Religious Wars or Healthy Competition in the NDE Movement?

In the early years of near-death research many organized religions rejected the near-death experience (NDE) as a legitimate expression of religious faith. More recently numerous religious apologists have laid claim to NDEs as verifying particular theological beliefs. I see this as a healthy competition between religions, and a competition that results from the very success of the near-death research effort. Religious apologists, however, must be reasonably objective in any juxtapositions of religious philosophy with NDE findings. I point out some problems in this regard with Michael Sabom's recent work. I also argue that Kenneth Ring's recent statements that we might not now be headed toward Omega as he once thought may be premature.     

Gendered Patterns of Experience in Social and Cultural Transition: The Case of English-Speaking Immigrants in Israel

This study aimed to connect between work on the impact on the self as a consequence of the immigration process an theories of gender. It was based on semistructured interviews with 12 English-speaking immigrants to Israel. The data were analyzed using grounded theory (A. Strauss & J. Corbin, 1990, 1994) to examine the difficulties that the immigrants felt when leaving and since being in Israel, their methods of coping and their views of what constitutes a successful immigration. Two major patterns were identified, each of which rested on a different self need that appeared to have been affected by the immigration process: (1) the need to feel competent and (2) the need to feel a sense of belonging. Although most of the interviewees talked of both needs being damaged or affected to some extent, there was a strong tendency for the women respondents to place belonging needs in the foreground of their accounts and for men to place competence needs in theirs. Such results can be understood in the context of feminist theories of self that distinguish between women's sense of self, built in relation through connection to others, and men's sense of self, built around the concept of separation.     

Avoiding the columbus confusion: An Ockhamish view of near-death research

The positive aftereffects of near-death experiences (NDEs) are sometimes regarded as due to the possibility that they may be visions of the beyond. But that notion could be a serious misconception, similar to what I call the Columbus Confusion. Five hundred years ago, Christopher Columbus's belief that he had found a new route to India prevented him from realizing that he had discovered a new continent. Likewise, contemporary belief that NDEs are glimpses of an afterlife may prevent us from realizing their more profound nature. Belief in an afterlife has not historically brought humanity a high quality of life, but NDEs seem reliably to do so, and may offer important clues about why the expanded vitality, the eternity-consciousness, of the mystics is commonly blocked. Those clues are obscured by popular emphasis on that minority of NDEs that resemble otherworld journeys.     

Amazing grace: The near-death experience as a compensatory gift

This paper illustrates the apparently providential timing and the healing character of near-death experiences (NDEs) and NDE-like episodes, through four case histories of persons whose lives, prior to their experiences, were marked by deep anguish and a sense of hopelessness. Spiritually, such case histories suggest the intervention of a guiding intelligence that confers a form of amazing grace on the recipient. Methodologically, these reports point to the importance of taking into account the person's life history as a context for understanding the full significance of NDEs and similar awakening experiences. The article ends with a retrospective account of a childhood NDE in which the big secret of these experiences is disclosed.We who are about to die demand a miracle. W. H. Auden (cited in Grosso, 1985)     

The price of information

In this paper I apply an old problem of Quine's (the inscrutability of reference in translation) to a new style of theory about mental content (causal/nomological/informational accounts of meaning) and conclude that no naturalization of content of the sort currently popular can solve Quine's gavagai enigma. I show how failure to solve the problem leads to absurd conclusions not about one's own mental life, but about the nonmental world. I discuss various ways of attempting to remedy the accounts so as to avoid the problem and explain why each attempt at solving the problem would take the information theorists further from their self-assigned task of naturalizing semantics.     

"Solar love": Nietzsche,Merleau-Ponty and the fortunes of perception

Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty repudiate the mirror view of perception and embrace what Nietzsche refers to as solar love or creative perception. I argue that Merleau-Ponty thinks of this type of perception primarily in terms of convergence and Nietzsche in terms of divergence. I then show how, contrary to their own emphases, Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh and Nietzsche's idea of chaos suggest that convergence and divergence are abstractions from an ontologically prior realm of hybrid perceptions. In this realm, each perception is shot through with the others, simultaneously inside and outside one another. The creative tension among these perceptions continually produces new perspectives or voices, that is, a realm whose very being is metamorphosis. Moreover, this realm of hybrid perceptions suggests a political principle that might prove attractive for communities in an age of diversity and cultural hybridity.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

A Translation of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic into Basic Predicate Logic

Basic Predicate Logic, BQC, is a proper subsystem of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic, IQC. For every formula in the language {, , , , , , }, we associate two sequences of formulas 0,1,... and 0,1,... in the same language. We prove that for every sequent , there are natural numbers m, n, such that IQC , iff BQC n m. Some applications of this translation are mentioned.     

Quark quantum numbers and the problem of microphysical observation

The main question addressed in this essay is whether quarks have been observed in any sense and, if so, what might be meant by this use of the term, observation. In the first (or introductory) section of the paper, I explain that well-known researchers are divided on the answers to these important questions. In the second section, I investigate microphysical observation in general. Here I argue that Wilson's analogy between observation by means of high-energy accelerators and observation by means of microscopes is misleading, for at least three reasons. Moreover, so long as high-energy observation is accomplished by means of spark or bubble chambers, then sentences about these observations do not meet Maxwell's criterion, that observation statements are quickly decidable. I argue, however, that this criterion is not a good norm for what is observable in high-energy physics, both because it would result in our describing a great many allegedly observed particle events as unobserved or theoretical, and because it fails to distinguish the reasons why some observation statements might not be quickly decidable. Most important, Maxwell's criterion fails because, contrary to Hanson's analysis, it presupposes that seeing does not involve both seeing as and seeing that.With this background concerning what is meant by general microphysical observation, in the third section of the essay, I discuss what might be meant by a more particular type of observation, that of the quark via scattering events. I employ Feinberg's distinction concerning observation of manifest, versus existent, particles and claim that the alleged indirect observation of quarks as existent particles is really based on a retroductive inference. I explain which premise in the retroductive argument appears most open to the charge of being theoretical (in a damaging sense) and less substantiated by observation.In the fourth section of the essay, I discuss two different types of observation of quarks: detection of overt and hidden quark charm. Although this is only one illustration of alleged quark observation, I argue that the difference between the two types of observation of charm provides insight into which observations are less theoretical in a damaging sense. I claim that this case reveals, paradoxically, that an observation may be both more theory laden, but less theoretical in a damaging sense; that there is no real opposition between theory and observation (which is nothing new); that it might be wrong to think of an observation-theory continuum; and that who discovered charmed quarks is a function of what is meant by observation.Finally, in the fifth and concluding section of the paper, I suggest that theoretical terms are essentially dynamic and that observations never really verify a theory. I close by suggesting why microphysical observations are becoming more theoretical, but not necessarily in a damaging sense. Both cosmological and microphysical observation demand that what is observed be seen in a very abstract way.     

Lexical insertion,inflection, and derivation: Creative processes in word production

This study examines the distinction between creative and noncreative behavior as applied to the production of words and sentences. Under one hypothesis words such as governor and government are stored as independent units and produced by rote, but under another these nouns are not produced as fully integrated units but are generated by rules for combining stems (govern) and affixes (-ment and -or). Analyses of German and English speech errors supported the generation-by-rule thesis and indicated that word stems, prefixes, and suffixes must be separately stored in the internal lexicon and marked as to syntactic function in combining with other word components. The data also suggested a three-stage model of lexical processes in the production of speech: a lexical insertion stage whereby abstract lexical formatives are called on or introduced into sentences by means of abstract syntactic and semantic features; a rule application stage whereby feature agreement rules are applied to the formative and then inflectional, derivational, and phonological rules are applied to derive the phonetic string; finally a serial output stage whereby the phonetic string is translated into serially ordered motor commands.This research was supported by NIMH Grant RO 19964 to Donald Mackay.     

The endorsement of irrational beliefs in a general clinical population

Burgess' Attitude and Belief Scale, a measure of Ellis' irrational beliefs, was administered to a large sample of outpatients. All 13 subscales demonstrate very adequate internal consistency. A factor analysis yielded one factor accounting for 83% of the variance, which was labeled irrationality. Clients endorsed focused items more than overgeneralized items, self-referential items more than non-self-referential items, and preferential items more than irrational items. Clients also received higher scores on the irrational process of demandingness than they did on the irrational process of awfulizing, self-worth and low frustration tolerance. The results were consistent with new formulations in Rational-Emotive theory. Suggestions were made for the construction of measures of irrational beliefs.     

Truth,Sentential Non-Compositionalit,and Ontology

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.     

Quine and the Limit Assumption in Peirce's Theory of Truth

Quine rejects Peirce's theory of truth because, among other things, its notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of nearer than which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of nearer than applied to theories can be supplied from within Quine's own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quine's epistemology must be rejected or Peirce's pragmatic theory of truth is partially vindicated.     

African American Dance - Philosophy,Aesthetics, and ‘Beauty’

This essay considers the recuperation of beauty as a productive critical strategy in discussions of African American dance. I argue that black performance in general, and African American concert dance in particular, seeks to create aesthetic sites that allow black Americans to participate in discourses of recognition and appreciation to include concepts of beauty. In this, I suggest that beauty may indeed produce social change for its attendant audiences. I also propose that interrogating the notion of beauty may allow for social change among audiences that include dance theorists and philosophers. Through a case-study consideration of work by three African American choreographers, Donald Byrd (b. 1949), Ulysses Dove (1947 – 1996), and Abdel Salaam (b. 1949), I ultimately hope to suggest critical possibilities aligning dance performance with particular aesthetic theory relevant to its documentation and interpretation.     

Rational choices in wason's selection task

Sixty-eight subjects were asked to solve a series of six Wason selection problems by physically turning relevant cards over until they could say whether the rule was correct or false. In the first experiment most of the subjects misunderstood the rule they were asked to verify, different subjects misunderstanding in different ways, but commonly reading (a) top/underneath for one side/other side and (b) a dual conditional for if..., then.... However, a majority of subjects thereafter responded in complete logical consistency with the rule as they understood it to be. When the misunderstandings revealed in the first experiment were themselves presented as rules to be verified in a second experiment, performance was much more logical than is usually reported. It is concluded that the illogicality commonly associated with Wason's selection task is only apparent.     

Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition

Following Henkins discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or cardinality quantifiers, e.g., most, few, finitely many, exactly , where is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin definition first to a general definition of monotone-increasing (M) POQ and then to a general definition of generalized POQ, regardless of monotonicity. The extension is based on (i) Barwises 1979 analysis of the basic case of M POQ and (ii) my 1990 analysis of the basic case of generalized POQ. POQ is a non-compositional 1st-order structure, hence the problem of extending the definition of the basic case to a general definition is not trivial. The paper concludes with a sample of applications to natural and mathematical languages.     

On the relation between recent neurobiological data on perception (and action) and the Husserlian theory of constitution

The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for the problem of consciousness insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically correlating subject and object in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator. In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of pure constitution to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to different ontological regions such as physical thing, owned body and shared world. Neuroscience brings to light the somatological correlates of noemata. Bridging the gap between incarnation and naturalisation represents the best way of realizing the foundational program of transcendental phenomenology.     

Third Men: The Logic of the Sophisms at Arist. SE 22, 178b36–170a10

This article aims at elucidating the logic of Arist. SE 22, 178b36–179a10 and, in particular, of the sophism labelled "Third Man" discussed in it. I suggest that neither the sophistic Walking Man argument, proposed by ancient commentators, nor the Aristotelian Third Man of the , suggested by modern interpreters, can be identified with the fallacious argument Aristotle presents and solves in the passage. I propose an alternative reconstruction of the Third Man sophism and argue that an explanation of the lines regarding the identity of Coriscus and Coriscus the musician (178b39–179a3) is indispensable for its correct understanding, since they hint at another sophism in some important aspects analogous. Finally, I show that two contradictions concerning spotted by scholars in the passage are only apparent and can be dissolved once the assumption that the anti-Platonic Third Man argument is at stake here is discarded, and once the passage is read in the light of its agonistic context.     

Логистическая система, исходными связками которой являются эквивалентность и дизъюнкция

- Allatum est die 5 Martii 1970     

Is “some-other-time” sometimes better than “sometime” for proving partial correctness of programs?

The main result of this paper belongs to the field of the comparative study of program verification methods as well as to the field called nonstandard logics of programs. We compare the program verifying powers of various well-known temporal logics of programs, one of which is the Intermittent Assertions Method, denoted as Bur. Bur is based on one of the simplest modal logics called S5 or sometime-logic. We will see that the minor change in this background modal logic increases the program verifying power of Bur. The change can be described either technically as replacing the reflexive version of S5 with an irreflexive version, or intuitively as using the modality some-other-time instead of sometime. Some insights into the nature of computational induction and its variants are also obtained.This project was supported by the Hungarian National Foundation for Scientific Research, Grant No. 1810.