Does the familiarity bias hypothesis explain why there is no masked priming for “NO” decisions?

Traditional "activation" views of masked priming explain the identity priming effect in terms of facilitation due to ‘pre-activation’ of stored representations. Norris and Kinoshita's (2008) Bayesian Reader theory of masked priming instead explains priming in terms of the evidence that the prime contributes towards the decision required to the target. In support of the Bayesian Reader account, Norris and Kinoshita showed that the absence of priming for nonwords in the lexical decision task and for targets requiring a Different decision in the same–different match task can be explained based on a single principle. Against this, Bowers (2010) argued that the absence of priming should be explained instead by a combination of sublexical priming and "familiarity bias". As evidence, Bowers cited Bodner and Masson’s (1997) finding that nonword priming did emerge with targets presented in visually unfamiliar cAsE-AlTeRnAtEd format. We present evidence that this finding was due to the use of an ambiguous letter in case-alternated format; when using unambiguous letters, we consistently failed to find priming of case-alternated nonwords. We suggest that the Bayesian Reader, rather than the familiarity bias hypothesis, explains the absence of priming.     

Semantic priming occurs for word but not location pronunciation in the postcue task

Semantic priming refers to the finding that a word response is facilitated if it is preceded by a related word compared to when it is preceded by an unrelated word. Dallas and Merikle (Can J Psychol 30: 15–21 1976a; Bull Psychon Soc 8: 441–444 1976b) demonstrated that semantic priming occurred under conditions in which a pair of simultaneously displayed words was previewed for over a second prior to the onset of a cue indicating which of the words should be pronounced aloud (postcue task). In contrast, semantic interference effects have been reported for postcue picture-naming tasks (Dean et al. in J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 27: 733–743, 2001; Humphreys et al. in J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 21: 961–980, 1995). According to Dean et al., the semantic interference effects in postcue picture naming occur because the integration of the object and the cued attribute in memory is more difficult for categorically related pictures than for unrelated pictures. The aim of this experiment was to determine whether this idea was true for postcue word pronunciation tasks. Participants completed two postcue tasks, one requiring pronunciation of the target word indicated by a locational cue and another requiring pronunciation of the location of a centrally presented word. Results indicated a semantic priming effect only for the locational cue condition suggesting that the integration of the cue and identity information was unaffected by word context. These data suggest that priming in a postcue word pronunciation task may be due to feedback from residual activation within the semantic system facilitating access to the target word’s phonology.     

Toward a scalable holographic word-form representation

Phenomena in a variety of verbal tasks—for example, masked priming, lexical decision, and word naming—are typically explained in terms of similarity between word-forms. Despite the apparent commonalities between these sets of phenomena, the representations and similarity measures used to account for them are not often related. To show how this gap might be bridged, we build on the work of Hannagan, Dupoux, and Christophe, Cognitive Science 35:79-118, (2011) to explore several methods of representing visual word-forms using holographic reduced representations and to evaluate them on their ability to account for a wide range of effects in masked form priming, as well as data from lexical decision and word naming. A representation that assumes that word-internal letter groups are encoded relative to word-terminal letter groups is found to predict qualitative patterns in masked priming, as well as lexical decision and naming latencies. We then show how this representation can be integrated with the BEAGLE model of lexical semantics (Jones & Mewhort, Psychological Review 114:1–37, 2007) to enable the model to encompass a wider range of verbal tasks.     

Human memory reconsolidation can be explained using the temporal context model

Recent work by Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, and Nadel (Learning & Memory, 14, 47–53, 2007) and Hupbach, Gomez, and Nadel (Memory, 17, 502–510, 2009) suggests that episodic memory for a previously studied list can be updated to include new items, if participants are reminded of the earlier list just prior to learning a new list. The key finding from the Hupbach studies was an asymmetric pattern of intrusions, whereby participants intruded numerous items from the second list when trying to recall the first list, but not viceversa. Hupbach et al. (2007; 2009) explained this pattern in terms of a cellular reconsolidation process, whereby first-list memory is rendered labile by the reminder and the labile memory is then updated to include items from the second list. Here, we show that the temporal context model of memory, which lacks a cellular reconsolidation process, can account for the asymmetric intrusion effect, using well-established principles of contextual reinstatement and item–context binding.     

Structural priming as implicit learning: Cumulative priming effects and individual differences

We explored the claim that structural priming is a case of implicit learning within the language production system. The experiment began with a baseline phase, in which we assessed participants’ rates of production for double object and prepositional object constructions. Then participants were biased toward the production of either the double object or prepositional object construction. Finally, we again assessed participants’ rates of production for the target constructions. Consistent with claims that structural priming is a case of implicit learning, we found that biasing participants toward the prepositional object construction produced stronger cumulative priming effects than did biasing participants toward the double object construction. We also found that individual differences in implicit learning were marginally correlated with overall rates of production for the double object construction. Participants who scored better on the learning task tended to produce fewer double object constructions.     

Perceptual distinctiveness produces long-lasting priming of pop-out

Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) demonstrated memory influences in singleton search from one trial to the next, an effect they termed priming of pop-out (PoP). This effect was described as resulting from the persistence of an implicit memory trace, the influence of which could be observed for around five to eight subsequent trials. The seemingly short-lived nature of this priming effect has been attributed to decay of the underlying memory representation that occurs when attention is directed to intervening search items, even when such items are perceptually dissimilar from the search trials upon which PoP is measured (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000). The present study reexamines the role of perceptual similarity as a mechanism of interference by examining the influence on PoP of rare search trials that were perceptually distinct with respect to the other, common trials. Long-lasting (n − 16) PoP was observed for rare trials that were composed of distinct target/distractor colors, suggesting that PoP can be observed across at least twice as many trials as has previously been reported. Thus, the time span across which PoP can be measured depends heavily on the nature of the intervening search displays, a result that must be accommodated by current theoretical accounts of PoP.     

Object-based attention occurs regardless of object awareness

In this study, we investigated whether awareness of objects is necessary for object-based guidance of attention. We used the two-rectangle method (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994) to probe object-based attention and adopted the continuous flash suppression technique (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) to control for the visibility of the two rectangles. Our results show that object-based attention, as indexed by the same-object advantage—faster response to a target within a cued object than within a noncued object—was obtained regardless of participants’ awareness of the objects. This study provides the first evidence of object-based attention under unconscious conditions by showing that the selection unit of attention can be at an object level even when these objects are invisible—a level higher than the previous evidence for a subliminally cued location. We suggest that object-based attentional guidance plays a fundamental role of binding features in both the conscious and unconscious mind.     

Centre–surround inhibition is a general aspect of famous-person recognition: Evidence from negative semantic priming from clearly visible primes

A centre–surround attentional mechanism was proposed by Carr and Dagenbach (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 16: 341–350, 1990) to account for their observations of negative semantic priming from hard-to-perceive primes. Their mechanism cannot account for the observation of negative semantic priming when primes are clearly visible. Three experiments (Ns = 30, 46, and 30) used a familiarity decision with names of famous people, preceded by a prime name with the same occupation as the target or with a different occupation. Negative semantic priming was observed at a 150- or 200-ms SOA, with positive priming at shorter (50-ms) and longer (1,000-ms) SOAs. In Experiment 3, we verified that the primes were easily recognisable in the priming task at an SOA that yielded negative semantic priming, which cannot be predicted by the original centre–surround mechanism. A modified version is proposed that explains transiently negative semantic priming by proposing that centre–surround inhibition is a normal, automatically invoked aspect of the semantic processing of visually presented famous names.     

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections.     

A diffusion model analysis of task interference effects in prospective memory

Holding an intention often interferes with other ongoing activities, indicating that resource-demanding processes are involved in maintaining the intention and noticing the appropriate event to fulfill it. Little is known, however, about the nature of the processes underlying this task interference effect. The goal of the present research was to decompose the processes contributing to the task interference effect by applying the diffusion model (Ratcliff, Psychological Review 85:59–108, 1978) to an event-based prospective memory task. In the first experiment, we validated the interpretation of the response criterion parameter (a) of the diffusion model as reflecting strategies to cope with the anticipated demands of a prospective memory task in the context of the ongoing task. The second experiment served to investigate which underlying processes contribute to the task interference often found with prospective memory tasks. Diffusion model analyses revealed that the task interference effect was due to (1) less efficient processing in the more demanding than in the less demanding prospective memory task and (2) a more conservative response criterion. We suggest that the anticipated demands and the additional processing demands of the prospective memory task jointly contribute to the task interference effect.     

Biased representations of the spatial structure of navigable environments

Recent studies (e.g., Shelton & McNamara in Cognitive Psychology, 43(4), 274–310, 2001; Valiquette, McNamara, & Smith in Memory and Cognition, 31(3), 479–489, 2003) have demonstrated that judgments of relative direction (JRD) access a single enduring orientation-dependent allocentric representation of the layout of objects in an environment, regardless of whether the space is viewed from one or multiple vantage points. Two experiments tested the limits of this phenomenon. In both experiments participants learned the locations of objects in a large room from two views: one view was aligned with salient environmental frames of reference (edges of the mat on which objects were placed and walls of the enclosing room) and expected to be preserved in long-term memory; the other view was misaligned and not expected to be preserved in long-term memory. The first experiment demonstrated that performing JRD between studying the misaligned view and studying the aligned view did not result in the misaligned view being maintained in long-term memory. The second experiment demonstrated that after studying the layout extensively from the misaligned view, 30 s of exposure to the aligned view (with no instructions to learn the layout from that view) resulted in the aligned but not the misaligned view being preserved in long-term memory. These findings indicate that the human spatial memory and navigation system is strongly biased to represent the spatial structure of navigable environments with reference directions or axes that are aligned with salient environmental frames of reference.     

Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s (Recent) Discontents

Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order to block the kind of luck with which knowledge was argued to be incompatible. What I’ll show here is that the modal account of luck offers a plausible story at the first stage and leads naturally to equally plausible lines to take at the second and third stages, at which a safety condition on knowledge is squarely motivated. There are, however, recent challenges—advanced by Jonathan Kvanvig (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 272–281, 2008); Kelly Becker (2007); and Jennifer Lackey (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2):255–267, 2008), among others—to the plausibility of the safety-based anti-luck project I’ve sketched here at each of its three stages of development. Once I’ve made precise the challenges, I’ll show why none implies that we abandon the commitments of the safety-based anti-luck project at any of its stages. What we should conclude, then, is that a safety-condition on knowledge is motivated by independently defensible accounts of (1) what luck is; and (2) just how knowledge should be thought incompatible with it.     

Perceptual specificity of priming for compound words not presented

Two experiments extended prior work on the perceptual specificity of priming to compound words not presented during a study phase. In both experiments, perceptual manipulations were employed, and priming was obtained on a word fragment completion test (e.g.,c_ec_po_nt) where the lexical elements of the compounds (check andpoint) were presented in different study words. In Experiment 1, priming was highest when identical fragments for the lexical components were presented during the study phase (c_ec_list, needlepo_nt) and test phase (c_ec_po_nt). In Experiment 2, visual study presentations, but not auditory study presentations, led to significant priming. The findings are consistent with predictions from transfer-appropriate processing and demonstrate perceptual, not lexical (postperceptual), priming.     

Phonological and orthographic overlap effects in fast and masked priming

We investigated how orthographic and phonological information is activated during reading, using a fast priming task, and during single-word recognition, using masked priming. Specifically, different types of overlap between prime and target were contrasted: high orthographic and high phonological overlap (track–crack), high orthographic and low phonological overlap (bear–gear), or low orthographic and high phonological overlap (fruit–chute). In addition, we examined whether (orthographic) beginning overlap (swoop–swoon) yielded the same priming pattern as end (rhyme) overlap (track–crack). Prime durations were 32 and 50?ms in the fast priming version and 50?ms in the masked priming version, and mode of presentation (prime and target in lower case) was identical. The fast priming experiment showed facilitatory priming effects when both orthography and phonology overlapped, with no apparent differences between beginning and end overlap pairs. Facilitation was also found when prime and target only overlapped orthographically. In contrast, the masked priming experiment showed inhibition for both types of end overlap pairs (with and without phonological overlap) and no difference for begin overlap items. When prime and target only shared principally phonological information, facilitation was only found with a long prime duration in the fast priming experiment, while no differences were found in the masked priming version. These contrasting results suggest that fast priming and masked priming do not necessarily tap into the same type of processing.     

Practicing Compassion Increases Happiness and Self-Esteem

The current study examined the effect of practicing compassion towards others over a 1 week period. Participants (N = 719) were recruited online, and were assigned to a compassionate action condition or a control condition which involved writing about an early memory. Multilevel modeling revealed that those in the compassionate action condition showed sustained gains in happiness (SHI; Seligman et al. in Am Psychol 60:410–421, 2005) and self-esteem (RSES; Rosenberg in Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965) over 6 months, relative to those in the control condition. Furthermore, a multiple regression indicated that anxiously attached individuals (ECR; Brennan et al. 1998) in the compassionate action condition reported greater decreases in depressive symptoms following the exercise period. These results suggest that practicing compassion can provide lasting improvements in happiness and selfesteem, and may be beneficial for anxious individuals in the short run.     

In Defence of Non-conceptual Content

In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.

The Logic of Theory Assessment

This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory. A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176.     

Scientific Representations as Limiting Cases

In this essay, I shall show that the so-called inferential (Suárez 2003 and 2004) and interpretational (Contessa 2007) accounts of scientific representation are respectively unsatisfactory and too weak to account for scientific representation (pars destruens). Along the way, I shall also argue that the pragmatic similarity (Giere 2004 and Giere 2010) and the partial isomorphism (da Costa and French 2003 and French 2003) accounts are unable to single out scientific representation. In the pars construens I spell out a limiting case account which has explanatory surplus vis à vis the approaches which I have previously reviewed. My account offers an adequate treatment of scientific representation, or so I shall try to argue. Central to my account is the notion of a pragmatic limiting case, which will be characterized in due course.     

Locating the Extrema of Fungible Regression Weights

In a multiple regression analysis with three or more predictors, every set of alternate weights belongs to an infinite class of “fungible weights” (Waller, Psychometrica, in press) that yields identical SSE (sum of squared errors) and R ² values. When the R ² using the alternate weights is a fixed value, fungible weights (a _i ) that yield the maximum or minimum cosine with an OLS weight vector (b) are called “fungible extrema.” We describe two methods for locating fungible extrema and we report R code (R Development Core Team, 2007) for one of the methods. We then describe a new approach for populating a class of fungible weights that is derived from the geometry of alternate regression weights. Finally, we illustrate how fungible weights can be profitably used to gauge parameter sensitivity in linear models by locating the fungible extrema of a regression model of executive compensation (Horton & Guerard, Commun. Stat. Simul. Comput. 14:441–448, 1985).