Practical Intentionality and Transcendental Phenomenology as a Practical Philosophy

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl's earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl's works written after the 1920's, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality.     

The Limits of Adverbialism about Intentionality

Kriegel has recently developed (but not fully endorsed) an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism can be had from within the act-object framework, provided we understand intentional objects correctly. I use Crane as a guide here, and build on his work on intentional objects. In the end, we can provide a suitable solution to the problem of thinking of non-existents within the act-object framework without adopting implausible ontological or metaphysical views. So, adverbialism is neither a possible stand-alone revisionary option nor a needed modification of the common-sense act-object framework of intentionality.     

Images,Intentionality and Inexistence1

The possibilities of depicting non‐existents, depicting non‐particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.     

Intentionality and Content in McDowell

In its most general form, the issue of intentionality takes the following shape: How can something be about something else? In basic cases, this relation is one between a subjective occurrence and a state of affairs, allowing the problem of intentionality to be articulated in this manner: What makes it the case that a subjective occurrence has the capacity to be about something external to it? The views of John McDowell on intentionality form the focus of this article. They are examined through the notion of content and via the later Wittgenstein's standpoint on content and intentionality. The main objective is to reach a conspicuous perspective of McDowell's stance on intentionality in order to uncover its presuppositions. This leads to the identification of a pivotal point of tension in McDowell's philosophical commitments, in particular the extent to which he can legitimately claim to be a quietist.     

Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'

Current diagnostic manuals in psychiatry such as DSM and ICD offer definitions of mental disorder, though it is recognized that they are unsatisfactory. It is likely that philosophy can help in this problem of definition. I argue that philosophical theories of mind have always implied definitions of mental disorder. Contemporary theories of mind commonly take intentionality to be fundamental, and I consider to what extent mental disorder can be defined in terms of radical failures of intentionality. Dennett has suggested that breakdown of intentional systems is to be explained from the physical stance, but explanations of breakdown from the design stance and even from the intentional stance are possible. Evolutionary theory emphasizes the intentionality of mind and behaviour, and is increasingly applied in models of psychopathology. It is unlikely that these models support the concept of mental disorder at work in current psychiatry.     

The role of intentionality in perceiving terrorism as a more important problem than traffic accidents

Current Psychology - We hypothesized that perceived intentionality is one of the factors explaining why terrorism is perceived to be a more important problem than traffic accidents. In Study 1, we...     

The Impact of Children's Language Ability on Parent Cognitions and Harsh Discipline Practices

This study examined associations between children's language ability and maternal cognitions about the intentionality and aversiveness of child behaviour, and mothers' reported harsh discipline responses to child misbehaviour. We tested associations with each type of cognition separately as well as in a single model to explore their unique associations. Participants included 69 mothers and their 18‐ to 37‐month‐old children. Mothers completed the Parenting Scale and were asked to rate the aversiveness and intentionality cognitions in response to eight common toddler problem behaviours. The Preschool Language Scale was administered to the children by an objective evaluator. A path analysis demonstrated that children's language ability was associated with maternal intentionality cognitions about their children's behaviour, which, in turn, was associated with mothers' harsh discipline. These findings highlight the importance of examining developmental markers of harsh parenting. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human

Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.     

An Intentional Model of Emotional Well-Being: The Development and Initial Validation of a Measure of Subjective Well-Being

The major problem with the current emotional well-being scales is that they lack intentionality (being about something), which makes them incongruent with the definition of subjective well-being. A new emotional well-being scale with new affect adjectives has been developed by addressing intentionality. It focuses on individuals’ affective evaluations of their life and has showed good psychometric quality. In the first and second studies, the factor structure of the scale, the Emotional Well-Being Scale, was determined by exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Study 3 showed that the scores on the scale were stable in time. The fourth and fifth studies indicated that this new construct did not overlap with personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism, with impressive predictive and incremental validity estimates.     

Introduction: The Role of Process Metaphysics in Our World of Science

This article applies the analytic rigor of philosophy to the vexed topic of business strategy, and uses the objective, public evidence of business strategy as an existence proof for the possibility of free will and purpose in the private realm of subjective intentionality. The first part distinguishes three types of intentionality in philosophy—purposive intentionality, referential intentionality, and the problematic intentionality of a godlike, miraculous “inner intender.” After rejecting this third type of intentionality, and noting that its rejection saves the first two types of intentionality from guilt by association, the second part draws parallels with three types of strategy in business: purposive, referential, and godlike. The first defines the goals and objectives of a company; the second picks out and targets consumers in market driven strategy; and the third, with the help of philosophical reflections, demands a rethinking of the function of leadership without reliance on a single, godlike leader. In the third part of this article, the existence proof from the public world of business is used to shed light on the possibility of intentionality in the private world of subjective intentionality. Finally, the article draws conclusions for its three audiences: for the philosophers, with credit to Nietzsche who saw it all, a greater clarity about intentionality and free will; for business people, greater clarity about the importance of purposiveness and strategic intent; and for business philosophers, a demonstration showing how—through strategy and intentionality—we can both create value and give meaning to the lives of our employees, ourselves, and our customers.     

Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers

Abstract

This paper argues that three characteristic modern positions concerning intentionality – namely, (1) that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’; (2) that intentionality concerns a specific type of objects having intentional inexistence; and (3) that intentionality somehow defies logic – are just three ‘modern myths’ that medieval philosophers, from whom the modern notion supposedly originated, would definitely reject.     

Categorizing the Body

I shall attempt to do four things in this paper:

(1) sketch the influence of two models—one essentialist, the other non-essentialist—on some contemporary ways of categorizing the body;

(2) indicate certain tensions that remain because of the dominant influence of the essentialist model;

(3) discuss what to my mind is the most sustained attempt by phenomenology to come to terms with the problem of the body by concentrating on Merleau-Ponty's theory of operative intentionality;

(4) argue that intentionality and ontological analysis must always be distortive of this issue, and indicate an alternative way of approaching the matter.     

Individual and Collective Intentionality: Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question

This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence.

     

The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability

In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things differently. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem.

     

Developmental Accounts of Intentionality: Toward Integration

A variety of developmental accounts of intentionality, arising from disparate theoretical perspectives, can now be found in the literature. This paper argues that this diversity is undermining the ability of developmental psychologists to construct a coherent developmental account of the capacity and that it would be more productive to pursue an integrated approach. To this end, the dominant theoretical positions on the development of intentionality are reviewed and evaluated: intentionality as goal-directedness, a result of parental scaffolding, an innate capacity for intersubjectivity, and behavioral object-directedness. Particular attention is given to comparing three key features of each position: the definition of intentionality adopted, the types of behaviors considered to be evidence of intentionality, and the proposed developmental sequence. The possibility of constructing an integrated approach based on these components is explored.     

What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The topic of the paper is at the intersection of recent debates on de se thought and phenomenal intentionality. An interesting problem for phenomenal...     

Processes,Acts, and Experiences: Three Stances on the Problem of Intentionality

The concept of intentionality addresses "aboutness," how one thing can be about, or refer to, some other thing. The argument I present in this article is that intentionality is an essential ecological concept that depends equally on process (the domain of physics), act (the domain of biology), and experience (the domain of psychology). The meaning of intentionality does not reside in any 1 of these realms, but rests simultaneously on all 3. A case is made for intentionality being rooted in a ubiquitous cosmological scheme that underwrites all systems no less than does the universal causality scheme.     

The real trouble with intentionality

I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.