Persisting Effects of Instruction on Young Children's Syllogistic Reasoning with Incongruent and Abstract Premises

Studies of reasoning have often invoked a distinction between a natural or ordinary consideration of the premises, in which they are interpreted, and even distorted, in the light of empirical knowledge, and an analytic or logical consideration of the premises, in which they are analysed in a literal fashion for their logical implications. Two or three years of schooling have been seen as critical for the spontaneous use of analytic reasoning. In two experiments, however, 4-year-olds who were given brief instructions that prompted use of an analytic approach continued to adopt this approach one week later. Thus, when given syllogistic problems in which the major premise was incongruent with their empirical knowledge (e.g. “All snow is black”), instructed children reasoned more accurately from that premise both immediately and a week later as compared to children given only a basic introduction. A third experiment showed that instructions also improved 4-year-olds' performance on hard-to-imagine, abstract material (e.g. “All mib is white”). Similarities between the effects of brief instruction and of schooling are discussed.     

Drawing styles of schooled and unschooled adults: A study in Ghana

The study is a replication of the work of Willats (1977), who identified six classes of drawing systems in a sample of schoolchildren in London. The primary aim was to discover whether, as Willats claimed, the drawing systems were largely independent of formal teaching and that the depiction of overlap followed a line of development distinct from that of drawing systems. Results comparing schooled and entirely unschooled Ghanaian adults essentially confirmed Willats' findings. Nearly all Ghanaian drawings could be reliabily allocated to Willats' classes, and the distribution of classes was unrelated to experience of elementary schooling: by contrast, depiction of overlap was significantly enhanced by schooling. While the Ghanaian data generally support Willats' scheme, they also suggest certain modifications in the definition of classes and raise questions about their implications, which are discussed.     

Modulation of the leniency bias in the discursive dilemma

We experimentally approach the discursive dilemma to gain insight into people's procedural appropriateness judgments. We relied on a vignette in which three people had formed opinions about two skills (premises) of a candidate to decide whether to hire her/him (conclusion). The dilemma arises when different outcomes (hire vs. not hire) are achieved depending on whether the majority opinion is independently considered for each premise or for the global conclusion of each judge. Participants were asked to choose the procedure they thought to be more appropriate to reach a decision. In Experiment 1, we found a leniency effect (a bias to prefer the aggregation procedure that led to hiring the candidate), which was reduced by introducing the participant as a juror with an exogenously provided negative opinion about the candidate's skills. In Experiment 2, we replicated the opinion effect, even when subjects did not participate as jury members. In Experiment 3, we found that the leniency bias was only reduced when participants' negative opinion was aligned with a majority of negative premises, but not with a majority of negative conclusions. We discuss present findings in terms of the identification of empirical regularities that may affect people's procedural legitimacy judgments.     

Schooling in western culture promotes context-free processing

Culture has been shown to influence the way people apprehend their physical environment. Cognitive orientation is more holistic in East Asian cultures, which emphasize relationships and connectedness among objects in the field, than in Western cultures, which are more prone to focus exclusively on the object and its attributes. We investigated whether, beyond, or in conjunction with culture, literacy and/or schooling may also have an influence on this cognitive orientation. Using the Framed-Line Test both in Portugal and in Thailand, we compared literate schooled adults with two groups of unschooled adults: one of illiterates and one of ex-illiterates. As in former studies on Western people, Portuguese-schooled literates were more accurate in the absolute task than in the relative task. In contrast, Portuguese illiterates and ex-illiterates were more accurate in the relative task than in the absolute task. Such an effect of schooling was not observed in the Thai groups, all of whom performed better on the relative task. Thus, the capacity to abstract from contextual information does not stem only from passive exposure to the culture or the physical environment of Western countries. Western schooling, as part of or in addition to culture, is a crucial factor.     

MENTAL ARITHMETIC IN AFRICA AND AMERICA: STRATEGIES,PRINCIPLES, AND EXPLANATIONS*

Mental arithmetic abilities were studied among unschooled African adults and American college students. A set of problems tested the use of the four basic arithmetic operations. Performance was analyzed for: strategies, implicit arithmetic principles, and explicit explanations of the principles. Both groups showed accurate mental arithmetic strategies related to the base ten structure of their native counting systems. The American students' mental strategies additionally made use of algorithms based on written place values. Several principles were implicit in the calculation strategies of both groups, and both used these principles to short-cut calculations. Though the African subjects did not, the American subjects did describe these abstract principles in explicit common language or algebraic expressions. Relationships between schooling and cognition are discussed.     

Do young and old preschoolers exhibit response bias due to different mechanisms? Investigating children's response time

Previous studies have suggested that younger preschoolers exhibit a yes bias due to underdeveloped cognitive abilities, whereas older preschoolers exhibit a response bias due to other factors. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the response latency to yes-no questions pertaining to familiar and unfamiliar objects in 3- to 6-year-olds. The 3-year-olds exhibited a strong yes bias for both objects, and their response latency was significantly shorter than that of the 6-year-olds. The 4- and 5-year-olds did not exhibit any response bias, whereas the 6-year-olds exhibited a nay-saying bias (a response bias to say “no”) for unfamiliar objects. Overall, children’s response bias scores were stronger for familiar objects than for unfamiliar objects. The results suggest that 3-year-olds exhibit a yes bias automatically, but 5- and 6-year-olds are sensitive to question context.     

Divergent Thinking Styles of the Hemispheres: How Syllogisms Are Solved during Transitory Hemisphere Suppression

Psychiatric patients solved syllogisms while recovering from transitory ictal suppression of one hemisphere by electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). The premises were familiar or unfamiliar, true or false. While the right hemisphere was suppressed, syllogisms were usually solved by theoretical, deductive reasoning even when the factual answer was known a priori, the premises were obviously false and the conclusions were absurd. While their left hemisphere was suppressed, the same subjects applied their prior knowledge; if the syllogism content was unfamiliar or false, they refused to answer. We postulate a left-hemisphere mechanism capable of decontextualized mental operations and a right-hemisphere mechanism, the operation of which is context-bound and incapable of abstraction. We show that each hemisphere tends to overextend its perspective on the problem and that in the intact brain they both contribute to an extent that depends on the characteristics of the problem at hand.     

Mathematical Knowledge Developed at Work: The Contribution of Practice Versus the Contribution of Schooling

Mathematical knowledge developed independently of school instruction has been documented among children as well as adults. However, the limits and strengths of this knowledge are not yet well known, and its relationship to knowledge acquired in school remains to be clarified. This study analyzes the use and understanding of mathematical knowledge among bookies with 0 to 11 years of schooling who work in a special kind of lottery game. They were observed at work while dealing with clients and while solving modified problems based on naturalistic observations. At work, regardless of their level of instruction, bookies were always highly efficient. When solving modified problems presented by the examiner, unschooled bookies often refused to try to solve some of them; when they attempted to solve the problems, however, their proportion of correct answers was similar to that found among more schooled subjects. Number of correct answers and a more general ability to analyze and to explain verbally the relationships and the mathematical models involved in the game correlated significantly with school instruction. Schooling did not, however, influence the use of specific techniques (e.g., algorithms) for performing arithmetic operations.     

Learning to read facilitates the retrieval of phonological representations in rapid automatized naming: Evidence from unschooled illiterate,ex‐illiterate,and schooled literate adults

Rapid automatized naming (RAN) of visual items is a powerful predictor of reading skills. However, the direction and locus of the association between RAN and reading is still largely unclear. Here, we investigated whether literacy acquisition directly bolsters RAN efficiency for objects, adopting a strong methodological design, by testing three groups of adults matched in age and socioeconomic variables, who differed only in literacy/schooling: unschooled illiterate and ex‐illiterate, and schooled literate adults. To investigate in a fine‐grained manner whether and how literacy facilitates lexical retrieval, we orthogonally manipulated the word‐form frequency (high vs. low) and phonological neighborhood density (dense vs. spare) of the objects' names. We observed that literacy experience enhances the automaticity with which visual stimuli (e.g., objects) can be retrieved and named: relative to readers (ex‐illiterate and literate), illiterate adults performed worse on RAN. Crucially, the group difference was exacerbated and significant only for those items that were of low frequency and from sparse neighborhoods. These results thus suggest that, regardless of schooling and age at which literacy was acquired, learning to read facilitates the access to and retrieval of phonological representations, especially of difficult lexical items.     

Enantiomorphy through the looking glass: literacy effects on mirror-image discrimination

To examine whether enantiomorphy (i.e., the ability to discriminate lateral mirror images) is influenced by the acquisition of a written system that incorporates mirrored letters (e.g., b and d), unschooled illiterate adults were compared with people reading the Latin alphabet, namely, both schooled literate adults and unschooled adults alphabetized in adulthood. In various sorting and same-different comparison tasks with nonlinguistic materials, illiterate participants displayed some sensitivity to enantiomorphic contrasts but performed far worse than all the other participant groups when the task required paying attention to such contrasts. The difficulties of illiterate participants were more severe with enantiomorphs than with rotations in the plane or shape contrasts. Learning a written system that incorporates enantiomorphic letters thus pushes the beginning reader to break the mirror invariance characteristic of the visual system, and this process generalizes beyond the realm of symbolic characters.     

THE INFLUENCE OF SCHOOLING ON ADULT RECALL OF FAMILIAR STIMULI: A STUDY IN GHANA*

Several studies have shown the influence of schooling on a variety of cognitive skills. However, since the tasks employed were nearly always derived from the school setting, such findings provide no adequate answer to the following question: given a cognitive task with which schooled and unschooled subjects have had equal experience, does schooling still have an effect? Opposing views are held about this question, and the aim of the present study was to contribute towards answering it. Twenty-four schooled and 24 unschooled subjects, evenly divided by sex within each group, were given a recall task based on an indigenous game equally familiar to all of them. The task involved positions, numbers, and combinations of both. The performance of schooled subjects was very significantly superior on all aspects of the tasks. With regard to position there was an interaction indicating that women's performance was particularly enhanced by schooling, but this was not the case with numbers. Results thus support the view that schooling does have a general effect not necessarily mediated by specific experience. Moreover, in the light of the proportion of variance accounted for among different component tasks, it is suggested that a major effect of schooling might be an increased ability to process complex information.     

Children's understandings of the attributes of life

Previous investigations of children's understandings of the life concept have focused on their classifications of the life status of familiar objects. In this study, we attempted to examine more directly the processes by which children infer life status by examining their reasoning about unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things to establish which attributes they associated most closely with life. Children age 7 and younger most often named attributes true only of animals but not of plants; older children more often named attributes true of both animals and plants. However, movement was the single attribute cited most frequently by children of all ages tested. In Experiment 2, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were presented information about attributes of imaginary objects on a distant planet and were asked to infer if those objects were alive. Again, young children relied relatively heavily on qualities true only of animals but not of plants, whereas older children relied more on attributes true of both plants and animals. Also as before, movement was viewed as indicative of life at all ages tested. In Experiment 3, we examined the hypothesis that children discriminate among different types of motion and that the types of motion they associate with life are in fact typical of living things. Children ranging from age 5 through 11 were found to discriminate among different types of motion and to infer that objects were alive only when they showed the types of motion typical of living beings. The results of Experiment 3 allowed interpretation of seemingly conflicting results that have arisen in previous studies, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study.     

How falsity dispels fallacies

From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants did not receive these instructions. There were more correct answers for illusory disjunctions whose premises had been falsified than there were for illusory disjunctions that had not been falsified. A second Experiment introduced illusory inferences in a real world context that accentuated falsification of premises. Accuracy also improved. Knowledge of how to falsify premises and to consider their implications for true premises transferred to a new problem introduced at the end of the Experiment without the falsification instruction. The participants' ratings of the difficulty of the inferences showed that they did not err simply because illusory inferences are perceived to be more difficult than control problems. The model theory predicts these results because it postulates that the limitations of working memory preclude the representation of false information.     

Early development of spatial‐numeric associations: evidence from spatial and quantitative performance of preschoolers

Numeric magnitudes often bias adults’ spatial performance. Partly because the direction of this bias (left‐to‐right versus right‐to‐left) is culture‐specific, it has been assumed that the orientation of spatial‐numeric associations is a late development, tied to reading practice or schooling. Challenging this assumption, we found that preschoolers expected numbers to be ordered from left‐to‐right when they searched for objects in numbered containers, when they counted, and (to a lesser extent) when they added and subtracted. Further, preschoolers who lacked these biases demonstrated more immature, logarithmic representations of numeric value than preschoolers who exhibited the directional bias, suggesting that spatial‐numeric associations aid magnitude representations for symbols denoting increasingly large numbers.     

Finding parts within figures: a developmental study

Preschool children, primary school children, and unschooled adults were tested on the part-probe task designed by Palmer. Relatively high scores were obtained with all groups on parts which had a 'good' relationship with the figure. However, the ability to find more deeply embedded segments was not present in the preschool children or in the unschooled adults. This indicates that the processes of postperceptual analysis necessary to find a part in a figure are neither built-in nor the consequence of mere cognitive growth, but depend on the instruction or experience usually provided in school. Such processes should not be confused with those that lead to form perception. Inspection of the part-figure pairs and of the corresponding detection scores suggests the importance of several stimulus properties.     

Between reasoning

In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog]_{referent_expression} is to the left of [the frog]_{relatum_expression}; [the snake]_{referent_expression} is between [the donkey and the deer]_{relatum_expression}). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given-new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.     

Understanding unfamiliar words in young, young-old, and old-old adults: inferential processing and the abstraction-deficit hypothesis

Previous research suggests that older adults derive interpretations of unfamiliar words that are less precise than those of young adults (D. McGinnis & E. M. Zelinski, 2000). Thirty-one adults aged 18-37, 27 aged 65-74, and 28 aged 75-87 read passages containing unfamiliar words (1 per passage) and were asked to think aloud during reading. After reading each passage, participants selected meaning-relevant cues and rated the quality of 4 definition options. Compared with the 2 younger groups, the oldest group rated thematic and irrelevant definitions significantly higher, and their think-aloud protocols included more generalized inferences. Results pertaining to cue selection were not significant. Taken together, these results suggest that age differences in meaning derivation may be related to inferential processing that is overgeneralized, providing support for the abstraction-deficit hypothesis.     

Memory factors in age-related differences in simple reasoning

Adults in their 50s were compared with adults in their late teens or 20s in the accuracy of relatively simple reasoning decisions involving varying amounts of information. Because the magnitude of the age differences in decision accuracy was independent of the amount of information relevant to the decision, it was suggested that adults in their 20s and 50s do not differ in the effectiveness of integrating information across multiple premises. However, the 2 groups differed in the accuracy of trials involving only a single relevant premise, and thus it was inferred that 1 factor contributing to reasoning differences within the age range from 20 to 60 may be a failure to encode, or retain, relevant information.