opportunity occurs where two or more persons with equal natural abilities and willingness to work hard have chances at various jobs that are in the aggregate of equal value. I then argue that equal opportunity is neither valuable nor something that the government ought to pursue. First, it is not clear why we should value opportunities rather than outcomes. Second, the value of equal opportunity rests on the value of interest satisfaction. However, if interest satisfaction is relatively constant across different jobs and different job opportunities, then the concern for interest satisfaction will not ground the value of equal opportunity. Third, equalizing opportunities is not in itself valuable because persons are not equally valuable. Fourth, even if equal opportunity were valuable, the government could pursue it only by trespassing on individual rights.     

Why 'Health' is not a Central Category for Public Health Policy

We normally think that public health policy is an important political activity. In turn, we normally understand the value of public health policy in terms of the promotion of health or some health-related good (such as opportunity for health), on the basis of the assumption that health is an important constituent or determinant of wellbeing. In this paper, I argue that the assumption that the value of public health policy should be understood in terms of health leads us to overlook important benefits generated by such policy. To capture these benefits we need to understand the ends of public health policy in terms of the promotion of 'physical safety'. I then go on to argue that the idea that 'health' is an important category for evaluating or estimating individuals' wellbeing in the normative context of social policy is confused. I then clarify the relationship between my arguments and QALY-based accounts of health assessment. In the final section of the paper, I defend this surprising conclusion against various attacks.     

Why modal fictionalism is not self-defeating

Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.

Why amnesia and the law is not a useful topic

This brief note suggests that amnesia and the law (or any other behavioral condition and the law) is not a jurisprudentially interesting topic because such behavioral conditions do not require distinct legal critera and procedures. Rather, the issues that each raises are examples of more general normative issues, such as the proper criteria for competence or responsibility, that should be addressed more generally and directly. Distinct behavioral conditions are simply factors that should be used as evidence when the law adjudicates or develops more general doctrines.     

Why manifold substantivalism is probably not a consequence of classical mechanics

This paper develops and defends three related forms of relationism about spacetime against attacks by contemporary substantivalists. It clarifies Newton's globes argument to show that it does not bear on relations that fail to determine geodesic motions, since the inertial effects on which Newton relies are not simply correlated with affine structure, but must be understood in dynamical terms. It develops remarks by Sklar and van Fraassen into relational versions of Newtonian mechanics, and argues that Earman does not show them to trivialize the debate.     

Why g is not an adaptation: a comment on Kanazawa (2004)

In S. Kanazawa's evolutionary theory of general intelligence (g), g is presented as a species-typical information-processing mechanism. This conceptualization of g departs radically from the accepted conceptualization of g as a source of individual differences that is manifest in the positive manifold. Kanazawa's theory is thus problematic in the sense that it concerns a purely hypothetical, and empirically unsupported, conceptualization of g. The authors argue that an evolutionary account of g should address it as a source of individual differences--that is, in a manner that is consistent with the empirical support for g.     

Why I'm not a Humean

There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humeans are to be compelled to accept it, and consequently, the second premise will have to be stronger to retain validity. I shore up the case against Humeanism by providing revised premises along with new defences of them. I show why this also provides a lesson for non-Humeans about the epistemology of causal relations.     

Encoding fluency is a cue used for judgments about learning

The authors used paired-associate learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image (encoding fluency) influenced 2 metacognitive judgments: judgments of learning (JOLs) and quality of encoding ratings (QUEs). Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that latency of a keypress indicating successful image formation was negatively related to both JOLs and QUEs even though latency was unrelated to recall. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when concrete and abstract items were mixed in a single list, latency was related to concreteness, judgments, and recall. However, item concreteness and fluency influenced judgments independently of one another. These outcomes suggest an important role of encoding fluency in the formation of metacognitive judgments about learning and future recall.     

All we need is a cue to remember: the effect of an extinction cue on renewal

In the present study, it was investigated by employing a human fear conditioning paradigm whether an extinction retrieval cue can attenuate renewal of conditioned responding after an extinction treatment procedure, and if so, what the precise role of such an extinction cue comprises. It was hypothesized that such a cue can attenuate renewal and would function as a safety signal capable of directly inhibiting the expectancy of an aversive outcome and conditioned skin conductance responding to a conditioned stimulus. The results demonstrated that the extinguished expectancy of an aversive outcome was renewed when the CS was presented outside the extinction context and that an extinction cue attenuated this effect. This extinction cue, however, only transferred its inhibitory properties to other, non-extinguished stimuli when there was no contextual switch. This safety signal function was not observed after a switch in context. Possible functions of the extinction cue and its application in extinction-based exposure treatments are discussed.